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The purpose in writing this dissertation is simply to compare
two things which have not been previously compared—the doctrine of
creation and process theology, and in so doing, see if process theology
puts forward an adequate and acceptable interpretation of this venerable
doctrine. That such comparison can and should take place is obvious
when one realizes the tremendous emphasis process thinkers place on
their notion of creativity and the unique way in which they define all
entities, including God, as •self-created creatures.' Perhaps, it is
outside Influences that have determined that focus of process interests
would be elsewhere. Linguistic analysis and neo-orthodox theology have
joined forces in attacking metaphysics. These same two forces have
made discussion of God and of Jesus Christ of immediate importance.
Be this as it may, dialogue between process thinkers and traditional
ones, on the subject of creation, is over-due.
Some of the terms in the title need definition. "Process
theology" is the baptized offspring of process philosophy and possibly
its only surviving heir. The progenitor of process philosophy is
Alfred North Whitehead who first established himself in Europe as a
mathematician and then switched subjects and continents, emigrating
to the United States where he became one of the foremost philosophers
of the first half of this century. The most important work in the
second half of his career was an expansion of his 1927-28 Glfford
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Lectures, delivered at the University of Edinburgh and published in
1929 under the title, Process and Reality. Even though Whitehead's
ideas had been expressed earlier elsewhere, this was by far his most
complete articulation of process philosophy.
If Whitehead is the progenitor of process thought, why does
this dissertation pay particular attention to one of Whitehead's
students, Charles Hartshorne? Whitehead's concerns were not primarily
theological, but cosmological. Hartshome's concerns are theological
as indicated by an early and sustained interest in Anselra's ontological
argument for the existence of God, which formed the basis of his theism.
Hartshorne, much more than Whitehead, has defined and discussed God
from a process point of view. Through his work, Whitehead's teachings
have been expanded and revised both with original thought and insights
gained from other persons. The understanding of God is one of the
areas where Hartshome takes many exceptions with the teaching of his
mentor.
Hartshorne also deserves special consideration because he, for
awhile, almost singlehandedly kept process thought alive. Process
philosophy is now fifty years old but was largely ignored until the last
fifteen years when opponents of the death of God theology revived
an interest in it as an alternative system. Although he was not the
only process thinker around in those thirty-five years of neglect,
Hartshorne certainly was the most ardent and articulate spokesman
for the cause.
"Traditional theology" is an umbrella term covering almost
everything in Western theology which is not process thought. This
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includes virtually the entirety of the tradition in which the Roman
Catholic and Reformed churches stand. Needless to say, the people
clustered by this term are a diverse group and might not be happy
at being lumped together. From the process perspective, traditional
theology has two basic characteristics: (1) an implicit or an explicit
preference for being rather than becoming as the basic metaphysical
description of reality (2) a •monopolar prejudice1 with regard to God
which permits him to be conceptualized only in terms of abstract,
non-relative categories. The wide diversity in traditional theology
is sampled here, and the term should suggest nothing other than
theology which is not process theology.
Traditional theology's many understandings of the doctrine
of creation are scanned in Chapter 1. What is instantly obvious, is
the wide and rich diversity of interpretations that have been put
forward. Two concepts, however, consistently support the various
understandings—creation ex nihilo and creatio per verbum. Three
affirmations have also been made about creation. The first concerns
the creation's total dependency on God as its creator. The second
states that even though God and the creation are not one, the creation
is fundamentally good. Finally, creation must be seen as an act of
God's love.
Chapter 2 lays out the process concept of creation beginning
with the basic understanding of creative-synthesis. Notable here is
Hartshome's and John Cobb's departure from Whitehead in placing supreme
importance on the role God performs in the creative process, that is
providing each entity with its initial aim. Through further analysis,
God is seen as being "creativity itself" and his creativity is the
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creativity which creates the creativity of others. God's creativity
is then identified with the traditional concept of the Logos.
In the third chapter traditional doctrines and the process
concept are juxtaposed. Process thought embraces creatlo pro verbum
but rejects creatlo ex nihilo replacing it with the notion of creation
out of chaos. In spite of this, process thought is able to make the
same affirmations as traditional thought; however, the content of these
affirmations is often distinctly different.
The dissertation concludes with a chapter on analogy. Various
Thomist classifications are put forward and the deep disagreement among
Thomists as to the correct understanding of them, is discussed.
Reformed concepts of analogy are also cited, particularly Berth's
ideas. Hartshorne's concept and use of analogy is set out and des¬
cribed as "the analogy of creativity." This analogy is then compared
with Thomas* analoqia entis and Barth's analoqla fidei.
The bibliography at the end of the dissertation contains
those sources actually used in the paper.
This author gratefully acknowledges that a large number of
people have aided and abetted this project, in direct and indirect
ways. Special thanks go to my advisors, Dr. John Mclntyre and Mr.
D.W.D. Shaw, for their patient guidance and assistance. Also, Charlene
Ireland's arduous and excellent efforts in typing the final copy merit
special mention as does nty wife, Alegria's proofreading. I also
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THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION
IN TRADITIONAL THOUGHT
Richard Overman, in his study of evolution and the Christian
doctrine of creation, makes the important observation that any religious
doctrine is like an animal species, for it is the product of evolution.^
Doctrines do not enter the world fully grown, and once they have arrived,
they do not remain unchanged. They are profoundly influenced by history
and survive as they continually adapt themselves to their changing
environment. Even though doctrines are attempts to state objective
truth, this truth has always arisen from human experience and has been
profoundly influenced by it.
This general observation is confirmed by the doctrine of
creation. It has undergone revision with every new statement of it.
Any discussion of traditional interpretations of the doctrine must begin
with the acknowledgment that there are as many traditions as interpre¬
tations. While Christians have, from an early date, explicitly confessed
their faith in God the Creator, they have not agreed on what that
confession meant. There has been unity of confession and diversity of
interpretation. Contemporary expressions of the doctrine would be quite
1Richard Overman, Evolution and the Christian Doctrine of
Creation (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1968), p. 230.
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unintelligible to the church Fathers, as indeed are their expressions to
many theologians today. In this first chapter we shall look at some of
the ideas traditional thinkers, both of the past and present, have had
concerning the Christian doctrine of creation, noting both the agree¬
ment and disagreement in their views.
CREATIO EX NIHILO AND
CREATIO PER VERBUM
That the doctrine of creation has constantly undergone doctrinal
development does not suggest futility in locating and discussing some
concepts which have served as the foundations on which the various
contractors have built. Beneath the various expressions of the doctrine
two notions are almost always found: Creatlo ex nlhilo; and creatlo per
verbum. These appear to be the enduring ideas which theologians have
continually considered essential to express their own understandings.
We could do as some theologians do and regard these two notions
as being essentially the same thing^ or look upon creatlo per verbum as
the method by which creatlo ex nlhilo is accomplished.3 What is implied
in such an approach is viewing the two ideas as a negative and a positive
expression of the one central affirmation that creation has no other
3e.g. Erail Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and
Redemption, Dogmatics Vol. II (London: Lutterworth Press, 1952),
pp. 10ff.
3e„g. Alan Richardson, The Gospel According to Saint John.
Torch Bible Commentaries (London: SCM Press, 1959), p. 38. Luther
lecturing on Genesis 1-5, says that the Word was God's instrument for
sharing his work.
source than the di/ine will of God. This approach has considerable merit
and could, in fined synthesis, be proved correct. But while it is true
that the two concepts are complimentary and correlative, they should
first be considered separately, since they are of different origin and
have not always been so closely connected.
Creatio ex Nihilo
No other expression of the doctrine of creation has assumed as
much importance as creatio ex nihilo. It has been central to the
thought of orthodox theologians from Irenaeus in the second century to
Barth in the twentieth. Another contemporary who's orthodoxy is
problematical, Paul Tillich., has said that the first task of theology
is the interpretation of these words, for they are, "the marks of
distinction between paganism even in its most refined form and Chris-
It
tianity even in its most primitive form."
While some might argue about Tillich's priorities, he is
certainly correct in citing the fact that the notion of creation out
of notiling has been the church's most fundamental way of separating its
teaching about God from that of other religions. Langdon Gilkey has
suggested, with considerable insight, that it has usually taken a
5
heretic to create a theologian. This is true in the case of creatio
ex nihilo. Though it has a pre-Christian history, its classical
k
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theolo
University of Chicago Press, 1951), P« 2
Vol. I (Chicago; The
5
Langdon Gilkey, Maker of Heaven and Earth, Anchor Books
edition (Garden City; Dougleday and Company, 1965), P-
formulation came as refutation to the various views of creation, which
both surrounded and infiltrated the church as it spread its gospel into
a Hellenized world. Gustaf Wingren points out that the early church's
belief in God the Creator was part of their Old Testament heritage and,
therefore, initially did not need re-affirmation. Hence, there is scant
reference to it in most of the New Testament. It was during the second
century, when groups like the Gnostics tried to disassociate the created
world from God, that understanding of God as the creator of heaven and
earth became essential to a proclamation of the Christian gospel.^ The
Hellenistic notion, which the church at that time needed to refute, was
that of dualism.
Ancient dualisms. Dualistic concepts of creation pervaded all
ancient cosmologies. They may well have been the original creation
stories. Though they appeared in a variety of forms, common to all of
them was the existence of two separate realms of reality, such as light
and dai'kness. Many of these stories saw creation taking place as some
warrior-god subdued, by his superior prowess, the personified forces of
7
evil. The Chaos-Dragon Myth, which may have been the literary ancestor
of the Genesis creation stories, is one example of such a story. Some
commentators think that the accounts of creation in Genesis were
^Gustaf Wingren, Creation and law (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd,
1961), p. 4f. """
7
An excellent and extensive discussion of these stories is found
in Bernhard W. Anderson, Creation Versus Chaos (New York: Association
Press, 1967).
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rendered the way they are specifically to refute dualistic cosmologies.
John Davis, for example, says that the Priestly writer took the Babylonian
creation stories which he encountered and used them as the framework for
his own account (Genesis 1i1~2!ite). The radical difference being that
in place of the picture of the God Marduk defeating Chaos and dividing
her into the various firmaments, there is but the one creator God in the
g
Priestly narrative.
Platonic dualism. As far as Christian thought is concerned, the
most influential dualism is extra-biblical coming from the cosmology of
Plato's Timaeus. The Tlmaeus was the most influential of all Plato's
writing in Hellenistic times. Not only was it the dominant world view
of the first centuries A.D., but, since it was preserved through the
Dark Ages, it supplied the early Middle Ages with their basic picture of
Q
the world and nature.
Two Platonic assumptions lie behind Timaeus' account of creation!
(l) the distinction between the two basic kinds of reality, Being and
10
Becoming; and (2) the insistence that everything must have a cause.
As concerns the distinction between Being and Becoming, Becoming
is the reality which the senses can perceive. It is an inferior mode of
g
John D. Davis, Beginning How, (London! Collins, 1971)» P- 18.
^A detailed discussion of this point is found in A. E. Taylor,
Plato, the Han and His Work (London! Methuen and Company, 1926), p. ^36.
10
For this distinction and the following discussion, I am
indebted to Richard A. Norris, Jr., God and World in Early Christian
Theology (New York! The Seabury Press, 1963)? PP« 16-21.
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existence characterized by being physical, occupying both time and space.
It is also characterized by change. Things are always becoming something
different from what they are now and never arrive at their perfected
Being. Therefore, nothing stable or reliable can be found in the realm
of Becoming. One cannot look there for a genuine knowledge of the
reality of things.
The things of the world of Becoming are shadows of the world of
Being. Being is the intelligible world, the realm of Ideas or Forms.
Plato was fascinated with the mathematics of his day. Here, basic
principles which were eternal and unchanging are illustrated in the
visible world. It is the mind and the mind alone which, through intu¬
ition, can understand them completely. What is true of mathematics,
Plato believes, is true of the rest of reality as well. The "really
real" things are the Ideas or Forms which lie beyond the confines of
existence. Man must use his reason to penetrate behind the reality
which he sees (Becoming) to the greater reality beyond (Being).
Along with this distinction between Being and Becoming, Plato
also postulated his doctrine of the Soul. The Soul to Plato is a cosmic
force which is the source of all orderly movement in the cosmos. It is
both "ingenerate and immortal," having never been created and being
immune from death. The Soul occupies an intermediate place between
Being and Becoming. It operates in the visible world as the life force
supplying tilings with their essential movement. But it is also a
partial member of the intelligible world, because it seeks to know
eternal Truth and to rationalize its movements in accordance with the
7
eternal harmonies of the realm of Ideas. This is how order comes to
the world of becoming.
The creation story, as Plato's Timaeus tells it, is that of God,
being generous and not wanting to monopolize the goodness which he alone
possesses, deciding to share his goodness by creating something in his
image ivhich would also be good. So Timaeus sayst
... he took in hand all that was visible—he found it not
at rest, but in discordant and disorderly motion, and brought
it from disorder to order, since he judged this way better than
that. Now he that is best might not and may not effect anything
but that which is most beautiful. ... he so made the universe
to the end that the work of his fashioning might be in its kind
most beauteous and best.
The image here is obviously that of the Athenian artist. The
creation is a work of art, perhaps vastly superior, but certainly
comparable to Greek architecture. Like a craftsman, the demiurge has
not only materials out of which to work but plans. His creation cannot,
however, be an exact replica of the perfection of the world of Being,
because he must work with alien matter, which is not completely yielding
to him. Therefore, imperfection exists in what he does.
The Demiurge creates the cosmos as a single organism with a soul
and understanding, but his creating stops at the point of creating living
creatures. This he does not do himself. So that there may be mortality
as well as immortality, he delegates the job of creating people and
beasts to the lesser gods which he has created. They are to copy him
11
Plato, Timaeus, 30. a and b. All quotations are from A. E.
Taylor's translation, Plato: Timaeus and Critias (London: Methuen and
Co., 1929).
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in their creating, using the materials he provides. He gives them this
charge:
I will sow the seed and make the beginning; thereafter do
ye fashion living creatures, weaving mortality upon immortality.
Bring them to birth: give then their sustenance and growth, and
when they fail, receive them again to yourselves.^
So the Demiurge mixes more of the materials out of which he has created
the universe, and from these he creates human souls which he plants
throughout the universe, entrusting each soul to its 'visible god' (a
star). He leaves these gods with the task of creating, governing, and
preserving mortal existence.
How seriously a reader is to take this story is controversial.
The story is not told by Socrates himself, but by Timaeus, whose histor¬
ical identity no one has been able to establish with any certainty. One
is hard pressed to think that Plato wanted his readers to take it
literally. It is most probably a myth. Nonetheless, it has become the
classic account of 'creation-out-of-matter,* which is surely Plato's
view of cosmology.
A Platonic view of creation was accepted by some within the
early church, Justin for one takes the myth of the Timaeus literally
and sees it as deriving from the creation story in Genesis. He tells
the Emperor Antoninus that Christians "have been taught that God at the
beginning, because he is good, did fashion all things out of unformed
matter."^3 it may be well to recall that Justin was a pagan philosopher
^Plato, Timaeus, op. cit. 41d.
■^Justin Martyr, Apology I. 10.2, Cited by Norris, op. cit.,
p. 62.
before he became a Christian, Those who had been raised in the faith
did not embrace Plato as warmly as he,14
Though others rejected this approach of reading Genesis through
Plato's glasses,15 the most emphatic renunciation of creation-out-of-
rnatter was made by Irenaeus, the "father of orthodoxy," His main work
is entitled Against Heresies and is a refutation of what he considered
to be a sectarian movement within the church—Gnosticism,
Gnostic Dualism, The origins of Gnosticism are quite uncertain,
Irenaeus gives a history, but it is not now accepted as being accurate.
He probably was right in insisting that the roots of Gnosticism were
planted outside the Christian faith and that it was not just a version
of Christian thought but a complete perversion of it. No precise
definition of Gnosticism can be given, for it was not a unified movement,
Raymond Brown does, however, point out that certain common patterns can
be recognized. They include, ontological dualism; intermediary beings
between God and man; the agency of these beings in the production of evil;
a strictly material world; the soul as a divine spark imprisioned in the
world; redemption coming through special, revealed knowledge; a limited
•^Cnly Clement of Alexandria seems to have shared this Platonic
perspective, Strom, v, 14, He, however, also states that creation was
the product of God's will and that he simply willed the world into
existence.
■^For example Theophilus of Antioch argued that if matter were
co-eternal with God, it would be on a par with him. Theophilus To
Autolvcus II, 4, cited by Richard H. Overman, Evolution and the Christian
Doctrine of Creation (Philadelphia; The Westminster Press, 1968), p, 248,
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number of people capable of receiving this knowledge; and a divine
16
redeemer who frees man from the evil, material world.
Gnostic thought seems to have accompanied the Christian church
just about everywhere it went. Irenaeus distinguishes at least a dosen
schools of gnostic thought, but his main concern is with the teaching
of a Valentinian Gnostic, Ptomley, whose thought flourished around
Irenaeus bishopric of Lyons„
It is not appropriate here to discuss Irenaeus' arguments against
Ptolemy. Suffice it here to say that Irenaeus recognized in Ptolemy's
thought a thoroughgoing dualism and was abhorred by it. There were in
Ptolemy's teaching two worlds—the immortal realm inhabited by divine
beings at whose apex stood the unknowable "Ultimate." Outside of this
realm was the material world which had been generated out of a fallen
spiritual being. Also generated from the material world was the stuff
out of which the souls of men and of angels had been made. One of these
angelic souls was the Demiurge who dominated and controlled the world.
17
Ptolemy believed this Demiurge was the God of the Old Testament.
Iranaeus' statement of creatio ex nihllo. Since we are the
heirs of the orthodoxy Irenaeus fathered, it is fairly obvious to us
that such an idea would be repugnant to him. To suggest that there was
a God beyond the God of the Old Testament was completely contrary to the
t
16
Raymond E. Brown, The Gospel According to St. John, I-XII,
The Anchor Bible, Vol. 29 (Garden City: Doubleday, , p. UII.
See Norris, op. cit., pp. 76-78.
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witness of scripture and the preaching of the Apostles. Nowhere was
such a god imagined* Since Irenaeus believed that the only authority
the church had was scripture and tradition, ideas which could not be
found there simply had to be rejected. Ironae is, therefore, insists
that the Christian must believe in Sod the Creator "who made the heavens
and the earth and all tilings therein." Furthermore,
There is nothing either above Him or after him; nor that
influenced by anyone but of His own free will, He created all
things, since He is the only God, the only Lord, the only
Creator, the only Father, alone containing allr, things and
Himself commanding all things into existence.
Not only has God liiraself created all things, but he lias needed nothing
to do it. "For this is a peculiarity of the pre-eminence of God, not
to stand in need of other instruments for the creation of those things
19
which are summoned into existence.
With Iren&ous the idea of creation out of nothing became firmly
established in orthodox Christian thought. We shall be looking in
greater detail at this concept as we go along, but it seems wise now to
pause briefly to note a few of the problems that this idea raises.
Problems with the concept of creatlo ax niliilo. One problem
with the concept of creation out of nothing is that, in spite of Irenaeus*
insistence on the authority of scripture for belief, creation out of
nothing is not explicitly mentioned in the Bible. The closest scripture
■i
Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 8k. II. 1.1. All quotations from
The Writings of Irenaeus,' Vol. I, in the Ante-Nicene Christian library,
Vol. V (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, l8S8s,
l9Ibid., II, 2.3.
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comes to it are these words of the mother of the Maccabees: "I implore
you my child, observe heaven and earth and all that is in them, and
acknowledge that God made them out of what did not exist and that
-",Q
mankind came into being in the same way. James Strahan feels that
the Vulgate translated this far too definitely when it said "creation out
21
of nothing." The same is true of the two other passages sometimes
used to support this idea, Romans 4:17 and Hebrews 11:3* Both of these
suggest creation out of that which did not exist rather than creation
ex nihilo.
Bernhard Anderson believes that creation out of nothing is
definitely not the teaching of Genesis 1. Creation out of chaos is
what is being described. He says:
As suggested in the footnote of the P.SV, it is grammatically
possible to treat Genesis 1:1 as a temporal clause which
introduces a main sentence which serves as a preface to the
entire creation account. On this view, the story actually
begins in verse 2 with a portrayal of uncreated chaoses the
presupposition and background of God's creative work.
Other authorities agree with Anderson that the Biblical teaching is
more adequately conceptualized by creation out of chaos than creation
out of nothing. Davis comments:
20
II Maccabees 7:28, trans. The Jerusalem Bible.
21James Strahan, "Creation," in James Hastings, ed., Encyclo¬
paedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 3 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1911),
p. 230.
22Bernhard Anderson, "Creation," in George Buttrick ed., The
Interpreters Dictionary of the Bible, Vol. A-D (New York and Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1962), p. 728.
13
The most clear and certain teaching concerning creation is
that is is the bringing of order out of chaos. God sorts out
the various factors that compose chaos; he names than and dis¬
tinguishes them .... The final goal of this is not a universe
stuffed tight with lots of things made out of nothing, but a
complete harmony of being brought into reconciliation with each
other.23
There is far from unanimous agreement with Davis and Anderson
on this point. D. M. MacKinnon, for example, insists that we should
24
interpret the language of Genesis as asserting creatio ex nihilo.
This notion of creation out of chaos never received attention,
much less acceptance, in the teaching of the church Fathers. Perhaps
this is because the affirmation of anything, even chaos, which might be
co-eternal with God, could have been seen as placing a limitation on his
sovereignty. Tertullian, for example, realized that creatio ex nihilo
was not a Biblical notion, but he argued for its validity from silence.
Had God, he reasoned, made things out of matter, then scripture would
have been obligated to say so, but there is no necessity that it mention
his creating out of nothing for this idea is completely intelligible.
The idea of an omnipotent God creating out of matter, unformed or not,
would require an explanation of where this matter came from. If anything
25
is co-eternal with God, then God is neither totally free nor sovereign.
23
Dav^-S» QP» cit., pp. 36-37.
24
Antony Flew and D. M. MacKinnon, "Creation" in New Essays in
Philosophical Theology, eds., Antony Flew and Alisdair Maclntyre,
(New York: The MacMillian Company, 1955), p. 170. This is also
Dr. Gilkey's view. Gilkey, op. cit., p. 47.
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Tertullian, Against Hermogenes, 21.3 in The Writings of
Tertullian, The Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 15 (Edinburgh:
T. and T. Clark, 1920).
What has been established here is that the idea of creatio ex
nihilo is not an idea clearly taught by scripture, but rather one that
was formulated to defend the Christian concept of God's sovereign
creative action from non-Christian ones. According to Ronald Hepburn:
It was clearly developed in and through a sustained polemic
with its rivals, both earlier and contemporary. Against the
Platonic account of a Demiurge shaping a pre-existent matter
after the pattern of the Forms, Christianity affirmed that God
created out of nothing whatever.
Although its negations were quite clear, its affirmations as to
what precisely was involved in God's creative act are not. John
Macquarrie points out that the distinction between creation out of
nothing and creation out of a pre-existent formless matter is not at all
clear. For if the matter was, as Plato contended, without any deter-
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minate characteristics, it would be indistinguishable from nothing.
This brings us to a second important problem with the idea of
creatio ex nihilo: Just how intelligible is it? Can any precise meaning
be attached to these words? All creation that we know anything about is
creation out of something. Even the creation of the world as we know it
today is creation out of the world as it existed yesterday. How can one
talk about God's creating out of nothing and make sense when this is
contrary to any notion of creation he can attain elsewhere.
Donald W. Hepburn, "Religious Doctrine of Creation" in Paul
Edwards, ed. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 2 (New York: The
Macmillian Company and The Free Press, 1967)j p« 253*
27
John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (London:
SCM Press, 1966), p. 198.
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A "solutioiP to this problem was found in the classical doctrine
of analogy which is discussed in the last chapter of this thesis. Suffice
it to say here that because the doctrine is not precise, it has been
explained and interpreted in a wide variety of ways. The phrase means
quite different things to different thinkers. As we shall note presently,
modern defenses of the doctrine are decidedly different from traditional
ones.
Creatio per Verburo
The second fundamental concept of the doctrine of creation is
creatio per verbum. Unlike creatio ex nlhllo, it is firmly rooted in
scripture. It appears at the beginning of Genesis (1»3) and at the
beginning of St. John's witness to the gospel (1:1). Abundant additional
OQ
use is made of it in both Testaments. There is, however, a subtle but
significant difference in its formulation between the two cannons.
Creation by word. In the Old Testaments the idea is basically
that of "creation by word." For the ancient Hebrews, speaking was the
way in which one made his will known. God creates simply by speaking.
"God said, 'Let there be light,' and there was light." (Genesis 1:3)
As Alan Richardson points out, there is no hyposticizing of 'word.*
God's act of speaking is his act of creation. "He spoke and it was done.
He commanded and it stood fast." (Psalm 33:9)
^8e.g. Isaiah 45:23, and 53:10-11} Psalm 147:15-18, and 107:20}
Hebrews 4:12.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer states this quite clearly:
•Word' means 'spoken word'—not 'symbol,' 'meaning,' or 'idea,'
but the concrete thing itself. That God in speaking creates
means that the idea, the name and the work are one in the created
reality in God. The essential point is, therefore, not that the
Word has 'effects,' but that God's Word is itself vrork ...
with God the imperative-is the indicative. The latter does not
follow from the former.
J. A. Hutchenson draws the distinction that with men deeds are
both intended and done. They cannot be understood outside the categories
30
of intention and decision. With God there is no such distinction.
Behind the idea of creation by word is the Hebrew idea of
language as an activity. Words are dynamic instruments. This is as
true of the speech of man as it is of God. The difference is that God's
word is inherently efficacious. Man's word often fails. D. D. Evans
points out that "a central theme in biblical theology is the conception
31
of the divine words as an act, v/hich brinp-s about results." The words
of men are often seen as having almost a magical power, even more so
the words of God. When the prophets declaim, "Thus saith the Lord,"
they have no doubt that their prophecy will be fulfilled. It is not an
idle threat or a vain promise, but a statement of fact. God's word is
an expression of his will and contains within itself the power of
accomplishing its intention. Such is the Old Testament concept of
creatio per verbura—creation by the spoken word of God.
29
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall (London: SCM Press,
1959), P. 20.
■y r |
J. A. Hutchenson, Faith, Season and Existence (Oxford Uni¬
versity Press, 1956)9 P* 102.
51D. D. Evans, The Logic of Self Involvement (London: SCM
Press, 1963)» P* 163.
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Creation by the word* Probably it was during the intertestamental
period that "creation by word" became "creation by the Word." Alan
Richardson says that in the literature of this time two creation motifs
are found. God's creation is the result of his word (logos) and of his
3?
wisdom (sophia). Wisdom seems to be the more common expression and
may have become personified before the Word. In Proverbs (8:22-31)
•Wisdom' is God's agent or architect of creation. This may be more
poetic than literal, but later on in the Wisdom Literature wisdom is
specifically designated as the 'artificer of all things.' Wisdom had
taken on its own identity, even though not an identity independent of
God. One could now speak of Wisdom without having to specify that it
vaB in fact the Wisdom of God.
This idea of Wisdom being God's creative agent developed within
rabinic Judaism until in the First Century A.D. it was basically
compatible with a non-biblical, idea of creation—the Stoic doctrine of
the Logos.
The Stoic doctrine of the Logos was a description of the
universal reason that vras immanent in and governing ever the world. The
Jewish philosopher, Philo of Alexandria, was greatly impressed by this
concept, and he used it to reconcile—ho thought—the teachings of Moses
and Plato. The latter, he claimed, borrowed them from the former.
Philo speculated that the Logos is an active, rational, teleological,
32
Alan Richardson, An Introduction to the Theology of the New
Testament (London: SCM Press, 1958), pp. 155f»
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impersonal principle which is directly responsible for the shaping of
passive matter. For him, the Logos is an intermediary between God and
the world. Through the Logos, God operates in his creation. In Philo
it is quite clear that the Word has a. .status independent of God. The
Word is God's agent. God does not create by speaking, but through the
33
agency of his word.
The influence of Philo's teaching on Hellenistic Judaism appears
to have been enormous. It dominated the philosophical world view of the
era when the Hew Testament was taking form.
The Logos in Christian Thought. In the New Testament, the most
explicit statement of creation by the Word is found in the Prologue to
John's gospel:
In the beginning was the Word:
the Word was with God
And the Word 'was God.
He was with God in the beginning
Through him all things came to be,
not one thing had its being but through him.
Scholars have searched diligently for the correct background
against which these words are to be interpreted. No one perspective
seems to provide an adequate vantage point. Neither does a synthesis of
them all explain them sufficiently. The Prologue must be seen, in final
analysis, as John's own unique insight. None the less, it is still
33Ibid.
3^
John 1:1-3. The Jerusalem Bible.
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worthwhile to look at the various things which could, and probably did,
influence him.
In writing the Prologue, John is obviously well aware of what
Hellenized Judaism taught concerning the Logos.. Scholars debate whether
or not he was personally familiar with Philo's teaching. William Temple
says that John is simply using a term (i.e. Logos) that was in general
use at the time he wrote, and is thereby seeking a common ground with
35
his readers. Brown sees both Philo and John being dependent on the
Old Testament with their tnoughts developing along parallel but indepen¬
dent lines. Had Philo never existed, John would probably not have
36
thought differently than he did. H. A. Wolfson does contend, however,
that John purposely modeled his Prologue after the first verses in
37
Genesis as interpreted by Philo. If this is so, it must also be noted
that John substantially modified Philo'a teaching in so doing, Basically,
John accepts the hyposticising of the Word, but he insists that the Word
is to be identified with God. "The Word was God." It is not to be
regarded as an intermediary but as God himself. The Word is the agency
of creation, but the Word is God's own creative power. It is one with
him. Irenaeus was later to stress the fact that John's teaching was
^William Temple, Readings in St. John's Gospel (London: The
Macmillian Co., 1959)» P-
"^Brown, op. cit., p. LVIII.
■^Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers,
Vol. I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 178°
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that since the beginning, it is through the Word that God himself acts
38
and reveals himself.
Wolfson says that John's description of the logos is based not
only on Philo's understanding of the pre-existent Logos, but also on the
OQ
Wisdom Literature's understanding of the pre-existent Christ."3 This last
point is the revolutionary aspect of John's teaching. John sees in the
various Logos-Sophia ideas surrounding him a seed of truth as to the
identity of who Jesus Christ actually is, and he places his entire
gospel within this framework. Jesus is the eternal Wisdom or Logos of
God by whom the world was made. The amazing thing about this, is that
this eternal Word has taken flesh in Jesus Christ and has "thus revealed
the transcendent God in the only way in which men could have seen him,
namely in human form. This is what would have scandalized the Greeks.
They admired the Logos and sought through it to leave the bondage of
their flesh and gain union with God. But as Brown says, "The suggestion
that the ultimate encounter with the Logos would be when the Logos
41
became flesh, would have been unthinkable."
John Knox says that the Prologue reflects a state of development
in the thought of the early church. Jesus is no longer to be regarded
^Irenaeus, op. clt.. 111.21.1.
39Wolfson, op. cit., p. 178.
^Richardson, The Gospel According to St. John, op. cit., p. 37.
41Brown, op, cit., p. 31.
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as simply just a man who, by virtue of what he did, was adopted by God
as his Son or Messiah. The reality of Jesus is that he is the incar-
nation of the Logos itself.
To say that Jesus is the incarnation of the Word is to ascribe
creation to him. He is the divine power which made the world. Evans
says, "As the Word, he had been God's creative instrument or agent, so
that when he was born as a human child, he entered a world which was his
If3
own property because it was his own creation." Wolfson summarizes it
this ways
When John in his Gospel adopted the PhiIonic term Logos as
a description of the pre-existent Christ, he explicitly retained
the Philonic description of the Logos and the Pauline description
of the pre-existent Christ as an instrument of creation. His
pre-existent Christ, now^surnamed Logos, is he through whom all
things came into being.
Though John is the only New Testament writer to use the Logos
concept, there are numerous other examples of creation being effected
through the Son. For example, this statement from Colossians!
He is the image of the unseen God
and the first-born of all creation,
for in him were created
all things in heaven and on earth ... kj-
all things were created through him and for him.
^2John Knox, The Humanity and Divinity of Christ (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 19&?)•
^Evans, op. cit., p. 166.
ifi+
Wolfson, op. cit., p. 257.
^Colossians 1:15-16, The Jerusalem Bible; see also I Corinthians
8:6, Hebrews 1:2, and Revelation 3*
The conclusion that we must make, then, is the one made by the
Fathers, that creation by the Word meant creation by Christ. This
needs to be qualified only by mentioning that this is not the same as
saying that the man Jesus of Nazareth was the creator of the world. It
is the pre-existent Christ incarnate in Jesus, who is the creative Word.
Arian teaching would have accepted that the Logos created all
tilings, it would have insisted that the Logos was itself a creature.
The Logos did have prestigue of having been made out of nothing, having
been brought into existence by God alone while all other creatures are
made out of matter. The Logos was, therefore, the mediator between God
and the world. Thxs view was flatly rejected by the church.
We are here on the verge of entering a discussion of many
problems which are outside the concern of this paper—the complexities
of the Trinity and the nature of the Incarnation. How the Word became
flesh John does not speculate, nor does Paul specify how the pre-existent
Christ is also Jesus of Nazareth. These are mysteries that they do not
probe and that we must leave alone. Brown says:
The description of the Word with God in heaven before creation
is remarkably brief; there is not the slightest indication of
interest in metaphysical speculation about relationships within
God or what later theology would call Trinitarian, possession. ...
The Prologue does not speculate how the Word was.
One result of equating creatio per verbum and creation by Christ
must be noted here, however. The Word which creates is also the Word
k6
Jaroslav Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition
(Chicago! University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 19^.
if7
Brown, op. cit., p. 23-
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that redeems. All things are created by the Word and redeemed by that
same word incarnate in Jesus. This is the way Irenaeus sees John's
doctrine of the Logos{
The disciple of the Lord therefore desiring ... to establish
the rule of truth in the church that there is one Almighty God
who made all tilings by His Word, visible and invisible and in
whom God made the creation, He also bestowed salvation on the
men included in the creation; thus commenced His teaching in ^he
gospel, 'In the beginning was the Word and the Word was God.'
The Arian controversy forced the church at the Council of
Nicea (325 A.D.) to state unequivocably the unity of the Son and the
Logos. "We believe in one Lord Jesus Christ ... through whom (namely
the Son) all things came into being, things in heaven and things on
earth, who for the sake of us men and the purpose of our salvation
ifQ
came down and became incarnate. ..." Pelikan says that this
confession is a cosmological confession and a soteriological confession
simultaneously. Underlying it is the conviction that the one who creates
50
the universe is the one who saves it.
The Logos doctrine became for the early church a way of demon¬
strating the unity of God the Father and God the Son and of denying any
"two god" ideas such as those held by Karcion. Through it they could
show that there was not a "bad god" of the Old Testament and a "good
God" of the New Testament or a creator god and a separate- redeemer god.
1^8
Irenaeus, III, 2. See also IV, 36, where he speaks of the
Word washing away the filth of the daughters of Zion.
Pelikan, op. cit., p. 201.
^°Ibid., p. 203.
Through his Logos, God is both Creator and Redeemer. Even though the
Logos has become personalized, it is still as intimately part of God
as though it were still nothing more than his spoken word.
By way of concluding this discussion of creatio per verbum, we
should emphasise that the Fathers saw no fundamental disjunction
between creation by word and creation by the Word. The latter was
simply a development of the former. For example, Tertullian speaks of
the Word having first existed with God as his reason, then taking on its
own form when it was uttered in the act of creation and finally being
51
made incarnate in Jesus Christ. In the Fathers creation by word and
creation by the Word are the same phenomenon differently described-,
Since the Logos concept provides a way of understanding God as
diversity within unity, we can readily see why the two concepts,
creatio ex nihilo and creatio per verbum are essentially compatible and
mutually supportive. Irenaeus can speak quite easily of God needing
nothing in his act of creation for "his own Word is both suitable and
52
sufficient for the formation of all things." From here on out, when
speaking of the doctrine of creation, we will have both these ideas in
mind unless we indicate otherwise.
51
Tertullian, Against Praxes, Ch. XI and XII. All quotations
from The Writings of Tertullian, Vol. II, in the Ante-Wicene Christian
Library, Vol. XV (Edinburgh! T. & T. Clark, 1870).
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Irenaeus, op. cit., II, 5«
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AFFIRMATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE
OF CREATION
In discussing the origins and the basic formulations of the two
ideas of the doctrine of creation, we noticed that both concepts denied
or radically modified other ideas of creation which flourished alongside
them. Creatio ex nihilo was explicitly negative in character; creatio
per verbum implicitly so. This does not mean that they do not say
something positive. What we must do now is see what these affirmations
are. Many lists could be formulated and used, but the one following
seems both straightforward and adequate:
1. God is the source of all existence, and the creation is
totally dependent on Him.
2. Creation is distinct from God, and even though corrupted by
sin, is basically good.
3- Creation is a free act of God's gracious love.
We shall look at these in turn.
God is the Source of All Existence, and Creation is Totally Dependent
on Him.
The first clause of this heading is carefully worded. From the
preceding discussion we could easily have said, "God is the creator of
everything, ..." This would be misleading. For most people, to speak
of God creating implies his involvement with a process with which we are
familiar—making something out of something else with the assistance of
tools. The image of the artist or the craftsman comes to mind. But
images like these are precisely the ones the doctrine of creation would
set aside. The doctrine of creation is not intended as a discussion of
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how the world was made. The men who formulated its classical expressions
were not postulating cosmogonies, nor were they trying to describe God's
creative process. "God creates out of nothing by His Word," is not a
statement similar to, "Man creates out of matter with his tools." The
latter expresses a dependency on some assistance; the former denies it.
Therefore, we have two different ideas of creation in the two statements.
With man there must be materials out of which he creates and either
ideas to inspire him or plans to direct hia. God needs none of these.
His creative act does not rely on anything outside Himself. No image
of human creativity can capture this.
If all images of human creativity must be set aside in speaking
of God's creativity, is it possible at all to speak of divine creativity?
Is it nonsence to speak of God creating out of nothing by His Word?
Many Theologians find this too harsh, or they see speaking of creation
in this way as an attempt to push us toward an understanding that is
beyond our normal comprehension. Irenaeus says that God creates in "a
53
fashion which we can neither describe nor conceive." Bruner says *
creatio ex nihilo (which he equates with creatio per verbua) presupposes
5^t
an absolute discontinuity in human thought. By using the concept dis¬
cussed above, theologians are trying to point at something which trans¬
cends human experience—something which is a mystery. Ian Ramsay's
55
discussion of this is quite helpful.
^Ibid., II. 2.k. "^Bruner, op. cit., p. 11. ^
^Ian Ramsey, Religious Language (London: SCM Press, 1957),
pp. 71ff. * ** *
Creatio ex nihilo as a "qualified model." Ramsey focuses his
attention on creatio ex nihilo. He says we have here an example of a
"qualified model." The purpose of the qualified model is to create a
discernment situation in which one suddenly grasps a truth which,
because of its incomprehensibility, would otherwise elude him. In all
qualified models, one of the terms is "at home." The other is "playing
away." In creatio ex nihilo, creation is a down-to-earth word with a
straightforward relationship to an ordinary situation. As has already
been said, creation refers to something that is made or fashioned. The
creator is dependent on pre-existing materials. Now add to this model
creation, the qualifier, ex nihilo, and we are directed to a very
uncommon situation—a type of creation that cannot be contained within
the usual categories. Therefore, a qualified model is not something to
be empirically tested, but rather something which causes discernment to
arise. In the case of creatio ex nihilo, the desired discernment is
one's status as a creature as opposed to God's status as a creator.
The problem here, Ramsey points out, is that many theologians
don't acknowledge this and speak as though creatio ex nihilo were similar
to creation out of matter. Gilkey broadens this criticism. Most people,
he claims, think that the human idea of manufacturing is what is meant
by divine creation. God is regarded as a great carpenter or engineer
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making the universe out of a something called chaos. Creation out of
nothing does not mean that there was once a nothing which God used as
something in His creating. That God used nothing is what distinguishes
"^Gilkey, op. cit., p. 47.
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His creating from man's. This is why we must be cautious when we affirm
with the Creed our belief in God "the maker of heaven and earth."
Definition of divine creativity. Not being allowed to think of
God's creative act as being similar to man's, we cannot avoid the
conclusion that what God does when He creates is radically different
than what men do. The question, then, confronts us, "What is divine
creation?" Thomas Aquinas gives this answers "To create is, properly
57
speaking, to cause or produce the being of things."
This definition is phrased differently by different thinkers,
but it is essentially the same idea. For example, Gilkey calls God's
58
creative act "the divine evocation into existence." Irenaeus says,
"He himself called into being the substance of His creation when it
59
previously had no existence." Karl Barth looks upon divine creation
as "grace." "We exist," he says, "and heaven and earth exist in their
60
complete, supposed infinity because God gives them existence."
This gift of existence is a unique creative act proper to God
and His alone. Creatures cannot bestow existence. Human creativity is
simply a process of transforming what already exists. Divine creativity
is the donation of existence itself. Athanasius was one of the first to
make this distinction plain:
cn
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologies, Pt» I, Q. *t-5? A. 6. All
quotations taken from The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas (London:
R. & T. Washboume, 1912).
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Gilkey, on. cit., p. 52.
CQ
Irenaeus, op. cit., II, 10.^; also III, 8.3»
^Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline (London: SCM Press, 19^6),
p. 5^«
For God creates, and to create is also ascribed to men. . . .
Yet does God create as men do? . . . Perish the thought, we
understand the term in one sense of God and in another of men.
For God creates in that he calls what is not into being, neegjng
nothing thereunto, but men work with some existing material* '
Of the contemporaries few would disagree with Tiilich's statement of the
distinction:
Man creates new synthesis out of given material. This creation
is really transformation. God creates the material out of which
the new synthesis can be developed. God creates man, he gives
man the power of transforming himself and his world. Man can
transform only what is given to him. God is primarily and essegg
tially creative; man is secondarily and existentially creative.
Thomas is also quite clear on this point. First, he equates
"not-being" with "nothing" and then says God brings things into being
from nothing. The being which God produces is absolute being, not any
one particular being. Both God and man "create," but God creates
absolute being. All man can do is produce being which has already been
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created in this or that creature. What Thomas seems to be saying is
that God is responsible for being in general. Man is responsible for
the particular manifestations of being. Thomas, unfortunately, uses
emanistic language in describing God's creative act:
We have to think not only of the emanation of some particular
being from some other particular being, but also the emanation of
the whole of being from a universal cause, which ig^God, and it
is this emanation we call by the name of creation.
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Athanasius, Be Decretis, Chapter 3» Section 11, Cited by
Gilkey, op. cit., p. 53.
^Tillich, op. cit., Vol. 3» P« 256.
4j -
Thomas Aquinas, Sumraa Theologica, op. cit., Pt. I, Q. *f5»
Art. 5.
6k
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, op. cit., Pt. I, Q. 85,
Art. 1.
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The gift of being and Being Itself. To give being to the creation
is the appropriate creative act for God. It most totally befits his
nature to do this because He is "Being Itself." This is the fundamental
understanding we must have of God's nature. Augustine grasped this
firmly. Repeatedly, he meditates on the meaning of the divine name as
spoken to Moses from the burning bush, "I am Who am." In his commentary
on John's Gospel, he expresses this insight: "He did not say: I am God
or I am the Author of the world, or I am the Creator of all things, or I
am the guardian of this people who must be liberated. Rather, he said
65
only this: I am Who am." What Augustine realized was that God must
not be identified with any mode of being but with being itself.
Though theologians are virtually unanimous in describing God's
creative act as the bestowing of being, as we noted in the examples
earlier on, they have not agreed as to what precisely this means. They
give no single answer to the question, "What is being?" A brief compar¬
ison of two highly influential views, those of Augustine and Aquinas will
illustrate this well.
Josef Pieper points out that the contrast between the two views
is between Augustine's "essentialistic"approach and Aquinas' "existen-
66
tialistic" approach. Augustine contends that no matter what natural
or physical causes may be used in the production of things, their
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Augustine, Commentary on St. John's Gospel, 28, 8, 8-10, quoted
by Josef Pieper, Introduction to Thomas Aquinas (London: Farber and
Farber, 19^2), p. 139-
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Pieper, op. cit., p. 139» I owe much of this discussion to
Pieper's analysis.
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natures "are the production of none but the high God. It is his occult
power which prevades all things and is present in all, ... which gives
being to all that is and modifies and limits its existence, so that
without him it would not be thus or thus, nor would have any being at
all."67
Augustine is thinking in terms of Platonic archetypes—of pure
essences remote from actualization. Truly to be means always to be in
the same way. In his work on the Trinity he says, "Perhaps it should
be said that God alone is essentia. For he alone truly is because he is
68
immutable." Being is most authentic in its immutable essence. It is
each creature's immutable essence which God gives to it in his creative
act.
Thomas's viewpoint is radically different. What made something
really real was not its essence but its "act-of-being." The decisive
thing about being is simply that it is not what it is. What is crucial
is the basic act-of-being itself. The distinction of non-existence from
existence is more basic than, say, that of plant from animal. Essence
is secondary to existence.
According to Pieper, the distinction between the views comes
from the two thinkers' understanding of God himself. Augustine in hear¬
ing the divine name thinks it means, "I am He Who never changes."
Thomas hearing it would think, "I am the pure act of being." As concerns
67Augustine, The City of God, Bk. XVII, Chapter 25-
68
"Augustine, The Trinity, 7, 5» 10., quoted by Pieper, op. cit.,
p. 139.
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this supreme being's creative act—the bringing of other things into
being—Augustine would regard it as the One Who Is making all things
what they are. Thomas would insist that for something to be brought into
existence is for it to receive sheer existence, not any particular type
of existence. "The first fruit of God's activity is existence itself;
69
all other effects presuppose it."
One other notion of Thomas should be pointed out. He sees
existence as actuality and God as actus purus. Existence is something
that the creation does. Existence is not the particular properties a
creature has (hair, voice, personality, etc.), and it is not the indi¬
vidual acts the creature may perform (talking, growing, thinking).
Beyond and behind these it does something more fundamental: It existsl
This is the one thing common to all of creation, and the thing which God
and he alone gives.
We should note here that neither Augustine nor Thomas saw any
other factor at work in God's gift of being other than God. According
to Augustine:
... it is not lawful to hold any creature be it ever so
small to have any other Creator than God. . . . The Angels . . .
though at His command work in things of the world, yet we no
more call them creators of livings things than we call husband¬
men the creators of fruits and trees.
^'Thomas Aquinas, Compendium of Theology, I, 68, 119*» quoted
by Pieper, op. cit., p. 1^1.
^Augustine, The City of God, 12. 2*+.
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Thomas saw a bit more scope for man's participation in creation, but
this certainly in no way qualifies his insistance on God's being the
source of all existence. Gilson contrasts Augustine's and Thomas'
views in this way!
In Augustiniam, the activity of the creature does not draw
out of the passive potency of matter as secondary causes do in
Thomistic Aristolelianism; it simply brings to light the effects 71
implanted by God in the seminal reasons at the moment of creation.
Though neither side would probably admit it, both did see the temporal
process by which the world exists as one of shared creativity. God
doesn't accomplish all of creation entirely on his own.
The gift of being and scientific questioning. Many theologians
feel that since God's creative act is the bestowing of being, there are
certain questions about creation that are inappropriately asked of
religion. These are primarily scientific questions. There is no
scientific way to investigate God's creative act, since it totally
transcends the natural process which science explores. The doctrine of
creation should never be seen as an answer to such quiries as, "How did
the world begin?" It cannot answer this or any other question concerning
the origins of the universe. The doctrine would not, however, deny that
these are important questions and must be asked, but they have at best a
"very remote and indirect relationship to the Christian doctrine of
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creation." How God creates is quite beyond the creature's experience
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Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine, op. cit.,
p. 208.
^Bruner, op. cit., p. 8.
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and is not a possible item of his knowledge because it belongs to a
sphere which totally transcends what the creature can know. The bestow¬
ing of being is the ultimate mystery of existence that no amount of
knowledge about the natural order can explain. Since they deal with
entirely different spheres of reference, science and religion cannot
possibly conflict in spite of what philosophical positivists and
religious fundamentalists would contend. Antony Flew and D. M. MacKinnon,
from their respective positions as atheist and Christian, are agreed
that the religious understanding of the doctrine of creation is as an
article of faith and not of scientific cosmology. For theology, questions
of science sure irrelevant. "Creation cannot be comprehended; it can
only be apprehended by faith.7^
The dependence of the world on God. To see God's creative act
as the bestowing of being on all that exists is, as we have seen, a
greatly different creative act from what the creature does in his
creation. To complete this disjunction, we must understand that divine
creation is not an event. Rather, it is a way of expressing a relation¬
ship between the Creator and his creatures. Concerning the notion of
creatio ex nihilo. Tillich says that it "is not the title of a story.
It is the classical formula which expresses the relationship between God
and the world."74 This relationship is one of absolute dependence of
the world on God.
7^Antony Flew and D. M. MacKinnon, op. clt., p. 178.
74Tillich, op. cit.. Vol. I, p. 254.
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Since God alone is responsible for existence, we are perhaps
stating the obvious by saying that the world is totally dependent on him.
Without God's gift of being, creation would not be. Were this gift
recinded, the creation would return to nothingness. There is no being
without God's creative act; therefore, the creation depends utterly on
him.
Theologians have insisted that this dependence is total. Not
only did the things of the past exist because God gave them being, but
also the things of the present exist because they receive life from him.
They too depend on God for the fact that they are. Two very different
ways of understanding of this dependence have been put forward! (l) God
created everything in one single act; and (2) God is continually
creative.
Augustine's idea of all creation being a single act. The Fathers
did not doubt that God was immanent in the world, but there is no
evidence that this was an aspect of creation. Augustine is a case in
point. Augustine contends that all creation was accomplished simulta¬
neously and instantaneously. This did not imply for him that the cosmos,
as he knew it, sprang at once into being, for he distinguishes between
two types of creatures—those completely created in their final form and
those created only as "seeds" (rationes seiainalos). These seeds would
mature when conditions were right. Those things created in their final
form include angels, time, the four elements (earth, air, fire, and
water), the stars, and men's souls. Preformed were the seeds of all
living things. These seeds are the potential for all future reality.
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The cosmos is unfinished, but creation is complete because all that will
ever be has already been created in its germinal state. No further
creation is necessary. Apparent newness in creation will simply be the
75
effect of causes that are already there.
Perhaps it is Augustine's Platonism that leads him to these
conclusions. They can be the logical result of thinking of being in
terms of essences. God is responsible from the beginning for each
thing's being what it is. Outside forces must have no influence on the
creature's essence, otherwise the uniqueness of God's creative act is
destroyed. Creatures cannot be responsible in any way for the essence
of other creatures. Therefore, we cannot think of any originating
creation taking place within the natural order.
Thomas' view that God is continually creating. For Thomas, God's
creative act is not only original, it is continual. As Etienne Gilson,
commenting on Thomas, points out:
If we suppose that being acts as a cause, ... his proper
effect will be the being cf creatures. This effect God will
not only cause at the time of their creation but so long as
they last. While the sun shines, it is day; when its light
ceases to reach us, it is night. So, let the divine act-of-
being cease fgr a moment to keep things existing and there is
nothingness.
b-
This perspective is labeled creatio continuo. George Hendry
places it alongside creatio ex nihilo and creatio per verbum as one of
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Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,
trans. L. K. Shook (London: Victor Gollanca, 1957)» P- 206.
Gilson, op. cit., p. 101.
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the fundamental formulae by which we understand the doctrine of creation.
VJhereas creation out of nothing and creation by the Word speak primarily
of God's absolute origination of creation, continual creation endeavors
to indicate that creation not only comes into existence by God's will
end act but continues to exist by it as well. "Every moment of the
world is called out of nothingness into being by the will of the
77
creator5 it is sustained by his will and absolutely dependent on it."
Tillich's view is parallel to Hendry's. "God is essentially creative,
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and, therefore, he is creative in every moment of temporal existence."
What both these men are saying is that being is not a self-sustaining
gift but one which is constantly renewed by the giver. Through this
continuous gift of being, the creator is immanent in every instant of
the creation's existence.
Macquarrie's existentialist perspective also gives us a view
of creatio continuo. One is to think of God the Father as "primordial
Being" which means that he is "the ultimate act or energy of letting-be,
the condition that there should be anything whatsoever, the source not
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only of whatever is but of all possibilities of being." These
possibilities of being are actualized through the Son whom Macquarrie
calls "expressive being." It is through expressive being that primordial
being is poured out and the world of particular beings arise. Macquarrie
77
George S. Hendry, God the Creator, (London: Hodder and
S toughton, 1937)•
"^Tillich, op. cit.. Vol. I, p. 262.
^Macquarrie, op. cit., p. 182.
38
believes that this identification of the Son with expressive being is
permissible because traditional theology has identified the Son with
the Logos of God, and the Logos is God's expressive being. The continu¬
ing creation of God can, therefore, be seen as God's constant expression
of himself through the Logos, and this expression is the perpetual
80
"letting-be" of the creation.
Providence. It is just a short step from the idea of God's
continuing the act of being to the doctrine of providence. Macquarrie
notes that expositions of the Christian doctrine of creation are generally
followed by discussions of providence. The same God who gives the world
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its being is the one who continues to direct and sustain it.
In Augustinian thought a fairly clear distinction is drawn
between creation and providence. When the emphasis is placed on creation
as a once and for all event in the past, it is necessary to put forward
a distinct concept of providence to demonstrate God's continuing interest
and involvement in his world. When one thinks along Thomistic lines,
there can be no sharp separation between the two. CreatujaLy being is
always dependent on Divine being providing it with its own being.
Looking at these two ideas in greater detail makes this distinction clear.
The Augustinian separation of creation and providence seems to
express what was at least the implicit view of all the Fathers. None
of them speak of providence in connection with the doctrine of creation,
8oT, . .Ibid.
^Macquarrie, op. cit., p. 219®
but rather in connection with the doctrine of God. They do not seem to
be thinking of creation in terms of creatio continuo. They did, however,
understand that the continuing life of the creature was totally dependent
on the will of God. According to Irenaeus, "He (God) grants them that
they should be formed at the beginning and that they should so exist
82
afterwards." It does not appear, however, that this continued
existence is the same thing as original creation. Irenaeus does say,
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"The Lord has power to infuse life into what he has fashioned," but
this is not the same as the act that brings them into existence in the
first place.
From Augustine's perspective, providence cannot be connected with
creation. The development of the world is the result of the continuous
interaction of forces which had been created in the original creative
act. God is not, however, idle. He takes care of the creation he has
made both from without and within. He illumines the minds of rational
creatures and offers them grace. He guides the interaction of the forces
he has created, insuring the generation of the seeds he has planted. He
also provides for both human and angelic oversight for non-rational
matter. In Augustine's concept of providence, God does not "do" things
himself. Augustine sees the infinite God working through his finite
creatures. This is one reason why angels are of such crucial importance
in his thinking. They are the highest order of creation. They are
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incorruptible and capable of knowing the mind of God completely. Because
they are not finite, they can pass between eternity and time as God's
messengers and administrators. It is largely through them that the
84
world is unified and directed toward a harmonious goal.
Among more modern thinkers, Emil Brunner also separates the
initial creative act from God's continuing involvement with his creation.
He sayss
Even if we do speak of creatio continuo we imply that even
now God does not cease to create an existehce distinct from his
own, and a manner of existence which is different from his. If
this is so, then there is also an activity of God in and on the
world He has created, which is not the activity of thegGreator
but of the Preserver, the Ruler, or even the Redeemer.
Thomas' re-interpretation of creation, in an existential rather
than an essential way, made some understanding of providence as creatio
continuo necessary. As previously indicated, the naked existence of
creatures is dependent on God's gift of being and this must be a contin¬
uous gift. By its very nature a creature must receive its existence
from another. Only God derives his existence from himself. Were a
creature able to exist for an instant independent of God, it would in
fact be God himself. Thus, Gilson comments:
The first effect of the Providence of God over things is the
immediate and permanent influence which assures their conservation.
This influence is, in some way, but the continuance of the creative
act. Any interruption of this continued creation by which God main¬
tains thingsgin being would send them instantly back into
nothingness.
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For this point I am indebted to Eugene TeSelle, Augustine the
Theologian, (London: Burns and Oates, 1970), p. 220.
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This view of providence was well established by the time of the
Reformation. No one was more determined about the nature of providence
than John Calvin. He insists that it is a creative act.
To represent God as a Creator for a moment, who entirely
finished all his work at once, were frigide and jejune; and in
this it behoves us especially to differ from the heathen, that
the presence of the divine power may appear to us no less in
the perpetual state of the world than in its first origin . .
Unless we proceed to his providence, we have no correct concep¬
tion of the meaning of this article "that God is the Creator"
. . . When it is learned that he is the creator of all things,
it should immediately canclude that he is also their perpetual
governor and preserver.
Calvin holds a very strong view of providence. Everything
happens according to the will of God. Not a drop of rain falls unless
he has willed it. Though the creature may disobey and stray, this too
is in accordance with his will. He can easily use wicked instruments
to good ends and thus insure the success of his divine plan. With
characteristic Reformed scorn of metaphysics, Calvin does not specify
how God creates or how his providence operates. It is simply, as the
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Bible says, through the Word that all is accomplished.
Barth carries on Calvin's idea of the Word's continual activity.
The ground of creation is God's grace and the fact that
there is a grace of God is real and present to us, alive and
powerful in God's Word. By God speaking and having spoken His
Word in the history of Israel, In Jesus Christ, in the founda¬
tions of the Church of Jesus Christ and right up to this day
and by his speaking to all futurity, the creation was and is and
will be.
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What Calvin and Barth call to our attention is their belief that
creation by the Word, like creation out of nothing, is a continuing
activity. All things are upheld by God's Word which creates theza. They
do not sustain themselves. All of creation from beginning to end is
God's gracious creative act.
General Providence. Theology has always noted that an aspect of
God's providential activity is his involvement in nature and history.
These form what is usually referred to as "general providence." When
Tillich, for example, speaks of sustaining creativity he notes that God
preserves his creature by working through the natural order by insuring
that that order is sufficiently consistent to sustain life. God
maintains "the continuity of the structure of reality as the basis for
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being and acting." Without this stability, the continuation of
existence would, be impossible. Brunner, likewise, contends that God is
responsive for natural order and that it is a revelation of his power as
creator. The consistency of nature shows the divine love and faithfulness.
Natural law is not independent of its legislator. According to Brunner,
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God has given the world its "orders," and it obeys these orders. It
would be more appropriate to use another terra for these orders than
natural law, for this implies something that has been established once
and for all and has irrevocable force. What thinkers seem to be trying
to express here is that nature appears to be governed by laws, because
"^Tillich, op. cit.. Vol. I, p. 262.
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nature is governed by God who is utterly reliable in his activity toward
nature. It is only on the basis of faith in a God who is not capricious,
that one can have confidence in nature.
The dependability of nature has been accepted as an indication
of God's faithfulness. History is an area which provides an even more
reliable indication. While God's preservation of the creature is seen
in his working through nature, his governing of the creature is seen
in his working through history. We cannot, of course, make a clear-cut
distinction between nature and history. History takes place within
nature and its course is influenced by nature. Furthermore, nature
itself has a history as geologists and palentologists have made uc aware.
Nevertheless, some theologians find it helpful to discuss preservation
taking place through the natural order and governing taking place
through history.
Orthodox theologians ere quick to point out that a big difference
between Hebrew and Greek religious thinking is the Hebraic understanding
that God is a God of history and that his revelation of himself is seen
most clearly in historical events. There is a purpose in history and
God directs history toward the fulfillment of this purpose. Barth says:
The rule of God is the operation of God over and with the
temporal history of that reality which is distinct from God:
the operation by which He arranges the course of that history,
maintains and executes His own will within it, ancj directs it
wholly and utterly in accordance with that will.
Vol. III. . 'gh:
T. & T. Clark, 196l), p. l6*f.
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Whether or nut nature ana history provide adequate evidence of
a providential God is a question we will discuss later. These two areas
are usually accepted as ways in which God exercises a general providence
for his creature.
Specific providence. Calvin is explicit that this provident care
by God's Word is far raore than a general providence—God's animation of
the entire universe. Rather, God has a particular providence for each
individual creature sustaining and supporting it. Even the sparrows
enjoy individual care. The full grandeur of God's providence is found
in just this, that he guides each creature to its appointed gcal.9^
Earth's view of providence likewise sees God caring for each creature by
preserving, accompanying, and ruling the entire course of its existence*
Nothing that happens to the creature, or that the creature does, happens
outside the sovereignty of God.''*
Gustaf winyren feels that it is essential to think of creation as
continual. "If we do not begin with the fact that life itself constitutes
an established relationship to God the Creator, then eil statements about
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God's sovereignty in Christ will be meaningless." Only a complete
misinterpretation of the doctrine of creation allows one to think of
God's creative act as something in the past. To believe that the world
is maintained by certain static orders of God is to deny any possibility
9^Calvin, Institutes, op. clt., I. XVI. 1-4.
^^Karl Earth, Church Dogmatics, op. clt.. Vol. Ill, Part 3,
Para. 49.
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of new creation and of redenrptian through the Word. If we look at
creation as something completed in on® najectic moment, we se« creation
in terms of results rather than the relationship of Creator to creature.
We have, then, according to Wlngren, "cut the nerve" of the belief in
creation*
To understand creation properly is to understand oneself as
having been created. Each individual depends on God net on the creative
order. The creation of each individual is one aspect of God's continuing
creation* In each man God is repeating what he did in Ada®. Birth
establishes one's fundamental relationship to God* Whether he acknow¬
ledges it or not, man is dependent cn God for his life. Therefore,
God's claim to all men's lives is totally justified. Life itself could
QJ
not continue unless God was always sustaining it or creating it anew,
i'illich's position on providence also depends on this notion of continuing
creativity* "Only in the power of being itself is the creature able to
resist non-being." Such preservation is continuous creativity, for God
"is creative in every moment of temporal existence giving the power of
being to everything that has being out of the ground of the divine life.
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Summary. The foregoing discussion has attempted to establish
the first affirmation that the doctrine of creation makes: God is the
source of all existence, and the creation is totally dependent on him.
Though thinkers differ as to precisely what this means, for each of
them it is true. Each would insist that at its most basic level, God
is responsible for whatever being there is whenever and however it
appears. His creative act is not to be confused with man's. His
creation is the gift of being and, therefore, establishes the relation¬
ship of absolute dependency of the creature on God for his existence.
This in turn affirms that God is Lord of all creation. He is Lord,
because he, and he alone, decides what will be brought into being and
what will be sustained in being. The Creator is Lord because of the
absolute dependency of the creation on his will that it be.
The Creation is Distinct From God and Even Though Corrupted by Sin is
Fundamentally Good
We have already seen how the notion of creatio ex nihilo is used
by the Fathers as a most effective weapon in defending the faith against
dualistic ideas which attacked it both from within and without. Through
it they could insist that there was no substance co-eternal with God
and that before his creative act there was nothing. Creatio ex nihilo,
however, proved to be a two-edged sword. Later on, it was used just as
effectively in the conflict with the philosophical opposite of dualism,
monism—or as it appears in religious dress, pantheism.
99Pantheism. Like dualism, pantheism comes in many forms, but
fundamentally they all agree that everything that is, in so far as it
is at all, is identical with God. The creation is "ontologically
continuous" with the creator. Creator and creatures are essentially
identical. Against those dualists who contend that God made the world
out of something which he himself did not create, monists would insist
that the world was made not out of matter, but out of God himself.
Natural existence is in some way a manifestation of divine being.
While such ideas have some contact with the affirmations of the
Christian doctrine of creation, they are ultimately opposed to it. The
implicit assumption of the early writers was that in creating, God has
established something distinct from himself. There is now, after God's
creative act, another reality alongside him. Irenaeus makes this quite
clear:
But the things are established as distinct from him who has
established them and what is made from him who has made them.
For he is himself uncreated . . . and lacking nothing . . . but
the things which have been made by him received a beginning
. . . (and) must by nec^ggity in all respects have a different
term (applied to them).
Though early theology did not clash as directly with pantheism
as it did with dualism, one of the clearest indications that it rejected
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monist thought is found in the debate between Athanasius and the Arians.
The issue is, of course, the person of Christ, human or divine? While
the protagonists were bitterly opposed on this issue, both agreed that
to be created means to be of a substance separate from God. The Arians
contended that Christ was "created," that is, made from the same sub¬
stance as man, and therefore, essentially human. Athanasius insisted
that Christ was of one substance with God, and therefore, essentially
divine. "Created" and "divine" are incompatible. Creator and creatures
are separate realities. He says, "if the Son, therefore not creature;
if creature, not Son; for great is the difference between them, and Son
and creature cannot be the same."
To Augustine belongs the definitive statement: "non de Deo,
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3ed ex nlhilo," not from God but out of nothing. Clearly one factor
leading Augustine to this conclusion was his realization that God and
man were basically dissimilar. "God's nature is unchangeable, incorrupt¬
ible, impassible and ... the soul (which may be changed by the will
unto worse and by the corruption of sin be deprived of that unchangeable
light) is no part of God nor God's nature, but by him created of a far
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inferior mold." God was infinite; man finite. The two could not
logically be thought of as the same reality.
In a strange way, pantheism acknowledges this difference.
Hartshorne and Reese point out that pantheism is the "label of a
101Athanasius, De Decretis, op. clt., III. 13.
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paradox," "the paradox that the unchanging and wholly necessary contains
10JL+
whatever is is real in change and contingent." The problem for
pantheism is how can the immutable have mutable constituents, the unmodi-
fiable have modes, Each monist system has its own way of softening the
paradox by slightly altering either the unchanging nature of reality,
the all-inclusiveness of this reality, or the absolute denial that there
is any change at all. A discussion of any one of these answers is not
important for our discussion here. What must be noted is that in
pantheism, there is but the one reality, God, who is characterized by
his absolute essence. He is universal, impersonal, and infinite. Now
there appears to be another reality, the created order, which is
individual, historical and finite. This other reality,is, however,
illusory or, at best, irrelevant. Pantheism would insist that the reality
of things consists in their resemblance to God. Whatever is real in
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things is one with God. Whatever is different is unreal. In this
view there is no value at all in creaturely existence. Gilkey explains
it this way. "If finite things are God and God transcends their finite
characteristics, then inevitably the creature as finite becomes
unreal."
Gilkey goes on to point out that "creation" in pantheism is
really a "fall" from the unity of God to the diversity of creatureliness.
Hartshorn© and Reese, op. cit., p. 165.
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I must agree with Hartshorne and Reese that this use of real
and unreal is suspect, but this is beside the main point of our discussion.
10^Gilkey, op. cit., p. 62.
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This world is an unreality, which exists because we are separated from
the unity of God. Hence, there is no value in creaturely existence. It
is something to be denied. The "really real" is beyond space-time exis¬
tence. The unavoidable result of this type of thinking is asceticism—
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a complete withdrawal from the realities (non-realities?) of life.
Ontological discontinuity of creator and creation. Such a view
of creation obviously conflicts with the one set forth in Christian
thought. In insisting upon the ontological discontinuity of Creator
and creation, theologians are not denying the reality of either. Rather,
they are affirming the reality of both. Both halves of the change-
unchanging, mutable-immutable, finite-infinite dichotomy are real.
Thomas is quite clear that God, in his creative act, gives the creature
being, but God does not give the creature his own being or any part of
his own being. He gives him creaturely existence, which is not the
same as divine existence. It is a real existence, nonetheless. Thomas
argues that the mistake the monist Parmenides made was in using the
term "being" as though it could have only one meaning and then insisting
that only one reality can, therefore, exist. To be other than this one
being is simply not to exist. Aquinas insisted that there were various
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types of being not all of the same genus.
Finite things are not, therefore, modifications of divine being.
Creatures are dependent on God, but they are also distinct from him.
Barth puts this quite poetically:
1°7TV4 .»Ibid.
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Has not each of us put to himself the question, whether
this entire world around us might not really be a seeming and
a dream? Has not this come over you too as a fundamental
doubt—not of God; that is a stupid doubtI but—of yourself?
Is the whole enchantment in which we exist real? Or is not
that which we regard as reality only the 'veil of Maya' and
thus unreal? The statement on creation (the first article of
the Creed) is opposed to this horrible thought. ^
The reason the Christian knows the monist to be wrong, Barth contends,
is, of course, Christological. God himself decided to become part of
creation in Jesus Christ and to exist as we exist. "Because God has
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become man, the existence of the world can no longer be doubted."
The goodness of creation. By denying or attenuating the reality
of creation, monists are also denying its goodness. The world is to be
shunned, for value lies only in oneness with God from which the world is
estranged by its individuality and multiplicity. The Christian profes¬
sion lias, however, always been an echo of another verdict-—God's
evaluation that the world he created was good. "God saw all that he had
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made, and indeed, it was good."
Fundamentally, the doctrine of creation has insisted that
creation is good because God has evaluated it so. Since he in his
omniscience pronounced it good, it is good. For some thinkers, parti¬
cularly within the Reformed tradition, this is adequate enough to
establish the fact. Barth, for example, says, "We must not desire to
know a priori what goodness is or to grumble if the v/orld does not
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correspond to it.1' For Bonhoeffer, "Because the world is God's
113
world, it' is good," He expands this further by saying!
... it is good only in the way that the creaturely can
be good; because the Creator views it, acknowledges it and
says of its 'It is good.' God views hie work and only this
makes the work good. This means particularly that the work
is good only because the creator alone is good. The goodnese
of the work is never in the work itself, but only in the
Creator.
God's declaration of the creation's goodness is the only criterion Me
have for determining it is so. God has not borrowed a word from men's
vocabularies and used it to describe his creation. He himself gives
meaning and definition to the word. Had he not called it good, we
should nexrer know that it was good.
If this is the proper perspective, then one cannot go beyond
his faith for his assurance that the world is good. This is, of course,
what Barth and Bonhoeffer would want, but the philosophic tradition in
theology has never been satisfied with this approach. It lias insisted
that man as well as God must be able, at least to a limited extent, to
pronounce the world good. Augustine, I believe, while feeling that in
the final analysis belief in created goodness was an act of faith, would
hold that reason could assist faith in reaching this conclusion.
Augustine equated being and goodness. "Every entity, even if it
115is a defective one, in so far as it is an entity, is good." He
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suggests that God has given everything measure, form, and order. These
are three essentials cf being. Nothing can be if it does not possess, to
some degree, each of these. If they are present in a creature to a high
degree, the creature is very good. If they are present to a lesser
degree, the creature is less good. But no creature could lack any one
of them entirely. Since all creatures have these perfections to some
degree, all creatures are correspondingly good to the same degree. In
his Confessions Augustine maintains this belief even in the face of evil:
And it v;as made clear to me that all things are good even
if they are corrupted. . . . unless they were good they could
not be corrupted. If they were supremely good, they would be <
incorruptible; if they were not good at all, there would be
nothing in them to be corrupted. ... If then they are deprived
of all good, t^eg will cease to exist. So long as they exist,
they are good.
Now each creature in itself is not wholly good but just partially
good. Nothing, no matter how perfect it is, equals God's goodness. To
cite the Enchiridiont
By this Trinity, supremely and equally and immutably good,
were all things created. But they were not created supremely,
equally, nor immutably good. Still, each single created thing is
good, and taken as a whole they are very good because together
they constitute a universe of admirable beauty.
In this last statement, Augustine indicates why he feels the
world can be called good. Taken as a whole it displays an "admirable
beauty." The influence of neo-OPlatonic thought with its aesthetic under¬
standing of creation is very apparent. The cosmos is regarded as an
infinitely vast work of art whose beauty lies in the totality of the
1 "|6
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work. When viewed from a cosmic perspective, which of course only God
can do, the beauty and goodness of creation are strikingly evident.
One does not, therefore, look at the individual parts of the picture,
for they are only more or less beautiful in themselves. One seeks to
see the work as a whole and therein discern its goodness. Such think¬
ing has been the dominant idea in Christian thought and is still the
basis of much Roman Catholic doctrine.
For Augustine, and even more for Thomas, to ascribe essential
goodness to the created order was not to insist, as Leibniz later did,
that this is the best of all possible worlds. According to Thomas, God
could have created a better universe than this one, but it would have
been a different one. He could not have created tills universe better
than he did, and this universe could not be improved and still remain
1l8
the same universe. One cannot contend that the creation is totally
and completely good. Augustine points to Jesus' statement, "None is
good save Cod alone," to indicate that the world is not perfect. None¬
theless, both Augustine and Thomas would insist that the creation is
basically and overwhelmingly good.
The problem of evil. Such a view has been labeled "aesthetic
optimism." Everything is really quite good. The reason one does not
see that is that he does not see all there is to see. When one thinks
this way, the question that inevitably must be asked is, "What about
evil?" Is this reality not being overlooked? How in a fundamentally
/j
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good world can the abundance of suffering, misfortune, pain, and
ignorance that is found be explained? Are the dark colors not somewhat
oven/helming, destroying the alleged beauty of the composition?
The problem of evil is an ancient one. Apparently, it was first
formulated philosophically by Epicurus around 300 B.C. He posed it as
a dilemma: If God is perfectly good, he must want to abolish all evil;
if he is ultimately powerful, he must be able to abolish all evils but
evil exists; therefore, God is either not perfectly good or ultimately
powerful. Stated this way, there is no solution. Either God must bear
some of the blame or else the severity of evil must be minimized. Thomas
saw the problem of evil as the first obstacle to Christian theism.
Simpler men have, through the ages, felt that the contention of God's
goodness is refuted by the existence of evil.
Both dualism and monism, which Christianity opposes, have ready
and, in many ways, satisfying answers to the problem of evil. In the
gnostic systems, for example, the world is not created by God but by a
second power, a demiurge. Sometimes this is an evil power which
purposely created evil. Other times he is simply inept and incapable
of making a totally perfect world. Another example is the idea in Plato's
Timaeus that the matter out of which the craftsman created was recal¬
citrant and not wholly obedient to his manipulation. Try as he might,
he just did not have the proper material out of which to create a totally
good world.
Monist systems have every bit as easy an answer. The world is
evil, but the world is also an illusion. Therefore, evil is simply
illusory. The only reality is God. Whatever evil we think exists is
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the result of our separation from the infinite. When we achieve union
with the One, our various illusions of evil will vanish. This summary
is over-simplified, but it does indicate the monist approach to the
problem.
Definition of evil. Before proceeding farther, we should check
to make sure we know what we are talking about. Just what is this
phenomenon called evil that is so upsetting to the Christian belief in
created goodness? Hick gives one compact answer. Theologically, he
says, whatever tends to fulfill the divine purpose in the world is good.
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Whatever thwarts it is bad. Evil is the negation of the goodness
God wants for his creation.
This definition owes much to Aristotle who suggested that the
happiness of any creature consisted of its fulfillment of its own telos—
the realization of its nature and potentiality. Everything is created
toward some end and completely satisfied only in reaching it. Theology
has never stopped at this point, but has always added its own essential
belief that individual fulfillment is supported by the cosmic process.
Human nature, for example, is basically in harmony with the structures
of nature and can, therefore, be fulfilled and not thwarted. Further¬
more, since the universe is God's creation and ruled by him, there is
120
a reasonable guarantee that such is always possible.
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Ibid. Hick's contention here is actually stronger than
stated. Since this is God's world, fulfillment is guaranteed—not
just always possible.
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Hick specifies three types of evil: (1) natural evil, that
which man does not originate—such things as earthquakes, floods, and
disease; (2) moral evil, that for which man is responsible—wax, despotism,
tyrany; and (3) metaphysical evil, which refers to the unavoidable
complications imposed by the essential limitation and finitude of the
creation's being created. Simply because this is a created world and
not ungenerate like its creator, there lurks within it the possibility
of evil.
Norris points out that Irenaeus' thinking went along this route.
God could not create something and have it be uncreated. This would be
a logical contradiction. Therefore, there is a limitation on his power.
He cannot do what is logically impossible and no one should insist that
he do so. To ask that God create a world possessing the attributes of a
121
non-created order is ridiculous.
For the creature to be created implies that it will be different
from God. It will be changeable and corruptible. For all his scorn of
philosophy, Irenaeus uses Plato's descriptions of the world of becoming
as his descriptions of the created order. The created order is not
eternal but capable of change. Creatures are imperfect and liable
122either to grow or to decay.
Augustine, too, saw the root of evil in the creation's creaturely
status. He believed that it was because things were created out of
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nothing that they were capable of being muted and corrupted. This
suggests the same sort of limitation as Irenaeus found. God cannot make
the creature immutable, for to do so would be to make him a divine
being. Augustine is opposed to any idea of emanation that sees the
creature participating to any degree in God's being. There is an
absolute gap between the creator and his creatures, because the creatures
were created out of nothing and God was simply not created.
Augustine saw evil as a privatio boni—a privation of the good.
As has already been noted, he feels that all things are created funda¬
mentally good. Evil must then be seen as a corruption of the intended
nature of an entity. Evil is not for him a positive thing. It is
negative. It is not so much something that an entity possesses but
12*t
something that an entity lacks.
Aquinas followed Augustine's teaching. He points out that this
"privation" is not precisely the same thing as "absence." It is the
absence of something the entity should by right have.
Evil denotes the absence of a good. But it is not every
absence of good that is called evil. For absence of good can
be understood either in a privative sense or in a purely
negative sense, and absence of good in the latter sense is
not evil. ... It is^gbsence of good in the privative sense
which is called evil.
12o
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Blindness in a man is evil because a man is meant to see and he is
deprived of his sight. It is not, however, evil in a stone which was
not meant to see and is, therefore, not deprived of anything it was
meant to have. "Evil is the absence of the good which is natural and
127
due a thing."
This is an easily comprehended illustration, but other examples
are less so. What about brain tumors? Are they privations? The answer
is, yes, but not intrinsically. The privation, and therefore the evil,
is not in the thing itself, but rather in the disorder it creates. The
evil of a tumor is found in its relationship to the person possessing
it. The tumor, were it isolated from anything, would not be called
evil because it would create no privation, but when the tumor impairs
one's motor facilities and deprives one of the ability to walk, then it
is evil.
Aquinas does not restrict this analysis to natural evil alone.
It is also true that moral evil is a privation. Moral evil is the pri¬
vation of the free human act of the relationship it ought to have to the
moral law promulgated by reason of the divine law.
By thinking of evil as privatio boni, Augustine and Aquinas are
preserving their claim that the created order is basically good. All
things are originally created good, and evil is an intruder who distorts
and deprives. Evil must not be regarded as an independent force existing
on its own. Aquinas pointed out that evil had no being of its own. It
was parasitic living off the good. Were evil to destroy the good from
127Ibid., I. ^9- 1.
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which it derives its existence, it would destroy itself. Nothing can,
therefore, be completely evil. As a privation, evil can exist only in a
being. It is not fundamental but incidental. Before there can be a
128
privation, there must be something to be deprived.
Since evil cannot exist without the good, Aquinas quotes with
approval Augustine's conclusion, "There is no possible source of evil
except good." Aquinas goes on to show how this is so by using Aristotle's
categories of causes:
Now that good is the cause of evil by way of the material
cause was shown (when) it was shorn that good is the subject of
evil. But evil has no formal cause, rather it is a privation
of form; likewise, neither has it a final cau^eu but rather
is it a privation of order to the projjer end.
There is, however, an efficient cause of evil. Evil can be seen as the
improper effect of an efficient cause. This happens when tin efficient
cause cannot produce its desired effect without depriving something else
of its perfection. Fire will deprive air of oxygen and turn water into
vapor. It does not set out to do this, but in achieving its own perfection
these privations result. They are not intentional but accidental.
Aquinas feels confident in concluding that "evil in no way has any but
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an accidental cause; and thus is good the cause of evil."
Even though evil may be caused per accidens, it seems inevitable.





flaw is there. Perhaps then God should not have created anything at all.
Maybe it would have been best for there never to have been a creation,
but rather just the perfection of the Trinity.
Not so, say theologians. It is best that there be a creation,
Augustine would contend, because greater beauty is achieved by there
being the gx*eatesi possible variety of forms. From Plato he borrows
what has been called the "Principle of Plenitude" which insists that a
universe of all possible beings is better than one of just the highest
type of being.
Augustine says there are really two questions which must be
answered in respect to the one question why God created anything at all.
The first question is, why should God create corruptible natures? In
answering this, Augustine points out that the beings which die are good,
but they are replaced by other beings which are also good. Good things
follow good things the former making room for the latter. Augustine
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sees in this change a certain beauty that would be lacking without it.
It is not, therefore, a bad thing that entities have corruptible natures
for the progression itself is essential to harmonious ordering of the
universe. From this .standpoint we would perhaps be correct in saying
that Augustine would find greater beauty in a symphony where beautiful
chords follow one another than in just one lovely chord eternally sus¬
tained. God, like man, must find variety pleasing and, therefore
desirable.
J Augustine, City of God, op. cit., XII.. h.
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The second question concerns man specifically. "How could a
good God create men with the ability to choose evil?" Some background
to this question needs to be given.
Sin and evil; The Augustinian viewpoint. Augustine called
voluntary evil sin. Evil is, as we have seen, inevitably present in
the cosmic process, since the cosmos wasvcreated ex nihilo. Over this
tragic flaw, metaphysical evil, man lias no control. There are, however,
voluntary evils over which man has control—evils which are caused
when the creature wills something that he should not, when he opts for
something contrary to God's divine will. In other words, he wills
something other than God wills. For this reason Augustine can see
sin, like all other evil, as a privation—the absence in man's will of
the true love of God. In the City of God he says:
Let none, therefore, seek the efficient cause of an evil
will: for it is not efficient but deficient, nor is there
effect but defect: namely falling from thajj-i}ighest essence
unto a lower, this is to have an evil will. *?
Augustine, through all of this, is insisting that the will is
free to choose less than the best for itself. All decisions are an act
of the will and this willing is always for the sake of attaining some
133
value, even though it may be an insignificant or inappropriate one.
The question being asked is: Is such a free will good? Again we get an
affirmative answer. The problem is not with free will itself, but with
the use to which it is put. Just as one cannot condemn fire outright
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if it burns rather than just giving warmth, so one cannot condemn the
will if it is not used for a good end. Just as there are things which
the body can misuse, so there are good things which the soul can misuse.
The fault is in both cases with the user and not with the thing itself.
God has made the will master of itself and made it capable of adhering
to the sovereign good or of not adhering to it. The will lias the power
to do either. The fall of the will is not a necessary fall, such as that
of a stone pulled to the earth by gravity. It is the fall of the will
13If
letting itself go. Thus Augustine sees the cause of sin as "the
defection of the will of a being which is mutable from the Good which
135
is immutable."
There is no answer, however, to the next logical question: What
makes the will defect? One simply cannot know. Sin, like grace, is
ultimately a mystery beyond rationalization. Augustine says it would be
impossible to analyze a deficient cause, since this would be an analysis
of nothing.
Even though man is capable of sinning, his sin will not ulti¬
mately result in total, destruction. We mentioned above that God was not
the cause of evil. His responsibility extended only to permitting its
occurrence. This must not be thought of as a divine fault for two
reasons! The presence of evil makes good seem all the better; and out
^'Augustine, City of God, op. cit., XII. 7»
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Augustine, City of God, op. cit., XII. ?• (Though Augustine
obviously meant this idea to be taken seriously, I find it more clever
than convincing.)
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of evil man ci'eates, God can make even greater good, In the Enchiridion
Augustine says:
In this universe, even what is called evil, when it is rightly
ordered and kept in its place, commends the good more eminently,
since good things yield greater pleasure and praise when compared
to the bad things. For the Omnipotent God, whom even the heathen
acknowledge as the Supreme Power over all, would not allow any
evil in his works, unless in him omnipotence and goodness, a.s„
the Supreme God he is able to bring forth good out of evil.
Augustine and Aquinas both talk as though the world is actually
a better place because of the evil in it. Aquinas insists that many
good things would be lost if God permitted no evil.
The order of the universe requires ... that there should
be some things that can and do sometimes fall. And thus God
by causing in things the good of the order of the universe,
consequently as it were by accident causes the corruption of
things.
Augustine puts the matter quite convincingly. "God judged it
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better to bring good out of evil than not to permit any evil to exist."
Evil is the necessary basis for God's redeeming activity in Christ. A
world saved by God's grace is a better world than one created already
perfect. If there had been no sin, God could not have shown the full
extent of his love. According to Aquinas, "the justification of the
ungodly which terminates at the eternal good of a share in the Godhead
is greater than the creation of heaven and earth which terminates at the
1^40
good of a mutable nature"
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Trie approach to evil v/e have been discussing can be summarised
in this way. Evil does exist because the creation is, by its very nature,
imperfect and, therefore, capable of exhibiting imperfection. Evil must
always be seen as a privation of an entityfe lacking something that it
ought to have. This is true both of moral and natural evil. Evil is
parasitic living off the good, which can, therefore, be called its cause.
Were there no good, there could be no evil. The apparent horror of evil
is less than we assume, since when we look at the universe as a whole
v/e find good outstripping evil. Though each part in itself may not be
lovely, taken as a whole the creation displays great beauty. Furthermore,
evil is not final. God can and does use it to effect great good. The
greatest good of ail having been achieved through the greatest evil in
the death and resurrection of Christ.
The most penetrating objection raised to this approach to the
problem of evil is that the pieces get lost in the whole. It is a highly
impersonal answer and existentially very unsatisfying. The interest and
emphasis is on the whole and not on its parts. The value of each
individual creature is minimized, since one is told to look at the whole
of creation as the place where value ultimately resides. It seems to
make no difference if some evil exists, so long as good dominates.
Aside from the issue as to whether or not there is any way (other than
an appeal to revelation) to establish that good actually does dominate,
one wonders if this says anything at all to someone caught up in the
agony of evil. The horror, the detestability, the vileness of one's
experience of evil is trivialized. Hick is utterly disgusted that
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Thomist thought cannot only tolerate but actually find satisfaction in
141the existence of a cholera germ.
Finally, one wonders if there is not a slight contradiction in
this way of thinking. If evil contributes to the good, why resist or
attempt to eradicate it? If it is true that the greatest good, however,
is the eradication of evil such as happened in the crucifixion and
resurrection of Christ, is there any reason to speak of evil as contri¬
buting to goodness? In other words, if the most beautiful creation is
the one in which Christ lias eliminated all the dark colors, why speak
of the contribution they make to the beauty of the whole. If the dark
colors are needed for the creation to be beautiful, with what sort of
soteriology is one left?
Sin and evil: The Irenaean viewpoint. There is, however, another
way of looking at evil which, its advocates believe, is more existentially
satisfying. Hick has labeled the approach we have just discussed
"Augustinian," due to its dependence on his thought. Hick points out
that this is the dominant tradition in Christian theology, having
persisted via Thomas through the middle ages and via Calvin through the
Reformation. Barth is a contemporary example of one who thinks as
Augustine did. Augustinian thinking on the problem of evil dominates
both Roman and Reformed theology. Another approach does exist, however,
and even though it has not had nearly as much prominance, it is, to
Hick, vastly superior. This approach he calls "Iranaean."
Hick, op. cit., p. 169.
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Irenaeus does not concern himself with the problem of natural
evil. For him the problem is strictly the moral one and is contained
within the single question, "Could not God have exhibited man as perfect
from the beginning?" We have already noted his insistence that since
-j if2
man is created ex nihilo, he cannot be perfect. This is the funda¬
mental explanation of evil. So far, Irenaeus and Augustine would be in
agreement. From this point forward though, Irenaeus takes another road.
Even though God could not logically create man perfect, it is
vrithin his power to perfect the man he has created. God first creates
and then perfects. Irenaeus looks upon man as being childlike in the
sense of incomplete, unfinished, capable of growth and development.
Man enters the world not only a physical child, but a spiritual one as
well. We could not be created perfect because we could not tolerate it
anymore than we could tolerate solid food. As a created being, man must
be nurtured as is a child to attain the glory that is his. This is, in
fact, exactly what God does. Irenaeus states it this way:
Now it was necessary that man should in the first instance
receive growth; and having received growth should be strength¬
ened; and having been strengthened should abound and having
abounded, should recover (from the disease of sin); and having
recovered should be glorified; and having been glorified should
see his lord.
In Irenaeus8 view, man is made only potentially perfect. To
actualize this potential, man must be taught to see what perfection is
and where it lies. The best way, perhaps the only, for man to know and
'Irenaeus, Against Heresies, op. cit., IV. 38-
love the good is to see it in contrast with evil. Evil must, therefore,
be included within the world. Irenaeus draws these comparisons!
For just as the tongue receives experience of sweet and
bitter by means of tasting, and the eye discriminates between
black and white by means of vision, and the ear recognizes the
distinctions of sounds by hearing; so also does the mind receiving
through experience the knowledge of what is good become more^i^
tenacious of its preservation by acting in obedience to God.
Even though Irenaeus speaks of man being created initially
without sin, there is really no doctrine of the fall in his writings.
Even though man should have known better and is responsible for the
state he finds himself in, his sin is more the result of immaturity
than conscious rebellion against God. Man is responsible for his sin,
but his sin is not the malignant catastrophic event for Irenaeus it is
for Augustine. It is difficult to understand how man's proper growth
could take place without evil being present. Since evil actually
assists in the proper growth of man, it serves a good cause and its
existence is justified. Evil will, however, be eliminated as God
perfects man and goodness will ultimately triumph. Irenaeus' thinking
is highly eschatological. God through Christ is recapitulating his
creation, and there will be a final consummation vrhen the devil and his
powers will be brought to nothing.
The Irenaean approach to evil does maintain the essential good¬
ness of creation in spite of the fact of evil. Irenaeus would not
contend that evil is a good thing or even the lack of a good thing, but
he would insist that it is a good thing that evil be overcome as this is
'ibid., IV. 39- 1.
69
how man will finally achieve his union with God. Man's struggle with
evil has great significance for it is the way to his salvation.
Tertullian had an even more positive attitude toward evil—at
least that specific evil which the Christians of his time were facing—
the persecutions. He is quite clear that it is only by God's will that
the persecutions are taking place. He wills them to be a winnowing
fan cleansing the church of the chaff who would deny God in adversity.
Christians ought not, therefore, flee from persecution but face it
boldly because God will guard them even in this, and they will then be
assured of their eternal bliss. God, Tertullian believes, actually
delivers Christians into the hands of the devil so they can be tempted,
1^5
punished, or humbled.
Granted that the goodness of God and his creation is maintained
by the Ire naean approach to evil, but here as in the Apguatinian approach /^
not evil trivialized. The great enemy of God is really his servant.
Evil, like the pain of the dentist's drill, is not really as bad as it
seems when one is experiencing it. Certainly there are those who have
struggled vrith evil, overcome it, and been better off because of it, but
does not the whole idea collapse if the person beset by evil collapses
146
under the weight of evil as often happens? Furthermore, is not the
ability to resist or respond positively to evil at least as much the
result of one's physical, psychic, and social status as his spiritual
status?
1^5
Tertullian, De Fuga in Persecutions, Ch. 1., cited by Roberts,
The Theology of Tertullian (London: The Epworth Press, 192*0, p. 232.
^°Hick, op. cit., p. 366.
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To draw a lengthy discussion to its close, we will summarize
briefly what has been said about this second contention that the creation,
even though corrupted by sin, is basically good. The goodness of the
creation is dependent on the goodness of its creator. It is good
because he made it and evaluated it as good. It is, therefore, from the
creator's perspective and not necessarily the creatures' that this
statement can be made. Even though evil from our vantage point may
seem to cast doubt on created goodness, evil has not overcome goodness
and can in diverse ways be seen as aiding and abetting goodness. Evil
is never seen as a force outside God's control but rather as something
he can and does use in maintaining the creation's goodness. There are
problems with evil but they exist only from the creature's side and not
from God's.
We may justifably close this part of our discussion by asking,
I
If evil is the servant of God and completely under his concrol, why did
God have to go to the extremes he did in the incarnation, crucifixion,
and resurrection to overcome it. If evil serves good ends, why bother
to eliminate it? The only possible answer to this question is that
redemption from sin and evil is an even greater good, but this still
does not seem to be an adequate enough reason for the high price God had
to pay for man's salvation.
Creation is a Free Act of God's Gracious Love
In the last section we mentioned that one reason for accepting
that the world was good was that it was created by a good God. This
leads us to our final assertion that the creation is a free act of God's
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gracious love. Much of what could be said under this heading has already
been said in the previous discussions, and we will repeat only when
necessary. The question being answered in this final section is, "Was
God's creative act necessary; and if not, what reason might there be for
it?" The answer being given is that God's creative act was not com¬
pelled by anything outside himself. God was not forced to create. He
did not have to bring the world into existence. It was his own decision
to do so. Furthermore, the choice as to whether or not any particular
creature shall exist is his as well. If it is appropriate to look for
any motive in God's creating, it can only be his goodness. There is not
other external or internal motivation.
According to both classical metaphysics and orthodox theology,
God certainly does not need his creation. He is already perfect and
nothing could be added to him. There is no deficiency which must be
made up. He can gain nothing by creating. Earth states it bluntly!
God has no need of us. He lias no need of the world and
heaven and earth at all. He is rich in Himself. He has fulness
of life; all glory, all beauty, all goodness and holiness reside
in Him. He is sufficient unto Himself; He is God, blessed in
Himself.
He then states further:
To what end, then, the world? Here in fact there is everything
here in the living God. How can there be something alongside..r,
God of which He has no need? This is the riddle of creation.
According to this view, God is unconditioned and self-sufficient,
depending on nothing else for any part of his reality. Because he does
not need to create his act is free. If there were this necessity, then
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freedom would be denied. Since God was not forced to create, his
creative act is, at least for thinkers like Barth, a mystery. Why
should God not want to be alone? There is no rational answer to this
question.
Bonhoeffer sees in the opening sentence of Genesis a statement
of God's freedom in creating. '"In the beginning God created the heavens
and the earth.• That means that the Creator, in fx*eedom, creates the
1*t8
creature." Since there could be nothing before the beginning, there
could be nothing pushing God to create. Between creature and creator,
he says, there is nothing except the void, and creation comes out of
-|if9
this void. To say the same thing in language we have been using
throughout this thesis, since God created ex nihilo, there is nothing
conditioning his creating.
We have noticed two tilings about God's creative act: lie was and
is not compelled by necessity to create; and his creating is completely
unconditioned. Nothing limits, restrains, or determines what he does.
It is a completely free act. We have so far cited only the neo-orthodox
view, bat Tiliich, speaking from another perspective, is just as emphatic:
There is no ground prior to Him which could condition his
freedom; neither chaos nor non-being has power to limit or
resist Him. . . . Freedom means that man's ultimate concern is
in no way dependent on man or on any finite being o^on any
finite concern. ... A conditioned God is no God.
1^8
Bonhoeffer, op. cit., p. 14.
l!f9Ibid.
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By thinking this way God's ontologieal transcendence is insured.
To be totally free he must neither be dependent on nor limited by his
creatures and his creation. The unbridgable gap between man and God
must be seen and acknowledged. Brunner begins his discussion of the
doctrine of creation from this point of reference. We must, he says,
drop altogether any idea of a correlation between God and world which
would make it impossible to think of one without the other and think
instead of God who is apart from his world and Lord over it. This
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Lordship is dependent on his being totally free in his creative act.
As mentioned before, Brunner finds this the idea which the concept of
creatio ex nihilo has maintained. "The truth that God is the One who
determines all things and is determined by none is the precise meaning
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of the idea of Creation as creatio ex nihilo."
God wills to create. If God is absolutely free, the only
possible reason for his creating is that he wanted to create. Theo¬
logians have, therefore, insisted that God willed to create. Brunner
tells us not only to think of God in terms of his eternal Being, but
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also in terms of his eternal Will. God willed that there should be
a creation and there was one. This is the reason why there is a creation,
and we need look for no other. "The Creation is because God wills it;
it has no other foundation. God's will is the ratio sufficiens of the
Creation.
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Even if we accept that God's will is the reason for his creating,
are we forced to stop with this will's inscrutability or can we repeat
the question we asked in the preceding section, "Why does God will to
create?" Fortunately, most thinkers have not considered it impertinent
to ask this and have suggested what it is in God's being that should
cause him to will to create. Brunner, for one, says we should not think
only of God's being "as-he-is-in-Himself" but also of his "being-for-us."
It is because he is for us even before we are created that we are
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brought into being.
Implied in what has been stated above is the contention we
encountered earlier that what God does is the expression of what he is.
When Brunner says that part of what God is is being-for-us, he is
commenting on what he sees as God's essential nature. Traditional theo¬
logy has always seen one indispensable attribute of God being his goodness.
Being-for-us and, therefore, creating us must be regarded as expressions
of God's goodness. Augustine puts it in this way:
And by the words 'God saw that it was good,' it is suffi¬
ciently intimated that God made what was made not from any
necessity nor for the sake of supplying any want, but solely
from his own goodness.
The answer Augustine is giving to the question of why God wills
to create is that God being good could not help but do this good thing.
William Temple has dubbed this idea "spiritual determinism" and insists
that such determinism is always part of freedom. One will always act in
accordance with what seems good to him. This is, hov/ever, radically
l55Ibid., p. 4.
^Augustine, City of God, op. cit., XI. 24.
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different from mechanical or organic determinism. "It is determinism by
what seems good as contrasted with determination by irresistible
157
compulsion."
The reasoning here is basically an extension of the reasoning
used by some thinkers in making the second point discussed above. In
that discussion v/e noted that they began with the revelation of God's
goodness received in Christ and, from this, concluded that one who was
Goodness itself could not create something that was not good (or at least
did not have the potential for goodness). The statement now under con¬
sideration takes this back one further step. The very act of creation
itself is a good thing. All that God does is good; therefore, his
creative act must be good. Since we know the cook, we do not have to
prove the pudding by tasting.
When theologians speak of God's willing to create they usually
contend that he had a good purpose in creating—that the bringing of the
world into existence was not a whim or a fancy but something done with
purpose. For this reason it is possible for creatures to find meaning
in their existence. Though the answer is phrased differently with each
thinker, it seems fair to generalize and say that they believe God's
purpose in creating was to give and receive love. Augustine and Thomas
were agreed that it is better for there to be all possible orders of
being than just the one highest order, because the greatest possible
variety of creatures gives God the greatest possible scope for showing
his love.
^^William Temple, Nature, Man and God (New York: Macmillian
Company, 19^9)» p« 229-
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The reason Tertullian gives for God's creating the world is that
it exists so there can be something to reflect God's glory. "What we
v/orship is the only God, who by his Word . . . drew out of nothing for
158the glorification of his majesty this whole immense system." Calvin,
several centuries later, echoed this, saying that the purpose behind
creation was for it to be a "theatrum gloriae Dei." Barth in our own
generation finds this answer totally acceptable and saysJ
... if we inquire into the goal of creation, the object
of the whole, the object of heaven and earth and all creation,
I can only say it is to be the theatre of His glory. The mean¬
ing is that God is being glorified ... Whatever objections
may be raised against the reality of the world, it's goodness
incontestably consists in the fact that it may be the theatre
of His glory.
The creation is good, because, through it all, honor and glory may be
given God. The chief end of the whole creation is to glorify God.
While Barth follows Calvin here, Brunner is closer to Luther's
idea that God's purpose in creation is to have loving communion with
his creatures. Thus Brunner says:
God creates the world because He wills to communicate
Himself, because He ^^dshes to have something 'over against'
Himself. As the Holy God He wills to glorify Himself in His
Creation; as the loving God He wills to give himself to others.
His self glorification, however, is in the last resort the
same as His self communication. He wills so to glorify Himself
that that which He gives is received in freedom and rendered
back to Him again: His love.
Brunner has here pointed out the mutual compatibility of the creation
being the sphere where God can be glorified and where God's love can be
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Tertullian, Against Hermogenes, op. cit., 21. 3.
"^Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, op. cit., p. 58.
l6°Brunner, op. cit., p. 13.
given and returned, the second being the way in which the first is
accomplished,. Brunner concludes his discussion by stating precisely
the point under our consideration: "This love ox His is at the same
time the revelation of the purpose of His Creation, and this purpose of
Creation is the reason why He posits a Creation. The love of God is
l6l
the causa finalls of the Creation."
Brunner, of course, insists that we know this only because of
the revelation given us in Jesus Christ. What we know specifically
from this revelation is:
. . . that the purpose of the world is in God: that in it
God wills His Glory; in it He wills to rule; and in it He wills
to bring man—through His self-manifestation into fellowship
with Himself. The purpose, and therefo^g0the fundamental mean¬
ing of Creation, is the Kingdom of God.
God wills there to be a creation so there can be a Kingdom of God—a
reciprocal relationship of love between Creator and creatures.
While all this sounds fine, we must agree with Tillich that
Calvinist and Lutheran theologies are not as effective as they should
be in maintaining both the non-necessity of creation and that there is
a real and genuine purpose in creation. Calvinism's contention that
the purpose of creation is to give God glory seems a bit strange since
Calvin's thought would insist that God is the only cause of his glory
and would, therefore, have no need for the world to give it back to
him. Lutheran ideas of God creating in order to have loving communion
with his creatures is also suspect, since reciprocal love can only be
l6lIbid.
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interdependent, the lovers needing each other. Both ideas seem to
suggest either there is some real need for the creature or there is
really no purpose in creation.''^*'
ADDITIONAL ISSUES
The Participation of Creatures in Creative Act
At this point, it would be well to focus on an issue that lias
arisen several times. Earlier, we noted how the various thinkers
throughout the centuries have insisted that divine creation is radically
different from non-divine. Although the question of what meaning can
then be given to the word create is discussed elsewhere, it seems
appropriate to note what role, if any, various thinkers have seen factors
other than God playing in the creative process. The question being asked
is: Does the creature participate in the act of creation or is this
solely God's activity?
Augustine allows that while the essence of each creature was
contained in the rationes seminales which God created, secondary factors
are responsible, working under the providence of God, for bringing these
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seeds into the full fruition of what they were meant to be. The seeds
will develop according to the divine plan. These outside factors will
not influence their essence, but rather be the means for carrying out
the divine plan. The Genesis' accounts of creation show how some of
these seeds, which were all created simultaneously, came into full being
''^Tillich, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 264.
^^See pages 35-36.
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in an orderly, temporal sequence. Other seeds still remain to be
developed. Although secondary factors are important in this development,
they do not influence creation. Each creature is created in germinal
form by God, and his providence governs each creature's development.
God alone is creator. This word cannot be used for anything or anyone
else.
Aquinas' view gave considerably more scope for the activity of
165
secondary causes. We noted that he believed God to be the giver of
being but that other causes played a part in determining specific being.
He says, "All things seek to be like God by being causes of others."''^
Secondary causes are not., however, like the first cause because they do
not give being itself. Their role is to determine the contours of the
being that the First Cause provides. Thomas rejects Peter Lombard's idea
that God's power of creation can be communicated by God to a creature.
Any contribution the creature makes to creation will be the result of
its own inate power and not God's. The creature simply cannot do what
167
God does. He cannot call into being that which was not. Even though
there is a categorical division between what is divine and what is non-
divine creativity, secondary causes do essentially affect the creation.
165
See page 29 •
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Thomas Aquinas, Surama contra Gentiles, III, 21. Cited by
Macquarrie, op. cit., p. 20©.
•*1 Csi
'Thomas Aquinas, £>e Potentia, 3, *+. Cited by Frederick
Copleston, S. J., Mediaeval Philosophy: A History of Philosophy, Vol. 2,
Part 2 (Garden City and New "York: Image Books, Doubleday and Company,
1962), p. Sk.
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Thomas does not hesitate to call secondary factors causes, even though
they are not the same sort of causes as the First Cause.
Calvin is not totally consistent on this point. We have already
seen how he believes that God governs everything that happens—not just
11
as a co-ordinator but as the one who actually decides what will happen.
Referring to human action, he assures us that we "do nothing save at the
secret instigation of God" and that nothing comes to pass but those
things that he has decreed and causes to happen by his "secret
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direction." Elsewhere, however, he contends that this divine govern¬
ing does not deny the activity of other causes. He says:
He who has fixed the boundaries of our life has at the same
time entrusted us with the care of it, provided us with the
means of preserving it, forwarned us of the dangers to which
we are exposed, and supplied cautions and remedies that we may
not be overwhelmed unawares.
Aside from the question of how it can be both ways, we want to ask
what influence, if any, do causes other than God have on the creation of
beings. On balance it would seem, according to the core of Calvin's
teaching, that the only answer is none. Calvin, even more emphatically
than Augustine, believes that something is and is the way it is because
God wills it so.
Barth contends that Calvin did not really know how to apply the
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idea of domination of God and the dependence of the creature. He
168CSee page 41.
''^Calvin, Institutes, op. ,cit., I. XVII. 4.
I7°lbid., I. XVII. k.
'''"'Barth, Vol. 3» Ft. 3* op. cit., p. 117.
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therefore, puts forward the idea of concursus. We are to understand that
the creatures are causes, but they are not the same type of cause that
God is. God can be called causa because he is the source of all other
causae. He is his own cause (causa sui) and the cause of all other
causes. Wot only does he originate all other causes,but he controls the
effects of their causation. Creatures are, therefore, causes of a
second, radically inferior, order, for theirs is a derived and dependent
causality. We can, however, speak of a divine and human concursus.
Since God and the creatures operate on different levels of causality,
they can in fact work together without interference. It must be noted,
however, that it is God who works with the creature and not the creature
with God. The creature can in no way limit God's activity, but God can
172limit that of the creature. Barth summarizes his idea of concursus
in this ways
As causa prima He (God) precedes and accompanies and follows
the causae secundae. Therefore, His causare consists and consists
only, in the fact that He bends their activity to the execution
of his own will which is His will of grace, subordinating their
operations to the specific„gperation which constitutes the history
of the covenant of grace.
Here again is another view which, even though it acknowledges the
existence of secondary causes, provides very little scope for their
independent operation. These particular comments occur in Earth's
discussion of providence, but no where in his discussion of creation is




Macquarrie, too, believes that creaturely activity is limited,
but his view is quite different from Barth's. Man is entrusted with
the responsibility for existence, yet God who has entrusted man with this
responsibility has "fixed the boundaries," and man cannot break through
these to reverse "the trend of creation which goes from nothing toward
17if
fuller being." This is a far more flexible idea than Berth's. There
is no indication of "bending" the creature to the creator's will. In
commenting on the imago Dei, Macquarrie says it is to be thought of in
terms of a "potentiality for being that is given to man with his very
being." He continues:
Main is a creature, but as the creature that 'exists,' he
has an openness into which he can move outward and upward. ...
At the level of human existence we have passed beyond the levels
of beings having fixed essences to existent being, and we have
already seen that while man is a creature of God, he has the
potentiality for becoming the 'offspring' of God or for being
•adopted' into Sonship and so for somehow participating in God's
life. It is when we consider this openness whereby creaturely
being may be taken up into holy Being that we get, so to speak,
a breathtaking.view into creation in all its unimaginable
possibilities.
The view expressed here is obviously one wherein at least one
creature, man, has the responsibility and the capacity for creating
himself—not in the sense of giving himself existence but in the sense
of determining what the features of that existence will be. Not only
man but other creatures too have this capacity, even though they have
it in a much more limited way. Macquarrie speaks of there being a
17^
Macquarrie, op. cit., p. 225-
175Ibid., p. 213.
hierarchy of beings. This hierarchy is determined by the capacity of
the various creatures to be in the imago dei. He cites and supports
Thomas' view that all creatures tend to imitate God. For him this
means that all creatures, even hydrogen atoms, are like God in their
capacity for "letting-be" or in giving being to other creatures. Since
"letting-be" is the essence of the creative act for Macquarrie, then
it seems fair to conclude that he sees all creatures being at least to
some extent, creative.
A link is seen here between man and the rest of nature. Man,
though distinct from nature,is not separate from it. Also implied
here is that there is a real risk in creation. With the capacity for
letting-be there is the possibility of rebellion rather than cooperation.
To speak of risk means freedom—freedom which can either be used
176
creatively or destructively.
It is impossible to generalize, then, about the relationship of
the creaturely creativity to divine creativity. Those who think along
Augustinian lines tend to see less scope for cooperation for those than
those whose thinking is influenced by Thomas. The issue appears to be
unsettled as to how much freedom a creature has in his creative act.
The one point of universal agreement, however, is that God's creative
act is unique in that it alone gives being. Whether this be approached
essentially or existentially, it properly belongs to God to give the





We now turn briefly to another issue which has received consid¬
erable attention in connection with the doctrine of creations the
question of the relationship of creation to time. Until fairly recent
times, the church accepted the account in Genesis 1 and 2 as literal
history., Therefore, the belief was that God created the world some six
thousand years ago. The question seems to have arisen frequently,
"What did God do before he made the world?" Various answers were given.
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Origin believed that before God made this world, he made others.
Augustine, however, had the insight that speaking of a time before the
creation would be impossible since time itself is a creature having come
into existence when the world was created. One cannot inquire abouta
178
time before creation because there simply was none. Time is the
measure of change in the created v/orld. God is unchanging and, therefore ,
not involved in time. This conclusion proved to be highly influential.
Thomas would agree that creation is outside of time since time
is an attribute of creation, but he argues that it cannot be proven
philosophically that there is a first assignable moment of time nor
can it be proven that a creation of a first moment is an impossibility.
Philosophy cannot settle this question. The answer can only be attained
through revelation, and revelation testifies to the creation of the
^'Origin, De Principio, III. V. 304. Cited by Strahan,
op. cit., p. 220.
178
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world in time and not from eternity. Thomas saw no problem at all in
the notion of a series without a beginning. Copleston comments:
In hie (Thomas') eyes the question whether it would be
possible for the world to have passed through infinite time
does not arise, since there is strictly no passing through an
infinite series if there is no first term in the series. More¬
over, for St. Thomas a series can be infinite ex parte ante
and finite ex parte post, and it can be added to at the end at
which it is finite. In general, there is no contradiction
between being brought into existence and existing ^ggm eternity:
if God is eternal, God have created from eternity.
Among contemporary thinkers, E. L. Mascall is one who believes
that the doctrine of creation is not concerned with a hypothetical act
by which God brought the world into existence, but rather with the
incessant act by which he preserves the world in its existence. Most
people, however, read the creation narratives as description of the
beginning of the finite world even though they accept the descriptions
as non-literal. Mascall believes that this identification of a world
beginning with the doctrine of creation is most likely the result of
nineteenth century deism wherein the world was considered so stable and
well ordered that it could keep itself going according to the laws of
Newtonian physics. There was no need at all in deist systems for any-
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thing more than this original moment of creation.
A first moment of creation receives little or no mention from
other contemporary thinkers. There appears to be implicit agreement
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Thomas Aquinas, Sunima Theological op. cito, k6. 2c«
^°^Copleston, op. cit., p. 86.
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(Archon Books, 19&5), PP» 132-137-
that this is more a scientific question than a philosophical or theo¬
logical one. Certainly, the existence or non-existence of such a first
moment would in no way affect the three affirmations stated above.
CONCLUSION
To draw together what we've been saying, we have found that the
Doctrine of Creation is primarily a statement of faith. Its purpose is
to express the relationship between God and man as Creator and creature.
Ever since the close of the nineteenth century, theology has been forced
to admit that this doctrine is making religious and not scientific
assertions. Thus, it cannot seek to explain the mechanics of the world
process, but rather the status of the world and man vis-a-vis God. Two
ideas are the foundation on which the Doctrine of Creation is built—
creatio ex nihilo and creatio per verbum.
One intention of creatio ex nihilo is to deny any correlation
between God's creative act and man's. Even though, both are creators,
God and nan create in radically different ways. Man is dependent on
the things he finds around him. God needs nothing and uses nothing.
God's act is absolute origination, while man's is simply transformation
of what he is given. But the difference is even greater than this.
Since Aquinas, theologians have said that God's creative act was the
gift of existence, that he and he alone bestowed being on all creatures.
The creature's existence depends completely on God, for it in God's
decision whether or not that creature or any other should be. Another
intention of creatio ex nihilo is well summarised by Macquarrie when
he says that it "drati?s attention to the fact that any particular being
stands, so to speak, between nothing and Being," It is only the grace
of God that brings the creature out of non-being and sustains him from
slipping back into non-being.1^2
The equating of creation with the gift of being leads theology
away from thinking about God's creativity as being solely originative
to seeing it also as continuing. The creature owes not only his moment
of origination to God but every moment of his subsequent existence. God
gives existence and he sustains it. This is, however, much more than
just keeping the mechanism well wound. As God sustains, he also directs
the creature toward its appointed end. Providence is part of God's
creative act. The creature is brought from nothingness and kept from
nothingness by God's creative power. The original relationship between
God and his creature is perpetually maintained.
The closest idea theology lias to a "how" explanation of creation
is the concept of creatio per verbum. Here God is seen as working
through his Word to effect all things, but again this is not a "scientific"
explanation of how tilings come into existence. The ancient Jews thought
of God summoning all tilings into existence. Their idea, was that the
"word" by which God creates was literally his spoken utterance, but
gradually this concept changed. The "Word" took on its own identity
within the Godhead. St. John speaks of the Word which created becoming
flesh. Irenaeus called the Word and the Spirit God's "hands" which he
uses in his creating. By the time of the Trinitarian controversies
the Word was understood as the "Logos" which was the pre-existent Son of
.cquarrie, op. cit., p. 198.
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God who has been with the Father froa the beginning* Christ was seen as
the incarnation of this creative Logos, Thus, the same power Which
created the world is also its Saviour. An intimate, essential, but often
minimised relationship between creation and salvation is thereby established.
These two notions formed the base which could support three
contentions about creations God is the source of all ercistence end all
that is is dependent on Mm} Creation, even though corrupted by sin, is
good; and, creation is a free act of God's gracioiis love. These con¬
tentions seem to moot theologians to express the truth of the doctrine
of creation. They establish a transcendent God who is nonetheless
iranaaontly involved in the world at the most fundamental level of giving
it itj being. Because God la good, what lie does in his creating is good
and he creates a good cosmos. Reasons differ as to why v/e might regard
this creation as good, but there is agreement among theologians that it
is not our evaluation, but God's, which is important. The world is good
because God pronounced it good, because he valued it so. This does not
deny, though ft often seems to minimise, the significance of sin and
evil. The world is created each moment good, but somehow in each moment
evil, can also be found. Evil is perhaps the hardest problem facing any
formulation of a doctrine of creation based on a belief in a good God.
Finally, God's goodness is the only motive he has for his creating.
Nothing els© causes him to do it. He creates out of love with the
purpose of establishing a loving communion between himself and his
creation. He provides tho opportunity of the greatest possible happiness
of there being something other than himself which can be in union with
himself.
Chapter 2
THE PROCESS CONCEPT OF CREATION
The fundamental principle of process thought is the notion of
creativity. Alfred North Whitehead ranked it as the ultimate of ulti¬
mate notionsIn so doing, he left the path followed by previous
western philosophy. No one before him had given creativity such
precedence. Up until Whitehead, ideas such as form, matter, substance,
and being were considered the most fundamental notions. These all share
one thing in common. They are categories which describe reality as being
basically static. For this reason, Whitehead could not use them to
express his vision of reality. Only those categories which give a
dynamic description of reality could be considered fundamental. Why?
Because what Whitehead saw as being most real was what he called process.
PROCESS AND CREATIVITY
The most complete exposition of Whitehead's thought Is found in
his Gifford Lectures of 1927-28, which he published under the title
Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. In this book he endeavors
"to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in
•'•Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in




which every element of our experience can be interpreted."* The basic
generalization found here is that the entire cosmos is composed of a
non-stop, non-hesitating series of events. As Charles Hartshorne says,
"The most concrete mode of reality is not existing substance, thing, or
person, but actually occurring event, state, or experience.The flow
of these events is so rapid and their duration so brief that it is
impossible to distinguish one event in a series from another. The situ¬
ation is like watching a movie where one sees the action in the film as
continuous rather than as a sequence of separate frames which is what
the movie actually is.4 These events, which are generally referred to
as "actual entities," are the ultimate things which compose creation.
The actual world is, therefore, to be seen as a process—the process of
the creation of these events. Whitehead states this fundamental
principle as follows:
How an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual
entity is; so that the two descriptions are not independent.
Its 'being' is constituted by its 'becoming.' This is the
'principle of process.'
We are then correct in saying that the process is a creative process,
since it is the creation of actual entities.
Ibid., p. 4.
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Whitehead placed creativity along with the notions of "many" and
"one" in his "category of the ultimate*" because these three ideas ware
seen as the necessary referents to everything that exists* Of the three,
creativity was the ultimate principle because it is the way "by which
the many which are the universe disjunctively become the one occasion
which is the universe conjunctively."7 Creativity is, therefore, the
essence of the process* It is the fundamental principle because it is
manifested in all reality. It is found in everything from the most
fleeting electronic imnulse to the eternal existence of God* Hartshorn*
assures us, "There is nothing but creative experience."®
This notion of creative experience goes farther than simply
stating that all of reality has creative capacity* It means that each
instance of reality actually creates. While some distinction must be
made between supreme creativity and lesser forms of It, some creativity
must be attributed to all actuality. Hartshorns puts the issue quite
clearly:
To be Is to create. According to this view, when we praise
certain individuals as 'creative' we can mean only that what they
create is important or extensive, while What others create is
trivial or slight. But what they create cannot be aero, so long
as tlie Individuals exist.9
This quotation hints at a possible reason why creativity has
been neglected for being considered sn ultimate principle in ether
7Ibid., p. 31.
®Charlos Kartshorne, Creative .Synthesis and Philosophic Method
(London: SCM Press, 1970), p. 7.
g
Ibid*, p. 1. See also hartshorn©'s A Katurai Theology for
Our Time, op. clt.. p* 26.
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philosophical systems. This neglect may be due in part to the fact that
in ordinary language the word is applied only to the more conspicuous
and exceptional modes of creativity. Artists, scientists and other
people are called creative when they introduce new ways of thinking or
feeling or when they bring into being things that had not previously
existed or had not been distinctly anticipated before. Process thought
takes this idea and expands it into a basic metaphysical description of
reality. The human creativity just mentioned is one form of creativity,
but there are also forms for the other animals and, beyond them, forms
for what are generally believed to be inanimate objects. Even atoms
exist by means of their creative experience.1^
The contention here is not that everything creates. While some
things are obviously creative, there are things, such as tables and chairs,
sticks and stones, which obviously are not. However, when these non-
creative things are broken down into their most singular, concrete
components, these components will, in some way or other, manifest creati¬
vity. This may be minimal, but nonetheless some creativity will be found.
For example, a rock is not creative, but the atoms which make up the
molecules of a rock are.11
In discussing creation, process thought first focuses its atten¬
tion on understanding these basic exemplifications of creativity which
are the actual entities.
"^Charles Hartshome, Whitehead's Philosophy (Lincoln: Uni¬




The most singular, concrete components of reality are actual
entities. They are "the final real things of which the world is made
up.Everything that is not an actual entity is either a group of
such entities or an abstraction from them. For the sake of clarity,
it should be mentioned here that one is not, in the normal course of
experience, aware of actual entities. Furthermore, they rarely appear
in scientific analysis. Human experience and scientific experimentation
are largely concerned with entities that are groupings of actual entities
rather than with individual actual entities themselves. Since actual
entities endure for only a fraction of a second, they can be detected
only by intense Introspection or by sophisticated scientific instru¬
ments.^ Nevertheless, they are regarded as the ultimate units of
reality. Therefore, the concept of actual entities needs considerable
clarification and careful definition. The ontological question must be
asked: What is the nature of the reality of actual entitles?
Actual Entitles as Energy Events
John Cobb's description of actual entities as "energy events" is
a helpful model to use in understanding them.^ Cobb prefaces his dis¬
cussion of this model by pointing out that traditional metaphysics has
•^whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 33.
13
Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op. cit., p. 40.
^John B. Cobb, Jr., God and the World (Philadelphia: VJest-
minster Press, 1969), pp. 69-70.
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always wrestled with the problem of whether mind or matter was "the
really real." The question being asked was, "Is reality basically mental
or physical?"
This is no longer a proper question. Modern physics has made it
very difficult to get any clear idea of just what constitutes a physical
reality. For example, the seemingly solid, inert objects which are often
used as illustrations of physical reality have been found to be made up
of sub-atomic particles which are highly active. Very few of the
physical properties one attributes to a stone—properties such as endur¬
ance through time, passivity, and impenetrability—can be applied to an
electron. An electron can best be understood as a succession of events
which transmit energy from past events to future ones. "The building
blocks of the universe, the things of which everything else is composed,
are energy events.Modern physics, therefore, gives a description
of physical reality which is not the one usually employed by philosophers.
A similar situation exists as concerns mantal reality. Modern
psychology has blurred considerably any understanding of what would be a
mental reality. The dynamics of psychosomatic relationships have made
a clear separation of the mental from the physical impossible. Even
"thought" which is generally regarded as exemplifying mentality, has been
shown to be intimately related to physical reality. It, too, may be
conceptualized as an energy event. "The act of thinking receives energy
from past occurences in the body and transmits that energy appropriately
15Ibid., p. 70.
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modified to subsequent events."16 The question than is not the relation¬
ship of mind to matter, but the relationship of a conscious (mental)
energy event to an unconscious (physical) one.
Process thought thus rejects the ontological dualism of mind and
matter or of a strictly meital and a strictly physical reality. The two
are not different types of reality. Cobb elaborates in this way:
... if thought is viewed as the characteristic function of
mind and sensory extension as that of the physical, the experience
of the physical through the senses is neither clearly mental
nor physical. Emotion likewise falls under neither heading. For
these and other reasons, ontological dualism is profoundly unsatis¬
factory.17
What is crucially important in this discussion is grasping the
idea that mind and matter, when understood as energy events, do not
belong to completely different order of being. Both are a succession of
events transmitting energy from preceding events to following ones. In
some instances, such as the case of inorganic matter, the energy trans¬
mitted from one event to another may be only very slightly converted.
In what can be termed living matter the conversion can, and often is,
quite radical. There are, therefore, vast differences between the various
types of events. Energy events are highly diverse in character.
Electronic events are not like human experiences in any inclusive way,
but all energy events do have a basic ontological similarity. Therefore,
a fundamental identity can be established between an occasion of human




IsJohn B. Cobb, Jr., "The Finality of Christ in a Whiteheadian
Perspective," The Finality of Christ, ed. Dow Kirkpatrick (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1966), p. 122.
96
For process thought, the model of actual entities as energy
events is broad and flexible enough to include the totality of what
other philosophies have classified as mind and matter. There is no
reality to which it does not apply. Whitehead insists that the notion
of actual entities can be sufficiently extended to include God, as well
as the lowliest occasion of experience. There is but one basic grains
of reality—actual entities.19 His introduction to the concept puts
it well:
There is no going behind actual entities to find anything
more real. They differ among themselves: God is an actual
entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-
off enpty space. But though there are gradations of importance,
and diversities of function, yet in the principles which
actuality exemplifies all are on the same level. The final
facts are, all alike, actual entities; and these actual entities
are drops of experience, complex and interdependent.20
CREATIVE SYNTHESIS
Actual entities are the fundamental facts of creation. Des¬
cribing them as energy events has stressed their dynamic nature. The
principle of process pointed out that an entity's being is constituted
by its becoming. We must, therefore, turn our attention to this to see
what is involved in the experience that constitutes an actual entity,
Hartshorne calls the experience of an actual entity "creative
synthesis." As a summary description, it may be said that creative
synthesis is the process of self-creation, whereby each entity fuses
together the vast multiplicity of influences bearing in upon it
19Whitehead, Process and Reality, op» cit., p. 168.
2°Ibia.. p. 28. The question of whether God is an actual entity
or a society of entities is discussed below. See pages 179-182.
producing the one singular experience which is its reality. Each ex¬
perience is more than just a suiwration of antecedent events, for by
means of the synthesis, the experience has added its own uniqueness to
21
the totality of reality.
Hartshorne*s notion of creative synthesis has been appropriated
almost totally from Whitehead. Whitehead called this process "prehension.
Hartshorne has said that this theory of prehension is "one of the finest
22
contributions ever made to epistomology." Most process thinkers, in¬
cluding Hartshome on occasion, use the term prehension instead of
creative synthesis. Hartshorne's terminology seems preferable for the
purposes of this paper, since it emphasizes the creative aspect of the
experience of actual entities. The two terms will, though, be used
interchangeably.
There are four factors determlng each creative synthesis:
(1) the "subject" which is the actual entity performing the synthesis;
(2) the "data" which are the objects of the synthesis; (3) the
"subjective form" which is how the subject decides to synthesize the
objects; and (4) God who is both the beginning and the end of the
23
process of creative synthesis.
21
The most compact discussion of this is the first chapter of
Hartshorne's Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. cit.,
pp. 3-19.
22
"Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. clt., p. 125.
^^Whitehead did not include God as a special factor determining
a prehension. God, in his thinking, is considered as part of the data
a subject receives. While this is true, God's role is far more
essential than this classification implies* as we shall see. Other
process thinkers included in this paper do define a special role for
God in each creative synthesis.
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THE SUBJECT
The most important factor in creative synthesis is the subject
itself. Whitehead, says that the experiencing subject is the primary
substance of philosophy. As far as he is concerned, "Apart from the
experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, nothing,
bare nothingness.The locus of the creative act then is found in
the subject's own creative synthesis.
The Reformed Subjectlvist Principle
Process thought functions on the basis of the "reformed sub¬
ject!vist principle." Whitehead enthusiastically endorses Descartes'
idea that "those substances which are the subject enjoying conscious
experience provide the primary data for philosophy•This, he says,
is the greatest philosophical insight anyone has had since Plato and
Aristotle. For Whitehead, the whole of the universe consists of the
elements that are disclosed in the experiences of subjects, and process
is the happening of these experiences. Succinctly stated, the reformed
subjectivist principle reads: "The subjective experiencing is the
primary metaphysical situation which is presented to metaphysics for
analysis.
^Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 254.
2^Ibid.. p. 241. He does comment, however, "Descartes missed
the full sweep of his own discovery, and he and his successors, Locke
and Hume, continued to construe the functionings of the subjective
enjoyment of experience according to the substance-quality categories."
The "reformation" of Descartes' subjectivist principle is in refusing
to recognize these categories as fundamental.
26Ibid., p. 243.
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A frequently used illustration of the reformed subjectivist
approach concerns the greyness of a stone. Substance-quality metaphysics
takes the statement "The stone is grey" as its basic abstraction.
According to the reformed subjectivist principle, the basic abstraction
is "my ejqperience of the stone as grey" from which "the stone is grey"
must be regarded as a derivative abstraction. What Whitehead finds
basic is what the occasion feels for itself and not, for example, the
simple "impression of sensation" as Hume suggested.
Self-Creation
Creative synthesis is literally centered in the subject. It is
first and foremost a process of self-creation. Although the idea of
self-creation does not exclude the idea of being created by others, the
belief that creation is basically the actual entity's creating itself
is of first importance in understanding process thought.
Hartshorne says we can find the basis for such a view in our own
experiences. Each of us, each moment of our lives, accomplishes the
remarkable creative act of having his own experience of that moment.
To argue against this that one does not create his own experience because
there are many causes altering that experience from the outside, only
proves that these causes alone cannot fully explain the experience. CXit
of many causes, only one experience arises. The many causal factors
must be integrated into the one experience, not just an experience but
the one which does in fact take place. Such integration cannot be
explained except by the unity which the experiencing subject itself
imposes on the various causes. Hartshorne elaborates In this manner:
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A person experiences, at a given moment, many things
at once, objects perceived, past experiences remembered.
That he perceives certain objects and remembers certain
things, we can more or less explain; the objects are there,
the experiences are recent and connected by associations
with objects, and so on. But an experience is not fully
described in its total unitary quality merely by specify¬
ing what it perceives and remembers. There is the question
of how, with just what accent, in just what perspective
of relative vividness and emotional colouring, the perceiv¬
ing and remembering are done. And no matter how we deduce
requirements for these aspects from the causes, we have
still omitted the unity of all the factors and aspects.
There is the togetherness of them all, in a unity of feel¬
ing which gives each perception and each memory its
unique place and value in this experience, such as it
could have in no other.27
In this final unity of the multiplicity of factors entering any ex¬
perience the meaning of self-creation is found. It is in the entity's
freedom to make the final decision of how it will synthesize the data
it has received.
Whitehead enjoys repeating the fact that entities are causa sui.
It is a mistake to think of them as being the result of external factors.
The final determination in any synthesis is the subject's own self-
determination. The entity itself is responsible for the results of its
own synthesis.
THE DATA
The entity itself is the subject of its synthesis; other entities
are objects. The entities that are included by another entity in its
synthesis form the data of its synthesis. "All creation is self-creation
27
Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. clt.,
p. 2.
28Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit.. pp. 135, 339.
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which becomes an element in the self-creation of other subjects. "29
Even though an entity is basically self-caused, it is not entirely so.
The data are also causes for they are the raw material which are used
in the synthesis. The antity is not capable of creating its own data.
These must be given it for the simple reason that there cannot be a
synthesis unless there is already something to be synthesized.30 Each
entity arises out of its "actual world"—that is the nexus of all other
entities that have previously had their synthesis and are available for
the present one to use in its synthesis.^1
Process thinkers point out that each entity has a heritage.
This heritage is made up of those other actual entities to which the
entity synthesizing is spacially and temporally related. Each entity as
the subject of its own synthesis receives its predecessors as objects.
It will in turn become an object for subsequent events. Hartshorne
outlines it in this manner:
Let us take a given act of synthesis, _S, following upon
other preceeding acts, A, B, . . . . In the act C, A and B
are not created for they had already been created previously.
Hence, in this act A and B are not created, do not become;
rather, they enjoy the status of having become. But in the
becoming of C as successor to 13, this relationship to (and
including) B does become. Succession ... is essentially
cumulative. First without reference to C, then C as
successor of 13 ... . The products of creation cannot be
until they are created, but having been created they are
bound henceforth to be.^2
29
Charles Hartshorne. "The God of Religion and the God of
Philosophy," Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. II,
1967-68, (London: MacMillan, 1969), p. 166.
30
Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. cit., p. 126.
31Ibld., p. 30.
32
Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method,
op. cit., p. 15.
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Two things need to be noted in this analysis. First, each datum
has been the subject of its own synthesis and subsequently has become an
object to be used in other synthesis. It cannot be a subject and an
object at the same time. An entity's subjectivity always precedes its
objectivity. Secondly, since they have already had their subjectivity,
data are not changed by their inclusion in the synthesis. They remain
what they previously were. Temporally prior entities do not depend on
their successors for their reality. Their reality has already been
achieved in their own synthesis. This means that the subject-object
relationship is external or non-constitutive for the data being used in
the synthesis. However, it is internal and constitutive for the subject
synthesizing. The subject could not become what it does become without
synthesizing just that data it does in fact synthesize.^
Causal Efficacy
Because they are constitutive of the entity, the data of a syn¬
thesis are said to have "causal efficacy" and are considered to be the
efficient causes of a synthesis. They provide the reasons why new
entities have the characteristics they do in fact have. Whitehead's
ontological principle puts the issue quite clearly. "Actual entities
are the only reasons; so that to search for a reason is to search for
one or more actual entities.in the sense that previous actual
entities are the data needed for an entity's synthesis, they can be
said to be creators of that entity.
33
Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. cit., p. 125-26.
34
Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 36.
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The causal efficacy an entity will have for subsequent entities
will depend on how it constituted itself in its own moment of creation.
Whitehead points out that to be is to become a potential for every
subsequent becoming. Each entity has in its own ccncresence fixed
itself and formed its own destiny for becoming part of another syn¬
thesis.^ For example, Plato has enormously influenced Western philos¬
ophy, and even though he has been dead for over two thousand years,
continues to influence it now. The influence he exerts is in what he
said and did when he was alive. Even though interpretations of him have
changed, Plato remains Plato. It is as men read Plato encounter his
ideas, and deal with than in their own thinking that Plato exerts his
influence. All causal efficacy is of this nature. Once an entity is
36
an object, it can be a cause of other entities.
The fundamental difference, thai, between a subject and an
object is that the subject is present, the object past. The objects a
subject experiences are nothing more than past subjects. Causal efficacy
is always efficacy of the past. Causes, therefore, are always objects,
and effects are always subjects. Cobb does caution, though:
35Ibid.. p. 33.
36
Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity: A Social Con¬
ception of God (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1942),
p. 16. Hartshorne illustrates this point with particular reference to
the relationship of Plato and Leibniz. Leibniz was influenced by
Plato but Plato did not influence him. This seeming contradiction
is resolved when one understands that it was only as Leibniz was aware
of Plato, that Plato could influence him. Plato did not consciously
decide to influence Leibniz. This would have been impossible since
Plato lived several centuries before Leibniz. Furthermore, Plato did
not determine what influence he would have on Leibniz. Leibniz
himself made this determination by incorporating much of Plato's thought
into his own. What Plato himself determined was the influence he could
have by having precisely those thoughts that he did have.
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The correctness of the epistemological analysis of
experience according to the subject-object scheme must not
be allowed to lead to an ontological view of objects as
different in kind from subjects in any way other than the
difference between past and present.3'
Perishing and Immortality
When an entity is experiencing its own synthesis, it is a subject,
but when that synthesis is complete and the subject obtains satisfaction,
it ceases to be a subject and becomes an object. As a subject it
"perishes" but as an object it attains "immortality."
The word "perish" is used in a highly technical sense by process
thinkers. They do not use it to mean being annihilated or even to be
changed or diminished. When a subject becomes an object it does not
become nothing but rather assumes another mode of being. Hartshorne
explains that, "'Perishing* is the realizing of the past in the present
as immortal actuality."38 To perish, therefore, means to cease being a
subject and, thereby, become objectifiable by other entities.
Hartshorne is not happy with the use of the term "perishing" to
describe the process of objectification. "1 could never see in the
'perishing' of actual entities anything more than a misleading metaphore
which, taken literally, contradicts the dictum, * entities become but do
not change.'"39 He continues by saying that any entity becomes during
(from an extended point of view) a finite time and is succeeded by ether
37
Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op. cit.. p. 44.
38




actualities which objectify it along with their other predecessors, the
objectifications being more or less abstract or deficient. The term
perishing suggests that the entity is something less as an object than
it was as a subject. This is not true. What is true is that an object
is rarely fully objectified by a subject in its synthesis. Philosophers
who use Plato do not simply repeat his thoughts or reproduce them
completely. These thoughts, rather, are used as the foundation or the
springboard for their own thinking.
It is through objectification that an entity attains immortality.
It is immortal in the sense that it can become part of another entity
through that entity's own synthesis. While its personal life concludes
with the satisfaction it attains in its own synthesis, it still has a
public life ahead as it is included in the larger matrix of other actual
entities. Whitehead says that following its life as a subject, an
actual entity passes into "its objective immortality as a new objective
condition added to the riches of definiteness attainable, the 'real
potentiality' of the universe.1,40 Objective immortality then insures
that there is a future for any entity beyond itself in the fashioning
of other entities. *
40Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. clt., p. 340.
41
Ibid., pp. 89, 192. It is worthwhile noting that an entity
does not experience its immortality. No longer being a subject this
would be impossible. It is other subjects who experience the immor¬
tality of an object. In process thinking there is no subjective
immortality.
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THE TWO ASPECTS OF SYNTHESIS
Subjects include objects in their own synthesis in two ways.
There is the concrete aspect of synthesis and the conceptual aspect.
42
Whitehead calls these the physical and mental poles of prehension.
The Concrete Aspect of Synthesis
The concrete aspect of synthesis is the inclusion of one actual
entity (a datum) by another (the subject) in its process of self creation.
When a datum is synthesized physically, it undergoes a literal transfer.
By what is called "re-enaction," "reproduction," or "conformation" the
concrete components of one entity become part of another distinct entity.
/
This physical aspect of the synthesis is said to have a "vector quality"
in the sense that it takes "what is there and transfers it to what is
here."43 For example, the entities composing the red rubber ball which
42
Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., pp. 49, 165, 375ff.
Whitehead frequently talks as though there were two distinct types of
prehensions—physical and mental. Often he seems to be implying that
one can take place without the other. That is, that there could be a
strictly physical prehension and a strictly mental one. This is care¬
lessness on his part. The analysis consistent with his overall view
is the one set out here. There is the single prehension which has
two aspects. Whitehead gives an elaborate discussion of the various
"phases" of a prehension indicates the inseparability of mental and
physical prehensions. He does not, unfortunately, say that they are
in fact two sides of the one coin. Though he deplores the "disastrous
separation of mind and body" which he finds characteristic of philosophical
systems derived from Descartes, he does not seen aware that his frequent
references gf the mental prehensions and physical prehensions leaves
him open to the same criticism.
43
Ibid., p. 133. A. H. Johnson comments that in physics
vectors are quantities that have direction (i.e. force and velocity)
as well as magnitude. In Mology vectors are the carriers of micro¬
organisms. Process thought can appropriately use the term vector with
both these connotations in mind. A. H. Johnson, Whitehead's Theory of
Reality (Boston: Beacon Hill, 1952), p. 40.
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existed a moment ago are reproduced in the red rubber ball which exists
now. These entities will then be reproduced in the red rubber ball
which will exist an instant from now. If they are not reproduced,
there will be no red rubber ball.
Data are not reproduced completely or re-enacted exactly in any
synthesis. No new synthesis is merely a reproduction of a previous one.
An object furnishes itself as datum for a subject, but, as we saw
earlier, the subject will synthesize that datum in its own way, The
subject receives all its data in tact, but in the synthesis the data
undergo change. In some instances, such as the ball mentioned above,
the change from one instance of synthesis to the next is quite minimal.
If the environment of the ball is stable, thai it would be hard to
detect change. But no environment is completely stable. New data is
always entering a sequence of syntheses, and in each instance of syn¬
thesis the data is being transformed by the subject into a novel
experience.^
An important point to be noted here is that the link between
object and subject is to be found in the re-enactment of the object by
the subject and not in a mutual exemplification of an abstract factor.
For example, the endurance of the emotion anger from one moment to the
next is part of the concrete aspect of synthesis. When this anger
appears in two successive events, it is not the abstraction anger which
connects the one event to the other, it is the actual concrete
44
Johnson, op. clt., p. 29.
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exemplification of anger which has been synthesized. The specific
anger itself endures from one synthesis to the next. A characteristic
is, therefore, retained from one synthesis to the next through the
concrete aspect of synthesis.
The Conceptual Aspect of Synthesis
In addition to the specific, concrete factors which data con¬
tribute to a synthesis, there are also ideas and abstractions which
constitute the conceptual aspect. In each synthesis a subject prehends
not only the concrete aspects of the data but also the conceptual or
abstract aspects which are exemplified in the definiteness of concrete
aspects. Though given to the subject by the data, these concepts are
independent of any particular actualization.
Cobb explains this relationship by way of example. He discusses
his seeing a green tie and says:
According to physics and physiology, we know that a train
of light coming from the molecules in the tie strikes our eye
and activates certain cells there which in turn relay this
impact to the optical lobe. It is only after all this has
occurred that we experience the green patch somehow projected
back onto roughly the region of space where those molecules
are located.45
This is the physical aspect of synthesis. Literally thousands of
successive events convey the image that was seen. Somehow, though,
it was a specific, recognizable image that was seen. The light waves,
nerve impulses, etc., have been transmuted into the concepts of
greenness and tie-ness. These abstractions are then projected back
^^Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op. cit., p. 30.
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onto the image, and what is seen is identified as a green tie and not,
say, a white cloud. The process of transforming the data received into
the notion of a green tie is a mental operation. Cobb's ability to
apply greenness and tie-ness to this object is due to the conceptual
aspect of the final synthesis in the sequence of events which compose
his seeing the tie. Through the conceptual aspect of the presentation,
data are received in an organized, meaningful way.
Whitehead believes that what is being prehended in the conceptual
aspect of synthesis are eternal objects.48 These eternal objects are a
very important aspect of his thought. He defines than as "any entity
whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to
any definite actual entities of the temporal world."4^ What Whitehead
has in mind are colors, forms, qualities of feeling, relationship between
entities, geometric patterns, and arithmetic relations. No specific
concrete referent is required for these. One can conceive of triangu¬
larity without thinking of any particular triangle.
Although he calls them entities, eternal objects are not the
same as actual entities. They can be distinguised from actual entities
not only by their abstract nature but also by the fact that they are
indifferent to actualization. They can be actualized repeatedly without
being modified. They remain eternally what they are.48 There has
48Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 379.
47Ibid., p. 70.
48
Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op. cit., p. 158.
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always been the greenness of the green tie which Cobb saw, This greenness
exists independent of whether or not it appears in a tie, in grass, or
in skin color of a visitor from outer space.
Eternal objects, therefore, transcend actual entities. They are
not, however, actual until they have been actualized by an actual entity.
Before this, they exist only as pure possibilities for realization and
they form, therefore, the realm of pure potentiality.
When Whitehead speaks about eternal objects, he has in mind
Plato's eternal forms,49 The two are not identical, however, and we
should note the difference between then. Whitehead's eternal objects
are said to "ingress" in actual entities; Plato maintains that actual
entities "participate" in the eternal forms. Eternal objects are
transcendent in the sense that they can ingress into a multiplicity of
actual entities but they have only this role of ingression. They are
no more than possibilities for actual entities, Plato's forms have an
ideal state in which the entities participate deficiently. They do
have a life other than that of being actualized, and their actualization
is little more than a reminder of their eternal, ideal state.
Not all process thinkers find it necessary to describe the
conceptual aspect of synthesis in terms of prehending eternal objects.-^
49Whitehead, Process and Reality, op, cit., pp. 69-70.
9Edward Pols, Whitehead's Metaphysics; A Critical Examination
of Process and Reality (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1967).
51
For example, see Evert W. Hall, "Of What Use are Whitehead's
Eternal Objects," Journal of Philosophy, XXV, January 16, 1930.
Reprinted in Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on IHs Philosophy, George
L. Kline, ed.
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While Cobb contends, "There can be little doubt that there are eternal
52
objects," Hartshorne says, "An obscure, if not definitely erronious
feature of Whitehead's view is his notion of eternal objects.
Hartshorne sees no need to posit the existence of a multitude of "forms"
for feelings and sensations. Such, he contends, is certainly not essen¬
tial to the Whitehead!an understanding of creation. There is no reason,
for example, why there needs to be an absolute, independent abstraction
"red" for the redness of the red rubber ball. Characteristics can have
a certain degree of universality without possessing it absolutely or
eternally. He says:
To use the current term, "essences" may perfectly well
emerge in the universe not merely in the world of actuality
but in the total universe of actuality and possibility.
It is true that, before an essence emerges, there must be a
possibility of which its appearance is the actualization;
but the question is whether such a possibility need be as
definite as the quality which actualizes it. The objection
to supposing this is that the process of actualization is
thereby reduced to a mere shuffling ... of primordial
qualitative factors. In short, creation in the proper sense
is denied.
Hartshorne's contention is that genuine creativity does not concern
itself with actualizing "images" that are already there but rather with
bringing into being "new images" that are additions to those which
already are. Hartshorne insists that the distinction between the
possible and actual is between "the relatively indefinite and relatively
definite and between the determinable and the determinate." Therefore,
52
Cobb, A Christian Natural Philosophy, op. clt., p. 159.




only the most general determinables or categories need to be regarded as
eternal. He says:
I see no good ground at all for supposing that, besides
numbers or similarly abstract entities, including metaphysical
categories, every quality of sensation or feeling that occurs
in experience must have its eternal duplicate. Feeling as such,
quality as such, yes, but not red or sweet as determinate
qualities idential with those v/e enjoy in experience. Feeling
is a determinable of infinite range, not a vast sum of deter¬
minates. 55
These objections to the idea of eternal objects can be sum¬
marized by saying that Hartshorne feels (1) they are unnecessary and
(2) they detract from a notion of creation because they are not the result
of the creative process. He says:
"The notion that creation consists in the mere parceling out
of already completed value is exactly what philosophers somewhat
lacking in religious vision, might be expected to have. It is a
denial of any intelligible creativity, divine or creaturly. To
be creative is to add positive determinations to reality, to
enrich the totality of things by new values."^®
This issue does not need to be resolved here and now. Both
Cobb and Hartshome do agree that as each successive actual entity
synthesizes a predecessor, it does so both conceptually and concretely.
The issue of eternal objects will be taken up again when "the eternal




Ibid., p. 65-66. Elsewhere he comments "There is the pos¬
sibility, in its pure or eternal form it is, as Peirce insists and
Whitehead seems at times to forget, essentially continuous. Hence, it
is misleading to talk of 'eternal objects' as though this were a
definite plurality. It is a continuous matrix out of which all
plurality is created." "Comment by Professor Charles Hartshorne" in
Eugene M. Peters, The Creative Advance (St. Louis, The Bethany Press,
1966), p. 139.
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Hartshorne, Anselm's Discovery, op. clt., p. 59.
57Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, p. 66.
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DIPOLARITY
Actual entities can synthesize both concretely and conceptually
because they are "dipolar." Each entity can be described as having a
mental and physical pole. The physical pole of an entity refers to
its capacity to receive data concretely and to synthesize the concrete
aspect of this data into its own subjectivity. The mental pole expresses
the entity's ability to entertain abstractions which are derived from
the data and also to imagine other abstractions which are not exemplified
in the data.
Through the physical pole, an entity feels itself related to and
derived from its actual past. A subject prehends physically only its
immediate predecessors. The physical pole cannot, so to speak, step
back in time and include the concrete aspects of objects which are not
contiguous to it in time and space. Physically, an entity does not
experience those things which happened, say, an hour ago. It physically
prehends only those things which have happened the Instant before the
present synthesis. This does not suggest that no physical experience
of the more distant past is possible. An entity can experience what was
experienced an hour ago, if that experience has been continuously passed
on through the sequence of syntheses which took place during this time.
Physically an entity is locked into a time sequence and can synthesize
only its immediate past. Its distant past is experienced only as it has
been re-enacted by all previous entities in the time sequence.
The mental pole is not so restricted. It does not depend on
contiguity. While in the initial phase of a prehension, it receives only
those abstractions which are derived from the data itself and reproduces
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then, in the subsequent phase of the synthesis it can reach outside the
immediate tradition bringing into the synthesis concepts that had been
exemplified by data not physically included in this synthesis.1"ne
most important illustration of this is memory. Something happens in
this moment which triggers our recalling a previous experience. While
we do not physically participate in that experience again, we do mentally
remember what it was like, sometimes with great vividness.
Because of the mental pole, all the conceptual aspects of a
synthesis do not have to be present in the data that is being prehended.
It can include conceptually any part of its relevant past. When such
inclusion takes place, a novel situation arises in place of the mere
reproduction of the previous one.
It is important to note here that "no actual entity is devoid
of either pole; though their relative importance differs in different
actual entities."59 What is being said here is that some synthesis
may be dominated by the actual entity* s physical pole and some by its
-• mental pole, but in no synthesis will either pole be completely lacking.
There is an element of mind and matter in all reality. There is no
such thing as a purely mental reality nor a purely physical one, as we
shall see later.
This dipolar nature of an actual entity accounts for, among
other things, the preservation and change, the limitation and freedom
within the cosmos.
CQ
Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. clt., pp. 380-381.
59Ibid., p. 366.
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What must be underlined before moving on, is that the mental
and physical poles of an entity are inseparable. They compose the dual
nature of the creative urge. There is not, as in classical dualism,
two independent realms of reality, or even two interdependent realms.
There is but the one, "two-sided" reality. When we look at the one
side of the reality, we must always be aware that we are only seeing
part of what must be taken into consideration. This point cannot be
over-emphasized. Lowe states:
Physical inheritance from the environment and novel
•mental* reaction to it, are both, in principle, ascribed
to every occasion . • . . It makes no difference that the
•mentality* involved in inorganic occasions is slight in
proportion as spontaniety is negligible.60
Even though he says the two poles of an actual entity are
indissclvable, Whitehead is not as clear on this point as he could
have been.6-*- Hartshorne, however, is emphatic that there is a dis¬
tinction between process "duality" and classical "dualism." Indeed,
the process intention is that these contrasts be so interlocked
that all classical dualisms expressing an exclusiveness of sub¬
stances based on mutual independence, be overcome. Hartshorne says:
Every actual entity ... is dipolar and that in
several ways. Nothing concrete or actual is merely one
or merely many, or mere cause which is in no effect, or
a completeness which is in no way incomplete or subject
to addition, or an activity which is in no way passive,
or the mere contrary of these.6^
60Victor Lowe, Understanding Whitehead (Baltimore: John
Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 242.
61 .
Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 366.
62Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. cit., p. 68.
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Drawing this together, we find that all data is synthesized
concretely and conceptually because each subject has both a physical
and a mental aspect to its nature. The predominance of these poles
differs from one entity to the next, but nonetheless, each entity has
both physical and mental aspect, and, therefore, data are synthesized
concretely and conceptually.
SUBJECTIVE FORM
We have been speaking of the creative process in terms of an
actual entity synthesizing the data it receives from previous actual
entities and, thereby, creating itself. The creative synthesis is the
single subjective experience of many objects. We have also mentioned
that the creative aspect of synthesis arises from the fact that the
data do not determine how they will be synthesized. This is a decision
that is made by the entity itself. Creative synthesis takes place
when an entity decides what it will do with what it has been given.
An entity's synthesis consists in "mating" the data with ways of
feeling provocative of a private synthesis. These subjective ways of
feeling ... clothe the dry bones with the flesh of a real being,
©notional and purposive.The way in which data are synthesized is
called the "subject form," and the subjective form is, therefore, the
third factor influencing the creative synthesis.
63Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method,
op. cit., p. 117.
64Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 131.
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Feelings
Basically, there are two decisions an actual entity can make
about the data it encounters. First, it can decide either to include or
to exclude a particular datum. Secondly, if it decides to include a
datum, it must further determine just how that datum will be included.
When the decision is made to include a datum, that datum will
be experienced positively, meaning that it will be used by the entity
as a constituent in its own concresence. This positive experiencing of
a datum is called "feeling." A datum is felt when it is included in
the synthesis. Feelings are, therefore, determinative of the synthesis,
because they determine whether or not an object will be permitted to
influence the subject.
If the decision is made to exclude a datum, that datum is re¬
jected. It is recognized as being available, but it is not considered
suitable by the subject for inclusion in the synthesis and therefore,
does not become part of the synthesis. It is inoperative and maintains
an external relationship to the entity synthesizing. This rejection of
a datum is important because it determines what the entity will not
become. An actual entity is what it is, not only because of what it
decides to include in its synthesis but also because of what it leaves
out. For example, Whitehead points out that one reason why North
America is what she is today is that she was never completely dominated
by Spain.66 He also explains:
65Ibid., p. 337.
^Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The
MacMillian Company, 1938), p. 122.
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A feeling bears on itself the scars of its birth; it
recollects as a subjective emotion, its struggle for ex¬
istence; it retains the impress of what it might have
been, but is not. It is for this reason that what an actual
entity has avoided as a datum for feeling, may yet be an
important part of its equipment. The actual cannot be ^
reduced to mere matter of fact in divorce from the potential.0
When a datum is prehended negatively, it is inoperable in the synthesis,
but the subjective form of its exclusion is part of the synthesis.
The fact that an object is included in a synthesis, does not
tall the whole story. Of equal importance is how that object is in¬
cluded. No entity is neutral toward the data it experiences.6® This
attitude which determines how the synthesis will happen, is the 'Sub¬
jective form" of the synthesis. The subjective form is the affective
tone with which a subject experiences an object. Whitehead says there
are many species of subjective forms and as examples lists emotions,
valuations, purposes, adversions, aversions, and consciousness.69
On the conceptual side of synthesis, valuation is always part
of the subjective form. This or that datum is felt to be either import¬
ant, trivial, irrelevant or not wanted. When more than one possibility
is presented, these are evaluated by the subject in accordance with their
importance to the subject. Each will be approved or disapproved in
varying degrees.
6''whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 346.
68
David Griffin says, "When I prehend my mother-in-law, the
content of what I prehend is the objective datum (my mother-in-law as
she appears to me), and this datum is felt with some emotion." David
R. Griffin, A Process Christoloqy, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press,
1973), p. 168.
69
Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 35.
119
Subjective Aim
The subjective form of each synthesis is the result of the fact
that each entity has a "subjective aim." The subjective aim is the
entity's purpose in self-creation—the goal it will seek for itself.70
Whitehead called the subjective aim a "lure for feeling" meaning that
it is this which guides an entity toward its final satisfaction. This
aim is always in accord with what is possible for the entity, taking
into consideration not only the entity's own satisfaction, but also the
contribution it will make to the societies of which it is a part.71
The relationship between the subjective aim and the subjective
form that is the subjective aim is the cause of the subjective form.
Data will be experienced in a particular way because this will or will
not satisfy the subjective aim. For example, if I am in a hurry to get
to my office and I encounter a red light, the subjective form of this
encounter will be annoyance since it thwarts my aim of arriving at work
quickly.
The subjective aim is the key to an entity's self-creation
because it is in accordance with this aim that it will synthesize the
data. It .is each occasion's aim that makes it a distinct individual.
Peter Bertocci discusses this in terms of "willing" and says:
70Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., pp. 37, 130.
71
Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op. cit., pp. 95-96.
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'Willing' is at least that activity of personal effort,
which far from producing the situation with which it is con¬
fronted at any decision point, does create a situation that
would not have ensued had the decision not been made to hold
firm to certain activity-contents as opposed to others.^
Bertocci further feels that these factors would "follow the path of
least resistance" if they were not directed elsewhere. The subjective
aim provides this direction.
The idea of a subjective aim carries with it several closely
related meanings. In normal conversation we speak of a man having an
aim in life. This can mean that he has some very general goal or
purpose that he hopes to attain, for example prosperity or pleasure. It
could also mean, however, that he has some very definite objective that
he wants to achieve such as being President of the United States.
Further, it can refer to the actual things that this man does to achieve
his aim. Usually all three meanings are so closely related that it is
not important to differentiate between than. The subjective aim like¬
wise carries all three connotations. It may be at something general
and/or specific. It may refer also, to the means of achieving this goal.
This act of aiming is perhaps the most precise meaning of the subjective
aim as it relates to the subjective form of a synthesis.^
^Peter Bertocci, "Free Will, the Creativity of God, and Order,"
in Current Philosophical Issues: Essays in Honor of C. J. Ducasse,
Frederick C. Dommeyer, ed. (Springfield, Illinois: C. C. Thomas, 1966),
p. 221.
73
Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op. cit., p. 152.
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Initial Aim
Whitehead points out that there are two phases to the subjective
aim. The first of these is what he calls the "initial aim." This aim
is given to the entity with the data it receives at the beginning of its
synthesis."'4 This aim points the entity toward an ideal possibility for
it but it does so in terms of graduations of possible realizations. The
entity is not forced, however, to accept and actualize what is presented
it in the initial aim. During the subsequent phase of the synthesis, the
actual entity is free to modify or adapt the initial aim. Thus, the
initial aim which is determined for the entity is changed by the entity
into the subjective aim, which governs the synthesis. As Cobb says,
"this self-determination of its own aim is the final locus of freedom
within the limits of causal force as determined by the settled past and
the principle of order inherent in its initial aim"7^
Although an entity may depart from the initial aim in forming
its own subjective aim, the initial aim is never completely abandoned
because it is the basis for the synthesis. The initial aim has deter¬
mined just what data will constitute the actual world out of which the
new entity arises. The determination has, therefore, been made as to
what entities this entity can synthesize. The entity occupies a quite
precise location in the space-time continum over which it has no control.
It does not decide which events will be contiguous to it. We can,
74Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 372.
"'Scobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op. cit., p. 96.
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therefore, speak of each entity emerging from a settled past. It does
not, however, have a settled future. Given the perspective of what has
already been settled for it, the entity is free to do what it wills to
do. 76
Subjective Aim and Final Cause
In process thinking, the subjective aim is to be regarded as the
final cause of the creative synthesis. Just as the data used in a
synthesis served as its efficient causes, so the subjective aim serves
as the final cause. Because of this, we are justified in saying that
each synthesis is teleological. There is a suggested goal for each
creative moment.
In a strictly Whiteheadian interpretation of the subjective aim—
an interpretation with which Hartshorne would disagree—each subjective
aim is an eternal object that an entity uses as the basis of its con-
cresence. The subjective aim is, therefore, presented to the entity
along with the rest of the data it initially receives. In this way,
novelty is introduced into the synthesis. The subjective aim does not,
however, have to remain the same; it can be modified. Even though it may
change, the change is not so radical that no substantial unity with it
remains throughout the synthesis.
Even though Hartshorne would agree that the subjective aim is
received in the first instant of the synthesis, he does not feel that the
aim had to exist eternally before that synthesis took place. It could
have arisen in response to the particular data given to the entity in its
17/-
Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. clt.. pp. 195, 434
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initial moment of synthesis. This is, of course, part of his objection
to the concept of eternal objects. As we mentioned earlier, Hartshorne
prefers to think of specific characteristics (i.e. Whitehead's eternal
objects) as "created rather than selected" out of the primordial poten¬
tiality. This has, Hartshorne feels, the advantage of being more con¬
sistent with the notion of all things being creative and created as well
as avoiding a rigid division of all things into sheer individuals and
sheer universals.77
Cobb's approach differs from both Whitehead's and Hartshorne's.
He sees the initial aim as a "propositional feeling." Propositions in
process thought have as their subjects the actual entity undergoing
synthesis and as their predicates an eternal object or a group of eternal
objects. The proposition consists in the possibility of the predicate
being assigned in a particular way to the subject. Therefore, a propo¬
sition serves as the initial guide for an entity's synthesis since the
entity's synthesis begins as it feels this particular possibility for
its becoming. Cobb says that the initial aim "is the feeling of a propo¬
sition of which the novel occasion is the logical subject and the approp¬
riate eternal object is the predicate." He further says that, "the
subjective form of the propositional feeling is appetltion, that is, the
desire for its realization"7®
This approach is helpful because it clarifies just what is
involved in the initial aim. The aim includes the actual entity not as
77Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. clt., p. 59.
7®Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op. cit., p. 156.
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an abstract possibility but as a very specific entity. It has a defi¬
nite goal present to it in the predicate. Robert Neville, citing Cobb's
view, says that seeing the initial aim as a proposition and not as an
object means we can understand it as being a norm. "Universals," he
says, "are not things, desiccated shapes imagining or being imagined in
concrete particulars; rather, they are norms undeterminate in themselves
but determinate as measures of how the particular components of a com¬
plexity ought to go together. "7^
Hartshorne's question is still a valid one, however. Do the
eternal objects need to exist prior to the occasion itself or can the
predicate of the proposition not be created for the particular subject
as it arises? Cobb's clarification does not demand the retention of the
concept of eternal objects.
Satisfaction
The subjective aim of an entity is said to direct it toward a
particular "satisfaction" which is the fulfillment of that entity's
subjective aim.®^ The entity has attained what it willed to attain and
its creative urge is exhausted. Satisfaction indicates that the final
unity of data and subjective form has taken place, and the entity is
said to "enjoy" this momentary completion of its synthesis. In this
final unity of feeling, it has achieved its full measure of individuality.
"The occasion arises from relevant objects, and perishes into the status
79Robert Neville, "Experience and Philosophy: A Review of
Hartshome's Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method," Process Studies
II/l, Spring 1972, p. 58.
^Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., pp. 195, 434.
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of an object for other occasions. But it enjoys its decisive moment of
absolute self-attainment as emotional unity.
Satisfaction, then, marks the entity's transition from subject
to object. In achieving satisfaction an entity thrusts itself into the
future. "The occasion arises as an effect facing its past and ends up
as a cause facing its future."82 Having attained satisfaction an entity
is now available for being a datum for other entities. Each entity in
its satisfaction has constituted itself not only in terms of its own
enjoyment, but also in terms of being included in future syntheses. As
a subject achieves satisfaction and obtains objective immortality, a new
object is added to the richness of the cosmos, and it has, thereby,
contributed to the "real potentiality" of the universe.88
Superjective Nature
Whitehead calls that aspect of an entity's satisfaction which
faces toward the future, its "superjective nature." He says:
An entity is to be conceived both as a subject presiding
over its own immediacy of becoming and as a superject which
is the atomic creature exercising its function of objective
immortality. It has become a 'being,' and it belongs to the
nature of every 'being' that it is a potential for every
'becoming.'"64
Whitehead is, therefore, justified in calling the superjective nature
the "pragmatic value" of an entity's personal satisfaction.88
®^Alfred North Whitehead, Adventure of Ideas (New York: The
MacMillian Company, 1933), p. 227.
82ibid., p. 248.




Whitehead further insists that one must never loose sight of the
fact that an entity is both "subj ect-superject.Johnson notes that
Whitehead is slightly self-contradictory here in describing the super-
jective nature as something that is congruent with an entity's subjec¬
tivity while also saying it emerges only when the subject has finished
its career. Whitehead would probably have been more accurate to have
said that an entity was subj ect-obj ect-superject rather than just subj ect-
superj ect, for the superjective nature can be described as the "publicity
of the entity's private satisfaction which constitutes its objectivity.88
It is both the feeler and the feeling. "The immediate occasion is both
an agent responsible for the specific immanence that arises and the
product of the process."®®
The superjective nature of an entity expresses its anxiousness
to be included in future creative syntheses. Since its immortality con¬
sists not in being available for other syntheses but in actually being
included in than, it contains within its own satisfaction an orientation
toward being included in subsequent syntheses. In other words, the aim
of an entity is not only at the maximum intensity of feeling for itself
in the present but also towards its being part of the future.®® The
86Ibid., p. .47.
87
Johnson, Whitehead's Theory of Reality, op. cit., p. 42
88
Lowe, Understanding Whitehead, op. cit., p. 355.
S9toid.
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Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 41.
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subjective aim, which dominates the synthesis points the entity toward
its final superjective status. We can then see that the satisfaction
toward which an entity is pointed is not only toward what it can achieve
for itself in the present, but also toward what it can contribute toward
others in the future. Whitehead comments:
Any actual entity considered in reference to the publicity
of things is a 'superject,' namely, it arises from the pub¬
licity which it finds, and it adds itself to the publicity
which it transmits. It is a moment of passage from decided
public facts to novel public fact.^
Whitehead's discussion of the superjective nature is not nearly
as well worked out as his discussions of the primordial and consequent
natures are. As the above discussion indicates, Whitdiead does see the
need to locate somewhere in his system the push forward which keeps the
system going. The superjective natures of entities are those aspects
of the system which do this. Were there not this appetite for the future,
it would be difficult to see how the creativity of the universe perpetu¬
ates itself. More will be said on this later.
Freedom and Limitation
Having looked at actual entities in terms of the data they
receive for synthesis and the subjective form which determines the nature
of the synthesis, we can draw together what we have been saying by look¬
ing at the relationship between freedom and limitation. Process thought
affirms one reality of both, since both are a part of each synthesis.
Like the mental and physical aspects of a synthesis, freedom
and limitation should never be thought of separately, for the two
91Ibid., p. 443.
128
together make up causation. As we noted, freedom is found in the sub¬
jective form of a prehension, which is the final cause of that prehen¬
sion, and limitation is found in the data of the prehension which is its
efficient cause. Creativity is not free in the sense of being completely
voluntary and without impediment, but rather it is free in the sense of
determining the otherwise indeterminate, or of adding to the antecedent
92
or presupposed definiteness of reality. When freedom is affirmed, it
is understood that freedom has limits. Freedom makes sense only within
the context of limitation. These limitations are the actual world of
each entity at the moment of its becoming. Each occasion must occur in
its own world and take account of that world. "Casual efficacy" is a
limiting factor. The determination lies here in the fact that the entity
has only certain data to synthesize. The freedom lies in its self-
determination of just how it will use the data it has. Any entity, there¬
fore, is free because it is finally responsible for the way in which it
creates its own experience. No datum can force itself. On the other
hand, no entity can conjure up its own data.9^
For an entity to have an experience, it must have antecedent
data. Therefore, it is true to say that an entity's experiences are
partially determined for it by outside causes. These causes do not,
however, determine the precise nature of the experience itself. All
they can do is establish certain possible effects. The very fact that
in each experience many factors are at work attempting, often in
^Hartshorne, Anselm's Discovery, op, clt., p. 206.
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Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, op. cit., p. 94. Cobb,
A Christian Natural Theology, op. cit., pp. 94-5.
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conflicting ways, to influence the experience indicates that they cannot
determine fully what the effect will be. This ultimate decision is
made by the entity itself. It is the entity's synthesis of these mul¬
tiple causes which determine what the experience is. Each synthesis is
the assimilation of the data it receives and the transformation of that
data into an experience that cannot be explained as simply the whole
being the sum of its parts. While an analysis of external causes can go
a long way in explaining why an experience is what it is, it cannot do so
exhaustively. An experience cannot be fully described in terms of
objects perceived and experiences remembered. An adequate description
must take into account the factor by which the many yield the one. Even
if all the causal factors of an experience could be deduced, the experi¬
ence itself could not be explained for "there is the togetherness of
them all, in a unitary feeling which gives each perception and each
memory its unique place and value in this experience such as it could
94
have in no other."
There are, of course, all sorts of different degrees of freedom.
Freedom is possessed by all actualities in degrees ranging from negligible
to extensive. One of the marks of a living person is the extensive free¬
dom, and the more alive an entity or a society is, the greater will be
its ability to create novelty.




Before discussing the final factor in the creative process
(i.e. God) we must now make explicit something which has been implicit
throughout the preceeding discussion. Process thought sees "reality as
95
social process." Whitehead identified his thought with a philosophical
scheme he saw beginning with Descartes and ending with Hume, a scheme
termed the "Philosophy of Organism."96 Whitehead saw the intricate
interconnectedness of all entities in the universe and was as interested
in explaining this connectedness as he was in understanding each entity
individually. He found that an understanding of an Individual was in¬
deed impossible if it excluded seeing that individual as an organism and
as part of other organisms.97
Up to this point, we have focused our attention on actual enti¬
ties looking at them as individual, distinct units of reality. However,
as we mentioned earlier, we are not aware of actual entities in normal
experience. Almost without exception, we are aware of various groupings
of actual entities. For example, I know that the chair I am sitting on
is composed of various electrons, atoms, molecules, etc. This knowledge
95Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process (Glencoe and
Boston: The Beacon Press, 1953). This is the title and thesis of the
book.
9®Whitehead, Process and Reality, op« cit., p. 5.
97Hartshorne defines an organism as a plurality of entities
contributing directly to the value of a single entity, the whole. They
do not need to be internally part of the whole in the sense of included.
It is only necessary that they should contribute to each other's values.
Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection (LaSalle: Open Court Publishing
Co.), p. 195.
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is available to me, however, only through scientific investigation.
What is obvious to me is the chair Itself. This illustration points us
to the importance of understanding the social nature of reality. As
Hartshorne says, "Social structure is the ultimate structure of ex¬
istence,"98 meaning that all reality is one vast social process made
up of a myrid of other social processes.
Creative Synthesis as Social Process
The basic social process is the one we have been discussing, the
experience of creative synthesis. Hartshorne praises as being a genu¬
inely novel intuition Whitehead's statement, "The many become one and
are increased by one."99 This sentence underlines the fact that it is
out of the many that the one emerges. The "heritage" or "tradition" of
an entity is the social structure that gives it birth. Without this
relationship to its past, it could not have a present. Creative synthe¬
sis is a genuine social process because it is dependent on the relation¬
ship of one entity, the subject, to others, its objects. Individual
actual entities can only be understood as being part of a sequence of
entities inheriting qualities from antecedent entities. These entities
then pass on the qualities to their successors. An example of this is
personality which is a special temporally linear case of such a social
structure.
98Hartshorne, The Divine Realitivlty, op. cit., p. 28.
"whitehead, Process and Reality, op, cit., p. 32.
1"Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. cit., p. 162.
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The relationship that an entity has to its predecessors is not
the only social relationship that it has. Each entity finds itself part
of some structure of entities. Hartshome points out that the higher
one goes, the more obvious the social aspect of reality is. A man real¬
izes that he is part of a family and a nation. Scientists acknowledge
that organisms are associations of cells and that cells are associations
of molecules and atoms. "The situation is that nothing could conceivably
be known by any observer not to be social ... thus our contention is
that the social category fits all actual or conceivable facts of
observation."10*-
Classes of Social Relationships
Any association of entities which is characterized by a genuine
interconnectedness, no matter how loose it may be, is called a "nexus."
When a nexus is characterized by a common characteristic, shared by all
its members, it is called a "society." Societies can exhibit any degree
of organization or specificity, but there is always an essential charac¬
teristic which defines that society as being what it is. Other charac¬
teristics can be considered as accidental and may vary as circumstances
change.
Defining characteristic. This "defining characteristic," men¬
tioned above, provides enduring individuality to a society and is process
thought's equivalent to the category of substance in other philosophies.
The defining characteristic as it persists from one entity to the next
10*Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, op. cit., p. 32
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In the sequence of entities provides a continuing identity for a
102
society. Hartshorne uses the concept of personal identity to illus¬
trate this. He points out that a person is aware of his self-identity,
and process thought does not seek to deny this experience. Rather,
process thought insists on something additional. Each person has,
besides his enduring individuality, his own unique, momentary self which
is more determinate and fully actual than his enduring individuality,
which, although real, is somewhat abstract. Hartshorne says:
It is thus not 'John* who literally says 'yes' today and
•no' tomorrow, but two subjects (without names, yet referred
to through 'John' plus indications of context, or through 'I*
(in the same manner), which subjects are for many important
purposes 'the same,' and really the same. For there is a lit¬
erally identical individuality structure, but (as follows from
the inclusiveness of process) it is the successive occasions
which have the conation structure, not the conation structure which
has the occasions.10-*
In speaking of a defining characteristic, we are talking about
something which does not endure on its own but something which derives
its endurance from the fact that it is exemplified in successive,
connected occasions.
Enduring objects. One basic social structure is an "enduring
object." An enduring object is a society of actual entities that are
temporally contiguous and successive, each one a near repetition of the
other. Cobb points out:
In such a society, no two occasions exist at the same time,
but at each moment one such occasion occurs, prehending all the
10^Hartshorne, "Tillich's Doctrine of God," op. cit., p. 171.
103Xbid.
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proceeding occasions in the society, re-enacting the defining
characteristic of the society, and mediating this pattern to
its successors.10^
A molecule is a good example of an enduring object. It endures
for a long time seemingly unchanged. It is however, no more than a
succession of molecular happenings connected in such a way that it is
possible to identify then as a molecule. What causes the overwhelming
similarity of successive occasions in a molecule is the fact that the
physical pole dominates each synthesis. There is an almost exact trans¬
fer of concrete data so that each molecular occasion virtually repeats
its predecessor. The novelty that is present in enduring objects is
trivial indeed. It is through enduring objects that stability is found
in the cosmos.
Corpuscular societies. While science may spend considerable
time examining molecules and other enduring objects, enduring objects
are still far removed from general experience. What we are aware of in
everyday life are more likely to be "corpuscular societies." When a
society can be analyzed as being constituted by various enduring objects,
intimately interrelated, it is said to be corpuscular.A stone is an
illustration of a corpuscular society. It is composed of a vast number
of closely related molecules. It persists through a long period of time
virtually unchanged because it is composed of enduring objects. This
means that it, like the enduring objects which compose it, is character¬
ized by massive physical inheritance and a minimum amount of novelty.
^ a Christian Natural Theology, op. cit., p. 41.
^■^Whitehoad, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 52.
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Cobb cautions that the classification of a society as corpus¬
cular does not have to be rigid. A society can contain many actual
entities which dorm enduring objects and others which do not. It is
according to the prominence of enduring objects that a society may be
considered more or less corpuscular. Besides this, the exemplification
of a defining characteristic varies from one society to another as does
the decisiveness of their inheritance from previous members of the
various enduring objects which provides from an infinite variety of
degrees of order within the classification.
Living societies. Not all corpuscular societies are primarily
characterized by stability and endurance for some demonstrate consider¬
able novelty. Novelty is the opposite of endurance, and when an entity
or a society exhibits more novelty than endurance, it is said to be
living. In process thought "life means novelty." Some novelty is
present in all syntheses and, therefore, there is no absolute gap between
living and non-living things. None-the-less, a distinction can be made
by the fact that some societies obviously display more novelty than
others.
Novelty enters a synthesis through the mental pole. The mental
pole, unlike the physical pole, is not bound to the entity's immediate
predecessors and can include in the synthesis, data that are not immedi¬
ately present. Life can then be attributed to an entity "when in some
measure its reactions are inexplicable by any tradition of pure physical
106Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op. cit., p. 42.
^Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. clt., pp. 145-156.
inheritance."'' Novelty occurs when the process yields something that
was not implicit in the preceeding situation.109 Sherburne elaborates
on this:
Explanation by "tradition" is merely another phraseology
for explanation by "efficient cause." We require an expla¬
nation by "final cause." Thus a single occasion is alive when
the subjective aim which determines its process of concrescence
has embodied a novelty of definiteness not to be found in the
inherited data .... The novelty is introduced conceptually
and disturbs the inherited responsive adjustment.110
Societies which are dominated by entities which are dominated by their
mental poles are living societies, for, as Whitehead points out, the
characteristics of a society are, without exception, the characteristics
of at least some of its component actual entities. No new character¬
istics emerge in social organization which are not present in the com¬
ponent members.says:
A 'living society' is one which includes some 'living occa¬
sions.' Thus a society may be more or less 'living' according
to the prevalence in it of living occasions. Also an occasion
may be more or less living according to the relative importance
<bf the novel factors in its final satisfaction.11^
Whitehead divides living societies into two classifications,
democratic societies and monarchial societies. He also refers to these
as vegetable and animal societies since these are his two primary illus¬
trations of these types of societies. Vegetables are democracies because
all members of the society are equal. There is no dominant or ruling
108Ibid., p. 159.
109Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for Our Time, op. cit., p. 25.
110Donald Sherburne, A Key to Whitehead's Process and Reality"
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 91.
111Whitehead, Adventure of Ideas, op. cit., pp. 260-61.
H2whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 156.
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member in this type of society. There is a high degree of uniformity in
the society's existence, but there is also some diversification. A
tomato, for example, is visibly riper one day than it was the last. In
democratic societies there is a high level of coordination among the
members of the society in order to insure its survival.
Monarchial societies have a dominant member which has precedence
over all the rest. The other members of the society are structured and
function in such a way that the dominant member of this society exercises
113
the decisive controlling influence over thern. This is demonstrated
in the control exercised by the central nervous system in higher animals.
The term "monarchial" must not be taken too literally for it does
not mean that the dominant member of the society makes all the decisions
and other members are powerless. The situation is that their power is
subordinated, in some cases radically subordinated, to the dominant
member.^4 The dominant member provides the society with a functional
unity which is aimed beyond mere survival. For example, some attempt at
attaining value characterizes these societies.
Routine and Innovation
We noted earlier that limitation and freedom ware essential
aspects of any entity's self-creative process. They likewise are essen¬
tial aspects of social process and can be thought of in terms of routine
and innovation. Hartshorne points out that every society behaves ac¬
cording to certain laws and customs. Without this routine of enduring,
■^^Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit.. pp. 155, 182.
•^4Hartshome, Reality as Social Process, op. cit., p. 38.
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common conduct, there would be little cooperation or coordination and
a great deal of conflict and frustration. Without routine, there could
be no society. But, the routine of a society is never absolute. Inno¬
vation, defined as creative departures from the norm, is always per¬
mitted albeit it in varying degrees depending on the society. Innovation
is always kept within the bounds of routine, but it is never eliminated.
The higher the society, the more capable it is of containing
members who do not do the routine or the predictable. Only a high level
society could produce a Beethovan composing his symphonies or a Shakes¬
peare writting his plays. Thus, in the dynamic established between routine
and innovation, we have an ideal that explains every conceivable degree of
orderliness and spontaneity. Hartshorne comments:
In a society with members on a very low level of existence,
their individual freedom will be correspondingly slight, and
the element of law will predominate. Given, at the other ex¬
treme, a society of superior individuals, say of geniuses,
obviously the element of the customary, predictable routine
will be there at a minimum.
Living persons. Process thinkers reserve the term "living
person" for those societies which have what is normally referred to as a
mind, psyche, or soul.-^^ Cobb goes as far as to contend that " a living
^-^Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, op. cit., p. 31
116Ibid.
^ "^Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit.. p. 163. Whitehead
uses the term soul extensively in Adventure of Ideas (e.g.), pp. 17-31,
but rarely elsewhere. Hartshorne, I suspect to avoid confusion with the
religious use of the term, makes infrequent use of it. Cobb, however,
employs it as a central concept. See "The Human Soul," A Christian
Natural Theology, pp. 49-91. Whitehead also makes it clear that human
beings are not the only animals possessing a soul. See Process and
Reality, p. 64.
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person is a soul."118 The soul is a society rather than in individual
actual entity since it endures throughout the life of the society
possessing it. Cobb says:
We must think of the soul as that society composed of all
the momentary occasions of experience that make up the life
history of the man. The soul is not an underlying substance
undergoing accidental adventures. It is nothing more than
the sequence of the experiences that constitute it.-^9
He goes on to point out several remarkable features of the soul.-^O
First, it is remarkable in that it is the dominant occasion of
the higher forms of animal society. It, therefore, can be seen as
exercising a strong control over most aspects of the animal's behavior.
Secondly, the soul is extraordinary in that it is a conscious experience.
As we noted, Whitehead says that consciousness is one possible aspect of
the subjective form of an experience. He also noints out that it is
possible only when the mental aspect of the prehension is strong.
Furthermore, it depends on a very complex integration of conceptual and
physical feelings. This is possible because the animal body is organized
in such a way as to make this high level of experience possible. There
is a constant flow of novelty from the various living occasions which
compose the society to its dominant member.
The third remarkable aspect of the soul is that, even though it
is an enduring object, the soul differs from other enduring objects in
that its most distinctive feature is not its serial repetition of its
predecessors but its aliveness or mentality. The soul, then, demonstrates




both the order and continuity characteristic of an enduring object and
the novelty which characterizes life.
4
Hybrid prehensions. To understand how it is possible for this
to happen, we need to make a distinction between two types of synthesis-
pure and hybrid. Whitehead compares them in this way: "In a 'pure
physical feeling' the actual entity which is the datum is objectified by
one of its own physical feelings ... In a 'hybrid physical feeling' the
actual entity forming the datum is objectified by one of its own con¬
ceptual feelings."^21
In its simplest form an actual entity must be synthesized physi¬
cally in terms of what is concretely there and mentally in terms of those
abstractions actualized in the data. Redness cannot be experienced if
the flower seen is orange. Only orangeness may be experienced. The
mental aspect of the synthesis is limited to what is physically present
in the data. In a hybrid synthesis this is not the case. Abstractions
may be synthesized which are not physically present. They are, however,
present mentally. The contents transferred from the one entity to the
next are contained in the mental pole of the entity being synthesized,
not its physical pole.-*^ Johnson explains it in this way: "Actual
entity 'A' has a hybrid physical feeling of actual entity 'B' if *A' has
21Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., pp. 375-76. As
indicated earlier, what Whitehead calls a "physical feeling" is what we
have called the "physical aspect of synthesis."
■^^"A hybrid prehension is the prehension by one subject of a
conceptual prehension ... belonging to the mentality of another
subject." Ibid., p. 35.
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a conceptual feeling involving the same datum as is prehended by a con¬
ceptual feeling in •b,.,,^23
Cobb illustrates this by the example of his looking at a green
tie and wishing it were brown. Here, he is encountering an object that
is actually green but he is recalling the browness of some previous
experience, and he imaginatively experiences a brown tie rather than a
green one. An occasion from the past is playing a part in the experience
of the present. The pure prehension of the greenness, which is actually
there, and the hybrid prehension of a brownness, which is not there, can
be compared and contrasted with each other. The mental aspect of the syn-
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thesis can thereby visualize the green tie as being brown.
In social process dominated by enduring objects, hybrid synthe¬
sis rarely, if ever, occurs. In living persons hybrid synthesis dom¬
inates. Continuity and idenity are maintained through the physical aspect
of the synthesis, but the appearance of something belonging to the mental
pole of a previous entity allows for novelty to be part of the synthesis.
In a hybrid synthesis, whatever novelty has been attained in the past is
made available for the future, and the living person is not confined to
the step-by-step progression of its tradition.^25
To tie all this in to our original discussion of living persons,
we can say that a living person is a social process which has a soul as
its dominant occasion. The soul is constituted by a series of enduring
*23johnson, Whitehead's Theory of Reality, op. cit., p. 31.
^•2^Cobb, a Christian Natural Theology, op. cit., pp. 33-4.
125Ibid.. p. 51. See also, Whitehead's Process and Reality,
op. cit., p. 343.
142
objects which differ from other enduring objects in that they are pri¬
marily constituted by hybrid syntheses. Hence, both change and perma-
nacy, endurance and novelty characterize living persons.
A further item must be underlined. The soul of a living person
has a radically relational character. In any one moment of its exist¬
ence, it is an actual entity including in its becoming not only those
objects with which it is in immediate contact but also the mental aspects
of previous occasions. Since it is the dominant occasion of a living
person, it is in touch, at least indirectly, with all the entities which
constitute the society over which it presides. Through these it is in
contact with a wider environment which constitutes the whole world, and,
therefore, within the limitations of its perspective, can include the
whole world in its becoming.*-26
The soul-body relationship. The relationship of the soul to the
body is also important to mention. The body, or more specifically the
brain, is the locus of the soul. The experiences of the body are the
primary data for the soul. The soul actually synthesizes only those
experiences immediately contiguous to the brain, but these in turn have
synthesized experiences contiguous to than and so forth throughout the
body. Even the reception of sense data must be seen as the chain of
synthetic events. "Sense data" are located outside the body and mediated
to the soul through the experiences of special organs. The body, when
functioning properly, mediates to the soul the knowledge the soul must
have of its external environment, but the information that the soul
126Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op. cit., p. 57.
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receives is basically about the bodily reaction to the internal stimuli
127
rather than about these stimuli themselves.
The soul is, in each of its successive states, like every other
entity in that it receives its actuality through creative synthesis.
There is not something already existing which receives actuality into
itself. Rather, the soul is constituted by its experiences. The more a
soul can receive, the more it can become. The more comprehensive the
experiences of a soul, the more comprehensive that soul is.
The Human Soul
What we have just noted, leads us directly to discussing human
beings, for here is an example of an organism with an extremely compre¬
hensive soul.^8 Any discussion of the human soul must, however, be
prefaced with the fact that process thought refuses to make any bifur¬
cation between man and the rest of the natural order in which he appears.
Pols points out:
A man, like other organisms, is a society of actual en¬
tities • • • • We have not, therefore, a doctrine of a hierachy
of entities as in the cases of Aristotelian ousial or Leibnizian
monads. The familiar, traditional notion that man is a higher
kind of entity is replaced by the notion that within the society
which is a man, an especially high kind of event (conscious¬
ness, choice, abstract thought) occurs.129
^^Ibid., p. 52. Cobb speculates that the actual location of
the soul is in the "empty spaces" between brain cells.
ipgxcoIt is outside the scope of this document to go into a detailed
discussion of the process understanding of man; however, since human
experience forms the basis of the "reformed subiectivist principle"
mentioned earlier, man's status in the cosmic scheme needs to be noted.
129Pols, Whitehead's Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 6.
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If the human soul is characterized by a particularly high kind
of event, in what does this event consist? Che answer to this question,
which Whitehead gives, is that the human soul is capable of greater
novelty than other animal souls. He says:
The conceptual entertainment of unrealized possibility be¬
comes a major factor in human mentality. In this way out¬
rageous novelty is introduced, sometimes beautified, sometimes
damned, and sometimes literally patented or protected by
copyright.
This increase in novelty is not to be regarded as an end in
itself. It is introduced for a purpose and in terms of purpose. This
purpose is the attainment of value. Even though some struggle toward
values can be found in other animal life, this is vastly extended in man.
The ability to create novelty which he possesses is essential for attain¬
ing greater value. Moral3 and religion arise as the human soul strives
toward the best possible satisfaction in each occasion. Whitehead be¬
lieves that other animals do have some sort of morality, but only man
has religion. The difference between the two being that morality empha¬
sizes the one specific occasion while religion emphasizes "the unity of
ideals inherent in the universe." He elaborates this by saying further:
In animals we can see emotional feeling, dominantly derived
from bodily functions, and yet tinged with purposes, hopes and
expressions derived from conceptual functioning. In mankind, the
dominant dependence on bodily function seems still there. And
yet the life of a human being receives its worth, its import¬
ance from the way in which unrealized ideals shape its purposes
and tinge its actions. The distinction between men and animals
is ih one sense only a difference in degree. But the extent of
the degree makes all the difference.131
^"^Whitehead, Modes of Thought, op. cit., p. 36.
131Ibid., p. 39.
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Another factor that distinguishes the human soul from others is
its awareness of the social nature of reality. Man realizes that he is
part of the world and is aware of that world and his relationship to it.
He is aware that he influences others and they him. Further, his choice
of subjective aim in each occasion of his becoming, is a conscious one.
In addition to these, man can symbolize his world and think about that
which is not his own experience. He can think and think about being a
thinker.1^
This ability to symbolize is most particularly displayed in man's
use of language. Here again, language is present in other animals, but
in none is it so extensively developed, so refined, as in man. Cobb
finds that, "When we ask specifically what distinguishes man from the
other animals, the single clear answer is language."*^ whitehead found
language and the distinctiveness of the human mind so correlative that
it is impossible to say whether the human mind has created language or
language the human mind* Language makes possible the comprehensiveness
of the human mind. It provides a way to store and express the totality
of what has been encountered and comprehended during a person's life.^4
Pittinger also lists the following characteristics of man: rationality,
ability to communicate, ability to establish relationships, decision
making which allows a person to strive toward an aim and to be respons¬
ible for achieving enduring good.
133cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op.cit., p. 59.
^^"hitehead, Modes of Thought, op. cit., p. 57.
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GOD
Having looked at the social nature of reality, we can proceed
to our discussion of the fourth factor in creative synthesis, God. In
the preceeding section, we mentioned that process thought sees the
entirity of creation as social process. Hartshorne calls the cosmos the
all-inclusive society of societies.135 It is the ultimate social
structure including all other societies withn itself.
The fact that there is any cosmos at all is, for process thinkers,
sufficient grounds for postulating that there is an order throughout the
cosmos. According to Whitehead:
It is not the case that there is an actual world which
happens to exhibit an order of nature. There is an actual
world because there is an order in nature. If there were
no order, there would be no world. Also, because there is
a world, we know that there is an order.136
What is at stake here is not whether perfect cosmic order exists. Any
order, perfect or imperfect, requires limitation. There is no need for
any particular limitation but only some sort of limitation. The contin¬
gent characteristics of the cosmos are irrelevant as to whether or not
there is an order in it.
To achieve the limitation necessary to create order in so radi¬
cally diverse a society as the cosmos, there is a need for a dominant
member who is able to set limits to the chaotic possibilities arising
from the multiple instances of freedom it includes. If there is no such
member, there can be no explanation at all for the fact that there is
I35Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, op. clt., p. 51.
136
Whitehead, Religion in the Making, op. clt., p. 101.
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order and stability in the cosmos and that the cosmos does not dissolve
itself by means of unmitigated conflict. Hartshome insists that "the
universe as a going concern must be a monarchial society if it is a
society at all."^37
God as Cosmic Orderer
God is the dominant member of the cosmic society. Concerning
this, Hartshcrne says that God is the supreme form of a personally
ordered society. His defining characteristic is the divine perfection.
He elaborates:
Each of his states will be the uniquely adequate summing
up of the cosmic actuality correlated with it and of all past
states of the divine society. Aid it will be the only society
whose defining characteristic could not fail to be actualized
in ever new (and greater) states.
As the dominant member of the cosmic society, he supplies the
order and limitation necessary to maintain it. Again quoting Whitehead:
God is ultimate limitation, and his existence is the ulti¬
mate irrationality. For no reason can be given for just that
limitation which it stands in His nature to impose • • • • He
is the ground of concrete reality. No reason can be given for
the nature of God because that nature is the ground of reality.
A divine orderer is needed because the order in cosmic process
is unintelligible without his influence. This is so because each entity
is at least minimally free and some are maximally so. Each transcends
its causal, determinative nexus. Process would come to an end if limits
were not imposed upon the development of incompatible lines of process.
The order found in the world is "enjoyed" but not created by the various
137
Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, op. clt., p. 39.
^■^Hartshorne, Anselm's Discovery, op. cit., p. 291.
^3%hitehead, Religion in the Making, op. cit.. p. 161.
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actual entitles. Since there is no obligatory order logically required
of entities, it is either blind fate or an ultimate synthesis which
creates the order. The only alternative to synthesis is a chance agree-
140
ment of the multitude of lesser creative acts.
It is vastly preferable logically to posit the existence of an
ultimate synthesis than chance agreement since there seems to be no way
of understanding how any order at all could come out of the confusion
and anarchy implied by a multiplicity of creative agents, none of which
are totally Influential or wise. Only through an agent who can include
in himself the totality of creation, can this order come. Hartshorne
says, "Apart from God, not only would this world not be conceivable but
141
no world, no state of reality, or even unreality, could be understood."
He elaborates:
If all individuals mafcte their own decisions, act with a cer¬
tain spontaniety, what prevents universal conflict and confusion?
Can all things freely conspire together to make an orderly world?
Each adjusts to all the others; but one cannot adjust to chaos.
Hence the notion of 'mutual adjustment* presupposes the solution
of the problem of order and does not furnish it. Suppose, how¬
ever, that each individual adjusts, not simply to others more or
less like itself, but to one supreme free agent; then, since all
reflect the influence of this one agent, they are thereby put in¬
to a certain degree of conformity to each other. The supreme
agent decides the outlines of the world order, this decision the
lesser agents accept; what is still left for than to decide is by
comparison trivial.142
To underline what Hartshorne is saying here, God is the orderer of the
cosmos because he, and he alone, influences all other individuals. It
is this influence that supplies the order which is there.
140Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. cit.. p. 164.
141Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for Our Time, op. cit., p. 53.
•^^Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. cit., p. 133.
149
The Dipolar Nature of God
To understand how this ordering happens, we need to look at God
as process thinkers visualize him. Such an understanding begins by
noticing that God, like every other individual, is dipolar. Whitehead
is explicit: "Any instance of experience is dipolar whether that in-
143
stance be God or an actual occasion of the world."
God's dipolar nature is the key to understanding him and his
relationship to other entities and to the entirety of the created order.
For Hartshorne, God necessarily includes both abstract existence and
concrete actuality. Gragg comments that in his notion of a dipolar
diety, Hartshorne has adapted Morris Cohen's "Law of Polarity" which
dictates that both halves of a pair of ultimate contraries should be
144
affirmed because they are mutually interdependent and correlative.
Hartshorne can, therefore, speak of God as being eternal in one aspect of
his being (his "primordial nature"). The same holds true for all other
contraries. Each of the opposites describes one facet of God's being.
He is in one facet of his being absolute, infinite, abstract and necessary
and in the other relative, finite, concrete and contingent. One
1^3:3
Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. clt., p. 54. Although
the basis for comparing God's attributes and those of the creatures is
discussed in detail in the last chapter of this thesis, we need to
mention here that process thinkers agree with Whitehead that "God is
not the exception to all metaphysical categories ... he is their chief
exemplification." Applying this principle to our discussion here, God's
dipolarity is not just another instance of dipolarity but rather the
supreme, unsurpassable example of it. God's dipolarity is different in
principle from all others by being radically superior to thorn. In our
analysis we will find that God far surpasses every other instance of
reality in every aspect of both poles of his nature.
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Alan Gragg, diaries Hartshorne, Makers of the Modern Theo¬
logical Mind, Bob E. Patterson, ed. (Waco: Word Books, 1973), p. 84.
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illustration of this is divine knowledge. It is infinite because God
knows all the potentiality of the world as potential. It is finite
because God knows as actual those worlds (and only those worlds) which
have in fact come into being.
In saying that God is dipolar, process thinkers mean that he has
both a mental and physical, an abstract and a concrete nature. As
indicated above, the mental aspect is called his primordial nature; the
physical his consequent nature. We must be very cautious here, as we
were in studying actual entities in general, to make sure we do not
think of these as independent aspects of God, but rather as the two
basic interdependent ways in which God functions. John Lansing suggests,
quite correctly, that we should not think of the words "primordial nature"
and "consequent nature" as nouns referring to different elenents of God
suggesting that each is a separate agent with a distinctive function.
Rather, we should regard them as adjectives describing the character of
how God as a whole functions.
The Primordial Nature of God
When God is "viewed as primordial, he is the ultimate conceptual
realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality."146 xt is in his
primordial nature that all possibilities for future becomings are envis¬
ioned, and it is from the primordial nature that these possibilities are
made available for entities in the actual world.
l^Sjohn W. Lansing, "The Natures of Whitehead's God," Process
Studies, III/3, (Fall, 1973) p. 144.
•^^Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 521.
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The way process thinkers view these potentialities differs from
one thinker to another. According to Whitehead, all possibilities are
eternal objects which are stored in the primordial nature. Hartshorne,
who, as we have seen, rejects the idea of eternal objects, insists that
God creates the potentiality for each new entity as that entity arises.
He says that the primordial nature is, "God in eternity knowing only
what is itself eternal, his own ideal system of ideals for the
creation. "147
Hartshorne feels that Whitehead's idea of eternal objects is
incompatible with his notion that characteristics are products of change.
Hartshorne praises Whitehead as being one of the first philosophers to
see in the principle of evolution that the characteristics of things are
products of change. Therefore, it is possible to do away with notions
of laws as eternally fixed yet quantitatively definite aspects of behav¬
ior. Like Platonic forms, Whitehead's eternal objects unnecessarily
control change. They ought to be regarded as products of change rather
than as having infinitely antedated the subjects in which they are
objectified. Universals should not be specific qualities but only vague
general directions of determinatoility or specificability. Hartshorne
says, "Since by Whitehead's own method of extensive abstraction, contin¬
uity is treated as the possibility of endless division ... eternally
there is just the unitary vague field of qualityt not a set of point¬
like determinate qualities."14®
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Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. clt., p. 133.
Charles Hartshome, "The Relativity of Non-Realitivity,"
Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Pelrce, p. 244.
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Hartshorne points out that his views on this issue have been
influenced by Peirce's conception of the evolution of Platonic forms.
This is the central issue for Hartshome in the discussion. Eternal
objects can participate in the temporal flow. Hartshome is, therefore,
y
attracted to Peirce's idea of the continum of possibility as a cor-
149
rection of Whitehead's idea of eternal objects.
That God's primordial aspect is the source of novelty can be
shown by looking at one aspect of the creative process. We have been
speaking of the process of becoming as the emerging of one actuality
from many possibilities which has implied that creative synthesis is as
much a process of exclusion as it is a process of inclusion.150 Most
of the possibilities simply remain possible and do not become part of
the real world. This excluded potential must be somewhere, and White¬
head's ontological principle, which we looked at earlier, demands that
it be with some actual entity. Further, this entity would have to be
V»
a non-temporal entity, leaving only God in his primoral aspect as the
reservoir of potentiality. We have already seen that the potential
which is realized is relevant to that which is not, and the unrealized
potential must remain available for future concresences or else there
is no possibility for novelty. Whitehead concludes that "apart from
God, eternal objects unrealized in the actual world would be relatively
non-existent for the future concresence in question."151
149James, The Concrete God, op. clt., p. 50. Hartshorne cites
The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. 5, Section 194,
pp. 185-212.
150Whitehead, Religion in the Making, op. cit., p* 109.
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Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 46.
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Specific functions of the primordial nature. As part of being
the location of all potentiality, three specific functions are attributed
by Whitehead to the primordial nature.First, the primordial nature
grades the various potentials for becoming in terms of their relevance
to one another. According to Whitehead, "The general relationships of
eternal objects to each other, relationships of diversity and pattern
are their relationships in God's conceptual realization. Apart from
this realization, there is mere isolation indistinguishable from non¬
entity. "152 what whitehead is saying here is that the primordial nature
arranges all eternal objects in such a way that they form a coherent,
logical whole and, thereby, do not exist as an unintelligible mass.
They are systematically cataloged.
The second function of the primordial nature is that it grades
eternal objects in terms of their relevance for inclusion in a particular
occasion. "By reason of the actuality of the primordial valuation of
pure potentials, each eternal object has a definite effective relevance
to each concrescent process."15^ The primordial nature distinguishes
between general potentiality and real potentiality. General potentiality
is the "bundle of possibilities" neatly ordered and arranged as is pro¬
vided by the totality of eternal objects. Real potentiality is that
which is conditioned by the data from the actual world and could become
part of a particular synthesis. General potentiality is absolute and
^-^Lansing, "The Natures of Whitehead's God," op. cit., pp. 144f.
1^whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 392.
153Lansing, "The Natures of Whitehead's God," loc. cit., p. 64.
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real potentiality is relative to some actual entity.*--'4 The primordial
nature's grading of eternal objects in terms of their relevance to one
another is general and eternal since no reference needs to be made to
any historical entity. Real potentiality is that bit of general poten¬
tiality which is available to one specific entity in its particular
historical setting.
Cobb feels that these two functions may at first glance seem to
be in conflict with each other. If there is one eternal ordering of all
possibilities, is it possible for there to be more than one creative
order for the universe. Whitehead obviously feels that there are others,
but it is difficult to see how one unchanging order can provide a
specific novel aim for every new actual entity. The solution, according
to Cobb, is that God's ordering of eternal objects is not just one
simple order but rather an infinite variety of orders. He says:
God's ordering of possibilities is such that every possible
state of the actual world is already envisioned as possible
and every possible development from that actual state of the
world is already envisioned as appraised. Thus, the one pri¬
mordial ordering of eternal objects is relevant to every
actuality with perfect specificity.155
What we have, then, is an ordering that takes into account every aspect
of a particular situation, but this ordering is not ordering which is
created as each new entity arises, but one which has existed eternally.
We have noted that Hartshorne is unhappy with the notion of
eternal objects. Therefore, it comes as no surprise to find that he is
also opposed to a fixed order, or even a multiplicity of fixed orders,
f potentiality. He prefers to think of initial aims as "created rather
154Ibid., p. 101.
^^Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op. cit., pp. 155-56.
155
than selected" out of the primordial potentiality.*56 He insists that
this has the advantage of being more creative and of maintaining the
abstractness of the primordial nature. It further av.ids a rigid divi¬
sion of everything into sheer individuals and sheer universals. Any
eternal order of potentiality seems to go against the main thrust of
the system which is genuine continuity and relativity. He further
argues:
If eternal possibilities are fully definite items, then God's
concepts never change, and his entire conceptual being is fixed
forever. All that can change (or give place to new ones) are
his physical prehensions and with them his hybrid prehensions
of the impure potentials as relevant to a given state of the
cosmos. The hybrid prehensions will change, however, only
in their physical constituents, and the impure potentials will
be simply identical with certain eternal objects as selected
for a given occasion by the physical prehensions. If on the
other hand, impure potentials are more definite than anything
to be found in eternal possibility, then God's concepts must
become more determinate with time and thus it will not be true
that the conceptual aspect of his being is completely primordial
just as it is not true that the physical aspect of his being is
completely consequent.7
With specific reference to the two functions of the primordial
nature under discussion, Hartshorne would insist that what the pri-
*
mordial nature does is not catalog specific possibilities and then
decide which one is best for a particular entity but rather from the
vast generalized potentiality it contains, the primordial nature will
create an initial aim uniquely appropriate for each occasion.
The third function of the primordial nature is that it makes
this graded relevance of eternal objects effective in the world through
providing the initial aim for each concresant occasion. "In this sense




God is the principle of concretion, namely, he is that actual entity
from which each temporal concresence receives that initial aim from
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which its self-causation starts." The initial aim which the primor¬
dial nature provides is of crucial importance for the actual entity
because it constitutes the entity as a self-creating subject giving it
its initial conceptual valuations and initial physical purposes. It
is in receiving the initial aim that each entity begins its career.
Hartshorne would agree fully with this function.
God's Giving of the Initial Aim Through His Primordial Nature
In this third function of the primordial nature, we find the
process understanding of the specific part God plays in creative syn¬
thesis. God gives each entity its initial aim which begins its self-
creative process. What makes each actual entity self-creative is, as
we said earlier, the fact that it has a subjective form which determines
how it will synthesize the data it receives. This subjective form is
determined by the subjective aim—the over-riding purpose an actual
entity has in its self-creation. Whiteheed's ontological principle
would remind us that an actual entity cannot generate its initial aim
anymore than it can generate the data it prehends. The initial aim is
part of the data an entity receives. At the same time it receives from
its tradition the other initial data for its synthesis, it receives its
initial aim from God. The first feeling toward self-hood an actual entity
has is the one God provides.
The initial aim points the entity toward a particular satisfac¬
tion, the best satisfaction possible for it. Whitehead says that in
1
Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 374.
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supplying the initial aim, God is aiming at "maximum intensity of exper¬
ience for the entity." This could also be called self-satisfaction.
What this self-satisfaction would be is largely determined by the situ¬
ation in which the entity will find itself, for the entity cannot be
isolated from its environment. The initial aim, therefore, offers the
entity maximum self-satisfaction through maximum harmonization with its
environment and with all of creation. Unless such harmony is achieved,
the entity's satisfaction will not be the best possible for it. The
initial aim which God gives an entity, since it comes from his own
subjective aim, is the best actualization for the entity in terms of
itself, best for the entity's environment in terms of its relationship
to its social structure, and best in terms of all future entities'
concresences.
The Consequent Nature of God
The primordial nature describes God in his absolute, eternal,
necessary existence. For most traditional Western metaphysicians, such
would be a complete and adequate description. Process thinkers, however,
believe that the primordial nature only half describes God. He must also
be described as dependent, relative, contingent actuality. This des¬
cribes his "consequent nature." Whitehead strongly repudiates ideas of
God such as "the unmoved mover" and any attribution of characteristics
which would make him an exception to the categories used in understand¬
ing other entities.Hartshorne contends that:
159
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Unfortunately, metaphysics was sidetracked for two millennia
by an insufficiently exact, insufficiently analytic conception of
God as the 'absolute,' the 'perfect,' the 'complete,' or 'self-
sufficient' or 'independent' being# This conception • • • does
not meet the concrete religious need#
The attack on traditional theism is, perhaps, most dramatically
expressed in Whitehead's list of antitheses:
It is as true to say that God Is permanent and the World
fluent, as that the World is permanent and God is fluent#
It is as true to say that God is one and the World many,
as that the World is one and God many.
It is as true to say that, in comparison with the World,
God is actual eminently, as that, in comparison with God, the
world is actual eminently.
It is true to say that the World is immanent in God, as
that God is immanent in the World#
It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as
that the World transcends God#
It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that
the World creates God.^°^
Hartshorne says that in affirming only one half of these ante-
thesis without affirming the other, traditional theism is guilty of a
"monopolar prejudice" which tragically distorts its image of God# He
agrees with traditional thought, that Gxi is absolute but not that he is
the absolute as though this were a complete description of his character.
Absoluteness is only one side of his character. Relativity is the other
side. God is the supreme relativity. His proposal is as follows;
IfcOHartshcrne, Reality as Social Process, op# cit., p. 66
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The standard terms of religious philosophizing—absolute,
infinite immutable, eternal, self-sufficient, necessary, uni¬
versal cause—do apply to the God of religion, but they apply
less simply and exclusively than has been supposed. God is
somehow absolute, infinite, immutable, and supreme cause; but
in such fashion that he can also be relative, finite, mutable
and supreme effect. God comes under both sides of the basic
contraries.162
Hartshorne goes on to point out that God's being on "both sides" is
different in principle from other entities because he uniquely exem¬
plifies the categories. He is finite like no one else is and infinite
like no one else is. He is both cause and effect in a uniquely eminent
sense. This Hartshorne calls the "principle of dual transcendence."!6^
God's consequent nature is his physical pole. It is composed of
his syntheses of the satisfactions of all actual entities composing the
temporal world. "God is to be conceived as originated by conceptual
experience with this process of completion and motivated by consequent
physical experience initially derived from the temporal world."1°^ In
saying this, process thought departs radically from traditional Western
metaphysics by allowing—indeed insisting—that God is influenced, or
more specifically created by, the world. He is not only the supreme
creator in his primordial nature; he is also the supreme creature in his
consequent nature.165 This will become apparent as our analysis proceeds.
162Hartshorne, "The God of Religion and the God of Philosophy,"
op, cit., p. 152.
16-^Ibid., p. 163. The principle of dual transcendence is dis¬
cussed thoroughly in the appendix on analogy.
l64Whitehead, Process and Reality, op.cit., p. 524.
l^^Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. cit., p. 134.
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Functions of the consequent nature. Two functions are performed
by God's consequent nature--two functions which correspond directly to
those of the physical pole of any actual entity.
First, God synthesizes into his own experience, each and every
satisfaction that has been attained throughout the cosmos. In other dis¬
cussion of relativity, we noted that each entity is relevant to all
others. Just as an entity prehends, either positively or negatively,
all entities in his actual world, so God prehends all those in his.
The crucial difference here is that any other entity* s world is quite
limited but God's actual world is the entirity of the coanos. Just as
the primordial nature of God is the source of all possibility, the con¬
sequent nature is the receptical of all actuality. This includes all
those satisfactions or values which are attained by entities but not
prehended by their successors. Hartshome points out that most entities
are negatively prehended by other entities which is virtually the same
as not being prehended at all. Were no entity to use this entity, it
would be wasted. Only a divine, supreme synthesis can effectively and
positively unify this otherwise rejected data. God, because he synthe¬
sizes all satisfaction, holds all things together in his consequent
nature.166
*
Because God synthesizes all that happens in the temporal world,
his consequent nature is said to be temporal. As we have seen, occasions
of experiences happen successively in the temporal world which suggests
that God's synthesis, being dependent on these experiences for data, are
likewise successive. This temporality in God is not, however, identical
166Ibid., p. 164,
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with the temporality of other entities. With other entities, temporality
means perishing. With God this is not so. As Cobb says, "Every achieve¬
ment of value in the temporal world is preserved everlastingly in God's
consequent nature."16^ Hartshorne defines this everlastingness of God's
consequent nature as being "the power of retaining experiences contain¬
ing also novel elements—in short, the growth of experience without loss,
addition without subtraction.
The consequent nature of God is also temporal in the sense that
development does take place within it as God constantly synthesizes new
data. Where this development differs from the development of other
entities is that with God there is no loss of the vividness of an exper¬
ience. With other entities there is. That development does take place
in the consequent nature further suggests that at least in one sense,
the consequent nature is incomplete. God constantly receives new data
into himself and is always open to receive new data. On the other hand,
there is also a sense in which the consequent nature is complete in that
it has received everything that has happened. Nothing is either com¬
pletely lost or totally rejected.
I
That God includes everything in his consequent nature does not
\
mean that he includes everything just as it is, which brings us to the
second function of God's consequent nature. Not only does God receive
all value attained by all entities into himself, but as he does so, he
performs his own creative synthesis of this data. In any synthesis,
data is objectified by the subject in some particular way depending on
"'"^Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op. cit., p. 162.
168Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. cit., p. 191.
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the subjective form of the synthesis. God creates out of the world at
any one moment, one harmonious integrated unity of experience. God makes
what he will out of what he receives. He decides how he will be affected
by what is included in his consequent nature. This is an important
point to understand, Whitehead does insist that God "looses nothing,"
but he qualifies himself by adding "that can be saved." This means that
each entity contributes "such elements as it can" to God.^®^ Some value
from each experience is saved, but it is harmonized by God with other
experiences all of which retain their own identity in the one experience.
1 I
Whitehead summarizes this by saying that God's consequent nature is "the
realization of the actual world through the unity of his nature and the
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transformation of his wisdom."
Good and Evil in God's Consequent Nature
What has been said above implies that with God, just as with other
entities, there is a subjective form, a valuation in each synthesis. God,
therefore, determines the ultimate value of any experience. Specific
illustration of this is found in the fact that both good and evil are
part of God's experience of the world.God receives both good and
evil, but the evil he transmutes into good. In no way should this be
seen as denying the reality of evil. Process thought always acknowledges
the reality of evil but further points out that God is able to overcome
the evil in the world with good. Evil is overcome but not eliminated.
It becomes an element in God's total experience, but in terms of the




total experience, it has been used to stimulate its opposite, and, thus,
the experience as a whole is good. Whitehead is quite clear about the
reality of evil, "Every fact is what it is, a fact of pleasure, of joy,
of pain, or of suffering."172 This means that God, in his consequent
nature, does experience suffering and tragedy and does sympathize with
then. Whitehead says God is "the fellow sufferer who understands."173
He is more than that, though. His sympathy goes farther than just feeling
the pain that others feel. It also involves transforming this pain into
the best possible harmony within his own nature. Hartshorne says:
Essentially it is creaturely fulfillments that enrich the
divine life; creaturely frustrations are misfortunes for God
... of such misfortunes ... we ourselves derive optimal
value from the health of our bodily cells, but we should do
the best we can when they are unhealthy. They not only lose
nothing by this, they gain something. If we do not make the
best of their ills, we add to then. So with God and his
cosmic body.-*-74
Hartshorne goes on to point out that God inherits creaturely decisions
as creaturely decision, not as his own decisions. In synthesizing then,
he does not enact them for they have already happened. What happens in
synthesis is that he uses these as the basis for his own decisions, his




^•72Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method,




Now it is possible to see clearly the inseparability of the pri¬
mordial and consequent nature of God. It is on the basis of the harmony
achieved in his own consequent nature that God is able to offer the
best possible initial aim to all subsequent entities. Whether in the
Whiteheadian sense of selecting the best possible eternal object or in
the Hartshcmian sense of creating the best possible aim, God does so on
the basis of the harmony he has created for himself out of his previous
synthesis of the actual world. Whitehead summarizes this interaction
between God and the cosmos in this way:
First, there is the "phase of conceptual origination." This
occurs when God begins the creative process by providing the entities
with their initial aims. The phase is deficient in actuality, but it is
rich in the potential for fulfillment of the divine initiative.
Secondly, there is the "temporal phase of physical origination."
Here, based on the conditions determined in the first phase, the indi¬
vidual entities perform their own creative synthesis, and full actuality
is achieved. What is absent in this phase is a unity of the various
entities with each other.
Thirdly, there is the "phase of perfected actuality." In this
phase, God talkas all the experiences occuring in the second phase and
unifies them everlastingly. The many become one without loss of their
own identity. This phase is dependent on the previous two phases.
Finally, the fourth phase is when the creative action completes
itself. The harmonization achieved in the previous phase passes back
165
into the world, and this "perfected actuality" becomes available for the
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experience of each subsequent entity.
God's Subjective Aim
The previous discussion has shown that God is the beginning and
the end of the creative process. The question that must now be answered
is what is God's purpose in creation, or, to use the language of process
thought, what is God's subjective aim?
Whitehead says that "the teleology of the universe is directed
toward the production of Beauty."176 He has defined beauty as being the
mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience.
As Johnson points out, Whitehead is here indicating the actual state of
affairs which must be present if beauty is to be achieved.177 Whitehead
distinguishes two main types of adaptation, either within an entity
itself or within a nexus of entities, which achieve beauty. The first
is the lack of interference among the various parts. This is the minor
form of beauty. The second is that, in addition to the absence of inter¬
ference, there are also striking contrasts of content,176 This is the
major form of beauty. In this form of beauty there is found a harmony
175Whitehead, Process and Reality, op, cit., p. 532
1^Whitehead, Adventure of Ideas, op. cit., p. 265.
177Johnson
178whitehead, Adventure of Ideas, op. cit., p. 324.
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of patterned contrasts in which each part enhances the whole and each
part is enhanced by the whole.-'-'®
Hartshorne is particularly interested in the second type of
beauty. For there to be great beauty there must be intensity, and this
depends on the amount of diversity that can be integrated into an exper¬
ience. "Aesthetic value is found in diversified, harmonious experiences.
This agrees with the old formula, beauty is unity in variety.There
is unity and variety in any experience. One of these may, however,
totally dominate the other. Beauty is found in the balance between unity
and variety. "Given a certain complexity, beauty is the diversification
of that complexity just to the extent that the aspects of unity, or
similarity, are no more, and no less impressive than the aspect of di¬
versity. What Hartshorne sees as the essential point in the formula
of "unity in variety" is that while success is single, the possibilities
of failure are dual, lying on the opposite ends of the continum. Beauty
is balance. Discord is not good but neither is to tame a harmony. "To
1 FiO
be bored to death is no better than to be shocked to death." This is,
of course, the Aristotelian "Golden Mean" the desirable quality being
found between two undesirable extremes. God's subjective aim is, there¬
fore, to achieve this balance between unity and variety, between monotony
3-'®Ibid., p. 339. Whitehead uses the sculptured figures on the
famous porch of the Cathedral at Chartres as an illustration. Each has
an individual beauty and each contributes to the beauty of the whole
which in turn enhances its own beauty.





and chaos, between hopeless complexity and superficial simplicity,
between too much freedom and too much limitation.
God aims at both maximum self-satisfaction and maximum satis¬
faction for the creatures. There is, in fact, no difference between the
two. Hartshorne comments, "God, I hold, is an artist fostering and
loving the beauty of the creatures, the harmonies and intensities of
their experiences, as data for his own."183 This is in no way "selfish¬
ness" on his part, for his future good includes the future good of all
others. Again citing Hartshorne, "God alone inherits all the harvests
for which he, or anyone, sows the seed ... God cannot benefit another
without benefiting himself. In his case, self-interest and altruism are
indeed coincident."184
Hartshorne believes that the basic idea of beauty as "integrated
diversity and intensity of experience" is metaphysical and valid for any
aspect of reality. He is quite clear about its ethical dimension. To
aim at beauty is valid ethically when this involves long term consider¬
ations. It is not just at momentary satisfaction which God aims but at
a satisfaction which will make possible an even greater attainment of
value in the future. He comments:
The aesthetic value of life is realized in relation to other
individuals and to the cosmos. Moral value is realized in
adopting aims for the future that transcend personal advantage.




consist in the contribution it has made to something more enduring
than amy animal, or than any.species of animal. Hie final beauty
is the 'beauty of holiness.'
God as the Cosmic Mind and the Cosmos as God's Body
We mentioned previously that the cosmos is the ultimate social
structure for it represents the unity of all societies whatever they
may be. Furthermore, such a society, due to its complexity, cannot be
a "democracy" but must be a "monarchy" having a dominant member who ex¬
ercises sufficient control and coordination to insure the maintenance and
continuance of the society. As we have indicated, the dominant member
of the cosmic society is God. "God is the personal order of the in-
XB6
elusive society of societies (the cosmos) and the cosmos is God's body."
The best way we can conceptualize the relationship between God
and the cosmos is through the mind-body analogy, for only in this analogy
do we have an instance of mentality dealing directly with physical
reality.^-37 Stated precisely, this analogy reads that God is to the
world as the mind is to the body. Hartshome points out that the idea
of the cosmos being God's body is valid if the notion of body is suffic¬
iently generalized to cover the supreme case. He does this by means of
defining body as "simply that much of the world with which the mind ...
has effective, immediate interactions of mutual inheritance, and over
XB5
Ibid., p. 321. An excellent "Theology of Beauty" based on
process thought is William Dean's Coming To, (Philadelphia: The West¬
minster Press), 1972.
lQ6Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op.cit., p. 90.
*37Hartshorne, "The God of Religion and the God of Philosophy,"
op. cit., p. 155.
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which its influence is dominant."-'-®® This is the relationship God has
to the cosmos, so we can quite properly call the cosmos his body.
Hartshorne quotes with approval the following statement from Nevin Harner:
It is hard to think of God as being at one and the same time
truly immanent and truly transcendent. We human beings ... are
immanent in our bodies in the seise that our life is intimately
bound up with and expressed through our bodies. At the same
time, we are transcendent to our bodies in the sense that we do
not remain a dimly diffused energy but somehow, somewhere come
to a self-conscious focus and can look down upon our bodies and
to a degree master them. In the same way, God may be thought
of as being immanent in the universe in that his life is inti¬
mately bound up with and expressed through it, and at the same
time transcendent of his universe in that somehow, somewhere
he comes to a self-conscious focus and is more than his uni¬
verse .... This dual relationship in ourselves ... we
accept ... everyday as a fact; we may as well do the same
concerning God. What is true of the microcosm can also be true
of the macrocosm.1®9
Obviously, this mind-body analogy is no crude anthropomorphism,
and Hartshcrne feels that, when properly understood, it has none of the
degrading effects that suggesting God has a body is supposed to have.
Indeed, it is the only effective way of saying that God has social
relations with all things that is uniquely adequate. Also, it insures
that God is considered radically superior to the individual societies
that compose his body.
The raind-bcdy relationship. To understand the appropriateness of
the mind-body analogy, we should look at what is the modern understand¬
ing of the mind-body relationship. Modern science has shown what,
• 183Ibid.
1®%evin C. Hamer, "Three Ways to Think of God," Religious
Education, XXVTV, p. 217. Quoted by Hartshome, Man's Vision of God,
op. cit., p. 208. The elipses are Hartshorne's.
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according to Hartshorne, ought to have been inferred from philosophical
principles, that "the solidarity of the body is an exaggeration of sense
perception." Although we perceive macroscopically the body as one
individual, viewed microscopically we realize that this one individual
is really many individuals. As sense perception has expanded through
modern technology, we realize that reality of multiple, formerly invis¬
ible constituents of our body. "A body, to the best of our knowledge
is really a 'world1 of individuals, and a mind, if the b-dy is one having
a mind (or one capable of thinking and feeling) is to that body some¬
thing like an indwelling God."^® Hartshorne is, therefore, inviting us
to consider ourselves as many individuals unified and directed by our
minds. Our bodies are from one perspective a whole, a single individual,
but from another more precise perspective, they are individuals unified
into the one reality transcending them all.
The mind-body analogy thus defined is apt for describing the
relationship of God to the world. An example of why this is so is know¬
ledge. Knowledge, as we experience it, varies in immediacy and distinct¬
ness. We know only a very few things really well. We must, therefore,
rely on imagination and speculation to fill in the gaps. The more we
know and the better we understand what we know, the less need there is,
except for projections into the future, for such imagination and specu¬
lation. Omniscience is nothing other than a completely "clear intuition
uf the entire cosmos."^*
190
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Power is another example where the mind-body analogy is helpful. As
human beings, we have limited power over some things. Indirectly, that
is thoughfr intermediaries, such as our muscles, we have control over a
number of things, but directly, we have very little control indeed. In
fact, we have direct control only of ourselves, our own bodies. If
"control" is the ability to carry out a purpose, the only immediate
effect of our purposing is the change in ourselves. Only after this
change can any change in the wr.rld beyond ourselves occur. Hartshorne,
therefore, concludes that the power relationship in which can be used as
a basis for the analogy of God's power over the world is the mind-body
analogy. While this may not be a perfect analogy, there is great simil¬
arity in one respect. God does not control the world except by the power
192
of his will and his knowledge.
We are not, however, like God just because both he and we "know"
and "will." Hartshorne agrees with traditional theology that God is not
only like us in these respects but that he is infinitely unlike us. "He
193
knows and wills eminenter, in a uniquely exalted fashion." Where
v
Hartshorne disagrees with traditional theology is that this dissimilarity
must be pushed to the point of saying that God does not really know or
will. This sort of pushing has completely dominated any discussion of
God's having an eminent, perfect body probably because thinking never
got beyond the features of a human body, and it was readily apparent






One of the bodily characteristics which is not applicable to
divinity is sense perception. All we know intimately is our thoughts,
feelings, bodily states and their changes. The knowledge of everything
outside ourselves is mediated to us by our sensory apparatus. Prom
this it is correct to assume that the internal conditions of our bodies
are more precisely experienced than external conditions surrounding
our bodies. Take for example, vision. Through sense perception all we
can be sure of is how an object appears to us. Since visual knowledge
is mediated to us by the eye and optical nerves, we have no visual
omniscience. Since God prehends all things directly, he does not need
intermediaries and his perception is vivid and distinct. This is the
source of his omniscience. Hartshorne explains the situation in this way:
God's volition is related to the world as though every
object in it were to him a nerve-muscle, and his omniscience
related to it as though every object were a muscle-nerve.
A brain cell is for us, as it were, a nerve-muscle and a
muscle-nerve in that its internal motions respond to our
thoughts, and our thoughts to its motions. If there is a
theological analogy, here is its locus. God has no separate
sense organs or muscles because all parts of the world body
directly perform both functions for him. *
The continuing endurance of the cosmic body. Perhaps the strongest
argument against conceiving God as having something analogous to a human
body is that human bodies are composite, passive, mutable, and above all
destructible. The first three of these characteristics can, according
to Hartshome, be predicted of God, but the final one cannot. That all
other bodies which we know do undergo not only change but also death
proves nothing about the divinely unique 'body' of God. If theologians
were to treat the divine cosmic body according to the same principles
^^Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, op. clt., p. 185.
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as they treat the idea of a divine, cosmic mind, there would be no
195
y objection at all to the concept of an indestructible body.
Bodies characteristically perserve themselves by generating new
parts to replace those which disintegrate. To survive, a body's gener-
ation must at least keep pace with its disintegration. The human body
and all bodies other than the cosmos itself are not able to sustain this
pace and, therefore, suffer their eventual demise. The explanation for
this is that no organism other than the cosmos itself could possibly
have control over all other organisms. All non-cosmic organisms exist
within an external environment and are subject to influences of other
organisms outside their control. This environment inevitably at some
point conflicts with the organisms internal needs. Destruction of the
organism is due, therefore, to the influence of factors outside its
control. If, however, we con speak of the cosmos as a "one-minded"
organism having all its constituent organisms under the direct control
of its mind, than we see that the destruction of the universe as a
whole is impossible. Even though its component parts are subject to
destruction, they are replaced by others and thus the whole is sus¬
tained.1^6 Hartshorne elaborates:
Each new divine state harmonizes itself with its predeces¬
sors and with the previous state of the cosmos, somewhat as a
man harmonizes himself in each new state with his previous
experience and bodily state but with the decisive difference
(among others) that the men must hope aid may easily hope in
vain that the internal and external environment will continue
to make it possible for his bodily harmony to survive whereas
with God there is no such problem.15*
195Ibld.. p. 181.
196ibid.. p. 182.
19^Hartshorne, An3clm's Discovery, op. cit»« p. 293.
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Sine® God has no external environment and his internal environment is
under radical control, there is no possibility of the complete destruction
of the cosmos. God needs only to continue adapting himself to the world
with his supreme, unique skill and power to Insure that there will be a
unified cosmic structure. This guarantees that there will be a cosmos
in some form or other.
Persuasion
One word of caution must be heard here. We have spoken of God
aa the order of the cosmos. The cosmic orderer must not be thought of
as the cosmic dictator. Just as the mind does not have absolute control
over the body, neither does God absolutely control the cosmos. The
analogy of God* a being a cosmic boss is "the most shockingly bad of all
theological analogies," for this implies the use of overt power to
achieve his will. He can, therefore, remain relatively impassive to the
feelings of those under him. God does not function in his way. According
to Hartshorn®: "God is the monarch or king of all only through being
in a real sense the slave, nay, the scourged slave, of all, infinitely
more passive to others, more readily 'wounded,* even than anyone else
can be."*98 If the cosmic mind, God, does not rule by force, then how
does he direct and influence the cosmos? Hartshome adopts Whitehead* 3
view that the world is ruled by "persuasion." He says:
I98Ibid., p. 204. In the chapter where this quotation occurs,
"Theological Analogies—Cosmic Organism" (pp. 174*212) a highly detailed
understanding of this is given. The concept of "the cosmic mind" Is also
fully explored in Reality As A Social Process, "Elements of Truth in the
Group-Hind Concepts," (pp. 53-6S).
175
God can rule the world and order it, setting optimal limits
for free action, by presenting himself as essential object, so
characterized as to weigh the possibilities of response in the
desired effect. This divine method of world control is called
• persuasion. '
We have already laid the foundations for understanding God's
power over the world as the power of persuasion in our discussion of
freedom. The freedom for self-creation is an essential aspect of an
entity's experience of itself. No creature is simply inert or passive.
If it were, it would not be. Therefore, there would be some resistance,
however slight, to any attempt at exercising "absolute" control. The
idea of power as the ability to control all things is an illusion since
it arises from the mistaken notion that there is something which can be
completely controlled. Since things cannot be coerced, the power that
God has must be the power of influence. All entities have this power to
a certain, limited extent in their superjective natures. This describes
their ability to influence other entities by being data in their syn¬
thesis. Since God is the one who issues the initial aim for all entities,
he is totally influential, not in the sense of determining all things
but of influencing all things.^00
It is possible to raise the question of creaturely freedom here
and ask if the actual entity receives from God the initial aim which
determines the original subjectivity of its prehension, how much self-
causation is really involved? God's giving the initial aim does not deny,
in any way, the entity's essential freedom. The initial aim is only
i99Hartshorne, The Divine Realitivity, op, clt., p. 142. frequ¬
ently, Hartshorne uses the word "influence" in place of "persuasion."
^^Hartshome, Man's Vision of God, op. clt., p. XVI.
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initial. God is only providing a possible, albeit best possible, aim
the entity could use for its becoming. The entity does not have to
stick with it; it can deviate from the initial aim and establish its
own aim which will govern the subjective form of the synthesis. Con¬
cerning this Whitehead says:
Thus, anxoriginality (actual entity) in the temporal world
is conditiorf; though not determined, by an initial subjective
aim (serving as its goal) supplied by the ground of all order
and originality (God).^®^
God's persuasive influence is felt by the world, as Hartshorne
indicated earlier, first by setting "optimal limits" for the free crea¬
tures. This means that he established those conditions which are maxi¬
mally favorable for each creature to enjoy rich, harmonious self-
satisfactions. In setting these limits each creature's freedom will be
maximized for the amount of freedom determines the depth of satisfaction
possible. This is risky, for it implies that with the greater degree of
freedom for self-creation is also the greater possibility of self-
destruction. There is, however, an optimum setting of conditions which
supply a degree of safety. This safety guarantees that the risks are
not too great and, therefore, provides the maximum possible freedom.
This limitation is the boundary within which a creature can make its own
free decisions. It is a boundary that does not keep it safe from the
possibility of all harm, but none the less does insure that it can and
will achieve some value in its lifetime. The amount of freedom any
creature is allowed is dependent on the extent that creature can, on its
2'^whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 164. I am in¬
debted to A. H. Johnson who supplied the clarifying information contained
in the parenthesis. See his Whitehead's Theory of Reality, op, clt.,
p. 60.
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own level, imitate the divine aim at harmony. Hartshorne believes that
no creature is given more or less freedom than it can properly use. ^02
This power of persuasion is all the power God needs to have. It
is the only power necessary for the divine orderer of the cosmos to con¬
tain. More power than this would trespass the legitimate freedom of
other creatures. God's power is supremely adequate to do what should be
done by a cosmic creator but not to do what should rightly be done by
non-cosmic creators. God does not coerce the cosmos into the best pos¬
sible state of existence. He creates the optimal conditions under which
the best possible state could be achieved. There is no guarantee that
this state will be achieved by various free creators. The result is
usually not ideal because these creators are not as optimally good or
wise as God is. The extent that the best possible state of the cosmos
will be achieved depends on how influenced by the cosmic creator each
non-cosmic creator allows himself to be.
This brings us to another important point. God's divine persua¬
sion can only be effective if it does in fact have influence. In other
words, the creatures must respond according to God's intention for them.
The lure which God gives than in the initial aim must be sufficiently
attractive that the creature will want to follow it. Already mentioned
is the fact that the lure is the best possible satisfaction the creature
can attain for itself personally and for the various social relationships
of which it is part. This in itself should make it attractive to the
creature. None the less, the creature is free to follow other lures
which may appear more attractive to it. Still, in providing the initial
^^Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, op. cit., pp. 136 and xvii.
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aim, God has started the creature off on the right foot, given him a
push in the right direction, and this in itself gives a certain impetus
toward fulfilling God's intention.
There is an additional argument here which Hartshorne mentioned
earlier. God "presents himself as essential object so characterized as
to weigh the possibilities of response in the desired effect." He
continues s
• • . it is by molding himself that God molds us, by pre¬
senting at each moment a partly new ideal or order of preference
which our unself-conscious awareness takes as object, and thus
raiders influential upon our entire activity. The total or
concrete divine mover is self-moved. Only he who changes him¬
self can control the changes in us by inspiring us with novel
ideals for novel occasions. We take our cues for this moment
by seeing, that is, feeling, what God as of this moment
desiderates.2<^
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As Whitehead says, "God's power is the worship he inspires."
One further thing needs to be said about the attractiveness of
God's lure. Process thought considers God to be most influential because
he is most influenced. God orders the cosmos by taking into his own
life all other life. Hartshome believes s
In the depths of their hearts all creatures (even those who
rebel against him) defer to God because they sense him as the
one who alone is adequately moved by what moves then. He alone
not only knows but feels (the only adequate knowledge where
feeling is concerned) how they feel, and he finds his own joy
in sharing their lives, lived according to their own free
decisions, not fully anticipated by any detailed plan of his
own.205
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Hartshome, The Divine Relativity, op. cit., p. 142.
^^Whitehead, quoted by Hartshome, Ibid., p. xvii.
205ibid.
179
God as a Living Person
We have been discussing God in terms of his self-creation and
his creation of others, using ideas like the relationship of mind to
body to illuminate our thinking. We have also noted how he uses per-
i>*
suasion rather than coersion in dealing with his creatures and how his
syntheses parallel ordinary syntheses but do so in uniquely supreme
ways. We have now come to the point where we must ask a question which
has not been finally answered by process thinkers. Is God an actual
entity cr is he a living person, that is a series of entities possessing
a particular type of continuity?
Whitehead's view, which it is argued he does not hold consist-
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sntly, is that God is an actual entity. Hartshorne rejects this view
feeling that regarding God as a living person gives greater coherence
to Whitehead's system than Whitehead's own view. He argues:
And here is one point at which Whitehead and I differ rather
sharply. He says God is the supreme form of 'actual entity';
my view is, he is the supreme form of the category of 'person¬
ally ordered society' of actual entities. Technically, this
difference is important. In thinking about God, Whitehead, it
seems to me, fell into the trap ... of taking continuity to
apply literally to actuality. For Whitehead's God changes,
while an actual entity, though it becomes, does not change.
Hence, God must be a series, or society, of actual entities.7
^''Hartshorne, Philosophers Speak of God, op. clt., p. 274.
Hartshorne points out this inconsistency in Whitehead's thinking. "God
is, as Whitehead agreed in a carefully noted conversation with A. H.
Johnson, a linear sequence (which Whitehead terms 'a personally ordered
society') of occasions with the difference, as contrasted to ordinary
personal sequences, that in God there is no lapse of memory, or loss of
immediacy as to occasions already achieved."
2°7Hartshorne, "Comment by Professor Charles Hartshorne" in
Peters, The Creative Advances op. cit., p. 139,
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John Cobb agrees with Hartshorne and points out that Whitehead
wrote much of the time without having in his mind a clear concept of
God as an actual entity and of what that implies. He points out that if
one thinks of God solely in terms f his primordial nature, which White¬
head usually did, it would be correct to think of him as an actual
entity because there would be no need to think of him as being temporal.
When the consequent nature is taken into consideration, h wever, this is
no longer possible. Cobb points out that Whitehead recognizes process
in the consequent nature of God. He then elaborates;
Such pr cess must be conceived either as the kind of pro¬
cess that occurs between occasions or as that kind which occurs
within an occasion. Whitehead's positi n that God is an actual
entity requires the latter doctrine. But the chief distinction
between internal process and physical time is that the process
occurring within an occasion has no efficacy for other occasions
except indirectly thr ugh the satisfaction in which it eventuates.
If the process in God* s consequent nature is thought of in these
terms, it cannot affect the events in the world. Yet, White¬
head explicitly affirms just such an influence.
Another factor which must be taken into consideration when deciding
whether God is an actual entity or living person lies in understanding
the complete unity of the primordial and consequent nature in providing
the initial aim for each new occasion of experience. God's casual
efficacy in this case is that of an entity which has already attained
satisfaction and not like one of the phases in the becoming of an entity.
Looking at this from a slightly different angle, God could not provide
an initial aim, in the way we have described his providing it, unless he
had already completed the process of harmonizing all events into his one
unitary experience. This means that a complete cycle of the creative
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Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op. cit., p. 188
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process must be accortplished. Such would not be possible if God were an
actual entity still in the process of becoming because he would not have
obtained objective immortality which is necessary to exert the influence
209
he does in fact exert on other occasions of creative experience.
Hartshorne would have an additional reason for insisting that God
is a living person. As we have seen, Cobb agrees with Whitehead that the
initial aim involves eternal objects. Hartshorne rejects the concept of
eternal objects opting for the creation of an original initial aim for
each new occasion. This would be impossible if God were not a temporal
series of entities for there would be no basis on which he could create
an original aim.
Whitehead's main objection to seeing God as a living person would
seem to be the loss of absolute self-identity through time and also the
loss in vividness of past events.2"''0 While it is true that both these
happen with ordinary living creatures, there is nothing that demands they
happen. Hartshorne explains:
Any changing, enduring thing ... has two aspects: the as¬
pect of identity, or what is common to the thing in its earlier
and later stages, and the aspect of novelty. A man is a new,
different person every moment; but equally he is the same person
every moment. There is no paradox in this. By change is meant
exactly this combination of identity and difference. A being which
changes only through a finite time has an identical aspect which
changes only at the beginning and at the aid of the stretch of
time daring which the thing endures .... A being which changes
through all time has an identical aspect which changes at no time
whatever, it is in this aspect immutable. Thus, there is a charac¬
teristic in God which is exempt from change.211
209Ibld..
210Whitehead maintains that society can maintain absolute self-
identity. Complete self-identity from one entity to the next within the
society is an "interesting fable." (Modao -f Thn-.ight-, op, cit.. p. 129.)
211
Hartshorne Han's Vision of God, op. cit.. pp. 107ff.
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If we look on God as being not just a living person but~the
supreme exemplification of a living person, it is possible to posit that
he does maintain an absolute self-identity through time and that the
vividness of past experiences is not lost. Indeed, both of these are
factors in his superiority. As concerns self-identity, Cobb points out
that self-identity is attained by each living person's prehensions of the
occasions that constitute his past. The living person would also,
though, prehend some non-contiguous experiences of other living persons
which would complicate his maintaining absolute self-identity. With
God, though, there are no occasions which are not part of his past since
every happening has already been included in his consequent nature.
Hence, there is no loss of self-identity. Likewise, with regard to loss
of vividness, this occurs because of the fragmentary way in which past
occasions are reinacted. This does not happen with God because he per¬
fectly remembers in every new occasion all past occasions. His exper-
212
ience grows, but in this growth nothing is lost.
Although the question is still open for discussion, it seems more
logical to conceive of God as a living person rather than an actual
entity. Certainly, if one stays with Hartshome, as we do in this dis¬
sertation, then it is impossible to do otherwise.
God and Creativity
Before drawing all that has been said together, one further clari-
ficatio must be made. This concerns the relationship of God to
creativity.
212
Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op. clt., pp. 190-91.
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Whitehead's concept of creativity. Whitehead*s initial account
of creativity is "terse to the point of obscurity.3 Looking at what
he says is helpful, though, in locating its place in the system.
'Creativity,' 'many,' 'one,' are the ultimate n tions
involved in the meaning of the synonymous terms 'thing,'
•being,' 'entity.' These three notions complete the Cate¬
gory of the Ultimate and are presupposed in all special
categories.
Creativity is the universal of universale characterizing
ultimate matter of fact. It is that ultimate principle by
which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become
the actual one occasion which is the universe conjunctively.
From the above quotations, it is obvious that creativity occupies
a unique place in Whitehead's scheme. It is the ultimate notion. The
terms "one" and "many" presuppose each other and refer to actual enti¬
ties. Creativity describes the nature of all entities. "One" signifies
the singularity of each actual entity; "many" the "disjunctive diversity
out of which the one arises and to which it contributes itself."
Whitehead continues:
The novel entity is at once the togetherness of the 'many'
which it finds, and also it is one among the disjunctive
•many' which it leaves, it is a novel entity, disjunctively
among the many which it synthesizes. The many become one
and are increased by one.^15
This last sentence, as we have already noted, is the key concept in
process thought. The "many becoming one" presupposes creativity as the
reason why it happens and that it happens.
213sherburn, A Key to Whitehead'3 Process and Reality, op. cit.,
p. 33.
214whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 31.
215ibid.
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Whitehead also calls creativity the "principle of novelty"2-^
for production of novel togetherness is the ultimate notion of creative
synthesis. The new entity is a different entity from any of those it
unifies. Creativity is the fact of the mergence of this novelty. The
"many" are in fact subordinate to the "one" so that it is unique in the
universe, but the new one will be subordinate to another new one as
that new one emerges. Whitehead says this constant movement from many
to one and one to many is the "rhythm of process whereby creation pro¬
duces natural pulsation, each pulsation forming a natural unit of his¬
toric fact."217 This rhythm of process is unending repeating itself
continually in the creative advance from creature to creature. Crea¬
tivity is pure activity—the activity which is the basis of all reality.
Because creativity is an ultimate notion it is hard to define
precisely. Whitehead finds he must appeal to our intuition for its
intelligibility. He does, however, direct our thinking to Aristotle's
ultimate category of "primary substance" which he says occupies the
same place in Aristotle's system as creativity does in his own.2-*-®
Equating primary substance with creativity is not what Whitehead has in
mind, however. He notes a fundamental difference between primary sub¬
stance and creativity being that the former is passive and the later
active. What, he says, is similar is that each, in its respective sys¬
tem, is "the highest generality at the base of actuality." Both primary
substance and creativity have "no character of their own" each relying
216Ibid.
2^Whitehead, Modes of Thought, op. cit., p. 120.
21®Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. clt., p. 32.
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on the actual world to receive their character. As far as creativity is
concerned, Whitehead says, "The function of creatures is that they con-
219
stitute the shifting character of creativity."
Primary substance does one other thing in Aristotle's system
that Whitehead, at least implicity, has creativity doing in his. Prime
substance is the material cause of all things. It would, of course, be
ridiculous to postulate a material cause in process theology where cate¬
gories of substance have been replaced by categories of change. The
material cause does though, answer for Aristotle the question of why
there is anything at all, and Whitehead would have creativity be his
answer to that question. Furthermore, in Arist tie the notion of pri¬
mary substance insists that the role of the creator is to give form to
a reality given him. This parallels what Whitehead sees actual entities
doing to creativity. Although it is responsible for creation, creativity
is not a creator because it is not an actual entity and only actual
entities create.
In Aristotle prime substance is the explanation of why there are
material things. It does not, however, provide any explanation for its
own existence. Neither does creativity. It cannot be understood to
exist because it does not fit into any of the categories of existence.
It is not an eternal object because eternal objects are "forms of
definiteness" and do not have to be actualized by any particular occasion.
As Whitehead says, "an eternal object is neutral as to the fact of its
^l^whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 46. I am indebted
to John Cobb for calling this and the following comparisons between
Aristotle and Whitehead to my attenti n. See his A Christian Natural
Theology, op. clt., pp. 206-9.
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physical ingression in any particular actual entity."^20 still, creativ¬
ity has no form of its own.
It might be possible to think of creativity as an abstraction
from the process itself, but this is confusing. Cobb comments:
Creativity is the actuality of every actual entity. We
may think of all the forms embodied in each instance of
creativity as abstractable from it, since creativity might
equally have taken any other form so far as its being creativ¬
ity is concerned. But it is confusing to speak of creativity as
being itself an abstraction from its expressions, since it is
that in virtue of which they have concreteness. Nevertheless,
creativity as such is not concrete or actual.221
Whitehead obviously believes that the process of creation is
unending or, at least, that it will continue "to the crack of doom,"222
but he gives very little reasoning to support this belief. We can
surmize, though, that one of the reasons he feels creativity will con¬
tinue is the super1ective nature of actual entities. Recall how we said
earlier that the superjective nature of each entity was the urge it has
to perpetuate itself by being included as datum in subsequent synthesis.
To repeat what Whitehead says, "It belongs to the nature of a 'being*
that is a potential for every •becoming.•"223 peters comments on this:
When we speak of data or objects provided by the past for
unification in a present occasion, our words carry the mislead¬
ing suggestion that the present occasion arises out of a
22^ibid., p. 70. Johnson believes 'creativity,' 'one,' and
•many' are eternal objects but 'ultimate' ones in that they must be
actualized by every occasion. For the reasons given above, this conclu¬
sion cannot be accepted. See Johnson, Understanding Whitehead, op. cit.,
p. 71.
221cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op. cit., p. 210.
222wbitehead, Process and Reality, cp. cit., p. 347.
223ibid., p. 33.
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purely passive state of affairs. The truth is that each of these
data actively compels its embodiment, its re-enaction, in the
burgeoning occasion. It thrusts itself into the formation of the
future and thereby acquires immortality.224
Peters concludes that the fact of past occasions propelling themselves
into the future providing the data required for new entities, is crea¬
tivity, for as Whitehead says, "the creativity of the world is the
throbbing emotion of the past hurling itself into a new transcendent
225
fact."" The locus of creativity then for whitehead must be in the
superjective nature of actual entities.
Hartshorae'a and Cobb's revision of Whitehead's concept of
creativity. While it sounds very convincing to hear of entities aimed
to and responsible for not only their present but also the future and
that this provides a momentum which perpetuates the creative process, we
still do not have much more than a description of the process itself.
The question of why there is this unending creative advance is not ade¬
quately answered. Cobb comments:
Creativity is inescapably an aspect of every such entity,
but it cannot answer the question as to why that entity, or
any entity, occurs. The question is why new processes of
creativity keep occuring and the answer to this cannot be
simply because there was creativity in the preceding occasions
and that there is creativity again in the new ones. If
occasions ceased to occur, then there would be no creativity.226
Hartshorns and Cobb believe that the question can be answered
only in strict adherence to Whitehead's ontological principle, that
actual entities are the reasons for all things, and that if we want to
224peters, The Creative Advance, op. cit.. p. 59,
225whitehead, Adventure of Ideas, op. cit.T p. 227.
226Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, op. clt.. p. 211.
188
know the why of something we must look to an actual entity or a society
of entities for the answer. Cobb suggests, quite correctly, that we
should look toward God. He points out that God's role in creation cen¬
ters on giving each entity its initial aim. This is "the originating
element in each new occasion."227 The giving of the initial aim is the
most significant moment in the creative process because it is this
decision which determines that the creative process for each individual
entity will begin. God's supplying the initial aim provides the initia¬
tion of each occasion.
Although the initial aim comes along with the other data an
entity receives, it is the most important datum for two reasons: (1) The
initial aim determines the entity's standpoint in space-time. This
means that the initial aim has determined what the entity's predecessors
will be and, therefore, what other data will be available to it. This
entity occurs at a particular time in a particular place because God
decides it will happen then and there. (2) The initial aim is the
entity's first subjectivity and determines at the outset how all other
data will be objectified. This aim may, of course, be modified but it
is the one with which the entity starts.228
The role of the initial aim is, therefore, different from that
of other data in that it determines what other data will be "real poten¬
tialities" for the new emerging entity and also how this entity will




initial aim is his decision that there will be the particular synthesis
that will constitute an entity and, moreover, this involves the decision
as to how that entity could and should conduct its own process of
self-creation.
Again, we must remind ourselves that the initial aim does not
determine the whole synthesis. It only determines what happens at its
inception. Nonetheless, this is the crucial moment. In giving the
initial aim God has decided that he wants an entity in a particular
place at a particular time, and he has also decided what he wants that
entity to become.
The initial aim and the superjective nature of God. The question
could, and probably should, be asked, "Why does God give an initial
subjective aim to each new occasion?" Stated in a slightly different
way, "Why does he decide that there shall be a particular entity at a
certain time and place with a specific potential for becoming?" The
answer to these questions is found in the fact that God, in each of his
momentary states of experience, has, like all other entities, a super-
jective nature.
Whitehead, Hartshorne, and Cobb say very little about the super-
jective nature of God. From what they do say it is apparent that, through
the superjective nature, God shares with other entities the quality of
having an urge to be formative of subsequent syntheses. God, through the
superjective nature, thrusts himself into the future. This thrust mani¬
fests itself in the initial aim. Even though he does not describe it
as such, what Whitehead sees happening in the fourth phase of the creative
process, is precisely what is happening through the superjective nature.
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This is the final stage of the process when the perfected actuality is
passed back into the world as part of the actuality relevant to future
experiences.229 John Lansing comments that the superjective nature of
God is God*s objective immortality. "We may speak of God," he says,
"as superjective in that as a unified actual entity he is present to an
immanent in the world luring it toward a greater intensity of ex¬
perience."2^0 In Modes of Thought, again without specifically calling
it tiie superjective nature, Whitehead says that in the final stage of
the divine process of creation, "the issue is the unified composition
which assures a datum operative in the future world."231
This revision by Hartshome and Cobb is a much stronger
definition of God the creator than Whitehead would want us to have.
Even though he sees God's role in the creative process as supplying the
initial aims to each new entity, he does not see the initial aim as
having so decisive a role as Cobb and Hartshorne do. He prefers to
regard creativity as ultimate and to view both God auid the world as
conditioning it. He says, "Both God and the world are in the grip of
the ultimate raetaphysic ground, the creative advance into novelty."232
Whitehead definitely wants to maintain that creativity is not dependent
on God and that God is an instance of creativity just as all other enti¬
ties are. There is no indication anywhere that he would want creativ¬
ity to be seen as an expression of God's will and purpose. Yet, it
ppq" See above, p» 164.
pofi
Lansing, op. cit., p. 151.
2^"Whitehead, Modes of Thought, op. cit., p. 128.
232yhitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 529.
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seems this is where his thinking goes when followed out as has been done
above.
God as Creativity Itself
Hartshome suggests that in Whitehead's view creativity is "a
sort of God beyond God."233 He insists that God cannot be conceived as
a "mere product of creativity" but as its "supreme and indespensible
aspect."234 He points out that:
All actual creativity is either God's own creative syn¬
thesis, or it is a datum for his creative-synthetic action. It is
either a divine 'subjective form' or a divine 'objective form,*
either a divine contribution to the creatures or a contribution
divinely received from the creatures.235
All creativity is, therefore, in God either by being his own creative
decisions or by including the creative decisions of others. When looking
at God's own creative process and seeing that it includes all other
creative processes, he concludes that divine process is "Process Itself."
He says:
The consequent nature of God is a super process—inclusive
of ordinary process, but only as these are its data, only as
they are its objective forms. The subjective forms are dif¬
ferent not in degree but in principle. 'God is not the world,
but the valuation of the world.' This does not mean that the
natural process goes on of itself and that God at roost adds
his evaluation, or merely originates the process • • • • Through
his fresh valuation of each phase of process as it occurs, God
is the continuing inspirer of order and stimulus to novelty of
each subsequent phase .... On the other hand, the divine
'flux' contains the absolutely fixed structure and absolutely
233Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. cit., p. 18.
23^Hartshome, Anselm*s Discovery, op. cit.. p. 71.
235Hartshorne, whitehead's Philosophy, op, cit.. p. 138.
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inexhaustible potentialities of the 'primordial nature,• The
flux is, in sum, the Process which evokes, sustains, and
processes ordinary process • • • • "236
Since God's creative synthesis is the supreme process and all
other synthesis are included in it, Hartshorne feels God should be
regarded as Creativity itself. He asks, "If in philosophies of being
God is Being itself, in a philosophy of creativity, should he not be
creativity itself?" He answers his own question by suggesting that "we
regard creativity or the principle of process as an 'analogical concept'
functioning in Whitehead's system somewhat as being functions in
Aristotelian theology."237 He develops this idea by saying that ac¬
cording to Thomas Aquinas, for an example of an Aristotelian theologian,
there are many different kinds of being with the major distinction being
made between the necessary being of God and the contingent being of
everything else. Likewise in Whitehead's system no simple identification
is made of creativity with God's own creative process because each
entity is at least partly self-created and, therefore, has its own
creativity. In addition to this, just as in Thomism where divine being
is held to exist necessarily and eternally, so in process thought does
divine creativity necessarily and eternally exist. In its primordial
aspect, divine creativity is the ground of all possibility and is thereby
necessary because without it there could be no other creative synthesis.
This is what distinguishes the divine creative process from other, con¬
tingent creative processes. He concludes that "creativlty-as-such is no
236Hartshorne, "Tillich's Doctrine of God," op. cit., p. 169.
237Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. clt., p. 18.
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more a God beyond God In this system them being-as-such is in Thomism.
The difference is mainly in the shift from mere being to process as the
ultimate analogical universal or form of forms,"238
Clearly then, in Hartshome's thinking, Creativity is not other
than God but rather God is Creativity itself. Just as God is seen as
the perfection of being in theologies of being, so he is seen as being
the perfection of creative process in process theology. This does not
deny any other entity its proper creativity and being independent of God,
(Kjr
It does insist, however, that its creativity is derivitive from and
dependent on the divine creativity.
Hartshome feels the reason why Whitehead never wished to draw
the conclusion that divine creativity was Creativity itself is two fold.
First, this identification could lead to the misunderstanding that crea¬
tures have no creativity of their own; and, secondly, it might then be
possible to make God the one who chooses the particular goods and evils
of the world. To avoid the determinism implicit in each of these,
Whitehead chose to distinguish between God and creativity, Hartshome
believes that what Whitehead actually says about God cannot be recon¬
ciled with this separation. He says:
Since he {God] is active as well as passive, he can con¬
tain creative decisions he does not make. He contains his
own divine decisions as making them and non-divine ones as
suffering them , . . , God as adequate cosmic subject, cor¬
relative in a unique way to the total universe of lesser
realities includes all instances and kinds of creativity
either as his own act-forms or as their contents. Thus





Thus, Whitehead, or anyone else, need not worry about a loss of genuine
creaturely creativity when God is viewed as Creativity itself.
God as Creativity Which Creates Other Creativity
A helpful way of understanding Hartshome's concept of God as
Creativity itself is to look at the way John Macquarrie has handled the
concept of being. Although there are many fundamental differences be¬
tween the two theologians, one being Macquarrie's assertion the primacy
of being over becoming and Hartshorne's the primacy of becoming over
240
being, some of their thinking runs along parallel lines.
Macquarrie, like Hartshorne, deplores a static concept of being.
He insists that we approach the concept of being through "existence"
rather than "thinghood." Being must be regarded as a "verbal noun" with
a double meaning—both the "act or energy of existing" and also "the
existent entity in which this act expresses or manifests itself." With
this in mind he says the essence of being is the dynamic "letting be of
241
other beings." Furthermore, God is absolute letting-be. His essence
242
is Being and his Being in turn is his letting-be. Macquarrie points
out that the Hebrew very hyh has more dynamic connotations than those
expressed by its usual translation "to be." It's meaning is more ade¬
quately captured by "to become." The name of God, "I am what I am" is
misleading, therefore, if it suggests only static being. Both Biblical
thought and sound ontology demand a dynamic element in understanding
240
Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, op. cit.,
p. 101} Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. clt.,
p. 13.
241




being. "I am what I am" should refer to the ongoing process of being or
to being in time and history rather than just an immutable, static being.
Significantly enough, he points out that a few biblical scholars trans¬
late the name of God as "I cause to be . . or "I bring to pass ..."
Even though this is not the preferred translation by most scholars, it
does suit Macquarries purposes well for he can then translate God's name
as being "I let be what I let be."243
God's Being, his letting-be, is prior to and the condition of
the existence of any other being. He determines that it will have its
being. The being of all creatures is subordinate to and dependent on
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his Being which lets then be. Without his letting them be, they
could not be. This does not in any way suggest passivity. There is no
inference here of leaving alone but rather one of enabling. Macquarrie
says: "When we talk of letting-be, we are to understand both parts of
the hyphenated expression in a strong sense—'letting' as 'empowering1
and 'be* as enjoying the maximal rauige of being that is open to the par-
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ticular being concerned."
Macquarrie's concept of letting-be is very similar to Hartshorne's
understanding of creativity. This closeness becomes apparent when
Macquarrie says, "Letting-be is the creativity of Being, and the de¬
pendence of beings is their creatureliness."246 From Hartshorne's perspec¬






the actual entities, to happen. Their creativity, their becoming, is
dependent on his creativity. He decides to let then become, to have
their moment of self-creation. As in Macquarrie, this is not passive
permission but em actual empowering to become, to enjoy the fullness of
their own particular creative synthesis. In Macquarrie God may be
thought of as the Being which lets being be. In Hartshorne, he is the
Creativity which creates other creativity. 247
The Logos as expressive Being and Creativity. Macquarrie makes
a further differentiation in his concept of Being which can be usefully
applied to understanding the process concept of Creativity. The Christ¬
ian concept of the Trinity, Macquarrie says, safeguards the Biblical
understanding of a dynamic God. Through God's self-revelation in the
Trinity, we can. see that there are three "movements" within the "dynamic
yet stable mystery we call Being."248 then describes the Trinity in
247We should note that while there is considerable agreement
between the ideas of letting-be and creativity, there is also a certain
incompatibility. The initial aim involves considerable specific content.
Letting-be does not. God's pouring out of creativity, his giving of the
initial aim is a function of the primordial nature. This initial aim
is, however, more than just a creation of the primordial nature. As
was established earlier, the content of the initial is dependent on wnac
happens in the consequent aspect of God's creative synthesis. What is
absent is Macquarrie's analysis of letting-be is any idea parallel to
Hartshome's understanding of the influence of God's consequent nature
on his primordial nature. The particular content of the initial aim
is dependent on the return of Creativity to its source and the further
creative synthesis of the fruits of this creativity in the divine
synthesis.
Concerning this, Overman comments that, "the notion of »letting-
be' captures part of what we mean by God's prevision of initial aims,
but it lacks the note of divine responsiveness to the past in terms of
hopes for the future." Evolution and the Christian Doctrine of Creation,
op» cit., p. 285.
248Macquarrle, Principles of Christian Theology, op. cit.,
p. 182.
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this way: God the Father is "primordial Being," "the ultimate act or
energy of letting-be, the condition that there should be anything what¬
soever, the source not only of Whatever is but of all possibilities of
being. "249 primordial Being is the "depth of the mystery of God" whom
we can only know through what he chooses to reveal of himself.
God the Son is "expressive Being." Through expressive Being the
energy of primordial Being is poured out and gives rise to the particular
beings of the world. Macquarrie reminds us that in Christian theology
the Son is the Word or the Logos, the agent of the Father in both the
creation and the recreation of the world. Therefore, he says "the Logos
is expressive Being,"250 and it is through him that primordial Being is
expressed in other beings. The Logos, or expressive Being, comes from
the Father and is co-eternal with him. There never was a time when
there was just primordial Being in splendid isolation. There has always
been primordial Being united with and moving out through expressive
Being.
God, the Spirit, is designated as "unitive Being." His operation
is "to promote a new and higher level of unity between Being and the
beings." Macquarrie explains:
... it is the function of the Spirit to maintain, strength¬
en and, where need be, restore the unity of Being with the
beings, a unity which is constantly threatened. But the unity
which the Spirit builds up is a higher unity than would have
been possible had Being never moved out of primordial Being
through expressive Being, for the new unity which the Spirit
builds is a unity of freedom, a unity of comprehending a di¬





Ihe Spirit thai performs a unifying function drawing the beings to Being,
for the Spirit "leads beings back up into a new and richer unity with
Being which let them be in the first place."252
These three movements of Being present us with a description of
divine Being which in many ways parallels the process understanding of
divine Creativity, in particular the three natures of God.253 Primordial
Being has a basic similarity to the primordial nature of God. Both are
transcendent, eternal, God as he is in himself. Both are the ultimate
potential for the universe and the source of all its possibilities.
They are the condition that there be anything, and everything that is
seen as being utterly dependent on then. Likewise, unitive Being, at
least in its basic description, and the consequent nature of God are
similar. It is in his consequent nature that God unifies all other
creative experience in his own creative experience. The many become
one. This is what Macquarrie sees happening in unitive Being when the
254
diversity of free responsible beings is unified. Through unitive
Being a level of unity is maintained among lesser beings and these
lesser beings are related to Being itself. Through unitive Being,
beings remain the possession of the Being which let then be. In the
consequent nature of God, each entity is possessed by God becoming an
eternal constituent of his divine self-creation.
252Ibid., p. 185.
253
In no way is it claimed that there is an exact correlation.
This does not mean, however, that Macquarrie's framework cannot be help¬
ful for understanding process ideas.
254in Macquarrie's thinking this unity is not a constituent of
divine being as it is in process thought.
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The most important similarity, at least for our purposes, is
the one between expressive Being and the superjective nature of God.
Here, in both cases, we find the locus of the creation of other
entities. Expressive Being and Creativity are, each in its respective
system, the agency for the creation of other reality. Because of this,
they are the way that the transcendent God becomes involved in the
finite world. Both are, in fact, the immanence of God in the world
which means they are more than just an agency but a real personal
involvement—an incarnation—of God in creation. Through expressive
Being, primordial Being pours out being to the other beings. Through
his superjective nature, God, who is Creativity itself, gives each
entity its creativity. In Macquarrie's thinking, expressive Being is
identified with the traditional Christian concept of the Logos. This
same identification can be made for Creativity in process thinking.
Cobb's understanding of the Logos. Cobb makes a different
identification of the members of the Trinity than the one we nave
made above. While the two views are somewhat compatible, they differ
sharply with regard to the nature of the Logos. A comparison between
these views will help clarify the identification we have made of the
Logos and creativity. In so doing, we must note that Cobb insists
that his position is not final and "very much in process" and that
his proposals have the "character of tentative exploration ...
rather than well established conclusions.
255John B. Cobb, Jr., Christ in a Pluralistic Age, (Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1975), p. 263.
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For Cobb, the Trinity is "Go<3, his Logos and his Kingdom. The
Logos is present with us as Christ: the Kingdom as Spirit."256 xiie
three members of this Trinity are not equal, the first person being
more "ultimately God" than the other two. In spite of Nicaea and
Constantinople, popular thinlciiig within the church, Cobb believes, has
always supported the idea that the Father was more fully God than the
Son or the Spirit, both of which were seen as belonging to God and
being derivative from him.257 This is also Cobb's view. The first
person of the Trinity is simply God or God "in general." The other
two members of the Trinity, Logos and Kingdom, are the two specific
activities of God—his creative and his redemptive love. The Son is
one mode of these activities, the Spirit the other. Cobb says that the
relationship of the Son and the Spirit to God is like the rela¬
tionship of Cobb's thoughts and feelings to himself. These thoughts
and feelings have no existence apart from Cobb himself, and Cobb is
the unity of these thoughts and feelings.2^8 Cobb likes the ancient
image of the Trinity which depicts God as a man with two hands. The
two hands belong to the deity but are not identical with the deity as
a whole. 2^9
Having established that the Trinity is composed of two persons
plus the unity of those persons "which is not another person in the
256Ibid.. p. 262.
2-*'John B. Cobb, Jr. and David R. Griffin, Process Theology:
An Introductory Exposition (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press,
1976), p. 110.
25®Cobb, Christ in a Pluralistic Age, op. clt. pp. 260-1.
259Ibid.. p. 259.
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same sense that the other two are persons,Cobb makes some ad¬
ditional differentiations. Each of the two persons in the Trinity has
an immanent and a transcendent aspect. The Kingd m of Heaven and the
consequent nature of God both refer to the same transcendent reality.
The Spirit is the way in which the Kingdom is immanent in creation.
The Logos and the primordial nature of God refer to the same trans¬
cendent reality, Christ is the way in which the Logos is immanent in
creation. Cobb does not use the word "Son" here because it can mean
both Logos and Christ. "The Logos refers primarily to the Son in his
transcendence. Christ refers to the Son in his immanence or in¬
carnation. "261
In spite of the fact that Cobb's view is in complete agreement
with Whitehead's understanding of God, we have two problems with this
understanding of the Trinity. The first is in terminology, par¬
ticularly as concerns his use of the word "Logos." As indicated
previously, the position taken in this paper does not identify the
Logos with the primordial nature of God, but with the superjective
nature of God. What Cobb calls the Logos is what we have called
Creativity itself. What he calls Christ is what we have called the
Logos or Creativity of God. We find confirmation that we are using
different words for the same thing when Cobb refers to the Logos
262
as "the source of novel order and ordered novelty," which is in
260Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology, op. clt., p. 109.
261
Cobb' Christ in a Pluralistic Age, op. cit., p. 261.
262Ibid., p. 229.
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our tMnking a function of Creativity itself. It is the Logos which
supplies the initial aims for each synthesis. The outward movement
of the Logos is Christ who becomes incarnate as these Initial aims are
prehended by the creatures. This movement, in our thinking, is the
Logos.
The question that must now be asked is whether or not Cobb's
classifications are superior to the ones presented previously in this
paper. Our answer is that they are not.
Cobb believes that his concept of the Logos is Biblical and
fundamentally what the church fathers meant by it. Aside from an
oblique reference to John 1:4, no substantiation for this is offered.
Our analysis throughout this paper has shown that the Logos, or the
Word, is to be identified with that aspect of God which moves out
into the creation and enters into relationship with the creatures, it
would be impossible to read the prologue to John's gospel, to which
Cobb refers, using his terminology, for there the Word (the Logos) is
spoken of as being with God and being God's creative agent. The
dynamic nature of the Logos is stressed. Likewise, no evidence is
given nor can any be found, for the Bible's using the word "Christ"
in the way Cobb does. While it is true that the Logos, or Word, is
seen as being incarnate in Jesus Christ, the word "Christ" is used
as a title for the historical person Jesus. S. E. Johnson points
out that the word "Christ" means annointed. It is used in the
Old Testament with reference to the anticipated messiah and in the
263
Cobb, Christ in a Pluralistic Age, op. clt., p. 262
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New Testament it is "practically a surname" for Jesus, properly identifying
him as the Messiah.264 Contrary to Cobb's usage, it would seem preferable
to use the word "Christ" with reference to Jesus as the messiah, and the
word "Logos" with reference to God's creative, redemptive self-ex¬
pression.
Cobb definitely does not want to do this. As Griffin points
out, Cobb, following a suggestion by William Beardslee, sees Christ as
a "proposition." Griffin further notes that this is a fundamental shift
in Cobb's emphasis, occurring around 1975, when his Christological concern
became no longer how God is related to Jesus and the distinctive structure
of Jesus' existence, but how the concept of Christ relates to the images
of modern consciousness.265 For Cobb, Christ is "creative transfor¬
mation"266 This is the image in art, literature, and theology to which
the word "Christ" refers. Even though God or Jesus may not be named,
the image of creative transformation indicates the presence of Christ.
Christ is to be recognizable in all the creative movements of our time.
Therefore, Christ is not fully contained by the Christian religion,
but is also to be found in other religious traditions.
Our question here is: Is it fair to name the process of creative
transformation "Christ?" We feel it is not. We prefer to keep "Christ"
264
S. E. Johnson, "Christ," The Interpreters Dictionary of the
Bible, Vol. A-D, (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1962) p. 563*
pcc
David R. Griffin, "Post-Modem Theology for a New Christian
Existence," in John Cobb's Theology in Process, David R. Griffin and
Thomas J. J. Altizer, eds. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1977),
p. 21.
2G6
Cobb, Christ in a Pluralistic Age, op. clt. This idea is
discussed extensively in Chapters 1-4, pp. 31-95, of this book.
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in its particular religious context and to let the word "Logos," which
long before the emergence of Christianity had just the sort of uni¬
versality Cobb wishes to convey by the word "Christ," stand for the con¬
cept of creative transformation.
Our second problem with Cobb's analysis is that he gives no
attention at all to the superjective nature of God. We have identified
God's superjective nature with the Word or Logos. In those places
where Cobb discusses the Logos, no mention of the superjective nature
is made. We cannot help but feel that were Cobb to give this concept
adequate attention, he would find it providing a better framework
for his thinking than the one he uses. What he calls Christ is, in
fact, identical with God's superjective nature as we have explained
it here. In distinguishing between the Logos and Christ, he is dis¬
tinguishing between the primordial and the superjective aspects of
God. Were Cobb to make this identification explicit, it would be
possible for him to realize that process thought can accommodate
something similar to the traditional doctrine of a three person
Trinity. His present thinking excludes this, however. He comments:
The doctrine of the Trinity is an artifical game when
much ado is made of the number three, and when the 'mystery'
that God is somehow three in one, is portrayed as of special
significance in itself, and even central to the Christian
faith. Discussion of the various aspects of deity are
meaningful only insofar as they help clarify experience in
general and Christian experience in particular. Hence, process
theology is not interested in formulating distinctions within
God for the sake of conforming with traditional Trinitarian
notions. ^67
p/r»7
Cobb, Process Thought, op. cit., p. 110. (Although this
book is co-authored with David Griffin, the preface points out that
Cobb is responsible for the chapter in which this quotation occurs.)
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Such a distinction for the sake of conformity is not the
motive for our identification of creativity and the Logos with the
subjective nature of God. We did so to provide a more adequate ex¬
planation of the role creativity plays in the pr.cess framework than the
ones given elsewhere. While we would agree with Cobb that the basic
distinction within the personality of God is between the creative
and responsive sides of divine love, ik.d's primordial and consequent
natures, we would go further and insist that the way in which this
divine love becomes operative in creation or manifests Itself as
"creative transformation" is through the superjective nature of God
which, from a Whitahead!an perspective, is creativity and fr~m a
f (
Biblical perspective, is the bog..,*, the Word of God.
The reason for the creative process. We are now in the position
to answer the question raised previously, "Why is there a creative
process?" The answer to this is net as Whitehead supposed, that God
and the world are both in the grasp of a metaphysical ultimate called
creativity, bather, God, who is Creativity itself, is the source and
condition of the creative process. As we have seen, in his primordial
aspect he is its beginning; in his consequent aspect, its end. beyond
this, in his superjective aspect with its drive toward the perpetuation
of his own self-creation, the continuation of the creative process is
assured. It is the nature of God to perpetuate himself and this he
does through the creation of other entities. His process of self-
craction insures their processes of self-creation. From his divine,
unique, supreme creativity—Creativity itself, he gave them their
appropriate forms of creativity. That creativity is drawn back into
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the divine creativity only to be given out again in whatever manner he
chooses# Creativity, as we have come to understand it, is God's ex¬
pression of himself—an expression on which the continuous creation of
the world depends.
The Process Concept of God the Creator
The most appropriate way of summarizing this chapter is to
focus briefly on the concept of God the Creator as it has emerged in
the preceeding pages. This concept is based on the process under¬
standing that God is essentially creative. Nothing is more character¬
istic of him than this, for it describes the nature of how he is and
how he acts.
Because God is dipolar, his creativity must be viewed from two
perspectives. The first is his creation of himself. This is what takes
place in his consequent nature. In each moment God is recreating
himself as he performs his divine synthesis of all that is happening
throughout the cosmos. Whatever transpires, whether trivial or sig¬
nificant, becomes part of the data out of which God creates his own
experiences. God, in his consequent nature, looses nothing that
takes place but takes all things into himself. This is not simple
retention, however, for what is retained is also transformed. This
transformation is determined by God's subjective aim which is to
maximize the beauty and intensify the harmony found throughout the
cosmos. The cosmos influences God, but it is not totally determinative
of him. Out of what he is given, he creates his own experience of the
moment which is his concrete actuality. This self-creation is the only
creation for which he is finally responsible.
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Even though fundamental, God's self-creation bears little
relationship to what is generally thought to be the understanding of
God the Creator. Whitehead certainly did not associate God's
assimilation of the cosmos with the usual notions of creation, in¬
sisting instead that it should be viewed as salvation.we must,
therefore, turn to the second perspective, which is gained by looking
at the primordial aspect of God, to find a view that corresponds more
closely to traditional views.
With regard to this perspective, what has been set out in
this paper goes beyond what other process thinkers are saying con¬
cerning God's role in creating other entities. Whitehead, as we
noted, is reluctant to give God a pre-eminent place in the creative
process. God is one among the many entities which contribute data
to other entities' concresences. As far as Whitehead is concerned,
God and all other entities are caught up in a metaphysical ultimate
he called Creativity. Creation was the result of this principle's
being operative throughout the cosmos. Creativity, not God, is the
cosmic creator. Hartshorne and Cobb realize the importance of God's
participation in the creative process, for it is he who supplies the
initial aim to each entity thus providing its first moment of self¬
hood. It is this giving of the initial aim which actually brings about
each entity's process of self-creative synthesis. Therefore, it is
with God that we find the origin of creativity. Creativity is not
something independent of him but rather something which issues from
him. The creativity which permeates the cosmos is God's creativity.
268whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 526.
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Even though God's Creativity may be described as creativity itself,
God does not monopolize creativity. His creativity creates the creativity
of others. The initial aim, which he gives, carries with it the en¬
abling of each entity to begin it's own creative synthesis. The initial
aim represents the divine decision that an entity will have its moment
of becoming. The aim not only permits this to take place but it also
points the entity toward an actualization which would be the best for
it and for all other entities. This actualization is only a pos¬
sibility, however. God does not force its realization. The creativity
he creates is genuine because it is free. Other entities possess the
freedom to create themselves just as God does. In being a cosmic
creation, God is not a cosmic dictator. While it is true that he limits
freedom so that the cosmos will not collapse into chaos, the limits he
imposes are broad enough to guarantee proper creaturely freedom.
In traditional thinking, God expresses himself through his
Logos. We have come to see that in process thinking, this self-ex¬
pression is accomplished through Creativity. This Creativity is
God's superjective nature. It is this conclusion which has taken us
beyond what other process thinkers are saying. Even though Whitehead
insists that every entity be regarded as subject-superject, he and
those who follow him, give scant attention to God's superjective
nature. Yet, it is here that we can locate God's creative urge, for
it is through the superjective nature that God moves out into creation.
It is the bridge between the primordial and consequent natures. It
represents the divine involvement in each entity's self-creative
process.
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Because of this identification, process thinking can put forward
a strong concept of God the Creator. God is responsible for the cosmic
process. Without him there would be no creation. He is Creativity itself.
His creativity is that which creates the creativity of others.
Seeing that there is a strong doctrine of God the creator in
process thought, we can now turn to a comparison of this concept with
the traditional concepts we discussed previously.
Chapter 3
THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION
THE PROCESS AND CONCEPT OF CREATION
John Cobb suggests that Whiteheadian thinking has many points of
contact with traditional Christian thought—more than either Whitehead
or his critics would generally recognize. Nonetheless, process thinking
is profoundly new, and it is this newness which most impresses observers.
He continues by saying:
After generations in which theologians and religious phil¬
osophers have struggled to defend some one relation in which
God's importance for the world can be argued, we are confronted
with a new world of thought in which all manner of modes of
relatedness to God are affirmed. Within the Whiteheadian con¬
text we can understand both the person-to-person encounter of
modern Protestantism and the mysticisms of both East and West.
We can agree with those who have seen the relation of man to
God in the ethical dimension and with those who have reasoned
to God "from the order and directionality of nature. We can
see both the reality and the all-determinativeness of God
and also the freedom and responsibility of man. But we can see
all this in a frame of reference that to some degree trans¬
forms the meanings of all the traditional terms and problems.
In this chapter, as the traditional understandings of the doc¬
trine of creation and the process concept of creation are juxtaposed,
we shall see just how extensive this transformation in meaning is.
•'■John B. Cobb, Jr., "From Crisis Theology to the Post-Modern
World," in Radical Theology: Phase Two, ed. by C. W. Christian and




Throughout our discussion we will question whether or not process
thought provides an adequate articulation of the doctrine of creation.
We will see if it can make the same affirmations concerning the relation¬
ship of God and the world as have proved essential in the past and
whether or not it provides a viable way of speaking of God the Creator
within a Christian context.
To begin doing this we must start by examining in the light of
process thought the two notions which have proved to be the most endur¬
ing expressions of the doctrine of creation—creatio ex nihilo and
creatio per verbum.
PROCESS THEOLOGY, CREATIO EX NIHILO, AND CREATIO PER VERBUM
Process Theology and Creatio ex Nihilo
Process thinkers, Hartshome in particular, have little good to
say about the idea of creatio ex nihilo. Hartshorne says it is a
"mischievously unclear way of talking which may have squeezed out more
truth and introduced some error." Further, it is a "man-made mystery,
. • • a stylized version of Biblical thought, a version invented by
philosophical theology. The invention need not be taken as sacred.
It is at best "a dubious interpretation of an obscure parable."3 Cobb
would second Hartshorne's sentiments saying, "There is no reason to
suppose that the world came into being out of nothing .... The fact
4
that theologians once thought this way is no reason to think so now."
2Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. cit.,
pp. 10-12.
3Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, op. clt., p. 30.
^Cobb, God and World, op. clt., p. 91.
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We have already heard others making similar, although perhaps
not quite such emphatic, criticisms of the notion of creatio ex nihilo.
Earlier, we noted both the lack of agreement as to whether it was act¬
ually the teaching of scripture and its questionable intelligibility.5
While Hartshorne obviously does not read the doctrine of creatio ex
nihilo in the Bible, insisting that Genesis does not demand this under¬
standing of its account of creation, he is not primarily interested in
exegesis. Of greater importance to him than the Biblical basis of the
doctrine is its intelligibility.
The intelligibility of creatio ex nihilo. Creation out of nothing
must be emphatically denied, Hartshorne believes, if it means that there
is no relationship at all between divine and non-divine forms of crea¬
tivity. Such a relationship does exist for creative synthesis is a
universal category and describes all actuality from the divine process
to the molecular. The essence of all reality is the self-creative syn¬
thesis. Everything which is, exemplifies it.
Against those who use creatio ex nihilo as a way of denying any
attempt at conceptualizing the mystery of God's creative act, Hartshorne
insists that we can, by the reformed subjectivist principle, conceptualize
God's creative act in the same way we do our own. God's creating out of
nothing is meaningless because it has no possible reference to what is
meant by the word "create." All creation is creation out of something-
taking what is there and making it into what is here. This "something"
is the antecedent events of an entity's tradition. No act of creation can
take place without this since an entity's self-creation depends on and
^See above, pages 14-15.
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is limited by the data it receives. Nowhere is there a possibility of
an entity's generating its own data. This, as we said, applies to God
as well as to other creatures. He creates his own momentary, concrete
experiences out of the data he receives which is the sum total of all
creative experience in the cosmos. God simply does not create out of
nothing. To say he does would deny any meaning to the word "create"
which could be analogous to other creative experience.^
Looking at this from the process perspective, the principle of
"causal efficacy" is denied by creatio ex nlhilo. Data are influential
though not determinative of, an entity's becoming. To deny causal
efficacy with reference to God, would mean that there is nothing that
influences him. This is, of course, something on which some traditional
thought insists. It insists that God is impassive, incapable of being
influenced. Process thought, as we noted, rejects divine impassivity
postulating instead a God who is supremely passive—that is, influenced
by all entities, not just some entities. It is on the basis of this
influence that God creates himself and then influences, or has causal
efficacy for, the creation. Without the influence God receives from the
world, he could not create an initial subjective aim for each creature
because he would be denied the basis on which he could decide what would
be the best satisfaction this entity could attain with reference to
itself and to the totality of the cosmos.
There is, and must be, according to process thinking, a certain
agreement in the use of the word "create" or else we would be talking
^Hartshorne presents this argument in almost idential form in
three places: Whitehead's Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 192-94; Creative
Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. clt., pp. 10-11; and Man's Vision
of G d, op. cit., pp. 230-31.
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nonsense when we say both God and man create* If there is not a basic
agreement of meaning in both cases, the word would be meaningless when
applied to one or the other. We cannot say the term belongs exclusively
to man, God, or anything else. Everything literally creates in that
everything exemplifies the creative-synthetic model. This model can be
7
applied analogically to all reality. To say that God's creative act
does not correspond to this model but is instead ex nihilo is, from the
process perspective, unintelligible.
To say that everything exemplifies creative synthesis in its
becoming is not to say that all syntheses ere identical. Each entity
will exemplify creative synthesis in its own unique way. Hartshorne
says, "God has divine self-creativity • • ., human beings have the
human form of self-creativity, dogs have the doggish form, amoebae the
amoebic farm, atoms the atomic form."6 While some degree of creativity
must be applicable to all reality, careful distinction must be made be¬
tween supreme creativity and lesser forms. As we have seen, God, who is
creativity itself, has the highest form of creative synthesis. His exem¬
plification of creativity is perfect and complete. It is absolutely un¬
surpassable by any other form of reality, and therefore, unique. All
other forms of creative synthesis share the characteristic of being im¬
perfect and partial. God creates "the whole world," other entities create
only very small parts of the world. God has unlimited influence in his
7
Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, op, clt.. p. 194; and A
Natural Theology for Our Time, op. clt., p. 26. The analogical status
of creativity is discussed in the last chapter to this dissertation.
8
Hartshorne, "Comment by Professor Hartshome," in Peter's,
The Creative Advance, op. dt«. p. 137.
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creativity; other entities have very little. God's creativity is eternal;
other entities create for a very brief period of time. A fundamental
distinction, then, between God and other creators is in the totality
of his creativity and the partiality of theirs.9
Another fundamental difference is that the creativity of other
entities is derived from the divine process. The divine process is
derived from nothing but itself, which includes all other processes.
There are, therefore, radical differences between the divine and non-
divine creative acts, but both are genuinely creative. God and all
other entities can be called creators, and the word will carry a clear,
precise meaning.
The preferability of comparing God's creative act with those
of other creatures to creatio ex nihilo. Hartshorne feels that under¬
standing God as the supreme, unsurpassable instance of creativity exalts
him more than contending there is no similarity between his creativity
and the creativity of others, which is what is often implied by creatio
ex nihilo. Can we talk of a supreme creator when there are no other
creators with whom he can be compared? Comparison demands similarity.
If there are no common aspects, there are no definite contrasts either.^
Even when we compare the proverbial apples and oranges, we are still talk¬
ing about fruit. To say God is the "supreme" or "ultimate" or "perfect"
anything, there must be instances which are not supreme, ultimate, or
*
9Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, op. cit., p. 193.
Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. cit.,
p. 139.
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perfect. If God and other entities are not genuinely creators, we
cannot contrast their creativity and, thereby, see the superiority of
God's creativity. Hartshorne comments:
To say 'only God literally creates' is not to exalt God
in any definite way. For you might as well say, ' only God
dubdubs' • • • • To say ... 'only creatures literally
exist' is again not to exalt God in any definite way--unless
another word, perhaps 'being,' is introduced for God which
does apply to creatures as well, and this will only repeat the
problem.
Since the words create and creator have a consistent, common
meaning, their intelligibility is not problematic in process speaking
as it is when one speaks of creatio ex nihilo. Hartshorne believes that
attributing to God the super-eminent form of creativity establishes a
theological analogy which is free from arbitrariness and contradiction. ^2
Creation as response to stimulus. Creativity is clear and unam¬
biguous in process thought because we may speak of any entity's creation
as its experience of self-creation through the synthesis of the data it
receives. Likewise, we can speak of an entity being a creator because
it is part of the data used in another entity's synthesis. Another way
of looking at this is to see creation as a response to stimuli. Being
the creator of another is being a stimulus for that other's response.
God's creativity is the super-eminent form of creativity. By pro¬
viding the initial aim to all other creatures, he is a stimulus for
every response. By including everything in his own process of self-
creation, he responds to all stimuli. God's creating of others is the
■^Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. clt.,
p. 140. *" _
"^Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, op. cit., p. 124.
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highest form of stimulating response; his own self-creation is the
highest form of responding to stimuli.
Put this way, it is clear that there is a fundamental conflict
between process thought and the idea of creatio ex nihilo for creatio
ex nlhilo has been used to challenge ideas similar to this. Scholastic
metaphysics did allow that God was the "first cause" and would, there¬
fore, be able to tolerate, but probably not embrace, the process under¬
standing of God's causation of other entities. Orthodox protestantism,
which rebelled against the scholastic model, would not be able to do
this. God could not be considered a cause, because the concepts of
causality, drawn as they are from the human or natural spheres of crea¬
tion, cannot apply to God. He must not be thought a cause among others—
not even the supreme or first cause.
Neither scholasticism nor protestantism could tolerate the
process idea of God's responding to stimuli, for saying that creation
is a response to stimuli seems tantamont to saying there is "something"
outside of God himself which God uses in his creative act. This
contradicts the basic meaning of creation out of nothing. We need,
therefore, to look at this point closely.
God's creation of the world out of his synthesis of the world,
not out of nothing. What God creates the world out of is the proceeding
phase of the world. God, in his consequent nature, creates himself by
prehending all immediately temporally prior actuality into himself. His
creating involves more than that, however. That from which God creates
the world is not the world in its preceeding phase, but the world in
its preceeding phase as it has been transformed by him. God, therefore,
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creates the world out of his own creative synthesis of the world, which
is his consequent nature. The perfected actuality of the consequent
nature is the basis for the initial aim, God's creative act, for other
entities. Hartshorne, after noting that God does create out of a given
concrete actuality like other entities do, says that what distinguishes
God's creativity from others' is that this concrete actuality, the pre-
ceeding phase of the world, was itself created by God. He continues:
God ... unlike us, is never confronted by a world whose
coming to be antedates his own creaturely existence. There
is no presupposed 'stuff* alien to God's creative work; but
rather everything that influences God has already been influ¬
enced by him, whereas we are influenced by events of the past
with which we had nothing to do.*3
Process thought, then, speaks of all creation, God's included,
as being creation out of something. Only with reference to a supposed
first moment of creation could there be amy other type of creation.*4
Certainly, all of God's present creative activity is creation based on
a previous state of the world. By way of illustration Hartshorne asks:
Does God create an adult out of nothing or out of a child?
The creative functioning of deity involved in the production
of Beethoven's music certainly did not treat as nothing the
free self-decisions of Beethoven's predecessors in composition.*®
When God creates, he does so on the basis of his previous creating.
Hartshorne, then, suggests that if one insists on retaining the idea of
creatio ex nihilo, it "may only be taken as an elliptical way of stating
that the divine action presupposes nothing anterior to God himself."*®
13
Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, op. cit., p. 30.
^.The question of a first moment of creation is discussed on
pages 84-86.
*Hartshorne, Philosophers Speak of God, op. cit., p. 23.
*°Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. cit., p. 194.
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He goes into this in some detail:
... the total concrete cause of this world is not merely
the divine essence; rather, it is God as having actually crea¬
ted and now possessing all previous worlds. On the assumption
one may, in a sense, say that God creates us 'out of nothing'
... thus, the other-than-ourselves-now which creates us, as
of now, is God and in addition to God, nothing. Or past,
which, ... is required material for our present self-crea¬
tion, is already included in God's receptive valuation, just
as our present is about to be, or is in process of being,
included. God, then, is the whole creative source; but not
God as First Cause, or as 'absolute' source; rather, God as
the ever-new ideal summation of the already created.^
It is worth noting that Hartshome's criticism of God's alleged
creating out of nothing is paralleled by an attack on the idea of man's
creating out of matter. This concept is far too simplistic a way of
viewing human creation. He says:
Both the statement that man creates only by modifying a
given material and the statement God's creation presupposes
nothing but the divine power are alike found unacceptable as
they stand. The notion that a new experience or event is
merely a new predicate of a material already there is con¬
fused • • • • Human creating makes use of, or profits by,
antecedent events. If, and only if, such and such has already
happened, can certain human acts happen. This is what we know
positively. The final actualities are events, and the events
we know vividly are those constituted by occasions of human
experience. If, thai, Beethoven had power in part to de¬
termine his own musical experiences, insofar he had power to
create not mere adjective of some actuality but actualities
themselves.
What Hartshorne is guarding in this passage is the novelty and freedom
that are part of each synthesis. Creation out of matter in no way
demands these as being included in the process. Creation out of pre¬
vious experience does, for it is more than just shaping the materials one
has on hand. New events require, or are built out of, existing materials,
17
Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection, op. cit., p. 273.
18
Hartshome, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. cit., p. 193.
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but they are more than just these materials acquiring new qualities.
They have some qualities of older entities and some novel ones; there¬
fore, they are unique. The merging of a new, unique entity through
19
creative synthesis is the true meaning of creation.
Another problem Hartshorne has with creatio ex nihilo is that it
implies coersion in creation. God does exactly what he wants without
needing the cooperation of the creature. Process thought stresses
repeatedly that in all his dealings with his creatures, God chooses to
persuade rather than coerce. In creation, the creature's freedom is
guaranteed. God gave the creatures this freedom and does not usurp it.
Nowhere does creatio ex nihilo suggest that the creature has freedom
for self-creation. Because of this, Hartshorne requests that the image
of God's creating by divine persuasion be substituted for God's creating
20
out of nothing.
By now, it should be obvious that it would be impossible to
effect a reconcilation between process thought and the notion of creatio
ex nihilo. Even though it has had a venerable history, creation out of
nothing cannot be an adquate tool for expressing the process under¬
standing of divine creation. Divine creation must be understood as the
super-eminent form of creative synthesis.
As we conclude that process theology rejects creatio ex nihilo,
we must remind ourselves that creatio ex nihilo was originally formulated
to refute heresies which had crept into the early church. What we must
•^Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. clt., p. 193.
20
Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, op. cit., p. 142.
221
do now, then, is to see if process thought affirms anything which creatio
ex nihilo sought to deny.
Process thought and ancient dualisms. Process thought is not a
modern representation of the ancient dualisms which originally forced
the church to formulate the notion of creatio ex nihilo. Certainly,
there is nothing here similar to Timaeus' idea of God working with alien,
recalcitrant matter. In no way is God's consequent nature alien to him!
Granted, the consequent nature has been influenced by things which are
not God himself—the free self-creative entities which are the products
of his own creativity. These, however, have only partially influenced
and are not completely determinative of the consequent nature, God has
freely unified them in his own self-creative experience of becoming.
The consequent nature, out of which God creates, is not the world but
transcends the world because it has transformed the world. Furthermore,
these entities which influence God's consequent nature were first influ¬
enced by him in the moment of their becoming as he gave them their ini¬
tial aim. What God creates out of, is not alien to himself and cannot be
called recalcitrant since God himself has transformed it.^l
Another difference between process thought and the Timaeus is
that the material which God uses in his creation are dynamic events with
their own unique characteristics; they are not a formless mass waiting
to be shaped. They have already created themselves.
2lHartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method,
op, dff.V p, 116. Hartshorne says that the issue of recalcitrance in
process thought is just "the familiar difficulty of eliciting harmony
among a plurality of creatures each having its own freedom which is
never fully determined by antecedents, including its own past nature."
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A third important difference is that God, unlike the Demiurge
in the Timaeus, does not force his creation into being what it becomes.
Process thought emphasizes self-creation, and the only creative acts
for which God is entirely responsible are his own continuous acts of
self-creation. He creates other entities only as he influences them.
He does not shape anything into what he wants it to be by any method
other than persuasion. Clearly, the creator God of process theology
is not the Demiurge of the Timaeus.
This is a good place to point out that process theologians are
no more willing to use "the potter making a pot" as a model for God's
creativity than are traditional theologians. Hartshorne finds this an
inadequate and misleading image. To conceive of God working over a
lump of clay to form his creatures is "poetically picturesque but not
22
religiously or philosophically helpful." What Hartshorne finds
particularly disagreeable in this image is what we have already men¬
tioned repeatedly—it suggests coersion rather than persuasion as the
way in which God creates. The idea of God forcing his creation to con¬
form to his design and desire does not accurately represent the concept
of the divine creativity. According to Hartshorne, there must be no
concept of pushing around passive clay or pulling a puppet's strings as
a model of how God works with the world. Furthermore, God must never be
thought of as using brutal punishment or irresistible bribes to achieve
what he wants. Hartshorne continues:
All that God can directly give us is the beauty of his ideal
for us, an ideal to which we cannot simply not respond, but to
^Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, op. cit., p. 194-
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which our response has to be partly self-determined, and it
has to be influenced by past creaturely responses in our uni¬
verse. 'Persuasion* is the ultimate power; not even God can
simply coerce.
Just as process thought is dissimilar to the thought of the Tiroaeus,
it is also dissimilar to the Valentinian Gnosticism which so infuri¬
ated Ireanaeus. In process thought we do not have two realms of
reality—one immortal and the other material—with the material realm
having been generated out of a fallen spiritual being. Further, the
world is not created by a demiurge, but by God himself. As we have
noted, there is a duality, but not a dualism, in process thought. This
duality refers to God's primordial and consequent natures, not to two
separate realms of reality. Only if we were to split God by separating
these two halves of his one reality, would there be the possibility of
separate realities. This separating, as we have said before, can only
be done for purposes of analysis. Although it is unlikely that Iranaeus
ever entertained the idea of a dually transcendent God such as the one
described by process thought, he does speak of God's containing all
things and commanding then into existence.24 were he our contemporary,
he might not be as offended by process thought as he was by Gnosticism.
Process thought and a first moment of creation. Before we close
our discussion of process thought and creatio ex nihilo we need to look
at one further matter. Much of the talk about creation out of nothing
implies a first moment of creation. The question must be asked of process
23Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, od. cit.,
pp. 239-40. *""*
2^See above, page 11.
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thinkers, "Was there ever a first state of creation—a time when God had
nothing out of which to create?" This question from the process point of
view is the same as asking, "Was there ever a time when God was only the
primordial nature without the consequent nature?" The answer to this is
an obvious and emphatic "no." The primordial and the consequent natures
are two aspects of the one God. Therefore, conceiving of a time when
there was not a cosmos is impossible—as impossible as conceiving of a
time when there was not God or a time when there was only half of God.
According to Griffin, "that there be an actual world of some sort or
other is not a contingent matter. There would simply be no meaning to
'God' apart from 'creativity' and the worldly 'creatures.'
Hartshome feels that the idea of "the beginning of time when
things could have been created ex nihilo is self-contradictory. The
reason for this is "even a beginning is a change, and all change requires
something changing that dees not come to exist through that same change.
Because of this, the beginning of the cosmos would have to be an event
in the life of something other than the cosmos. God himself is the only
possible subject for such a change. In his primordial nature he is self-
identical, but in his consequent nature he is ever-changing.
The argument could be made, however, that the beginning of the
cosmos was not a change in anything anterior to it. There need not be
a subject of the change. There is still, though, the factor that it
^^David R. Griffen, God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy,
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976), p. 279.
Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, op. cit., p. 233.
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would have to be the actualization of some possibility which, as not
separated from it in time, would have to co-exist with the actuality.2?
Hartshome further asks what a first state of the cosmos could
possibly have been like. It would have nothing in common with later
states for it would lack memory and would not be the achievement of any
antecedent purpose. Hartshorne is fond of citing the dilemma of Edmund
Gosse's father who wondered for years what the first state of the world
would have been like and finally "solved" the dilemma by saying that God
had to create a first state that did not appear to be a first state.
Did Adam have a navel? If so, did not this point to a mother? If not,
was he really a man? Gosse's father's answer was God had to create Adam
with a navel so that he resembled the men who would follow him.2k This
is for Hartshorne the reductio ad absurdum of the notion of a first
state of creation.
As an alternative to the idea of a first state of creation,
Hartshome suggests an "infinite regress of past events." Although we
could not possibly imagine what this would be, the idea is not self-
contradictory. We can think of the present state of the cosmos as
arising out of the immediate previous one and so forth ad infinitum. The
idea of God creating this world out of a previous one which was created
out of a previous one, et cetera, is open to no objections other than
those supposedly derived from revelation.^ Hartshome regards this as
2®Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, op. cit., p. 232, and White¬
head' s Philosophy, op. cit.. p. 194.
29
Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, op. cit., p. 232.
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compatible with the accounts in Genesis. God's creating the present
world, "consisted in the transformation, as radical as you please, given
time enough, of an earlier, to us unimaginable, nature which itself may
have been similarly produced out of a still earlier state of things."-*0
Overman puts this in the context of God's own perpetual self-creation
and says:
God may be understood as enjoying an infinite succession
of divine moments of experience, each one complete and satis¬
fied. Because of God's aim to perpetuate his personality,
and his ability to do so by initiating new occasions, his
existence will be without end; likewise, if we look backward, we
discover that each divine occasion in turn has received its
existence from earlier ones so that we fail completely in try¬
ing to imagine a beginning of the series.
We do not need to dwell on this longer, for as we saw earlier,
many contemporary thinkers, even those who find some validity in the
idea of creatlo ex nihilo, have moved away from defending the idea of a
beginning in time pointing out that this is not the crucial issue as far
32
as doctrine of creation is concerned.
Creation out of chaos not out of nothing. In the first chapter
we noted that some Biblical scholars find the teaching of Genesis to be
creation out of chaos rather than creation out of nothing.Process
thought is strikingly compatible with this point of view. Whitehead,
3°lbid., p. 94.
-^Overman, Evaluation and the Christian Doctrine of Creation,
op. cit., p. 276.
•*^cf. Mascall, Christian Theology and Natural Science, op. cit.,
p. 132, and Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, op. cit.,
p. 199.
^See above, pages 12-13.
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for instance, specifically rejects "the beginning of matter of fact" in
favor of the creation of order out of chaos.
We saw in Chapter Two how God is the cosmic orderer. He limits
the chaotic potential of the cosmos, and this limitation creates the
order which is necessary for maintaining the cosmos.^ He supplies this
order in two ways. First, in each moment of his self-creation, he creates
a harmonious world out of the discordant one that he is given. The free¬
dom each entity has to introduce novelty in its own self-creation means
that disorder inevitably accompanies the creative process. The conflicts
created by this disorder are reconciled in God's consequent nature.
Second, the radical diversity of the cosmos means that chaos would
always be a possibility were it not for God's limiting its chaotic poten¬
tial. This he does through the giving of the initial aim which points
each entity toward the best internal and external harmony it would be
possible for that entity to achieve. Complete harmony is not attained,
but self-destructive chaos is averted.
Creation out of chaos, of course, is usually used with reference
to a primeval event when order was first imposed on disorder. Process
thought, as we just noted, does not look back to any first moment of
creation but rather sees the emergence of an ordered universe from dis-
orderliness as being part of the ongoing process of creation. There
never was a beginning of some form of cosmic structure, but this need
not suggest that the cosmic structure we now have is the only one that
has ever been. Some cosmic structure is necessary; a particular cosmic
structure is contingent.
^^Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., pp. 146-47, 519.
35see above, pages 147-48.
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Whitehead postulates that there has been a series of cosmic
epochs each reflecting a particular form of order. These forms of order
have come into being gradually, existed for a period of time and, then,
36
gradually dissolved as new forms have come to take their place. The
diiolusion of order is accompanied by an increase in chaos, and, hence,
the creation of the world or of any social structure can be seen as
creation out of chaos. Chaotic potential is always there. Sometimes it
is more fully realized than others, but still God's creative act contin¬
uously rescues the creation from lapsing into utter or absolute chaos.
In a state of utter chaos, there would be no social order at
all. Entities would not be able to form themselves into even the most
elementary societies. There could be no enduring objects since even a
serial order of actual entities would be impossible. A certain amount
of order is obligatory for any society no matter how primitive. The
more complex a society, the more order is required. As Whitehead says,
"In proportion to the chaos there is triviality."®® A highly complex
society such as a living person requires a highly ordered environment.
Griffin says we can look on the emergence of the various social
structures as reflecting the cosmic epochs. There has always been a
thrust toward the future which would involve the emergence of entities
capable of a greater intensity of feeling. As we noted, in every
®®Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 142.
®7Griffin, who provides an excellent analysis of the various
cosmic epochs of the world, says that we should view the world as
having been created at each of the epochs out of a nearly chaotic situ¬
ation. One form of order does not succeed another without first
passing through a time of comparatively strong disorder. See, God,
Power, and Evil, op. ext., pp. 286ff.
^Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 169.
229
subjective aim there is the twofold thrust of maximum enjoyment of the
present experience of concresence and of contributing to the maximum
enjoyment of future entities. Griffin suggests that:
This twofold aim also characterizes the divine aim in
bringing forth each step in the evolutionary process. That
is, each breakthrough makes possible a greater enjoyment of
experience in the present. It also provides the necessary
conditions for the emergence of a more complete form of
actuality in the future, which will be capable of ever
greater intrinsic good.
He illustrates this by showing that the emergence of the atom out of
enduring individuals at the level of protons, neutrons, and electrons
enabled a gain to be made in the achievement of intrinsic value.
"These atomic occasions are able to harmonize a greater variety of the
available data than are any of the subatomic occasions. Hence, a more
intense harmony is possible."40 The same is true in the advance from
the molecular to the atomic, from atoms to cells. This advance being
most crucially important because cells are the first living occasions.
In postulating that the cosmos had been and is being led from
one level of order to a higher one so that more complex creatures could
emerge, process thought is identifying itself with evolutionary theory.
God has consistently lured his creation into more ordered and, therefore,
more complex states of being. There has been a gradual movement upwards
but this has not been without setbacks. These only confirm the freedom
of the creature to follow or ignore God's lead. The lapses which do
occur come from the entities' failure to achieve that harmony and
intensity of feeling which is possible within the order given than in
^Griffin, God, Power and Evil, op. cit., p. 287.
4QIbid., p. 288.
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their receiving of their initial aims. To see that there has been an
upward trend in cosmos reflecting a divine purpose, requires a broad
look at cosmic history. Such a look reveals that the divine subjective
aim has guided each step in the evolutionary process. This guiding
has always been toward a specific ideal possibility embodying the maxi¬
mum value which God judges to be possible for it in light of its heri¬
tage and its future. Because of this, the evolution of the cosmos can
be understood as an open-ended, historical process "characterized by
41
novel responses to settled situations."
Drawing this together, we can only reiterate the incompat¬
ibility between process thought and the concept of creatio ex nihilo.
The process understanding of creation can in no way use or include this
notion. It is possible, indeed desirable, to speak of creation out of
chaos, but creation out of nothing must be laid aside. The question,
then, which we shall be answering later on, is: Can a doctrine of creation
which does not include this idea, make as strongly the affirmation about
divine creation as do those doctrines which include it?
Process Theology and Creatio Per Verbum
The foundation for comparison between the process concept of
creation and the traditional notion of creatio per verbum was laid when
we concluded that God, in process thinking, was to be regarded as Crea¬
tivity itself and that there are various aspects of his being Creativity
itself. One of these aspects is his superjective nature. It is through
the superjective nature that creativity is given to the creation.^2 We
^Overman, Evaluation and the Christian Doctrine of Creation,
op, cit., pp. 284, 270.
^see above, pages 196ff.
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further noted that this idea was parallel to John Macquarrie's concept
of expressive Being which he identifies with the Logos. We then made
the move of identifying Creativity as understood in process thought with
the Christian understanding of the Logos. We can, therefore, expect to
find considerably more compatibility between process thought and creatic
per verbum than between process thought and creatio ex nihilo. Ironically
though, process thinkers do not deal extensively with the idea of creatio
per verbum. Little mention of it can be found in their writings; there¬
fore, whatever conclusions we draw concerning it must be done mainly by
analysis and inference.
By way of review, we noted the strong Biblical basis for the
idea of creatio per verbum both in the Old and the New Testaments. We
further noted that, although it is a persistent theme in the Bible, it
is one which had gone through considerable development. The Old Testa¬
ment idea is "creation by word" which means that when God "speaks" or
expresses himself what he says comes to pass. The New Testament idea is
"creation by the Word." which depicts God creating through the agency of
his Word. These ideas are in no way regarded as contradictory. The
second is seen as a philosophical understanding and explanation of the
first. In the Old Testament there is no speculation as to how God
creates by his Word, but, nonetheless, there was the assurance that
God's word is the expression of his will and that his word contains
within itself the power to implement the divine will. The New Testament
idea is of the Word having its own identity although not an identity
apart from God. Also, it is through the Word that God accomplishes his
purposes of creation and redemption.
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A basis for agreement between process thought and the concept of
creatlo per verbum is that the Biblical view of the Word is that it is
neither a sound nor a symbol but an act or an event through which the
power of God is affected in the world. Macquarrie's designation of the
Logos as "expressive Being," the "outgoing life of God" is helpful in
understanding this because this designation underlines that the Word
"is not only agent in creation but really does enter into creation.
To see how this is compatible with process thought we must remind our¬
selves that in the previous chapter, we determined that creativity was
not the "ultimate of ultimates" Whitehead thought it to be. Rather,
creativity has to be seen as an aspect of God, the way in which he
expresses himself in creation.44 Defined and interpreted in this way,
it is possible for us to say that the process notion of creativity is
a way by which we can understand the traditional Logos doctrine, for,
with regard to creation, we find in process thought that creativity per¬
forms the same role as the Word performs in some other theological
systems.
Although he does not discuss it in detail, Hartshome is impressed
with the concept of creation by the Word. He sees the statement, "Let
there be ... " expressing a "decision in the divine life.This
represents God's free decision that something will happen, some event
take place. God wills that there will be light, plants, animals, nan,
4%lacquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, op. cit., p. 203.
44See above, pages 199ff■
4^Hartshorne, "The God of Religion and the God of Philosophy,"
op. cit., p. 165.
233
and what he wills comes to pass. Here, in narrative form, is an expres¬
sion of what we have been discussing metaphysically as God's deciding to
create an entity by giving it an initial aim. This is the decision
which says that the entity will have its moment of creative synthesis
and the decision as to what will be the framework, the possibilities
for the entity's becoming.
Overman cautions that the statement, "Let there be . . . can¬
not be interpreted Calvinistically because this would suggest that God
is imposing his will artibrarily on the creature.4® Certainly, the
process understanding of, "Let there be . • • ," is not as strong as
Calvin's. The decision God makes in providing the initial aim lies be¬
tween absolute freedom and strict determinism. The entity is created
to create itself, but there are limitations placed on this self-creation.
The decision, "Let there be . . . ," does envisage a particular satis¬
faction for the creature, but it does not force the creature to have
this satisfaction. On the other hand, it does not permit the entity to
achieve just any type of satisfaction whatever. The possibilities of
becoming are there, but which possibility shall be actualized is not
predetermined for the creature. It shall make its own decision as to
exactly what it shall be.47 This is in agreement with Evans' ex¬
planation of the Biblical theme that divine words are acts which bring
about results, but it is in agreement only if these results are not seen
as being completely decided in every detail in advance.4®
4®Overman, Evolution and the Christian Doctrine of Creation,
op, cit., p. 279.
47See above, page 127.
48See above, page 16.
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The compatibility of the process notion of creativity with
creatio per verbum is not limited to an Old Testament understanding of
creation by Word. The process notion of creativity is also compatible
with the Mew Testament concept of creation by the Word. In the New
Testament we found that the creation of all things is attributed to the
Word, the Logos of God, which becomes incarnate in the creation. Simi¬
larly, we find that, with the revision we have made in our understanding
of it, Creativity can be seen as God's agency in creation. Through the
Logos, God is related to the world both as creator and redeemer. Like¬
wise, through his Creativity, God creates and redeems the cosmos. By
means of this Creativity he is incarnate in creation. Creativity is not
something other than God. Just as there is a distinction—but not a
separation—between primordial and expressive Being helped us see,
Creativity (as contained in the superjectlve nature) can be viewed as
bearing the same relationship to God (in his primordial nature) as the
Logos (understood as expressive Being) does to God (understood as
primordial Being.) It would, therefore, seem justifiable to para¬
phrase the prologue to John's gospel in this manner:
There has always been Creativity.
Creativity is an aspect of God, part of God himself.
There never has been a time when God was without Creativity.
Through Creativity all things have had and will have their
becoming.
Not one thing has become or will become without him.
Just as Jesus Christ was seam to be the complete and unsurpassable form
of the Logo's incarnation in humanity, so can process thought affirm him
to be the complete, unsurpassable instance of the incarnation of God's
intended aim for all persons.
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PROCESS THEOLOGY AND THE AFFIRMATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION
With the preceeding analysis in mind, it is now possible for us
to see if process theology can make the same affirmation concerning the
doctrine of creation as traditional theology does. We begin with the
first affirmation.
God is the Source of All Existence, and the Creation is Totally Dependent
on Him
In the first chapter we heard Thomas Aquinas answer the question,
"What is divine creation?" by saying, "To create is, properly speaking,
to cause or produce the being of things."48 Although phrased differently
by different thinkers, there was unanimous agreement that this was the
essence of God's creative act. God, and he alone, can bestow existence.
The gift of being is his unique, gracious and proper gift to his creation.
Process thinkers would not talk about God's creative act in
terms of producing the "being" of things. For them the meaning of exis¬
tence is "becoming" not being. If, however, the concept of becoming is
substituted for being, process thought can make the same response as
traditional thought. God causes or produces the becoming of entities.
He is the source of their existence because he is the origin of their
self-creation.
To understand this we must repeat again that the locus of God's
creative act is in the giving of an initial aim to each entity. The
importance of this cannot be stated too often. For purposes of our
present discussion, we need to underline again the fact that in giving
48
See above, page 28
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the initial aim God decides that there will be an entity and also estab¬
lishes the boundaries within which that concresence will take place.
Significantly, Overman notes that the providing of initial aims serves
the same function for process theology that creatio ex nihilo does for
traditional theology. He points out what we have already seen—that
those who first formulated creatio ex nihilo were trying to make it clear
that God was the only reason that things exist. They supposed, of course,
that existence came about all at once and had little or no notion of
creatio continuo. Process thought is locked into evolutionary thinking,
so rather than asking why creation happened, process thinkers ask for
the reason that it is happening, and the answer they find is that God
continuously provided initial aims. Overman states:
His [God's] provision of the initial aim is the only factor
in the universe that can account for the start of a new pro¬
cess when old ones have been completed. Apart from God, past
occasions by themselves would find their aims for a future
completely thwarted, and whatever effectiveness they may have
in contributing toward initial aims depends upon God's infin¬
itely greater role in achieving a harmony of initial aims.
Therefore, we are justified in saying that the notion of God
as providing initial aims serves the same function as the
notion of creatio ex nihilo—both point to God as the reason
that things are.
God, then is the source of all existence since he gives entities their
initial aims—aims which are created out of his synthesis of the cosmos.
We can carry this a step further by noting that God is respon¬
sible not just for the becoming of entities, but also the being of
societies. As discussed earlier, process thought regards being as a
function of becoming, and the locus of being is in the societies which
^Overman, Evolution and the Christian Doctrine of Creation,
op. cit., p. 281.
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entities form. God is the source of the being of these societies in
that he creates the entities that compose them. More specifically, he
provides initial aims which will guarantee the preservation of a par¬
ticular enduring object thus insuring its preservation through a period
of time. His giving of the appropriate initial aims insures that this
particular succession of entities will continue to be.
This point is extremely important for our comparison of process
and traditional thinking. Discussions of creation in traditional think¬
ing do not concern themselves with actaial entities as process thought
defines them. These discussions are about societies of entities, most
usually about what process thought calls "living persons." In process
thought, as opposed to traditional thought, a living person is not
created only once, but must be re-created every moment of its life. The
actual entities which compose the living person perish after their moment
of self-creation. The living person cannot, therefore, perpetuate its
own existence. It must rely on the creation of new entities for this.
If God were to cease creating successors to the entities in a society,
their being, in the traditional sense of the word, would cease to be.
Therefore, the traditional "gift of being" refers to a perpetual process
of creation, a process composed of the continuing creation of those
entities which constitute a given society. God must be seen as the
source of existence of both with regard to the becoming of entities
and the being of societies.
Creation as transformation. It should be possible now for us to
see that there is not an irreconcilable conflict in two seemingly opposed
interpretations of creation. Some traditional thought has insisted that
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The distinction between divine and non-divine creativity was that divine
creativity gives existence itself while all other forms of creativity
simply transform what already exists.50 Process thought, on the other
hand, sees all creativity as transformation because each new instance
of creativity emerges from previous instances. In providing the initial
aim God "transforms" (i.e. synthesizes) the data furnished him by previous
entities. This is not, however, all that is involved. As we have just
seen, the continued existence of a society depends on the perpetual
re-creation of the entities which compose it. This re-creation is based
on transformation. It is not the case that something which already
exists is being transformed but rather that its existence depends on
God's transformation of its predecessors. Traditional thought tends to
see "being" as continuing without having to be recreated. Process
thought does not permit this. Process thought does speak of God's trans¬
forming things which exist prior to any one creative act but these
things have perished; they have ceased to have subjectivity. God does
use his transformation of previous reality as the basis for his creation
of new reality, but this transformation is not reshaping of what is al¬
ready there. This transformation is re-creation. That God is involved
in transformation in his process of creation in no way compromises his
being the source of all existence.
Existence—essential or existential? Earlier, we saw how tra¬
ditional theology said that the gift of being was an appropriate gift
for God to give. God in traditional thought is "Being itself," and,
50
See above, page 28.
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therefore, he can properly give being to all creatures.51 Since Thomas
equated "not being" with "nothing" it is clear, on the basis of our
previous analysis, that in process thought God is creating being out of
not being by creating succeeding entities to previous ones. What, though,
in process thinking, does God's gift of existence mean to the creature?
Pieper's discussion of the Augustinian and Thomist viewpoints helped us
to see that the distinction between the two was between Augustine's
"essentialistic" approach and Aquinas' "existentialistic" approach. For
Augustine, existence is something an entity is; for Aquinas, existence
is something an entity does. Augustine believes that the essential being
of things, their natures, is what God gave them in bestowing their being
on than. He is thinking in terms of essences. God gives each creature
its essence. Thomas believes that what God is giving each creature is
its existence, its sheer act of being. Essence, he holds, is secondary
to existence.
Process theology stands between Augustine and Aquinas, embracing
some aspects of both men's thinking on this issue. Process thought is
close to Thomas in its insistence that the act itself is the fundamental
meaning of existence. In Thomas this is being; in process, becoming.
What is actually created in a synthesis varies radically among the var¬
ious entities, yet all of them share in exemplifying the process of
self-creative synthesis. Like being in Thomism, this becoming in process
theology is the basic reality that all entities whatever share. Things
are because they become, because they exemplify creative synthesis.
51See above, page 30.
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The process concept of becoming is close to Augustine in that
each entity, through its initial aim, is pointed toward a particular
concresence. God intends that an entity should achieve a certain,
definite satisfaction. Unlike Macquarrie, for example, who sees letting
be as an abstract principle, Hartshorne insists that the divine creation
52
does have definite content. The aim is specific in what the entity
could—and should—become. Also, there is a definite sense in which God
does decide what an entity will be because he determines what entities
compose its heritage and, therefore, will have causal efficacy in its
C-'
concresence. The difference between process thinking and Augustine's is
that Augustine sees God determining the essence of entities and process
thought sees God luring each entity toward a particular satisfaction.
The process notion of satisfaction can be compared with the traditional
notion of essence, since the only aspect of an entity which does not
change is its satisfaction. Its satisfaction is what it will be
eternally. This satisfaction is determined by the entity itself and
not by God. Therefore, the entity can be said to determine its own
essence. There are, of course, limits set to this, but within these
limits the entity is free to determine its final satisfaction.
By way of summary, we can conclude that process thought on this
is more open-ended than Augustine's but not as open-ended as Thomas'.
52With Hartshorne we prefer to think of the content as being
created "fresh" for each entity. The argument is not altered, how¬
ever, if we think with Whitehead and Cobb that this content has ex¬
isted eternally and God chooses a particular eternal object (or set
of objects) for this particular occasion.
241
There is more to becoming than just the act, the process, itself, but
the results of the process are not predetermined, just limited.^3
The dependency of the creation on God. Seeing that God is the
source of all existence leads traditional theists to the conclusion that
the world is dependent, absolutely dependent, on him. Several writers
pointed out that the purpose of the doctrine of creation was not pri¬
marily to point to an event but to express a relationship—a relation¬
ship of total dependency of the creature on God.~*^ Without God's be¬
stowing being, creation would not be. Were he to rescind what he has
given, creation would return to nothingness. This means that, in spite of
an emphasis on the initial act of creation, there is also an emphasis in
traditional thought on the understanding that God is involved in the
maintenance as well as the initiation of being. As long as a creature
exists, his existence is dependent on God. Again, Augustine and
Aquinas presented us with contrasting views on what this means.
As we noticed, Augustine saw creation as being essentially a
single act. All creation was simultaneous and instantaneous, but not
everything that now exists came into existence exactly as it is now.
Some things did, but others were created as "seeds which hold the poten¬
tial for all future creation." Thomas believes that God is continually
creative. The effect of God's creative causality sustains the creature
as long as it exists. If this were to stop, the creature would no
-^Whitehead and Cobb, who retain the concept of eternal objects,
are closer to Augustine, and Hartshorne is closer to Aquinas even though
all of them stand somewhere in between the two.
54See above, pages 34-35.
^See above, pages 35-37.
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longer be. This perspective is called creatlo continuo. Of the two
views, process thought is closer to Aquinas than to Augustine.
It is stating the obvious to say that process thought has a
strong concept of creatio continuo. As far as each actual entity is
concerned, its creation is not a continuous process. Its existence
as an experiencing subject is momentary. When it is through, it
perishes. It is preserved as an object for other experience, but this
is not creatio continuo. The entity is, though, dependent on the
entirity of the process of cosmic creation which is creatio continuo.
The locus of creatio continuo is in the continuing creation of actual
entities which compose the various social structures throughout the
cosmos. Societies endure as they receive new members. Therefore, God
continues the existence of a society. One must view the entire cosmic
process as continuous creation. God's own sequence of self-creative
acts is the supreme example of creatio continuo, and the world depends
on his continuous process of self-creation.
There is no sharp distinction in process thought, as there is in
some traditional thought, between original and continuous creation. All
creation exemplifies the model of creative synthesis. Continuous crea¬
tion simply refers to the on-goingness of the creative process. God
brings new entities into becoming and continues to do so. The same
actual entity is not re-created nor sustained in being. A successor to
that entity is created which will embody the data it has received from
its predecessor. Thus, as God maintains the existence of societies, we
may and must speak of his creation as creatio continuo.
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Process Thought and Providence
In our survey of traditional thought, our discussion of creatio
continuo led directly into a discussion of providence. Quite a diver¬
gence of opinion exists on the relationship between creation and provi¬
dence ranging from Gilson—who sees an intimate interconnectedness between
the two so that in some ways providence is but the continuation of God* s
creative act—to Brunner who insists that a careful distinction and
separation be made between the two.->^ Most scholars surveyed, however,
agree that creation and providence are connected and that providence
represents the perpetual presence of God with the creature. Even those
who do not view providence as an extension of God's creative act realize
that the creatures' continuing existence is governed and sustained by
God.
The process understanding of providence. Process thinking about
providence is quite precise. It focuses on the order found with the
cosmos. Divine providence "sets the limits to the free interplay of
lesser individuals which would otherwise be pure chaos.We have
already seen how God is the principle of limitation and, as such, sup¬
plies the order in the world.58 The vast number of free agents in the
world could not, operating on their own, produce order. All are, there¬
fore, influenced by one agent, God, who decides the broad outlines of
world order and then, through their initial aims, leads than toward the
58See above, page 40.
57
Charles Hartshome, The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays
in Neo-classical Metaphysics (LaSalle: Open Court Publishing Company,
1962), p. 314.
^®See above, page 147f.
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best harmony possible with that order. As Hartshorne says, "One unsur¬
passable or divine agent with a multiplicity of surpassable ones, covers
both the possibility of order and that of partial disorder."-*9 He
illustrates this by saying that a committee with no chairman and no
directive would be chaotic. Given a chairman and a directive, there
still might not be perfect order, and, if he were a good chairman, there
would not be control of every detail of the committee's work. The com¬
mittee would be free to reach its own decisions on the business at hand.
Still, there would be sufficient coordination for the committee to
function reasonably effectively.
Providence, then, is to be found in the order God imposes on
the relationships which exist between the various free entities com¬
posing the cosmos. In saying this, we can see that process thought takes
both the entity's freedom and its need for limitation seriously. Because
of the nature of the creative process there is always risk and oppor¬
tunity involved. As we have mentioned, in each self-creative act, an
entity is given the opportunity to attain what God considers to be the
best possible satisfaction it could achieve. This is not just the best
for the entity personally but also the best in terms of the relationship
the entity would have with other entities and in terms of the contri¬
bution it would make toward the future. Since the entity is free to
create itself and modify its aim, there is always the risk that it will,
within limits, become something other than God intends. Because of this,
there is always the risk that the order God seeks to achieve will be
^9Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for Our Time, op. cit., p. 62.
^®Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection, op, cit., p. 314.
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substantially disrupted. Adjustments must then be made in the creation
of subsequent entities to maintain a basic order. What Hartshorne sees
happening is that "providence decrees that the range of possibilities
set out before an entity involves the most favorable relation of risk
and opportunity in view of the antecedent decisions that have been made.
God has exercised some control over these antecedent decisions,
but in no way has he determined them. He is not able to impose his
will. This means that he cannot guarantee that everything will be per¬
fect for the creature. The free decisions of other entities may have
raidered this impossible. He says, "The lesser individuals, being more
or less ignorant of each other, act somewhat blindly with respect to
many of the effects of their acts."®^ Granting that this individual
freedom is inherent in individual existence, the best that God's provi¬
dence can guarantee is that the order will be made up of free but mutually
%
compatable creatures. "The divine perfection lies ... in the wise and
efficient limitation of the risks to the optimum point beyond which
further limitation would diminish the promise of life more than its
tragedy.Through his synthesis of all value that entities attain,
God can give new initial aims to subsequent entities which, if actualized,
would provide the best order possible. The entity may not come very
near to actualizing it. God does not, however, allow the entity the
possibility of totally disrupting the order of the society in which it
is found by being totally incompatible with other entities.
63-Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, op, clt., p. 137.
^Hartshome, The Logic of Perfection, op. cit., p. 203.
6^Ibid.
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Providence, therefore, cannot mean that nothing will go wrong in
the world. Process thought takes the reality of failure and tragedy
quite seriously. They are everywhere throughout the cosmos. Because
of creaturely freedom the world will not be perfect. Again quoting
Hartshorne:
The root of tragedy ... is in free creativity, and if
freedom of creativity is reality itself, tragedy is neces¬
sarily pervasive. But if Supreme Creativity inspires all
lesser creative action, and takes it up into its own im¬
perishable actuality, then the opportunities of existence
outweigh its risks, and life is essentially good.®4
Here, then, is what providence means for the creature. It means
that the opportunities for the attainment of value outweigh those for
its non-attainment. This is so because the potential it has been given
has been adequately adapted to its environment. It can utilize its
potential to the fullest and can strive to achieve the highest it can
attain. There is no exclusion of the possibility of frustration, but,
nonetheless, the world will be basically supportive.®-*
Just as we say that process thought can happily include both
freedom and limitation with the system; likewise, it can' include both
chance and providence. Hartshorne says the alternatives of either
chance or providence is invalid. Explaining this he contends:
Providence is not the prevention of chance but its opti¬
mization .... Chance is within limits and these limits can¬
not be set by chance, for chance, limited by chance, is the
same as chance and not limited at all. And chance not
limited at all is sheer chaos, everything together, or nothing




®®Hartshome, The Divine Relativity, op. clt., p. 137.
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The purpose of providence, as this quotation indicates, is not to elimi¬
nate chance or risk. The purpose of providence is to support or sustain
the creature in a world that is filled with chance and risk. The sig¬
nificance of providence is that it minimizes the opportunities for
evil and maximizes those for good. God's providence accompanies the
creature throughout its existence doing precisely this. Process thought
can, therefore, avoid the painful alternative that many other systems
must face—either there is no divine control or God is the author of
all ill. God does not decree that the creature shall suffer. All that
he decrees is that suffering is possible but so is the attainment of a
high level of intrinsic value. It is toward this, not suffering or
tragedy, that the entity is lured.®7
Process theology and Calvinism. In understanding how process
thought on the subject of providence compares with traditional thought,
we can begin by putting it alongside a view with which it contrasts
markedly—the view of Calvinism. Calvin holds, as we saw, a very deter¬
ministic view of providence.Nothing happens unless it is in accord¬
ance with God's will, and eveirything which happens insures the success
of his plan for the world. Process thought finds this intolerable.
Hartshorne says that there is absolutely no reason at all "for positing
the notion of providence as an absolute contriving of all events accord¬
ing to a completely detailed plan embracing all time."69 This idea is
67Ibid.
b®See above, page 41.
®%lartshome, The Divine Relativity, op. clt., p. 23.
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doubly objectionable. First, it denies genuine creaturely freedom. If
all the decisions have already been made, what is there for the creature
to do except enact what's already been determined for it? Second, if
God is the only decision maker, he is responsible for all that happens,
even suffering and evil. This second point is dealt with later. Con¬
cerning the first, process thought insists that there is no "detailed
plan embracing all time." In place of the cosmic plan, process thought
sees cosmic process. The details of the cosmic process are the result
of the process itself. Just as each entity determines what its final
satisfaction will be, so the specific, concrete aspects of all creation
are determined by it not for it. God does not determine the outcome of
the world process any more than he does the outcome of an individual
synthesis.
What does this say about divine purpose? Is there no teleology in
divine creation? We have seen that there definitely is a cosmic purpose
in terms of God's subject aim, his own purpose in self-creation.
Quoting Whitehead, we noted that "the teleology of the universe is dir¬
ected toward the production of beauty,"70 and quoting Hartshorne, "God
is an artist fostering and loving the beauty of the creatures, the har¬
monies and intensities of their experience, as data for his own."7*
God's purpose, then, is in creating maximum intensity and harmony within ^
the cosmos, the maximum of unity-in-variety which God himself will enjoy.
Kartshome contends that such enjoyment can reach "no final maximum, but
70Whitehead, The Adventure of Ideas, op. cit., p. 265.
"*Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method,
op. cit., p. 309.
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is endlessly capable of increase, since the divine capacities for
aesthetic enjoyment are strictly infinite.This is not just an ego¬
tistic self-satisfaction. God wants to enjoy creaturely good, the same
good creatures seek; for themselves.
None of this suggests that any particular details of beauty and
harmony must be envisioned for God's purpose to be fulfilled. Hart-
shorne illustrates this by saying, "A man who goes to the theater to be
amused can say that he has accomplished his purpose without implying
that he knew in advance just what jokes he wished to hearl"^ it is
quite possible, indeed desirable, to speak of an abstract cosmic pur¬
pose which is indeterminate as far as concrete details are concerned.
The problem with teleologies like Calvin's, Hartshorne believes,
comes from failing to see that there are many purposes, many aims—not
just one purpose, one aim—in the cosmos. He sayss
An absolutely controlling purpose would be the sole purpose,
and could not have as its aim the creation of other purposes. If
there be even two purposes, two decisions, thai the conjunction
of these two into a total reality must in some aspect be un¬
decided, unintended, a matter of chance.
God's aim is an all-coordinating but not an all-controlling aim. Pro¬
vidence is found in God's ability to coordinate not to control.
Having said this, one final comment about process theology and
Calvinism must be made. Although he nowhere says this, Hartshorne could
agree with Calvin that nothing happens unless God wills it. He could
make this affirmation because he sees God willing freedom for his




creatures. God wills that each entity, whose creation he initiates, be
free to be self-creative. This is the fundamental meaning of his creative
act. He creates other self-creators. This is his intention in creation.
He does not will that they should not make their own decisions and be at
least partially causa sul. He wills to take the risk that their freedom
implies. Calvin's mistake, from a process perspective, was in believing
that God wills the exact details of each creature's existence. This
God simply does not do. He does give them possibilities for their self-
creation and lures them toward those which are best, but he does not
will that they must follow his leading. He wills that they be free to
follow or not to follow. This cosmos is exactly the sort of cosmos God
wills it to be because it is composed of myriads of self-creative
entities. This is what God wants; this is what he gets. Unfortunately,
Calvin never considered the possibility of God's being flexible and
capable of adapting himself and his purpose to whatever concrete real¬
ities the world produced. Without the notion of something parallel to
God's consequent nature, it would be impossible to permit the creature
genuine freedom. Were he to stray beynd God's intention, God could not
maintain his soverignty over him. In process thought God is soverign
over the creature because he is the one who finally receives into himself
all that the creature does. He initiates the creature's self-creation
and receives that self-creative act back into his own self-creative
act.
Our survey of traditional thought on the subject of providence
revealed that there are two aspects of God's providence, a general and
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a particular aspect. General providence refers to God's involvement in
nature and history. Particular providence refers to the individual
attention he gives each creature. Process thought includes both these
aspects. We can call God's continuous creation of order throughout the
cosmos general providence. His giving of initial aims to each entity
and his preservation of the various societies can be labeled specific
providence. General and specific providence are, in process thought,
two ways of looking at the same thing, for it is through the initial aim
that both are accomplished. Because of the social nature of reality, all
providence is both general and particular. God is individually involved
in the life of each entity, and at the same time and the same way, in
the life of each society from atoms to the cosmos. For purposes of
comparison with traditional thought, however, we can look at general
and specific providence separately.
General providence. General providence always involves a dis¬
cussion of the natural order, for one way in which any creature is sus¬
tained is through a natural order which supports and sustains his exis¬
tence. General providence is seen in the fact that there is an order
in nature on which creatures can and do rely. We cited Tillich's state¬
ment that God maintains "the continuity of the structure of reality as
the basis for being and acting.This continuity is sometimes called
natural law. Without it the continuation of existence would be im¬
possible or at best fortuitous. This aspect of providence is frequently
referred to as God's sustaining his creatures.
7CJSee above, page 42.
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Process theology has a slightly different perspective on this
because it sees the sustaining of a creature's existence located in
God's re-creation of the entities which compose a particular society.
An orderliness of nature is required for this, as we have already seen.
Concerning this Hartshorne says:
We can ... infer from scientific knowledge that God
must intend nature to follow certain patterns, those which
she universally does follow. This enables us to under¬
stand what it can be in nature that gives her a reliable
structure, and indeed, enables a coherent world to exist
at all.76
He goes on to say that the "so called Laws of Mature" are simply the
limits God sets on creaturely creating.77 By placing limits on the
entities' acts of self-creation, God imposes harmony on nature.
Societies can, then, endure over a protracted period of time. We must,
however, stress again that this order is a changing order, and, there¬
fore, even the most enduring objects are not eternally fixed in their
being. A society is assured, though, that it will have continuing self-
identity. A human experience will not be followed by a stellar one
within the same society.
Traditional thought, in speaking of God's providence in nature,
refers primarily to how the natural order is supportive of man. God
is frequently envisioned as directing the order of nature to benefit
man, and questions arise at the point when nature does not seen to do
this. Process thought denies a separation between man and nature.
Although not denying the particularity of man, it has insisted that
76Hartsh::rne, The Logic of Perfection, op. cit., p. 110.
77Ibid.
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human existence be seen as one part of all existence. Evolutionary
thought would point out that God has lured the cosmos to the point
where a society as complex as the human soul could emerge, but that
does not mean that God is only interested in humankind. God's in¬
terest is in the entirety of the cosmos, and he aims at maximum inten¬
sity of feeling throughout the creation. Hartshorne points out that
there is a dominant Western tendency to regard the rest of nature as
nothing but a means to human aids. He says:
Western science makes the extreme form of Christian exal¬
tation of man as the sole valuable form of life rather ridicu¬
lous since it implies that divine purpose took billions of
years to get to something of value.
He goes on to point out that in process thought every singular instance
of creativity has intrinsic value. Man is merely the supreme not the
sole contributor of value to the divine life. God's providence in
nature must be seen in reference to the whole of creation.
God's creation of the natural order is often seen in traditional
thought as God's sustaining his creature. There is another facet of
general providence which concerns itself with God's governing of the
creature. This is history. Barth, as we saw, emphasizes God's oper¬
ation in history through which he directs its course in accordance with
his will. The history of Israel serves as an excellent example of
God's providential governing of his creatures.
Here again, as in the case of nature, we find process thought
insisting that human history is not the only history with which God
^Charles Hartshorne, "Cobb's Theology of Ecology" John Cobb's
Theology in Process, eds. David R. Griffin and Thomas J. Altizer
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976), p. 114.
^See above, page 43.
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has been concerned. Our discussion of evolution pointed out that God
was involved in cosmic history before the arrival of man. The cosmos
has a history before humanity which is significant and which has contri¬
buted value to the divine life. Cosmic history, like human history, is
under God's providential guidance because God has limited and ordered
it. Human history must be seen as only one slice of history in general.
Process thought takes history very seriously. Overman stresses
the fact that "the things in the world come into existence as historical
in nature."88 'The reliance of any entity on its tradition and heritage
for the data it needs in self-creation points to this fact. God creates
each entity within a historical setting. Furthermore, God's purposes
have been realized within evolutionary history. Again, we must note
that God's governing of history has not been and is not now despotic.
He has not arranged the events of history so that only one particular
end would be achieved. His governing of history has reflected the divine
flexibility which takes into account creaturely deviations from his
intended purpose. History has been and is open-ended but, nonetheless,
guided by God's enduring subjective aim. Overman illustrates:
To regard human personality as part of a historically
evolving nature means ... that the evolution of man was
but one way in which the divine aim for beauty of creaturely
experience might reach concrete expression. We are the un¬
likely outcome of an immensely long process, during which
countless ether possibilities have been excluded, and it
may be that as God envisioned the future a billion years ago,
he was quite indifferent as to whether homo sapiens would
turn out to be the avenue through which his aims for beauty
on earth are now mainly channeled.81
QOoverman, Evolution and the Christian Doctrine of Creation,
op. cit.. p. 282.
81Ibid., p. 289.
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None of this compromises the Biblical intuition that there is a
strong purposiveness in history. It simply says that this purposiveness
includes a myriad of ways for its realization. Whitehead points out that
God is not committed to any particular course of history. "The given
course of history presupposes his primordial nature but his primordial
82
nature does not presuppose it." God is inescapably involved in history
but is open to what that history will be. "There is a yearning after
concrete fact—not particular facts, but after some actuality."83 There
is divine guidance for specific events embodied in specific initial aims,
but this does not reflect a reaching toward a specific goal. We must
remind ourselves that the teleology of process thought is aesthetic not
historical. The universe is aimed at beauty and the achievement of
maximum satisfaction for each occasion. Hartshorne elaborates:
Order is drive toward harmony in the relations of past,
present and future, of self and others immanent in self. It
is aesthetic teleology • • • • Local order can in some minor way be
in the hands of local orders, ... but cosmic order ... can
"
only be safe or anything but doomed, if there be a unitary
cosmic aesthetic drive.®4
It is this drive that governs history. Overman takes this one step
further:
The relevant future for God's experience is infinitely
long and inclusive, so that he can provide for individual
occasions just those initial aims which are harmonious with
movement toward far distant kinds of beauty as yet envisioned
only by him. This is the reason we have intuitions of a
^whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 70.
83Ibid.. p. 50.
84Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy, op. cit., p. 82
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general providence, the reason that evolution appears
as a movement toward higher kinds of societies.
What we can say about human history, then, is that it is a way
in which God is seeking to fulfill his purpose. It is probably, as
Overman suggests, the primary way in which he is doing this now. God
intends that each human occasion enjoy fully the history which he gives
it. With Overman we can agree that:
If it is true that God's aims for man are roost fully
realized in that strand of history culminating in Jesus,
perhaps God holds that history out for us with particular
concern as part of the lure for feeling with which we begin
each moment of our lives.8®
Process thought probably takes history more seriously than any
other theology for it alone posits that God is historical. He has a
present, a past and a future. This is expressed through the under¬
standing of his consequent nature which has been influenced by all past
reality and in which all history is everlastingly preserved. God's own
life is caught up in the history of his creation, just as the history of
creation is caught up in the life of God.
Specific providence. Before discussing general providence, we
noted that there is no fundamental distinction between general and
specific providence. They are simply two ways of looking at the same
phenomenon. Process thought would concur corrpletely with Brunner when
he says, "Providence is just another name for the fact that the God who
looks at me and never ceases to look at me, at the same time with his
glance embraces the whole and unites his will for me with his will for
^Overman, Evolution and the Christian Doctrine of Creation,
op. clt., p. 274.
86Ibld.. p. 275.
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the world."®'' By looking at general providence we obtained a cosmic
perspective on God's creative care. As we look at specific providence,
we will focus on his concern for each entity.
The creation of actual entities is the locus of God's creative
act. All he does is accomplished through this. His creation of each
entity reflects a dual concern. We have just dwelt on one of these—
his concern for the cosmos attaining ever increasing levels of beauty.
This concern is part of another concern, the enjoyment of a maximum
intensity of feeling for each entity. God, then, is not just concerned
about the cosmos but is also and at the same time concerned about each
entity which composes it. Whitehead explains that God's purpose for the
world is always "embodied in the particular ideals relevant to the actual
state of the world."36 Overman comments that herein is found process
thought's agreement with all theological doctrines of special providence,
"the main intent of which is to express faith that God's overall purposes
89
do not exclude his attention to the particular situations on earth."
In our earlier discussions we saw how through the initial aim
God provides the best satisfaction an entity could attain for itself.
God is wanting only "the best" for each of his creatures, and he makes
that best possible for them. This is the core of his special providence.
God maximizes to the greatest extent possible, the possibility of each
entity achieving its best possible concresence. Because he gives each
entity freedom as he creates it, he does not coerce the entity into its
87Brunner, The Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, op. cit., p. 157.
®®Whitehead, Religion in the Hakinc, op. cit., p. 152.
8550verman, Evolution and the Christian Doctrine of Creation,
op. clt., p. 250.
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best possible concresence. He sets the optimal conditions under which
the best possible concresence could be achieved. Hartshorne points out
that in this "optimum setting of conditions" there is "neither a degree
of safety, mitigation of risk that w uld be too dearly paid for in de¬
pression of opportunity, nor a degree of opportunity or promise that would
be too dearly paid for in inflation of risk."9® God's special providence,
then, balances security and risk. It does not eliminate either. The
conditions for concresence are neither too dangerous nor too tame. Again,
as in the case of general providence, we are faced with the fact that
divine providence does include an element of chance. As Hartshorne says:
Providence can reasonably be conceived, not as a simple
alternative to chance, its mere negation or prevention, but
only as a channeling of chance between banks less than in¬
finitely close together. The function of Providence is not
to enforce a maximal relation of good to evil, but a maximal
ratio of chances of good to chances of evil.9*
While traditional thought has generally agreed that the creature
has no passport to safety and that he may encounter disaster along the
way, some thinkers have insisted that the proof of God's providence lies
in the ultimate security of the creature. Brunner is an example of these.
With reference to God's care for man, he points out that it is only ulti¬
mately that the creature may be considered safe. Those who are God's will
not suffer ultimate defeat, for the promise of eternal life is always there.
92
Their redemption is secure. Process thought can agree with Brunner on
this if we remind ourselves that ultimacy for process theology is found
^Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, op« cit., p. 129.
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Hartshorne, Reality as a Social Process, op. clt., p. 107.
^Brunner, The Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, op. cit.,
p. 157. ~ ~ " " ~~ "
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in an entity's being included everlastingly in the consequent nature of
God. Here he is eternally secure. The value that he has attained is
free from any threat of destruction. God does save all that can be
93
saved in each concresence. This is the source of an entity's ulti¬
mate security and the final expression of God's providential care for him.
The importance of this idea is seen in the fact that Whitehead
refers to the consequent nature of God as "heaven" or "the Kingdom of
94
Heaven"
... the kingdom of Heaven is with us today .... It is
the particular providence for particular occasions. What is
d ne in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven,
and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By
reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world
passes intorthe love in heaven, and floods back again into
the world.
To be included in the consequent nature of God, the Kingdom of
Heaven is the ultimate destiny of the creature. To enhance and enrich
that kingdom is its goal. This understanding of heaven is not totally
dissimilar to the usual one of "a place where one goes after death."
An entity is included in the consequent nature only after it has perished.
Immortality is possible only after an entity has ceased to be the subject
of its own experience. Defendars of a traditional view of heaven would
insist that there must be a continuation of subjectivity after death.
Heaven must be "enjoyed" by those who have reached it. In process
93
See above, pace 162.
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Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit.. p. 532. See also
Cobb's interpretation of this. "The Kingdom of Heaven" Chapter 14 in
Chx'. t In a Pluralistic Age, op. cit., p. 221f.
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Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 532.
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thinking an entity does not enjoy its immortality. It is possible, though,
for those entities which compose a society to experience the perfected
actuality of their predecessors. A society, such as a human being, can
enjoy the riches of the kingdom of Heaven as part of his present exis¬
tence. Hartshome, who is skeptical of the traditional Christian idea
of heaven, pays tribute to the ancients who did not consider themselves
immortal but knew that God's love for them was everlasting. He says that
all entities live eternally as "creatures of the divine awareness." God
is their "ultimate posterity.
Life beyond the grave has been seen as unimportant in process
thinking. There is nothing, however, that outlaws its being possible.
The soul could continue to exist in situations radically different to
life on earth, but it would itself be radically differait. This would not
exclude the possibility of a continuing identity for a creature in a life
"beyond" this one. Cobb comments that one who believes in God as process
thought understands him, is entitled to hope for life after death. He says:
He is entitled to hope first because belief in the divine
spirit already implicitly entails belief that reality is not
limited to the sensuously accessible world and hence opens up
the possibility of belief that there are other spirits as well.
And he is entitled to hope also because the God who brought
order into being out of chaos, novelty out of aidless repeti¬
tion, life out of subllving nature, man out of subhuman forms
of life, and the occasional saint out of a sinful humanity,
may also have the power to sustain or recreate man in a quite
new form.
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Hartshume, "The God of Religion and the God of Philosophy,"
op, cit.. p. 157.
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Cobb, God and the World, op. cit., pp. 101-02. See also his
"Whitehead's Philosophy and a Christian Doctrine of Man," Journal of
Bible and Religion, XXXII/3 The subject of life after death needs
more attention from process thinkers than it has so far received.
Griffin does provide a reasonably complete discussion of it in the
appendix to God, Power and Evil.
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Summary, Even though, as Cobb suggested, the meaning of many
terms lias been transformed through a decisively different conceptualization
of what is meant by creativity, creator, and creature, process theology,
can affirm with traditional theology that God is the source of all ex¬
istence and that the creation is completely dependent on him. Through
the interpretation of creativity put forward in this dissertation,
creativity is seen to be God's Logos, his way of expressing himself in
the cosmos. The locus of this creative self-expression is found in his
giving of an initial aim to each new entity. Without these, entities
would not have their own process of self-creation. The initial aim is
his "gift of becoming." Process theology further sees in God's crea¬
tion of new entities within a society, the preservation of that society
over an extended period of time. God, therefore, is the source of all
existence because without his decision that an entity have its con-
c-
cresence, that entity would not become. Likewise, if he did not decide
that there would be entities succeeding other entities, the existence of
a society would cease. Both of these point to the absolute dependence
of the cosmos on God.
Where process thought differs from traditional thinking is in
its insistence that God's creative act results in the creation of en¬
tities who are, within limits, self-creators. Creati n by God is not abso¬
lute determinism of either the essence or the existence of an entity.
God's creativity both gives and guarantees creaturely creativity.
This insurance of freedom does not mean that the creature is
alone or separated from God. Providential care is part of God's creativ¬
ity. Even though he does not determine the exact course of history nor
the precise order of nature, he has led and is leading the cosmos to
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ever higher levels of beauty and to an increasing attainment of value.
Through his own synthesis of all value attained in the creation, he ever¬
lastingly preserves each creature guaranteeing its immortality. Since all
creation is initially and ultimately part of God's self-creation, it can
be affirmed that the creation is accompanied and sustained by its creator.
Once again, we must note that process thought is demanding more
freedom for the cosmos and the creature than traditional theology would
allow. Whether or not this freedom critically compromises the power of
God is a question we will answer when we have looked at the other basic
affirmations concerning creation in the light of process thinking.
The Creation is Distinct from Gcd and even though Corrupted by Sin, is
Fundamentally Good
As we saw in the first chapter, traditional thought insisted that
while there is but one God, there are two fundamental realities—the crea-
98
tor and his creation. While demanding that the ontological dependency
of the creation on the creator be affirmed, there was also the demand that
any ontological continuity be denied. There was unanimous agreement that
creator and creature were of separate substance. Any monistic thought
was totally and officially rejected. Here again, we have a sharp contrast
between process thought and traditional thinking. As we have seen re¬
peatedly, process thought speaks of the cosmos being included in God's
consequent nature. God is, in one aspect of his being, partially consti¬
tuted by the creation. Are we then discussing a form of pantheism which
must be rejected outright? The process answer to this question is an
emphatic, "no."
98
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Panenthelsm. Process thought cannot be identified with classical
pantheism any more than it can with traditional theism. To understand
this, some careful definitions must be made. Hartshorne provides thern:
Pantheism is conveniently defined as the logical contrary
of pure transcendental deism. (The term, theism, which is more
commonly used for the contrary of pantheism, suggests that
the doctrine conforms to religion, really describes the theos,
the God of worship, and that is open to dispute.) Deism here
means that God is the super-cause taken as self-sufficient,
a complete being, in abstraction from any and all of his
effects. God thus excludes the world; he is only its cause,
in no sense is he effect, of himself or anything else. Pan¬
theism (better "pandeism" for again it is not really the
theos that is described) means that God is the integral
totality of ordinary cause-effects, and that there is no
super-cause independent of ordinary causes and effects. God
thus includes the world; he is in fact the totality of world
parts which are indifferently causes and effects."
Hartshorne points out that most traditional theism has defended its
doctrines on the mistaken belief that its view, transcendental theism, is
the only alternative to pantheism. This is not the case. There are
basically three views one can hold: (1) God is the cosmos. He is the
totality, the sum of the system of all dependent things. This view is
pantheism and can be identified with Spinoza. (2) God is not J>e system
and is, in every aspect, independent of it. This is traditional theism
typified by Thomas Aquinas. (3) God is both the system and something
independent of it. This view Hartshorne calls panentheism ("all in God")
100
and is the view held by Whitehead and other process thinkers.
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his Philosophers Speak of God, op. cit., pp. 15-25, for a detailed
classification of theistic doctrines.
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As is apparent, there is a polarity reflected in traditional theism
and pantheism. Panentheism, as indicated by its dipolar concept of deity
includes both poles. According to the Law of Polarity, which we cited
earlier, ultimate contraries are correlatives and mutually interdependent.
They do not have to exclude each other and must in fact include each other.
God needs to be seen as separate from yet including the cosmos. Hartshorne
comments;
Panentheism agrees with traditional theism on the impor¬
tant point that divine individuality, that without which God
would not be God, must be logically independent, that is, must
not involve any particular world. The distinction between
individual and state, or personality and experience enables
us to combine this point of theism with the equally neces¬
sary point of traditional pantheism that God cannot in his
full actuality be less or other than literally all-inclusive.
This view is exactly as far from traditional pantheism as from
traditional theism.
In our previous discussions of God's relativity to the world, we
have spent considerable time distinguishing between panentheism and
traditional theism. Basic to this was our understanding of God's conse¬
quent nature which indicates how God includes the world. This also leads
us to the understanding of how panentheism differs from pantheism. Hart¬
shorne says the difference between them is the difference between the
statements, "God is all things" and "God includes all things."11^ unlike
pantheism, panentheism does not see the divine reality exhausted by the
totality of the cosmos. God is more than the sum of all things. White¬
head's intuition that God was the sum of all entities in the cosmos plus
one—himself—Indicates that God has an individuality beyond that of the
cosmos.
"^^Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, op. cit., p. 90.
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Panentheism does not deny the absolute, eternal, essential nature
of God as does pantheism. Just as traditional theology denies the con¬
sequent nature of God, so pantheism denies his primordial nature. Pan¬
entheism affirms both. Both pantheism and theism are in a sense true.
It is not that there are two Gods but one God with two natures—an in¬
dependent and a dependent one. Panentheism affirms God as containing
both an independent all causative factor and the totality of all effects.
This is simply the distinction between what God is in himself and is in
any one of his particular, concrete states. Hartshorne says:
Common to theism and pantheism is the doctrine of the
invidious nature of categorical contrasts. One pole of each
is regarded as more excellent than the other, so that the
supremely excellent being cannot be described by the other
and inferior pole.
This results in a dilemma:
Either there is something outside of deity, so that the
total real is deity-and-something else, a whole of which deity
is merely one constituent; or else the allegedly inferior
pole of each is an illusory conception. J^|ism takes one
horn of the dilemma; pantheism the other.
Panentheism is the way out of this dilemma. The full actuality of God
includes both polls. Each is equally part of him.
That God includes all things in himself does not suggest that
these things have no identity apart from God. They are independent as
well as included. As we have noted, the entities composing the cosmos
have their subjectivity before they are included in God*s consequent
nature. As subjects, they are independent of him. As subject, God is
likewise independent of them, for, though he includes them, they do not
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determine his full concrete actuality. His own synthesis of them does
this. God and the cosmos are not synonymous. God only includes the
cosmos as constituait of his consequent nature. The cosmos has its own
integrity as does God.
Traditional thought would want process thought to affirm that God
and the world are of "separate substance."104 This would be difficult, for
process thinking makes little use of substance categories. It is, however,
possible for process thought, using its fundamental category of event
rather than substance, to affirm that the events which constitue each
entity and those which constitute God are not identical. Even though the
entities furnish data to God for his self-creation and he furnishes data
to them for theirs, each is more than the data he receives.
Cobb suggests that an understanding of the spatio-temporal relation¬
ship of God to the world is helpful in understanding the logic of panen-
theism. The modern concept of space-time is not that space is a fixed
receptical which pre-exists the events which fill it. Rather, the events
which take place have patterns of relationships which can be described as
extensive in that they include successiveness and contemporaneity. For
this reason, events can be seen as being spacio-temporal. Each event
receives its data from a particular spatio-temporal standpoint and its
spatio-temporal standpoint determines the particular data that is relevant
to its synthesis. The difference between the spatio-temp ral standpoint
of other entities and of God is that while other entities occupy a
specific, limited standpoint within the whole of the cosmos, God's stand-
point is the entirity of the cosmos. Each entity other than God is
104
See above, page 47.
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somewhere. God is everywhere. His standpoint is all-inclusive, so in a
sense, everything is part of God but it does not follow that God is simply
the sum of the total of his parts or that the parts lack independence or
self-determination. Because God's spatio-tenporal standpoint is all in¬
clusive, he can include localized events within it. Cobb illustrates this
by saying that the electrons in his brain enjoy their subjectivity from a
very limited standpoint while he enjoys his experiences from a much more
inclusive standpoint. The experiences in Cobb's brain have an independent
self-identity, yet they are included in his self-identity. He says: "The
events occupying the inclusive space and those occupying the included space
act upon each other in complex ways, but they have their distinct individ¬
uality and autonomy. They are independent as well as interdependent.
Cobb concludes his argument by saying "Panentheism is the
synthesis of the central concerns of traditional theism and pantheism,
and it distinguishes itself from both only in ways that are secondary.
The central concern for traditional theism against pantheism, as Cobb sees
it, is not the spatial separataness of God and the world, but that God
and other creatures must be understood as having integrity in themselves.
The central concern of pantheism against theism is to reject a creator
who is outside the world manipulating or controlling it from without.
Pantheism seeks to understand God as pervading the world and manifest
in all its parts. To both these central concerns panentheism says "yes"
and, beyond that, provides a conceptualization which can hold them together.*-0'
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The goodness of creation. We have established that even though
God is included in the creation and the creation is included in God, they
are separate and distinct. The question now before us is the same one as
the one facing traditional theology: If the creation is distinct from God,
can it be affirmed as essentially good?
The foundation of the traditional affirmation of the goodness of
108
creation is, as we saw, God's evaluation that it is good. It could
hardly be supposed otherwise for God is good, not only in himself but
in everything he does. Therefore, the creation is good because of the
goodness of the creator. Even though good, the creation is not to be
regarded as perfect. Perfect goodness belongs to God alone.
Process thought is in basic agreement with traditional thinking
here, Cobb says that "the possibility of affirming life and humanity
depends on belief in God. The ground for • • . affirming the goodness
109
of creation is belief in the goodness of the creator," He continues
by saying:
That means that the goodness faith perceives in God is no
mere function of the goodness seen in creation. The highly
ambivalent appraisal of man's worth and excellence to which
the study of human history must lead, is wholly inappropriate
in relation to God. The Christian apprehends God as entoodying
just that purity of goodness for which he searches the world
and himself in vain.^lO
For some traditional thinkers, this belief in the goodness of God
is all that is required for affirming the goodness of creation. One must
simply accept this and not question further. Others have not been content
108
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to stop here and have tried to explain what, from a creaturely standpoint,
would make this affirmation possible. Process thinkers would also want
to proceed this way.
Augustine contends that simply to be is better than not to be.
Existence in and of itself is good. Again, we have agreement from
process thinkers. Cobb points out that this is the first of the fund¬
amental assumptions behind the process affirmation of the world process.
It Is better that there be creative experience than there be nothing
111
at all.
Traditional thought goes beyond this and so does process
thinking. Augustine insists that in spite of being corrupted, each
thing is basically good, and taken altogether, things display an
"admirable beauty." With Augustine, process thought is committed to
an aesthetic standard for evaluating the goodness of creation both
with regard to individual entities and to the totality of all entities,
the cosmos.
As we noted earlier, God's subjective aim in each instance
112
of his creating is an aim toward beauty. We have indicated that
much more is meant by the word "beauty" than is implied in common
usage. Occasionally, process thinkers use the word to mean simple
113
aesthetic pleasure, but usually it is a more inclusive term including
what Hartshorne sees as the three headings for value—acting rightly,
thinking correctly, and experiencing well or satisfactorily. He says:
mibid.. p. 93.
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The basic value is the intrinsic value of experiencing
as a unity of feeling of whatever volition and thought the
experience contains, and exhibitng harmony or beauty. If
we know what experience is, at its best or most beautiful,
then and only then can we know how it is right to act; for
the value of an action is in what it contributes to ex¬
periences.
The achievement of beauty, therefore, is what makes experience good. It
is toward this beauty or goodness that God lures each creature with the
initial aim.
As indicated in the above quotation from Hartshorne, Griffin
says that in process thinking, beauty generally refers to the intrinsic
goodness of an entity. Intrinsic goodness means the goodness of some¬
thing in and of itself, the value it has attained in its own synthesis.
No reference need be made to anything other than the individual entity
in determining this type of goodness,115 As far as each creature is
concerned, the intrinsic goodness of its experience is the "enjoyment"
it has of it's self-creative experience, According to Griffin, there
are two variables involved in this enjoyment, harmony and intensity,
116
Both of these have been discussed previously. The question is how
do they function as criteria for goodness?
Harmony, as we said, means the compatibility of the various
factors within the synthesis. Intensity refers to the "excitement,"
the "zest," the "adventure" that can be part of the experience. There
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is always a certain amount of tension between these two factors.
Harmony is easier to achieve among data which are similar. Intensity
requires diversity and complexity. For some syntheses, harmony may be
of greater value than Intensity and vice versa for others. Both must
be present to some degree, however. For an experience to be enjoyed,
the various elements in that experience must not clash to the extent
that discord outweighs harmony; yet, for a maximum of harmony to be
enjoyed, there must also be a certain level of intensity, otherwise
the value attained will be trivial. The capacity of an entity to have
both harmony and intensity depends on the entity itself. The more
complex an entity, the greater its capacity to cope with contrasting
elements in its experience. "An increasing capacity for intrinsic
goodness means an increase in the power to integrate harmoniously
117
an ever-greater variety of data from the environment. The level of
beauty that an entity can attain corresponds to the nature of the entity.
In addition to intrinsic goodness, there is also instrumental
goodness. This is the capacity of an entity to influence others for
the attainment of value. As we talked about creative synthesis, we
noted that an entity's subjectivity is private, but its objectivity
is public. The way in which it constitutes itself determines the
influence it can have on another. The more value an entity has attained
in its own synthesis, the more it can contribute to other entities. In
other words, the greater the intrinsic goodness of an entity, the greater
its potential for instrumental goodness. Griffin says, "Those actualities
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which are more complex and intense in themselves, also have more to
contribute to others. A weak individual exerts a weak influence and a
strong one a strong influence." He continue to show how this is born
out in the evolutionary process.
Living cells could not have emerged directly out of an
arrangement of enduring individuals as primitive as protons
and electrons. Those lowly creatures cannot contribute the
types of data necessary for the emergence and sustenance of
living occasion of experience. The intermediate states of
atoms and molecules were needed. Likewise, an animal soul
... could not emerge directly out of a complex combination
of molecules. Molecules do not have the capacity to con¬
tribute the variety, type and intensity of data necessary
to provide an adequate basis for a soul.*18
The final instrumental value of an entity is seen in the contribution
it makes to creative advance.
This brings us to the second aspect in evaluating the goodness
of creation, the beauty displayed by the cosmos as a whole. Hartshorne
says, "The beauty of the cosmos is the spectacle of its innumerable
forms of creative social experience, all basically in harmony to-
119
gether." This harmony, as we have seen, is not the simple harmony
of similar experience but a complex intense harmony arising from wide
diversity of experience. This harmony arises as disharmony and is over¬
come. As noted earlier, process thought believes that in spite of
there being disharmony within the cosmos, harmony is pervasive, there¬
fore, the cosmos as a whole is beautiful and good.
Up to this point process thought is not too far away from tra¬
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but there is one aspect to this affirmation wherein process thought and
traditional thinking part company. Hartshorne says that the beauty
of the cosmos is both inspired and enjoyed by God. We have already
cited his belief that God is an artist "fostering and loving the
beauty of the creatures, the harmonies and intensities of their ex-
120
periences, as data for his own." The ultimate reason for evaluating
the cosmos as good is found in the instrumental value it holds for God's
own experiences. Not only are entities contributing to the experiences
of other entities, but they are also contributing to God's experiences.
They can and do provide him with the attainment of value which is needed
for his own growth. In his primordial aspect he lures and leads the
creation to ever higher levels of beauty which he himself, in his
consequent nature, will enjoy. The goodness of the creation ultimately
lies in its ability to enrich God. For example, from a human perspective,
what makes life good is the possibility human existence presents for a
person making a meaningful contribution to God, or more specifically
to the "Kingdom of Heaven," God's consequent nature. Such a viewpoint
is, of course, repugnant to traditional thinking. God does not need,
in any aspect of his being, to be enriched. We will address this
issue later on.
In summary, process thinking finds the creation good because
each creature is given the maximum opportunity to have the best pos¬
sible experience for himself in his own self-creative synthesis and
also, because this affords the creature the chance to contribute real
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value to other creatures* experiences. The ultimate dimension of this
is found in the possible contribution each entity can make to God.
Because there are these possibilities and because the cosmos is led
toward their actualization, the universe may be affirmed as being good.
Just as traditional thinking does not find it necessary to insist that
the creation be "perfect" to affirm its fundamental goodness, process
thought does not suggest cosmic perfection as a criterion for goodness.
In fact, process thinking recognizes that all possible value is not
attained. This brings us to the question of evil in the cosmic
structure and its effect on belief in the goodness of creation.
The problem of evil. In the first chapter we saw how the exis¬
tence of evil posed an enormous problem for affirming the basic goodness
121
of creation. Process thought, while not denying or deminishing the
existence of evil, regards it as being, from a philosophical stand¬
point, a "pseudo-problem"--one that has been created by philosophers and
theologians holding the wrong concept of divine power. The question of
how evil can exist in a world created by an all-loving and all-powerful
122
God, can be adequately answered if divine power is properly understood.
From what has been said previously, we are already familiar with
123
the process concept of divine power. First of all, it insists that
divine power is not the only power in the cosmos. Power, in the
121See above, pp. 54-70,
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form of freedom for self-determination, is found in each instance of
creative synthesis. God does not monopolize power. To be a creature
means to be self-creative. Without this power, creatures would not be
creatures. God could only have absolute power over something which
was absolutely powerless. God's power is only one of the powers shaping
the cosmos. It is however, vastly superior to all other powers.
This understanding of God's power must be taken one step further.
124
It is, as we have seen, persuasive and not coercive. God does not
force the entities to conform to his initial aim for them. Rather, he
lures them toward its actualization. Creatures cannot be completely
controlled and be creatures. Absolute control contradicts the essence
of their self-hood; their freedom for self-creation. Griffin points out
that this means God's power as being persuasive power is to be under¬
stood as metaphysical and not moral. "God does not refrain from con¬
trolling the creatures simply because it is better for him to use
persuasion, but because it is necessarily the case that God cannot
125
completely control the creatures." God, however, can and does limit
creature power by restricting the chaotic aspect inherent in indl-
126
viduality. Freedom for self-creation is limited but not controlled.
This understanding of the power of God makes it possible for us to
recognize the evil in the world for what it is without having to com¬
promise the goodness of God.
That God does not have a monopoly on power and that the power
^^See above, p. 174f
125
Griffin, God, Power, and Evil, op, cit., p. 276.
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Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection, op. cit., p. 295.
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he does have is persuasive power, forms the basis of the process under¬
standing of why there is evil in the cosmos. Hartshorne makes this
explicit.
It is not God alone who acts in the world; every indi¬
vidual acts. There is no simple producer of the actual series
of events; one producer, to be sure, is uniquely universal,
unsurpassably influential. Nevertheless, what happens is in
no case the product of his creative acts alone ... a multi-
plicit of choosers means that what concretely happens is
never simply chosen; rather, it just happens .... Concrete
evils and goods simply happen, they are never in their full
particularity chosen. Hence, to ask, why did God choose to ^7
inflict this or that evil upon us? is to ask a pseudo-question.
Hartshorne also says that since creatures do have the freedom to decide
what their self-creation will be, evil arises from "unfortunate
creaturely decisions." God does not inflict evil on the creatures;
123
evil is inflicted on the creatures by each other. Hartshorne
illustrates this with the Biblical example of Job. Job1s sufferings did
not come from God, rather they came "from Satan via the Sabaeans, the
Chaldeans, lightning, wind and also ... bacteria and his own bodily
129
cells" These are responsible for Job's sufferings, not God.
The question must now be asked, what constitutes an unfor¬
tunate creaturely decision? Unfortunate creaturely decisions are those
that fail to conform to the divine purpose. As we have noticed fre¬
quently, when God gives an entity an initial aim, that aim embodies the
divine purpose for it. This divine purpose includes both what is best
for the entity individually, and as part of the society to which it belongs.
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Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for Our Time, op. cit., p. 58.
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Hartshome, "A New Look at the Problem of Evil," op» cit.,
p. 205.
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If the entity were to fulfill God's aim, it would have not only maximum
intensity of feeling but also maximum compatibility with other entities.
Being free to fulfill the aim or not to fulfill it, entities often
modify their initial aim and become other than what was intended for them.
As far as most creatures are concerned, this modification of
their initial aim is unconscious. We are talking here of what is
usually referred to as natural evil. Most evil in the "natural world"
is of this type. The creatures are not aware of what they are doing.
Hartshome says we cannot blame the malarial mosquito for biting some¬
one since it has no way of knowing what the consequences of its action
130
will be. Likewise, one cannot blame a small child for some of the
things he or she does because the child is literally "too little to
know any better." Someone or something can only be held accountable if
he realizes what he is doing. This consciousness of one's actions is
what separates natural from moral evil. Sin is the willful refusal
to do what one knows is God's will which is what is best for the individual
or other individuals. Cohb points out that if God did not draw persons
toward some ideal which was in tension with their other urges, the
question of sin would not arise. Without God's leading, everyone
would do whatever he wanted, but there would be no growth in terms of
sensitivity to others, nor would there be any attempt to harmonize
131
conflicting self interests. Natural and moral evil differ primarily
on the issue of consciousness. Both represent the failure of creation
to achieve the goodness God intends.
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This failure to achieve the goodness God intends can result in
two dimensions of intrinsic evil. One is triviality. The other is
^ 132discord.
Triviality is the opposite of intensity. As we noted in the
previous section, intensity of feeling is the highest value which an
entity can attain. If the value attained is an experience of creative
synthesis and is considerably less than it could have been, the experience
is said to be trivial. There is a deficiency here in what could be
attained. Superficiality is a frequent form of this evil. Although
it is impossible to speculate about the experiences of all creatures,
it does seem certain that human experience is frequently trivial. To
the extent that this triviality degrades the person, it is evil.
There is a real sense of loss, of lack of achievement, in triviality.
Whitehead illustrates this form of evil by saying that the experiences
of a hog are not evil if they are in fact the experience of a hog. If,
h wever, these are the experiences of a person, then they are evil be-
133
cause they are less than they should have been.
Discord is the extreme form of disharmony. As we saw, an
entity in striving for maximum intensity of feeling, will disrupt
the harmony that has been created but, this is with the purpose of
achieving even richer harmony. Such is not discord. Discord arises
when an entity creates a disharmony which cannot be subsummed into
132
Griffin, God, Power and Evil, op. cit., p. 94.
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some richer pattern of harmony. The feeling of distructiveness, a
feeling experienced both by the entity and the society of which it is
a part, is the experience of evil. As in the case of triviality, there
is also a sense of loss here. In place of the intended higher form of
harmony, discord has emerged.
It is important to emphasize that both triviality and discord
are seen as evil in process thinking. Whitehead says, "evil is ex¬
hibited in physical suffering, mental suffering and the loss of higher
135
experience in favor of lower experience," Suffering is what we
have called discord, loss of higher experience is triviality. Most
discussions of evil, as noted in our previous discussion, focus almost
exclusively on discord. Triviality is not considered. Yet, in process
thinking, it is the greater of the two evils.
To process thinking, the avoidance of unnecessary triviality
is important, because this is the basis of the creative advance of the
cosmos. As we saw when looking at evolution, the advance of the cosmos
has come as the cosmos has produced entities capable of higher, more
intense experiences. God's initial aim is not only toward enjoyment
in the present, but also toward the possibility of future enjoyment.
For this advance, it is necessary to risk discord to attain more of an
intense experience and, hence, greater intrinsic good. Griffin mentions
that if this greater intensity of experience were not a goal, it would
be much easier to solve the problem of evil. If evil is only suffering,
^Norman Pittenger, "Process Theology and Evil," The Expos¬
itory Times LXXXII/3. (December, 1971), p. 74.
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Whitehead, Religion in the Making, op, cit., p. 92.
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then the way to avoid it would be for God to lure the cosmos toward a
simple harmony wherein no possibility of discord would be present because
there would be no striving toward higher values. However, since goodness
involves the promotion of intrinsically rewarding experiences, God must
not avoid the possibility of the evil of discord at the expense of the
136
value of a possible greater intensity of experience. Discord and
triviality must both be avoided, either one is an evil, but avoiding
triviality is paramount.
Since both triviality and discord indicate loss, it is possible
to note the compatibility of process thought with the traditional con¬
cept of evil as being a privatic bonl. In process thought, as well as
much of traditional thinking, evil is regarded as being privative in
nature. The entity lacks something it could and should have had.
This is the maximum intensity of feeling or full enjoyment of its
synthesis. This is a deprivation in two ways. First, the entity itself
fails to attain the best possible satisfaction. It attains less value
than it could have. The value God intended in the initial has not
been realized. If I decide to be stingy when the situation would have
best been served by my generosity, then iny decision is evil. Second,
this intrinsic deficiency creates an instrumental deficiency because it
does not provide the best possible data for the creative advance.
Pittlnger says, "The purpose of God in creation is the augmenting of
all possible good, achieved through the decisions of the creatively
137
occasions or events." As we saw when we looked at evolution, God
IS^Griffin, God, Power, and Evil, op. clt., p. 285.
137pittinger, "Process Theology and Evil," op. cit., p. 74.
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lured the cosmos toward ever greater self-actualization. When God
provides each entity with its initial aim, he has determined what
the entity should become if this creative advance is to continue.
Failure to be what God intends, deprives the cosmos of one step in
the advance. Again citing Pittiner, "Evil ... is that which holds
back, diminishes or distorts the creative advance of the cosmos to-
138
ward the shared increase of good."
Is every failure to attain the full value of the initial aim,
evil? Aquinas insisted that not every absence of good was evil—only
the absence of those things which are genuinely needed. We have
already indicated that the possible value that could be attained in
any creative synthesis depends on the nature of the entity itself.
The initial aim contains the maximum value possible for that entity to
attain. Nothing is lured toward something impossible for it to achieve.
God does not want a horse to have human experiences. We cannot, there¬
fore, speak of a privation when this does not happen. The privation
comes when the horse's experiences are not adequately equine.
Aquinas goes further by pointing out that some things are not
intrinsically evil but rather evil in the effect that they have on
others. Just as there is instrumental goodness, so there is its
opposite, instrumental evil. Evil exists when something is in
destructive conflict with its environment. Process thought also
holds this position. Hartshorne points out that cancer cells are
not intrinsically evil. They are evil because they are in conflict
with the organ of which they are a part. Among themselves, the cancer
138Ibid.
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cells achieve harmony, but their internal harmony is in conflict with
their external environment. As a result of this, disease, pain, and
139
suffering result.
There is yet another point of contact between process thought
and the thinking of Augustine and Aquinas. Augustine and Aquinas both
believe that good is the source of evil. Aquinas worked this out on
140
the basis of Aristotle's categories of causality. Pr cess thinking
does not say that good is the source of evil but rather that good and
evil are caused by the same thing—creaturely freedom. According to
Hartshome,
The price of a guaranteed absence of evil would be
the equally guaranteed absence of good .... Risk of
evil and opportunity for good, are two aspects of just
one thing—multiple freedom; and that one thing is also
the ground of all meaning and all existence.-*-^
It would be impossible to have a world in which there would not
be the possibility of evil because there would also be no possibility
for good. It is the free creaturely decision which determines both.
As we have noted repeatedly, this creaturely freedom implies risk—
the risk that something other than the good God intends, will be
attained. Yet, a world without the risk of evil would not be worth
having because there would be no opportunity for attaining the good.
For example, Pittinger points out that human pain or suffering is
just the other side of physical, mental or emotional pleasure. Both
139
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are made possible in the same way. Hartshorne puts the issue
like this
It is argued that a divinely-created world must
absolutely lack evil, be devoid of suffering and frus¬
tration, as well as of wicked intentions. But could
•good' mean anything in a world in which any contrasting
term would be totally excluded by omnipotent power? And
in such a world how could the creatures, who would have
no genuine option, even know what was meant by divine
freedom to choose this world out of the totality of
possibilities? And if they could not know it, then
the envisaged perfect would be one in which at least
the good of creaturely 'understanding of the creator
was quite impossible.
Process thought, therefore, says that God does permit evil, but
this can only be understood as meaning he gives creaturely freedom. He
could not do this and outlaw the possibility of evil. He does not
keep evil from happening, just as he does not keep good from happening.
Neither alternative is forced on the creature. God permits evil in the
same way he permits good. It is in the creating of the possibility of
good, that the possibility of evil arises. Cobb says, "Only where there
are values does the prospect of thwarting than arise. The possibility
of pain is the result of the capacity for intense feeling which comes
from heightened consciousness.144
God as the "fellow-sufferer who understands." tven though God
does not, indeed cannot, prevent evil, he is not neutral to its hap¬
pening. He wills goodness by luring an entity toward xt in the initial
142pjttlnqer, Process Theology and Evil, op. clt., p. 75.
143Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for Our Time, op. cit.,
pp. 81-2.
144Cobb, God and the World, op. clt., p. 96.
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aim. Through the initial aim, he attempts to persuade the entity to
attain the best possible for it. Cobb says that we can only think
of "omnipotence" in terms of this persuasion. If it has any meaning at
all, it can only mean that God "exercises the optimum persuasive power
in relation to whatever is. Such an optimum is a balance between
urging toward the good and maximizing the power—therefore the freedom—
of one whom God seeks to persuade.145 Secondly, once evil has occurred,
God moves to ameliorate it. This takes place in the third phase of the
creative process when God saves whatever good he can from the synthesis
that has taken place. He then issues the best possible aim, under the
given circumstances, for the entities which will follow. He cannot
instantly make everything turn out right. His creative act Is limited
by the actualities of the world. He can, however, issue a new aim
toward the best that is possible, considering the situation.
God cannot prevent an entity from choosing to become less than
he intends for it to become and, thereby, attaining little value that
he can include in his own life. Not only can creatures contribute to
the divine experience in which a high level of value has been obtained,
but they can also contribute experiences in which the value obtained
is virtually nill. God, by his very nature, must include all experi¬
encing in his own experience. He cannot choose to overlook the bad
and use only the good. His omnipotence means he knows everything
that happens and this knowledge has casual efficacy. He not only
145ibid, p. 90.
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knows the event itself, but he also knows the feelings that are part of
it. These are the data of his experiences. He suffers with the world,
just as he rejoices with the world, because the world is in him. Because
God includes everything in himself, not all his experiences are good ones.
Hartshorne comments:
The idea that God equally and solely experiences bliss
in all his relations, is once and for all a denial of the
religiously essential doctrine that God is displeased by
human sin and human misfortune. Without such displeasure,
the words 'just' and 'loving' seem mockeries.146
This passivity indicates that God is dependent on his creatures
for his weal and woe. In our human situation we include, albeit im¬
perfectly, the joy and suffering of a few ethers. God, because of his
omniscience, includes all joy and suffering in his experiences. Because
he includes the pain of the world, Whitehead calls him "the great com¬
panion—the fellow-sufferer who understands. 7 Hartshorne comments
on God's being "the fellow-sufferer" by saying:
The cross is the sublime and matchless symbol of this • • • •
The point is that in whatever sense incarnation is required to
make God passive, in that sense the incarnate God is the only
God that reason, all revelation apart, can give us any concep¬
tion of, as well as the only God of any use to religion.
If God experiences the evil in the world and the discord that re¬
sults from it, is he to any extent evil? God must not, from the process
perspective,be regarded as evil. Even though he permits evil, he lures
the creatures toward the good. Even though he is influenced by evil, he
turns that evil toward the good. In no way is he qualified by that which
l^Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, op. cit., p. 195.
14?Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit.. p. 532.
148Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God. op. cit., p. 198.
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makes evil a matter of ethics and morality—the willfulness to do less
than what is known to be best. God is not evil, because he wills only
what is best for the creatures. We can then say that God knows evil and
experiences evil, but he does not will or do evil. When evil occurs, it
is not because he has chosen it but because the creature has done something
other than what God would have had him do.
Even if God is not evil, since he creates the order of the cosmos
and since he does not prevent the creature from doing evil, is he not
o
still responsible for the evil in the world.' Yes, according to process
thought, he is responsible for evil but only in the same way that he is
responsible for the good. Griffin says that whether or not God should
be indicted for this is to be answered in terms of the question: Are the
positive values that are possible in our world valuable enough to be
worth the risk of the negative experiences which have occurred and the
possibility of even greater evils which may occur in the future? He
answers his question with a question:
Should God, for the sake of avoiding the possibility of
persons such as Hitler and horrors such as Auschwitz, have
precluded the possibility of Jesus, Guatama, Socrates, Con-
fusius, Hoses, Mendelssohn, El Greco, Hichaelangelo, Leonardo
da Vinci, Florence Nightingale, Abraham Lincoln, Mahatma
Gandhi, Chief Joseph, Chief Seattle, Alfred North Whitehead, John
F. Kennedy, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sojourner Truth, Helen Keller,
Louis Armstrong, Albert Einstein, Dag Hammerskjold, Reinhold
Niebuhr, Carol Channing, Margaret Mead, and millions of other
marvelous human beings well known and not.well known alike,
who have lived on the face of the earth?
For Griffin and other process thinkers, the risk is worth taking. God,
therefore, should not be indicted for permitting the possibility of evil.
Griffin, God, Power and Evil, op. cit., p. 309
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Summary. Drawing together what has been said, we can conclude
with Hartshorne that "we should accept our risk-full world as essentially
good and providential."150 I'he reason for this is because of the oppor¬
tunities that are provided for ever-increasingly intense levels of ex¬
perience which are not only intrinsically satisfying but can also con¬
tribute value to the experiences of others. Because God, in his con¬
sequent nature, is the ultimate recipient of all value, the ultimate
goodness of the creation lies in its capacity to enrich the divine life
and, thereby, enhance the cosmic advance. God lures all creatures to¬
ward fulfilling in their concrete experiences, his ideal aim of beauty.
Not everything which happens in creation is good. Evil is
very much a part of the cosmic scene. Evil arises because God does not
force the creatures to do what is best. They are free to accept or
reject the lead he offers. The possibility that the creature will
create discord instead of harmony is the risk God takes in creating.
The risk is always present because of the freedom for self-creation
which is part of each entity's becoming. There is a direct correlation
between the opportunity for good and the opportunity for evil in each
situation.
When evil does occur, God is not indifferent to its happening.
He is "neither a transcendental snob nor the transcendental tyrant,
ignoring creatures or enslaving them." Rather, he is the'hnsurpassably
interacting, loving, presiding genius and companion of all existence."151
As such, he experiences within himself both the pleasure and pain of the
150Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for Our Time, op. cit., p. 112.
151Ibid.. p. 137.
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wrld. Moreover, his experiences transform all that happens Into the
richest harmony possible, and, on the basis of this harmony, he issues
new initial aims to all subsequent entities which again lure them toward
the best concresence possible.
The responsibility that the creature has for the success of the
cosmic enterprise is apparent. Hartshorn® comments that it ia up to us
"to minimize by our own wisdom, energy, courage and good will the most
destructive risks."152 No matter what the creature does with his freedom,
his responsibility to God will not fail to exist. This should not lead
us to believe, however, that a failure on the creature1s part will
endanger God. Hartshorne says:
We are not to think that by sinning we can jeopardize his
being, or that by good acts we can make the universe safe for
him. But it is one thing to contribute to the safety of a
being, its freedom from the danger of annihilation, and an ther
to contribute to the color and richness of its existence.
Granted that God will continue to exist, with essential
characteristics of power, goodness, and wisdom, no matter
what we may do. It does not in the least follow that he will
also have the same concrete experiences no matter what we my
do. His essence may be independent of us but his accidents
may not be.153
Process thought takes the creatures' capacity for good and evil with
total seriousness. That the creatures' actions can affect C-od and the
cosmic advance, places great importance on what creatures do, but no
matter what the creatures do, God can work some good out of it. There¬
fore, his creation is basically good.
152Ibid., p. 113.
i51Hartahom«, Han's Vision of God, op. cit.. p. 107.
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Creation is the Free Act of God's Gracious Love
The final affirmation which is made concerning the doctrine of
creation in traditional thinking is that creation is the free act of
God's gracious love. Pointed out here is that in no way is it necessary
for God to be a creator. He does not have to create because he has no
need for anything outside of himself. There is nothing compelling him
to create; therefore, creation is a free act. Ha creates simply because
he wants to create. The only motive he can have for his creating is love.
Hepburn gives this summary.
The emphasis on creation as freely willed by God, is in no
way necessitated, allows the doctrine to express the central
affirmation about God, that his nature is love .... It is
possible, therefore, to see the creation of the world as a
wholly gratitultous exercise of love."^^
Traditional thinking gees even further than this by insisting that God
gains nothing by creating. There is no way in which the creation can
enrich him. His creating is totally altruistic, entirely for the bene¬
fit of others.
Herein is one of the major conflicts between process and tradi¬
tional thinking. Process thought contends that it is the very nature
of God to create. He is Creativity itself. Without creating, God would
not be God. We have seen how process thought understands God in terms
of becoming rather than being and how this becoming is dependent on the
synthesizing of the data furnished him by his cosmic environment. God
does need the creation,. He requires the existence of some creatures, and
he has the power to guarantee absolutely that there will be some creatures
•'■^Hepburn, "Creation," op. clt., p. 253.
155s@e above, p. 90.
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This power is his creativity which he pours out through his superjective
nature. Just as in traditional thought where the existence of God is
seen as necessary, so in process thought God has no option between exist¬
ing and not existing. The conflict is between the two understandings of
what it means to exist. Given the process understanding of existence as
becoming rather than being, it is totally consistent to insist on the
necessity of there being a creation.
Because process thought does contend that God needs the creation,
traditional thinkers contend there is an irreconcilable conflict be¬
tween process thought and an acceptable doctrine of creation. Pan-
nenberg, for example, says the "mutual interdependence" of God and the
156
world "is unifiable with no concept of creation." Hartshorne is
well aware of the clash and contends that traditional thought is wrong
157
at precisely this point. Nothing will be gained by trying to re¬
concile process and traditional thinking on this issue. It is how¬
ever, possible, indeed necessary, to see that process thought does
affirm both divine freedom and divine love in God's creative act.
God's creating as a free act. In understanding this point of
God's needing the creation and yet his creating being a free act, it is
important to reiterate what we have said before. God does need some
creatures, but he does not need any specific creature. Hartshorne says
there is an important distinction to be made "between the necessity of
^*\folfhart Pannenberg, "A Liberal Logos Christology," in
John Cobb's Theology in Process, eds. David R. Griffin and Thomas
J. J. Altizer (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1977) p. 147.
157
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op. clt., p. 144.
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God's existence as a loving creator and the contingency of his reality as
creator and lover of just the creatures which exist."*58 His dependence
on the creation, then, is not a dependence on there being the particular
creation which do ess in fact exist but rather on there being some creation.
It is necessary that there be a creation. What that creation will be is
totally contingent. God is not, therefore, dependent on the existence of
any one particular creature or even the totality of all existing creatures.
All that he requires is that there be a creation in some form or another.
Again citing Hartshorne: "That God exists and loves is true about all
actual and possible states of affairs. That God loves us is indeed one
such state. "*59
That God is not dependent on any particular entity indicates that
he has more freedom in his creating than the critics of process thought
would admit. He must create, but he does not have to create any par¬
ticular entity. Therefore, it is his free decision just what entities
will in fact be created. Understood this way, process thought, even
though affirming the necessity of God's creative act, can affirm that
his creating is free. He is not forced to initiate the self-creative
process of any entity. It is, as we have seen, his decision on the
basis of his own subjective aim and that an entity will have its
moment of becoming.
Hartshorne does not contend, however, that God's free creative
act is totally altruistic. The creative act reflects the perfect
*58Hartshorne, "Is God's Existence a State of Affairs?"
op. cit., p. 29.
159Ibld.
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coincidence of self-love and love of others. He says;
In God there is indeed a perfect agreement of altruism and
egoism. For whatever good God may do to any being anywhere he
himself, through his omniscient sympathy, will enjoy. The
future welfare of all beings will be entirely included in the
future satisfactions of God.-*-®®
Not only does Hartshorne say that the process concept of God's
purpose in creating is not completely altruistic, but also the tra¬
ditional notion, when carefully thought through, fails to reflect a
total lack of self-interest. He finds two difficulties with the
traditional view. First of all, it is not self-evident that God's
creating is totally altruistic because there is divine purpose served
by his creating.161 Altruism, he says, "is an identifiable experience
as a process of participation in the good of others, so that some
sort of value accrues to the self through the very fact that value
accrues to another self."162 This does not suggest that selfishness
is the only motivation there is in creating, but it does indicate
that there is a benefit derived from having helped, or at least
having tried to help, another. Therefore, to talk of divine creating
as being altruistic and devoid of any benefit to God is misleading
for it implies that he has no purpose in his creating.
Hartshome's second objection is that if God is purely
altruistic in his creating, then the creature, according to tra¬
ditional metaphysics, must be purely ego-centric in his. The reason
for this is because traditional thinking does not allow that God might
^^Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God., op. cit., p. 161. See
also Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. cit., p. 309.
161see above, p. 75.
162Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, op. cit., p. 118.
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be benefited by what the creatures do. Hartshome asks, "Is it not
the noblest aspect of religious aspiration, the wish to have a cause to
serve, some value to enrich by our contributions, which is more satis¬
fying as an object of service than mere man?"16-* Such an object should
be God, for, he points out, we often fail in our attempts to benefit
others. If God is not ultimately benefited by our efforts, then no one
is, and much of what we do is futile and without purpose.
As we just mentioned, traditional thought does insist that there
is a purpose in creation. Earlier, we specifically noted Calvin's view
that the purpose of creation was to be a "theatrum gloriae Dei" and
Luther's idea that the purpose of creation was for God to have a sphere
where he could express his love toward something "over against" himself.16*
We further noted that these concepts suggested something to which their
advocates would not want to suscribe—that the creation is in some
way necessary. Why speak of glorifying God if he does not actually
receive the glory? Why talk of loving God if he is not touched by our
expressions of love? Concerning Calvin's perspective, Hartshorne con¬
tends that even though the aim of creation is God's glorification, God
is not really benefited by our glorifying him. The reason for glori¬
fying God is that it is important that the creature glorify the
Creator. "God should be praised and made to seen as great as he
would in any case be, even without glorification."16^ Therefore, it
is only important to the creature and not to God that God be glorified.
l63Ibld.
164See above, p. 77.
166Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, op. cit., p. 130.
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Hartshorns feels that this "humanly self-regarding view" is blasphemous,
for it makes man ultimate. He is the ultimate beneficiary of his own
praise to God.166 In place of this insult, we should understand that
the purpose of the creation is "to serve and glorify God, that is,
literally to contribute some value to the divine life which it would
not otherwise have,"167 This is precisely the process perspective.
God is more adequately glorified when he can receive the benefits of
his glorification than when these benefits are arbitrarily denied him.
The "theatrum gloriae Dei" is the arena where the creatures "enjoy rich
harmonies of living and pour their richness into the one ultimate
receptical, the life of God."168
It is significant that Brunner sees the purpose of creation as
being the Kingdom of God,169 for as we saw earlier, process thought
calls the consequent nature of God the Kingdom of Heaven.1TO Bib¬
lically speaking, the terms "Kingdom of God" and "Kingdom of Heaven"
are synonymous,171 so w® have at least a verbal agreement between
process thought and one traditional thinker. The level is deeper than
this, however, for both see the kingdom as being the place where the
will of God is done. Prom the process perspective, we have seen
how each entity, through the initial aim, is given the opportunity of
making the maximum contribution possible to the Kingdom of Heaven.
166ibid.. p. 131. 167Ibid., p. 133.
168Ibid.. p. 127. 169See above, p. 77,
170See above, p. 259.
1710. E. Evans, "Kingdom of God, of Heaven," The Interpreter's
Dictionary of the Bible, (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1962), p. 17.
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God then uses whatever value has been attained in his own synthesis of
the cosmos. The more value an entity has attained, the greater is the
possibility of the advance of the Kingdom. In process thinking the
purpose of creation is truly to make a contribution to the Kingdom
even though the precise nature of that contribution is not determined
for the creature. The coincidence of an authentic egoism and altruism
mentioned a moment ago, pertains to the creature as well as to God.
The creature's greatest personal satisfaction would also provide the
greatest benefit for God's Kingdom. Hartshome concludes that "God
needs only one thing from the creatures: the intrinsic beauty of
their lives, that is, their own true happiness through his perfect
appreciation of them. This appreciation i£ love.17^
God's creating is an act of love. We are now ready to see how
process thought conceives God's creative act as a gift of love. Much
of what we say here will summarize what we have been saying elsewhere.
Hartshome looks upon his entire philosophical enterprise as
a justification of the early Christian insight, Deus est caritas, words
which he believes are "contradicted as truly as they are embodied in
the best of the older theologies." The reason for this contradiction
is the older theologies' denial of the "essentially social character
of the supreme or cosmic being." Without an understanding of God as
being "social" and "related," it would be impossible to think of hira
173
as being loving, for love implies a relationship. Hartshorne offers
this definition: "To love is to rejoice in the joys and sorrow with
17^Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, op» clt., p. 163.
17^Ibid., pp. xiv, ix.
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the sorrows of others. Thus It is to be Influenced by those who are
loved."174 From the process point of view, being "all loving" means
that God participates in each and every quality of experience and that
he includes all experiences in his own. This total empathy with the
lives of all others reflects the nature of divine love.
The only genuinely loving relationship which traditional
thinking generally permits God to have is the love which exists be¬
tween the members of the Trinity. The Trinity is supposed to give
God an object to love which is worthy of being loved and not in con¬
flict with his supposed self-sufficiency. According to Hartshorne,
whatever else this love within the Trinity may do, it does not deal
with the issue of God's love for the creature. It is irrelevant to
the creature whether or not the Father loves the Son and the Son loves
the Father. What the creature is interested in is whether or not God
loves him and whether or not he can really love God.175
Process thought affirms that God does love the creatures and
that the creatures can love God. We have already looked at some ways
in which love for the creatures is shewn through God's creative act,
and we need only review then briefly here.
The giving of the initial aim is an act of love. To love is to
desire the good of others, and in the initial aim this desire is fully
expressed.176 We noted earlier how Whitehead saw the final phase of the
174Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for Our Time, op. cit., p. 75.
175Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, op, cit., p. 164
176Ibid., p. 14.
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creative process as what happens when the "perfected actuality" of pre¬
vious occasions passes back into the world through the initial aim.
Whitehead calls this "the love of God for the world"*^' The initial
aim expresses God's desire for the creatures good because it presents
the creature with the best concresence it could attain, the most intense,
harmonious experience possible.
It would be difficult to think of God as being all loving if he
created each entity with an excellent initial purpose and did not also
make it possible for the entity to achieve that purpose. In process
thought, divine love insures that the possibility of attaining what God
178
intends outweighs the possibility of its non-attainment. We saw how
it was part of God's providential care for each entity, to place it in
an environment that would be supportive of it. This providential care
does not mean that risk is eliminated but rather that the opportunities
for good dominate the risks of evil.
A third dimension of the love expressed in God's creative act
is that it is persuasion and not coersion.^'^ God guarantees creaturely
freedom. This is not absolute freedom for such would not be supportive
of the creature. The limitations he places on the creatures self-
creation are those that are necessary to insure the possibility of a
180
good synthesis. They are the "optimal limits for free action." God
however, does not force the entity to have a good synthesis. The
77wMtehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 532.
■^®See above, p. 246. ^"^See above, p. 174.
180
Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, op. cit., p. 142.
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entity may choose less than God's intended best. Divine love does not
deny this freedom.
CONCLUSIONS
We began this chapter by noting Cobb's suggestion that White-
headian thinking might have more points of contact with traditional
thought than either its advocates or its critics realize. In this
chapter this observation has been verified. While there are profound
differences between process and traditional thought—differences as
basic as whether being or becoming is primary, and whether God is
monopolar or dipolar—process thought is able, in its own way, to
make the same affirmations about creation as is traditional theology.
The content of these affirmations, however, if often transformed.
That the affirmations mean different things to process theologians than
to traditional theologians, does not mean that process thought does not
articulate an adequate doctrine of creation, for, as we discovered in
the first chapter, traditional theology does not present a unified con¬
ceptualization of what the affirmations mean. There is a great variety,
and process thought should at least be considered as a legitimate
variation.
Our interpretation and expansion of process thought has led
us to formulate a strong doctrine of God the Creator. The process
doctrine of God the Creator is based on the understanding that being
a creator is the basic description of God's nature and of his relation¬
ship to the cosmos. "To be is to create" expresses the process under¬
standing of reality. God, who is the "Supreme Being" in traditional
theologies, is the "Supreme Creator" in process thought. All creation
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is seen as being part of his divine self-creation wherein he synthesizes
all that is created in the cosmos, and on the basis of this, creates new
possibilities for the cosmos. God is "Creativity Itself" and as such,
creates the creativity of others. This is accomplished through his
superjective nature which we have identified both with Whitehead's concept
of creativity and the traditional Christian concept of the Logos, the
Word of God.
Creation in process thought is creatio per verbum. As we have
seen, process thought provides an excellent articulation of this ancient
doctrine. To do this, however, it is necessary to modify Whitehead's
concept of creativity to see creativity as part of God rather than an
ultimate metaphysical principle holding God and everything else in its grasp.
The agreement between process and traditional thought on creatio
per verbum does not extend to the other great expression of the doctrine
of creation—creatlo ex nlhilo. The incompatibility between this idea
and process thought is irreconcilable. The process model is one of
entities creating themselves out of the data they inherit from their
predecessors. Process thought holds firmly to the notion that nothing
comes from nothing, and each stage of creation is seen as being built
out of the preceeding stage. The idea of a first stage of creation can
only refer to the emergence of a particular cosmic epoch. The notion of
creation out of chaos is much closer to the process view.
When process thought affirms that God is the source of all ex¬
istence and creation is totally dependent on him,it is noting the im¬
portance of the Initial aim which God provides for each entity. This
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initial aim is the "gift of becoming" for it begins the entity's self-
creative process. Without the initiation the entity would not have its
concresence. The initial aim constitutes the entity's first moment of
subjectivity as well as determining what data it will inherit for its
self-creation. Each instance of creation is dependent totally on God.
Providence is seen as God's maximizing the opportunities each entity has
for an intense and harmonious concresence. It further testifies to God's
limiting the concresences which do take place so there is always the
greatest possibility of value being attained for the entity personally
and value being contributed to the cosmos in general.
Because of God's providence, the creature finds himself in a
supportive environment, and the cosmos finds itself ordered in such a
way that the threat of chaos is averted. Divine providence in no way
negates the creatures' freedom but rather guarantees it by insuring
that each entity will have the best chance possible for achieving a high
level of satisfaction in its concresence.
That the creation is distinct from God and, even though corrupted
by sin, is fundamentally good, must be viewed panentheistically. Process
thought sees all that happens in the cosmos as being included in God.
The cosmos is not identical with him, however, for in his self-creation
he transforms all that has been created. God is the cosmos plus his own
synthesis of it. He can, therefore, both include the cosmos and trans¬
cend it.
The problem of evil is regarded as a "pseudo-problem" for a
philosophical standpoint, because the cause of evil is also the source
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of good. This is the freedom for self-creation that has been given
each entity, God the Creator is not God the dictator. Although he
creates an entity with purpose, the entity does not have to follow God's
lead and can do whatever it wants to do with its concresence. There is
always the implicit risk that the entity will become less than intended
and something which is, to some extent, destructive of the society in
which it is found. Evil must not be seen only in terms of creating
discord but more in terms of trivial attainment. Ihis is the failure
of an entity to achieve as rich and full an experience as God purposes.
Of the two types of evil, this is, for process thought, the worse be¬
cause it deprives the cosmos of some value which is needed for the
cosmic advance. The sheer impossibility of a world without the possibility
of evil is underlined by process thinkers. The possibility of evil is
simply the other side of the opportunity for good. If one is diminished,
so i# the other. This means that creation is risky, and evil, in one form
or another, is bound to occur—not because God wills it but because he
allows the creature freedom to do what it wants. God is not, however,
indifferent to the occurence of evil. First, he lures the creature
toward a concresence that is the best possible, and secondly, he amelio¬
rates, as much as possible, whatever is destructive in an entity's con¬
cresence in his own synthesis of the data he receives. On the basis of
this harmony he issues a new initial aim that permits the entity to work
with God in eliminating the effects of whatever evil has occurred.
Affirming that the creation is a free act of God's gracious love,
would at first seem difficult for process thinkers because they hold to
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the necessity of there being a creation. God must have data for his own
self-creation, and this demands some sort of creation. It does not,
however, demand any particular creation. Here is where God's freedom
lies. It is his decision just what entities he will create and what sort
of order he will impose on the cosmic structure. He is not forced to
initiate any one particular concresence. As concerns his love for creation,
process thought finds a perfect coincidence of self-love and love of others
in God's creating. Whatever he creates will eventually affect him; there¬
fore, he creates with the purpose of having the best possible data to use
in his own self-creation. What is best for him is also best for the
creature because it will provide the entity with the possibility of at¬
taining a high level of value. The more value a creature achieves, the
more value it can contribute to God.
The process concept of creation puts forward the notion of
God's sharing his creativity with his creatures and guaranteeing them
the opportunity to exercise their creativity. There is expressed what
could be called a partnership in the enterprise of creation. In this
partnership there is no doubt that God is the "senior partner." He
creates all entities and includes all of them in his self-creation.
Each creature creates only a few other entities and is included only in
a few others in its self-creation. Still, God and his creatures are co-
creators of themselves and of each other. There is a reciprocal re¬
lationship. This gives genuine meaning to creaturely existence for the
creature can make a contribution to the Kingdom of God by what it does
each moment of its existence. It can glorify God through the fulfilling
of God's intention expressed in the initial aim. When this happens, God's
will is done "on earth as it is in heaven."
Chapter 4
ANALOGY IN TRADITIONAL THEOLOGY
AND PROCESS THOUGHT
Due to the nature of the subject and and those who discuss
it, talking about God is inherently difficult and in some philosophical
circles has fallen into disrepute. Religious language is regarded by
some as nonsense, having no intelligible meaning and should, therefore,
be abandoned or ignored by philosophers. While many have not accepted
this conclusion and continue to talk about God, linguistic analysis
has forced them to scrutinize carefully what they are saying and to
provide a patient and thorough accounting of the language they use.
In this dissertation, we have been talking about God, particu¬
larly about him as creator and, from the process perspective, creature.
The assurrption has been that our talk makes sense and that what we are
saying is meaningful. This Is too great an assumption and needs the
careful scrutiny suggested above. It is important that we understand
the way we are using language, especially when a conation characteristic
is predicated of both God and other actualities. When this is done,
it is generally noted that the term is being used analogically. As
the subject of analogy is a topic for dissertation in its own right,
what we say here will be somewhat cursory in nature. It will, however,
point up the important issues and indicate the substance of the process
contribution to the discussion.
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ANALOGY IN TRADITIONAL THEOLOGY
For traditional theology, the via analogia is a way out of a
dilemma. On the one hand, God is utterly transcendent and, therefore,
beyond human understanding and conceptualization. His being and nature
are beyond a person's powers of comprehension. God is not another
creature, another being among beings. Because of this, he should not
be discussed in language and concepts drawn from ordinary experience.
On the other hand, all we have as creatures, beings among beings, is
our every day, mundane language in which to conceive—or receive—
and express our understanding of God. There is .for theology the
unavoidable need to talk about God and the unavoidable need to do
it in human language. If human language is not used, man cannot talk
at all; but because God is not man, man's language is by its nature
inappropriate and must, therefore, be radically qualified when used
in reference to God. The only alternative to this is the via negative
which, while useful in denying strictly creaturely predicates of God,
would lead eventually to total agnosticism. One could affirm nothing
at all about God.1
Analogy, quite understandably, plays a far more significant
role In the thinking of those who accept natural theology than in
those who rely on revelation. For natural theology it is not only
a question of linguistics, how the transcendent God can be discussed
E. L. Mascall, Existance and Analogy, (London: Darlton,
Logman and Todd, 1949), p. y2; Gilkey, Maker of Heaver: and Earth,
op. cit., p. 99; and A.M. Farrer, Finite and Infinite, (London:
Dacre Press, 1943), p. 2.
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in mundane, human language, but also the metaphysical question of how
God's existence can be perceived through the existence of finite things
and how he is related to them. Farrer calls this the "cosmological
2
idea," "the scheme of God and the creature in relation." Even though
more strongly advocated by natural theologians, the most ardent and
articulate revelationist of this century, Karl Barth, has fully re¬
cognized the dilemma of speaking about God in human language and
"pressed by the true revelation of God" has been "pushed" to the
concept of analogy. "Between our views, concepts and words, and God
as their object," he says, "there exists, on the basis of revelation of
God, the relationship of analogy .... On the basis of this simi-
3
rarity, there is a true human knowledge of God.""
Univocity, Fqulvocity and Analony
The via analoqla is a via media between univocity and equivocity.
Univocity and equivocity are easier to define than analogy. Univocity
is predication of one terra in an identical way of two different subjects.
Equivocity would be to use tire term with completely different meanings.
Mascall illustrates the difference with these examples: When we call
a Great Dane and a Pomeranian 'dogs' we mean exactly the same things
about each of then. Dog is predicated univocally. The characteristics
that distinguish the two dogs from each other are additions to their
common caninity. Certain other words have vastly different meanings
2
Farrar, op. cit.. p. IS, cited by Mascall, op. cit., p. 93.
3Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II/2, (Edinburgh: f. & T. Clark,
1957), pp. 22S, 227.
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depending on their referent. The word 'mug' can describe a certain
4
type of cup and a victim of fraud. Mug is predicated ecpiivocally.
Multiplying examples of these two forms of predication will
not enhance our present discussion greatly, Their importance is in
being the alternatives which the doctrine of analogy surplants. We
can, perhaps, encapsulate them by saying that in unlvocity the term
transcends whatever referent it has. Neither Great Dane nor
Pomeranian is completely definitive of dog. In equivocity the term
is completely subordinate to its referents. A type of drinking cup
and a victim of fraud each defines a different thing as being a mug.
In univocity, the term is unchanged in meaning regardless of the
referent. In equivocity, its meaning changes totally.
Traditional theology has never accepted either of these
alternatives. We do not speak of God and man univocally or equivocally.
To accept the first vould be to denigrate God to the status of a
creature through generic predication. To accept the latter would
5
in fact deny any relationship at all between God and the world.
Barth's terms for univocity and equivocity are parity and disparity
respectively. By the use of analogy, he says,
Both the thesis of parity and the equally false thesis
of disparity were attacked and destroyed, but the elements of
truth in both were revealed. It could therefore be claimed
as the correct definition of the matter. In distinction
to both likeness and unlikeness 'analogy1 means similarity,
i.e., partial correspondence and agreement (and, therefore,
^Mascall, op. cit., p. 97.
5
See Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, op. cit., I.37j and
Sumrna Theological op. cit., 1.13.5c.
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one which limits both parity and disparity between two or more
different entities.)®
What Sarth sees as constituting this correspondence will soon be
discussed as well as that all important qualification 'partial**
but first we turn to Thomas Aquinas who formally introduced the
concept of analogy to theology.
Thomas' Concepts of Analogy
The basic classification made by St. Thomas* at least in the
two 'Suraraae' is that of analogy duorum ad terfclum and analogy unius
ad alternuro*
Names said of God and creatures are predicated neither
univocally nor equivocally but rather analogically* that is
according to an order or reference to something one. This
can take place in two ways. In one way* according as many
things have reference to something one • . • • In another
way, the analogy can obtain as the order or reference of
two things is not to something else but to one of them.7
Quorum ad fcertium. The analogy of two to a third (duorum
ad tertium) is an analogy between two beings because of the relation¬
ship each bears to a third thing. Aquinas' example, which remains
the standard illustration, is 'health.' "With reference to one health
we say that an animal is healthy as the subject of health, medicine
is healthy as its cause, food as its preserver, and urine as its
8
sign." When we say that food and medicine arc healthy, we realise
that the term "healthy" cannot apply properly to either of than hut
6Barth, Church Dogmatics. 11/1, op. cit.. p. 225.
7
Aquinas, Suroma contra Gentiles, op. cih. 1.34; also
Surama Thoolothca , op. cit.. 1.13.5c.
8
Ibid.I also see Haacall, Existence and Analogy, op, ext..
p. 101.
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only by reference to the health itself, the thing caused by the
medicine and sustained by the food. Healthy can only be 'formally'
predicated of the animal which actually possesses health. The animal
is the prime analogate since the term healthy applies primarily to
him. The other analogate are secondary and the term healthy can
be applied to them only with reference to the prime analogate. The
analogy between healthy medicine and healthy food is two to a third.
As Aquinas points out, the analogy of two to a third can
have no application when we attribute to both God and the creature
9
the same predicate. There is nothing prior to God which the
predicate could more formally or rore properly apply. Here, as in
univocity, God's superiority and transcendence would be seriously
compromised because he would be subjected to generic predication and,
therefore, held on the same level as the other analogates. We must,
due to the inadequacy of analogy duorum ad tertium, look to the
second type of analogy, analogy unlus ad alteram, as the way of
attributing a common perfection to God and the creature.
Unius ad alternum. The analogy of one to another (unius
ad alternura) is not founded on the relationship each analogue bears
to a third term but upon the relationship one analogue bears to the
other. Thomas' example in the passage we've been citing is 'being.'
"Being is said of substance and accident according as an accident
has reference to a substance and not according as substance and
accident are referred to a third thing.The method of such
predication is that of priority and posteriority.
10Ibid.
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Now nothing is predicated of God and creatures as
though they were of the same order but according to
priority and posteriority. For all things are predicated
of God essentially ... but in other beings predi¬
cations are made by participation, as Socrates is said
to be a mam, not because he is humanity itself but be¬
cause he possesses humanity.11
The problem in analogy two to a third, the denigration of
God's transcendence, is avoided in analogy of one to the other be¬
cause the predicate, according to priority and posteriority, be¬
longs to God essentially and to the creature only through his
participation in the predicate. This is always true of the God-
creature relationship; it is not true of the relationship between
creatures when they participate in a perfection also predicated of
God. The analogy between then is always two to a third. The funda¬
mental analogical predication between God and the creature is
12
always analogy unlus ad alternum.
Analogies of attribution and proportionality. The analogy
unius ad alternum subdivides into two types: the analogy of at¬
tribution, and the analogy of proportionality. Protestants, generally
speaking, have accepted one form of attribution (extrinsic denomin-
13
atlon) as the fundamental analogy between God and the creature.
11Ibld.. p. 22.
12
It should be mentioned that in his earlier writing, Thomas
speaks of predication by priority and posteriority only in reference
to the analogy of two to a third and, therefore, excludes it from the
predication of divine attributes. (I Sentences, 19) As indicated
above, this is not his view in later writings.
13
Barth appears to me to be mistaken in attributing to
Quenstedt considerable accuracy in summarizing the thought of the
Reformers. In the Reformers, as we shall see, attribution is ex¬
trinsic not as in Quenstedt where it is intrinsic. In this respect,
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Roman Catholics have, with considerable unanimity, accepted propor¬
tionality. Recently, proposals have been made from both sides that the
two should be used in conjunction with each other. We will look at
this in a moment, but first each analogy must be approached on its own.
The analogy of attribution. The analogy of attribution (also
called the analogy of proportion) describes the relationship between
entities which, even though different, are in some respect similar in
that they are related, even if by different relations, to one identical
thing. To return to the example of 'health,' health can be predicated
by attribution. When the term is predicated analogically of the
animal having health, the medicine which gives or restores health
to the animal, and the complexion or urine of an animal which is the
sign of its health, it is the health of the animal that is being
referred to in each case. Health is realized formally and properly
only in the animal itself and is attributed or proportioned to the
other analogates. As opposed to the analogy of two to a third in
which all analogates are related to another term, in attribution the
14
prime analogate actually possesses the attribute.
John Mclntyre lists four properties of this type of analogy.
The most important property is that the attribute is realized formally
only in the prime analogate and referred to the others by extrinsic
denomination from the former. Secondly, the 'analogous formality' is
Quenstedt does not seem to summarize Reformed thought, either before
or after him. Sarth, Church Dogmatics II/2, op. cit., pp. 237-241.
14
See Mclntyre, "Analogy," Scottish Journal of Theology. XII,
(1959), p. 6ff, for a concise discussion of the forms of analogy.
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numerically one, not logically or conceptually. Thirdly, the defi¬
nition of the secondary analogate must include reference to the prime
analogate from which it derives the name. Finally, the common predicate
has a different meaning in relation to the different analogates but
the common reference prevents these meanings from being completely
disparate.15
In outlining these four properties, Mclntyre is summarizing
the views of J. F. Anderson who follows Cajetan's interpretation of
St. Thomas.15 Cajetan's is unquestionably the majority view within
the Thomist tradition and is often presented as the only perspective.
There is, however, another interpretation of Thomas, first put for¬
ward by Suarez, which presents a distinctly different view of the
analogy of attribution. Let us look briefly at both of these.
Cardinal Cajetan uses as the foundation for his inter¬
pretation of Thomas' teaching on analogy, an early text found in the
First Book of the Sentences, where Thomas speaks of analogy according
to intention but not according to being, analogy according to being
but not according to intention, and analogy according to intention
17
and according to being. Cajetan fits all other divisions and
distinctions of analogy found in Thomas, into this schema. Analogy
according to being and not according to intention is discussed first,
and cajetan calls it the analogy of inequality. Because this involves
15Ibid.. p. 9.
16
See Anderson, The Bond of Being; An Essay on Analogy and
Existence, (St. Louis: B. Herder Books, 1954.)
17
Aquinas, I Sentences, 19.5.2.1., cited by G. P. Klubertanz,
St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, pp. 7-10.
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generic predication, Cajetan disqualifies it as being a proper mode of
analogy. Analogy according to intention but not according to being
is what Cajetan calls the analogy of attribution. By this identification
attribution cannot be other than extrinsic denomination as regards the
secondary analogates. Here Thomas uses the example of health for
his illustration. Analogy according to intention and according to
being, Cajetan calls the analogy of proportionality which he identifies
18
with the analogy discussed in De Veritate. This latter is for
Cajetan the only truly proper type of analogy since it is the only
one in which each of the analogates intrinsically possess the analogous
perfection which is proportionately similar in all the analogates.
The analogy of proportionality will be discussed in detail shortly.
Francis Suarez contends that Thomas teaches not only an analogy
19
of extrinsic attribution but also an analogy of intrinsic attribution.
As opposed to the prime analogate being the only analogate possessing
the predicate formally, in intrinsic attribution all analogates
possess the predicate formally. The prime analogate posse®it
absolutely, and the secondary analogates possess it relatively through
their relationship to the prime analogate. Suarez feels this is the
type of attribution used by Aquinas in his predicate of being to
both substance and accident. Substance is being in a primary and
absolute sense, and accident is being in a secondary and relative
18
Aquinas, De Veritate, 2.11., cited by Klubertanz, loc. cit.
19
Francis Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, 27, discussed
by Battista Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic
Theology, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), p. 40f.
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sense not just because of external domination by the being of substance
but because it possesses its own proper being. Establishing this,
Suarez then claims that the analogy between God and creatures is
intrinsic attribution. Proportionality does not deserve the promi¬
nence it has in Cajetan's system. Before this claim can be evaluated,
we must look at proportionality as traditionally defined.
Even though they reject intrinsic attribution, the Caje-
tanists do accept an analogy of intrinsic denomination, the analogy
of proper proportionality. In proportionality there is a direct
relationship of the modes in which a perfection is realized in
various beings to the beings in which it is realized. There is not
necessarily any reference to a prime analogate. An Aristotelian
example which Thomas uses is the term 'good.' Good is predicated
of different things proportionately by virtue of each fulfilling his
own individual goodness, his 'telos,' not because they are related to a
prime analogate in which goodness is formally realized. Each
analogate possess goodness formally but a goodness that is appropriate
to its existence. There is no suggestion of unlvocity, for goodness
20
means different things when predicated of different subjects.
Maseal1 illustrates the analogy of proportionality with the term
21
•life.»
Cabbages, elephants, men and God can be said to possess life
formally in the sense that each is quite literally, unsymbolically
20
Mclntyre, "Analogy," op. cit., p. 9f.
21
Mascell, Existence and Analogy, op. cit., p. 103f.
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alive, but each is alive in a way that is appropriate to itself. A
cabbage's life is proper to being a cabbage, an elephant's life to
being an elephant, a man's life to being a man, and God's life to
being God. Analogies of proportionality can be expressed by the
formula A/B :: C/D. Substituting the examples cited above we find:
life of cabbage .. life of elephant ,. life of man _ _ life of (Sod
essence of cabbage 'essence of elephant "essence of man 'essence of God
We would be in error to interpret this formula mathematically rather
than philosophically. In this case the equals sign does not imply
equality. The life of the cabbage is not determined by the essence
of the cabbage in the same way that God's life is determined by his
essence. Rather, a cabbage's life is determined in a way that is
proper to being a cabbage, and God's life is determined in a way that is
proper to God. As Mclntyre points out, in proportionality, "the
similarity lies not in the attributes of the terms but in the rela-
22
tionships that hold between than."
As noted in our brief glance at Suarez and Cajetan, the
debate rages among the Thomists as to whether intrinsic attribution
or proportionality is the correct type of analogy to describe the
relationship between Creator and creature. The Thomists' belief that
any such relationship does in fact exist comes from their acceptance
that between God and man there exists an analoqia entis. Although a
precise definition of this analoqia entis depends on how one regards
proportionality and attribution, some mutually acceptable baclcground
information can be supplied.
^^Mclntyre, "Analogy," op. clt., p. 10.
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The 'analoqia entis.' For Thomist thought, the analoqia
entis is the fundamental analogy. It is the foundation for all thought
concerning the relationship between God and man. Since God and man are
related by being beings, other relationships can and do exist between
then.
Translating the phrase, analoqia entis, creates a problem.
The usual rendering as 'similarity of being* has for some people implied
a continuity of being—that God's being is identical with ours. As
we shall see, Thomas goes to great lengths to exclude this possibility.
It is, after all, an analogy, and one of the purposes of analogy is to
avoid univocal predication. If the analoqia entis implies ontological
23
continuity, it is not an analogy. Assuming that it is an analogy,
certain essential features of it must be noted.
The analoqia entis is an analogy of intrinsic denomina¬
tion. Both God and the creature formally possess being; it is proper
to both their natures. Aquinas makes this point repeatedly: Creatures
resemble God by some analogy because the very act of existing is
24
common to both of them. This point is usually expressed in terms
of God being 'existence itself' and the creature 'participating in
25
being.' God is_ being; the creature has being.
The 'participation' of the creature in God is found
throughout Thomas' writings and the concept requires some clarification.
23
See Mclntyre, "Analogy," op. clt., p. 11.
24
Aquinas, Summa Theologies, op. cit. 1.4.3c; 1.14.9.2.
25
Thomas Aquinas, "Since God is existence itself, each thing
participates in a likeness of God inasmuch as it exists." Summa Theoloqi^g.,
op. clt., 1.14.9.2.; also Summa contra Gentiles, op. cit., 11.53.
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Thomas points out that two things may participate in a common charac¬
teristic or one may simply participate in a characteristic of another
insofar as it is possible for it to do so. This is the agreement
which exists between the creature and God. "Being is predicated es¬
sentially only of God, since the divine esse is subsistent and
absolute. Being is predicated of all creatures by participations no
creature is its own existence, but rather is a being which has ex-
25
istence." There is no doubt that participation does not mean full
or adequate possession. Participation is always coupled with the
idea that the creature has a less perfect or deficient possession of
being. Since God has the perfection essentially and the creature
only by participation, there is no univocal predication.
Since God is being and the creature only has being, being
is predicated per prius et posterlus. "Nothing is predicated of God
and other things according to the same order but rather according to
27
priority and posteriority." Predication according to priority
and posteriority does not occur in univocal predication where the
term can apply equally to any species within the genus. Even though
being may be predicated of both God and the creature, it is more
properly predicated of God. This method of predication is what
distinguishes analogies of two to a third from analogies of one to
the other. By predicating being of God priorly, we establish that
Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Quodlibetales II, 1.10.22.1.
cited by Klubertanz, op. cit., p. 60.
27
Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, op, cit., X.32.
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he Is the prime analogate and all references to being are most properly
references to him and his being.
VJhat we have seen about the analogia entis so far is that it
is an analogy of intrinsic denomination since both God and the creature
actually have being, but this does not mean that they have the same
being. God is being and, therefore,possesses it antecedently to the
creature. The creature participates in being and, therefore, has it
in a deficient or inferior way. These distinctions become clearer when
we look at the most important aspect of the analoqla entis—the fact
that it is established by a creative act of God.
The creation of the analoqia entis. The analogia entis refers
primarily to creation. God, who is being itself, has created creatures
who have being. The act of creation is the communication of being from
God to his creatures. Thomas discusses the creation of being in terms
of causality.
To Thomas, it seemed almost self-evident that omne agens
20
aqit simile sibi. all causes produce effects similar to themselves.
This is the universal principle of all causality. Applied to God
it means that God creates a world that is somehow and in some way
similar to him. This is the basis of the analoqia entis. The most
frequent way in which Thomas expresses the similarity between God
and his creatures is by the causal relationship. Creatures have
some resemblance to God because they are proportioned to him as effects
to their cause. A cause cannot produce effects of any sort but only
Aquinas, De Potentia. op. cit.« 2.2., 7.5., Summa contra
Gentiles, op. cit., 11.21.8., 22.5., 40.2., 43.8., and Summa Theologies>
* 1.5.3.
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effects according to its nature. This means the activity of a cause is
restricted to a fixed, limited sphere of effects and can cause only those
effects and no others.
Causality is not a simple situation. Effects do resemble
their causes, but these resemblances can be of various kinds de¬
pending on the type of similarity Which exists between the effect
and its cause. Usually, Thomas speaks of two basic types: univocal
and equivocal. Both are present in this statement:
The form of the effect is in the natural agent inas¬
much as the agent produces an effect of like nature, since
every agent produces its like. Now this happens in two
ways. When the effect bears a perfect likeness to the
agent, as proportionate to the agent's power, then the
form of the effect is in the agent to the same degree,
thus it is in univocal agents, for instance fire generates
fire. When, however, the effect is not perfectly likened
to the agent, as being improportionate to the agent's
power, then the form of the effect is not in the same
degree in the agent but in a higher degree: this is the
case in equivocal agents, for instance the sun generates
fire.2^
Theologically speaking, God is the supreme cause, and it is, therefore,
proper that he will bring forth effects like himself, but in so doing
God is always an equivocal—not a univocal—cause as witnessed by the
30
fact that all creatures fall short of his perfections.
Occasionally, Thomas speaks of three basic types of causality.
In these passages God is neither univocal nor equivocal cause, but
analogical.
29
Aquinas, De Potentia. op. clt.. 7.1.8. Also, Gumma Theologies,
op. cit., 1.105.1.1.
30
Aquinas, Gumma contra Gentiles, op. cit.. 1.29 & 31, III 7.2.,
Also, Sumroa Theologies,1.13.5.
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We find three kinds of efficient causes. The first
of these is an equivocal cause, whose effect agrees with it
neither in name nor in intelligibility. The sun, for in¬
stance, produces heat although it itself is not hot. The
second kind is a univocal cause, whose effect agrees with
it in name and intelligibility. A man, for instance, gen¬
erates a man and heat produces heat. God's activity is
neither equivocal nor univocal. Not univocal, because
nothing univocally agrees with him. Not equivocal, because
effect and cause somehow agree here in name and intelli¬
gibility, according to priority and posteriority. God
for instance, by his wisdom makes us wise, but only in
such a way that our wisdom always falls short of the per¬
fection of his wisdom, just as an accident falls short of
the perfection of being, as this is found in substance.
Thus, the third kind of cause is an analogous agent. It
is clear, then, that the Divine Being produces the being
of the creature as an imperfect likeness of itself.
Thomas makes this distinction only in his earlier writing. In later
ones analogical causes appear to be assumed under equivocal causes.
Thomas does, however, in his later writings, make a distinction
which conveys the same idea. God is the cause of certain perfections
because he possesses them virtually, others because he possesses them
formally.
Virtual possession of a perfection means that God would not
necessarily possess the perfection formally but only in such a way
that he is able to produce that perfection in his creatures. This
seems to compromise the principle of omne aqens aglt simile sibi which
implies that effects are to some extent pre-contained in their causes.
Thomas would contend, however, that virtual possession of a per¬
fection is a valid way of containing that perfection, for perfections
do not have to be contained in the same way by cause and effect un-
32
less the cause is a univocal cause.
31
I Sentences, op. clt.. 8.1.2c.
32
Mascall, Existence and Analogy, op. cit». p. 102.
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Formal possession of a perfection means that God actually contains
some form of the perfection within himself. Again, this does not
mean that as cause, God possesses the perfection in the same form
as the creature, his effect. Indeed, this is never the case. God
always possesses the perfection in a more eminent form, in a
superior mode, to the creature.
Thomas maintains that the principle "all causes produce
effects similar to themselves" is valid but only in a restricted
sense. He places three restrictions on the meaning of the term
"cause" if the principle is to be accurate! (a) Causes in this
principle must be causes per se and not per accldens. Modin's
clarification of this distinction is helpful.
A cause is said to be per se or natural when it
produces an effect according to its proper end. A cause
is said to be per accidens or accidental when there
attaches either to it or to its effect, some characteristic
or event that is incidental, something not included in
the scope of assimilating the end to itself.33
(b) Causes must be principal causes and not just instrumental causes.
To cite Mondin again, "A cause is said to be principal if it acts by
its own native power. A cause is said to be instrumental if it acts
by the power of the principal cause that employs it." (My type¬
writer is the instrumental cause of this dissertation; I am its
principal cause.) (c) Causes produce effects like themselves only
inasmuch as they are the cause of the effect and the effect is
^^Mondin, op. cit., p. 89.
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not the result of other causes. The likeness any one effect bears
to ariv one cause can be modified by other causal factors. (The fact
that an egg turns hard when boiled is the result of at least two
factors-~heat, which does not necessarily make things hard* and the
substance of the egg* which does not Hum hard «»n its own*)
According to Aquinas, God is the most important instance
of the principle etas egms wilt simile albl, God is the primary end
per me tm&a* of all things. A® such, he brings out effects like
35
htegslf. He is not, as we have seen, a unifocal cause bat
rather an waj!vocal cause; tJvirefore, eadh creature falls short
of the divine perfections#36 Even so, man can predicate <gmmm
terms of God and himself, but because God possesses the perfections
either virtually or formally or eminently, the predication nwst,
In application to God, be qualified. Perfections which God
possesses virtually are predicated of his metaphorically. A
frequent case of this is in discussing God*e dynamic attributes,
perfections relevant to external action (anger, repentance, etc.)
n
This is the most common mode of Biblical predication.
34
Aquinas in Dp Pontontie, 7,5.8. discusses the proper effects
of primary and secondary causes,
35*
Aquinas, I Sentence®, op# cit., 3.1.3; Also Sumna contra
&&&&& oj^^cit., 1.29. J smm VheatoxOca. on., dt., 1.4.2. t an
greatly indebted, to JSondin, op. cit«a pp. :>3*»94t for this mmmry*
3SGee above, p. 318.
37Sea Aquinas, suwrwi pw:dty.n.Cb, op...cit., 1,13.3.1; also
Suraraa contra Gentiles,
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Perfections which God possesses eminently merit special
consideration because it is the way in which Thomas most frequently
discusses the relationship between creature and Creator.
Hie way of eminence. A discussion of the via eminentia^
will draw together much of what we have already said about the
relationship between God and his creatures which is established by
creatures being proporti ned to God as effects to the supreme cause.
Basically, the relationship thus established is one of causal
eminence meaning that which is received in the creature exists in
the Creator in a more perfect and noble manner. From the massive
number of texts that speak in this manner, this quotation from the
First Book of the Sentences expresses the situation clearly:
(Dlonysius) says that we go from creatures to God
by three ways: through causality, through negation, and
through eminence. The reason for this is that the being
of the creature is from another. Hence, we are led to
the cause from which it comes. This can happen in two
ways. With respect to the perfection which it receives,
we are led by the way of causality. With respect to the
manner in which it is received (namely, that it is im¬
perfectly received), we are led by two paths: by negation
or removal of the Imperfection from God and by way of
eminence, inasmuchas that which is received in the
creature exists in the Creator in a more perfect and
noble manner.
What precisely is meant by a perfection existing in God in a more
eminent way is spelled out by Thomas. Two further distinctions will
help clarify matters.
38
I Sentences, op. cit.. 3. Similar statements can be found
in De Veritate. IV. 6cj De Potentla. VII. 5.2. j 5.8} Summa Theologie*.,
op. cit., I.4.2cj 13.2.2.; 13.3c; 29.3c.l.; At least two dozen
additional references are given by Klubertanz, op. cit.. pp. 73-74.
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Thomas distinguishes between two types of perfections--specific
(or mixed) and simple (or analogous.) The first of these denote a
perfection taken precisely as it appears in a particular finite mode
of realization. These 'specific* perfections can only be formally
realized in the creature. God possesses them only virtually and,
39
therefore, they are predicated of him metaphorically. These
perfections are characteristic of certain creatures and could in no
way be predicated of them all. Because of their limited applica¬
bility they could not be regarded as either universal or trans¬
cendental. They depend on a specific mode of realization for their
intelligibility. Other perfections can be understood without specific
reference to any form of realization. Because of this their trans-
40
cendental nature, they can be properly predicated of God. Very
few terms can be predicated in this way. Scholastic thought iso¬
lated six primary notions which could be called transcendental
j 41
perfections—ens, res, unum, alquld, varum, and bonum.
These simple perfections can be properly predicated of God
only if another distinction is made— a distinction between the res
signifiesta and the modus siqniflcandi. Simple perfections can be
predicated of God only in regard to the perfection itself, the
thing signified, and not in regard to any form of predication. The
39
Aquinas, Summa Theologies op. cit., 1.13.3.1.| 1 Sentences,
op. cit., 22.1.2.; Surama contra Gentiles, op. clt., 1.30.
40
Aquinas, Summa Theoloqica, op. cit., 1.13.3.1.
41
See Mascall, Existence and Analogy, op. clt., p. 98.
Thomas does not present such a closed list. He aiso gives no criteria
for determing whether or not a perfection is transcendental and, it
appears, would prefer to approach each perfection on its own merit.
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perfection is, therefore, attributed to God in an absolute sense. We
are not suggesting any mode of realization when we attribute a simple
perfection to God. When the perfection is attributed to anything
else, some mode of existence is always referred to.
We can attribute simple perfections to God in an absolute
sense, but this poses a problem. We have no experience of a simple
perfection in the absolute sense of the word. Creatures cannot know
any perfection outside of some particular creaturely mode of real¬
ization. Therefore, Thomas says that even though God possesses the
attribute eminently and is the prime analogate as far as the per¬
fection itself is concerned, as far as our knowledge of the per¬
fection is concerned, we know the perfection primarily through the
creature. To quote the Summa Theoloqic3:
For when God is called good or wise, this signifies
not only that he is the cause of wisdom and goodness but
also that these perfections exist in him in a higher way.
In the light of these considerations, then, it must be
maintained that, as far as the reality signified is con¬
cerned, these predications are made antecedently of God
rather than of creatures, because perfections of this sort
flow from God to creatures. As far as the imposition of
the name is concerned, however, creatures are named first,
because we know them first.
Mondin explains Thomas in this manner:
All names, In their mode of signification, apply pri¬
marily and properly to creatures, only secondarily and meta¬
phorically to God. But names of simple perfections, with
respect of the perfection signified, apply primarily to
God and only secondarily to creatures. The reason is that
with regard to the mode of signification the primary analogue
42
Aquinas, Gumma Theologies., op. cit. 1.13.6c,
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is always a creature, but with regard to the perfection
signified, in the case of simple perfections, the primary
analogue is God.^
Conclusions. We are now in a position to state some
conclusions about the Thomist method of analogical predication as it
pertains to the relationship between Creator and creature, (1) God
possesses all perfections found in the creature, some virtually, others
formally. Those which he possesses virtually are predicated meta¬
phorically of him and formally of the creature. (2) Those which
he possesses formally can properly be predicated of both him and
the creature. These are called simple perfections and because of
their transcendental and univeral nature depend on no particular
mode of realization. (3) In making this predication, however, a
distinction must be made between the perfection itself and the way
in which the perfection is realized. God possesses the perfection
in its absolute form; the creature possesses it only in some finite
mode. (4) The analogy thus established is that of one to the other
with the creature participating in some way in the divine perfection.
(5) This participation is the result of the creature having been
created by God who as supreme cause produces, according to the
principle of cause and effect, creatures bearing some sort of
similarity to himself. (6) By God's creative action there is,
therefore, established the analogia entls, an analogy of intrinsic
^Mondin, op. cit., p. 95.
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denomination wherein God possesses being (and all other simple perfec¬
tions) in an eminent way and the creature possesses them in a non-
eminent, deficient manner.
The choice between intrinsic attribution and proportionality.
Nothing in the above summary has by necessity committed us to a choice
between intrinsic attribution and proportionality as being the correct
description of the analogia entis. The discussion of these options is
certainly one of the greatest controversies within Thomism. It now
remains for us to see what arguments are advanced in favor and in
opposition to each position.
The majority view is held by the Cajetanists who contend
that is is the analogy of proportionality which best expresses Thomas'
concept of the analogia entis. Actually, they have not left then-
selves any other alternative since proportionality is the only
analogy of intrinsic denomination they recognize. Two types of
criticism are made of the Cajetanist position. The first concerns
Cajetan's interpretation of Thomas. The second concerns the analogy
of proportionality itself.
44
As we mentioned previously, Cajetan bases his inter¬
pretation on a text from Thomas commentary on the First Book of the
Sentences. Here Cajetan equates Thomas' analogy according to
intention and according to being with the analogy of proportionality
as found in De Veritate. 2.11. The critics contend that there is
^See above, p. 311.
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very little justification for Cajetan's having done this, for there is
nothing in the text from the Sentences which calls for such a re¬
striction. True enough, proportionality is an analogy according
to intention and according to being, but is it the only one? According
to the De Veritate text the answer is, yes. Here Thomas does limit
intrinsic denomination to proportionality.
Consequently it must be said that knowledge is pre¬
dicated neither entirely univocally nor yet purely equi¬
vocally of God's knowledge and ours. Instead, it is pre¬
dicated analogically, or in other words according to a
proportion. Now an agreement between things having a
proportion can be of two kinds. According to this, two
kinds of community can be noted in analogy. There is a
certain agreement between things having a proportion to
each other because they have a determinate distance be¬
tween them or some other relation to each other, as two
is related to one because it is its double. Sometimes
an agreement is also noted between two things between
which there is no proportion but rather a likeness of
two proportions to each other, as six agrees with four
because six is two times three just as four is two times
two. The first kind of agreement is one of proportion;
the second of proportionality ....
Because in those terms predicated according to the
first kind of analogy there must be some determinate
relation between the things to which something is common
by analogy, nothing can be predicated analogously of God
and the creature according to this type of analogy; for
no creature has such a relation to God by which the divine
perfection could be determined. But in the second kind
of analogy no determinate relation is noted between the
things to which something is common by analogy; so ac¬
cording to this kind, nothing prevents us from predj^
eating some name analogically of God and creatures.
Critics say that this passage in Thomas is an Isolated instance and
not typical of his thought generally. Certainly no mention is made
of proportionality in the two great Suramae. Klubertanz says that
45
Aquinas, De Veritate, op. cit.. 2.11.
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proportionality certainly is a Thomist analogy but only in the sense
that it is a doctrine taught by him for a brief period early in his
career. Before and after the writing of Pe Veritate (1256), there are
numerous texts teaching various doctrines of analogy but not pro¬
portionality. Certainly proportionality cannot be regarded as the
Thomist analogy for expressing the analogia entls, the relation¬
ship between Creator and creature. Concerning the position in
De Veritate, Klubertanz is quite specific. "St. Thomas had not pre¬
viously held, and would not subsequently hold, proportionality even
as a complementary description of the analogy between God and crea-
46
tures, much less as the only valid description.
These complaints, while important for discussion among
Thomists, are not so significant for our present discussion as those
made about the analogy of proportionality itself.
The basic problem with the analogy of proportionality is
also its chief benefit. It is a relationship between relations. This
means that while it makes emphatically clear that there is no onto-
logical continuity between creator and creature, God does not have
the same sort of being man has, it says nothing at all about what
being means when predicated of God. Since proportionality is not
mathematical equality, does any relationship at all exist across or
46
Klubertanz, op. cit., p. 94. Mascall says that the position
in De Veritate can be reconciled with the position in the Summa. Basically
this is not opting for proportionality over proportion but for unius ad
alternum over duorum ad tertium. Therefore, De Veritate is defining the
theological appropriateness of unius ad alternum and not insisting that
proportion and proportionality are mutually exclusive. Existence and
Analogy, op. cit., p. 114n.
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or between the two proportions? Klubertanz says that the inherent
weakness of proportionality is that it,
• • • involves either agnosticism about one set of the
terms of the proportions involved • • • , or is merely an
extrinsic comparison of beings which are known independently
from other sources. St. Thomas does not wish to teach a
complete agnosticism about God, as is clear from his criti¬
cism of doctrines of equivocation. If he rejects all other
analogies between God and creatures, it is difficult to see
how he can know even that God and creatures possess ana¬
logous perfections much less what they are or wh^ the
relationship is between God and his perfections.
To put the point in a slightly different ways When an attribute is
predicated of both God and the creature, we are attempting to do
more than establish a similarity of relations. We also want to
establish some similarity of nature. When we say, for example,
that God and man are loving and wise, we are trying to say some¬
thing about love and wisdom. If the analogy is only proportionality,
no relationship at all is established between divine and human
wisdom, and one wonders if there is any point at all in using a
48
common term. Mclntyre says, "Because the analogy of proportionality
is an analogy of relations, it requires to be supplemented by some
49
form of analogy which relates the terms of the analogy.
Mascall, who fundamentally accepts Cajetan's interpretation
of Thomas, is well aware of this problem and shows how a relationship
between relations can easily become an infinite regress. To return
to his example of the relationship between the lives of cabbages,
47Ibid». p. 94.
48
Mondin, op. cit.. p. 69.
49
Mclntyre, "Analogy," op. clt.« p. 14.
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elephants, men, and God, Mascall lets "L" stand for "life of" and "E"
stand for "essence of," "c" stand for "cabbage" and "in" stand for
"man." He substitutes these terms in the formula A/B which signifies
"determination of A by B." First, the equivocity of Lc :: Lm is denied
and the proportionality of Lc/Ec :s Lm/Em is substituted. This formula
must, however, be further qualified so as not to suggest equality be¬
tween the two terms. Therefore, (Lc/Ec)/Ec ;: (Lm/Em)/Em. But as
soon as this is established it must be further qualified {7lc/Ec7] /Ec ::
jlLm/Em)/EmJ /Em. This process would go on without end, and pro¬
portionality would become nothing more than a series of affirmations
which would instantly have to be negated. No real relationship between
cabbages and men (or men and God) could be established, and "all we
are left with is the fact that cabbages have nothing in common with
men except the fact that, for no valid reason, men have described them
both as being alive.
Klubertanz summarizes the objections to proportionality as
the expression of the Creator-creature relationship by saying that
we are given the choice among three undesirable possibilities: (a) either
we have complete agnosticism about God, or (b) we make proportionality
secondary to a more direct analogous knowledge of God, or (c) we are
content with rather trivial statement about God. Klubertanz believes
that Thomas could not have accepted any of these possibilities, and
51
this is a logical reason for his abandoning proportionality.
50Mascall, Existence and Analogy, op. cit.. pp. 105-6. Ferre,
op. cit., also believes that proportionality is incapable of saying much
about the analogates.
5*Klubertanz, op. cit., pp. 98-9.
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We have already noted Suarez's basic objections to the Cajet-
anist position and his insistence that Thomas teaches intrinsic as
well as extrinsic attribution. Intrinsic attribution is, furthermore,
the correct analogy to express the analoqla entls. Proportionality
is rejected because it always includes an element of metaphor. This
being the case, there is no analoqia entis. for God alone properly
has being. The only reason that there can be an analoqia entls for
God and the creature is to attribute being to them both without
52
saying anything about proportionality.
The first complaint against Suarez is that he does not under¬
stand proportionality. He Identifies all proportionality with extrinsic
proportionality. (Just as the Cajetanists see proportionality as the
only analogy of intrinsic denomination, so Suarez and his followers see
attribution as the only analogy of intrinsic denomination.) Proper
proportionality does in fact intrinsically attribute being to the
creature but only being that is proper to its nature.
The second complaint concerns the "non-Thomistic character
of Suarezian analogy." Suarez holds that between divine being and
creaturely being there is an analogy of intrinsic attribution. The
creature is a being-by-participation while God is Being-by-essence;
therefore, the creature participates In being only through dependence
upon God and in subordination to him. According to Anderson, this
relationship of dependence of the creature on the creator is real but
52
Here I am following J, F. Anderson's discussion and critique
of Suarez. See Anderson, op. cit., pp. 106-118.
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it is not that which primarily distinguishes these two orders of being.
This relationship in and of itself does not constitute the being of
the creature. He quotes St. Thomas:
Although relation to its cause does not enter the
definition of the thing caused, nevertheless that relation-
follows from the very notion of that thing: for from the
fact that a thing exists^y participation, it follows that
it is caused by another.
This establishes that being is ontologically prior to
54
relation. "Things are things before they are related things."
Anderson follows Penido in pointing out that to speak in
terms of intrinsic attribution is to speak materially. This is quite
proper in cases of 'mixed' analogy where there is a 'material co¬
incidence.' The best example of this is the analogy between substance
and accident, the primary analogy in Suarez's thinking. Being is in¬
trinsic to both substance and accident, but substance and accident
have being in different ways according to their different natures.
The 'intrinsicism' of being,
... consists precisely and soley in the common
though diverse (proportional) possession of a common
"form," namely, the act of being. Accidents are said
to exist in virtue of their relation to substances
(attribution), but they do exist in virtue of their
inherence in substances; and this existence is in every
case proportional to the natures of those accidents and
of those substances, so that a proportion of proportions,
a "proportionality" in being is thereby established.
53
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, op. clt., 1.44.1.1. cited by




Anderson, op. cit., p. 112. (Italics in the original.)
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There is a material coincidence of attribution and proportionality in
the analogy between substance and accident and in some other analogies
but this in no way establishes it as a general principle.
Another non-Thomistic feature of intrinsic attribution is that
while Thomas does specifically mention proportionality, he nowhere
commends intrinsicism. Again following Penido, Anderson concludes
that the whole Suarezian thesis is fabricated from texts in St. Thomas
which do not attempt to explain the nature of analogy in general but
only to explain the application of the principle in 'mixed' cases.
56
Nowhere else is there intrinsic attribution.
No only is intrinsic attribution non-Thomistic, it runs the
risk of "introducing a fundamental univocity into the very heart of
analogy." Among the diverse modes of being, there would be only
accidental differences. All analogates would be formally the same
only relatively different. Analogy itself would be nothing more than
a species of univocity. Being would become a genus and each being
would be a species. Intrinsic attribution leads logically to the
destruction of analogy. Anderson summarizes:
In the measure that attribution is stressed and
proportionality denied, or given a secondary role, anal¬
ogy will tend to resolve itself into univocity. And if
proportionality in the proper sense is excluded and attri¬
bution set up as the sole constitutive character of true
analogy, then in effect a basic formal univocity will




In brief, toleration of intrinsic attribution is to court meta¬
physical and theological disaster.
The above discussion is not exhaustive. The various parties
are aware of their opponents arguments and have answers for then. It
seams, however, beyond the scope of this paper to do more than we have
done in outlining the basic points of difference. To go further would
obligate us to resolve the disagreement. This is not the purpose of
our having looked at Thomas' ideas about analogy and the interpre¬
tations of him by his followers.
Some conclusions about Thomistic analogy. St. Thomas never
compiled a systematic treatise on his theory of analogy. When he does
make reference to his analogical method, it is always in reference to
some other problem or discussion. This in itself seems sufficient cause
for the widely varying interpretations of Thomas put forward by his
followers as the Thomistic understanding of analogy. Much of the dis¬
agreement seems to come from decisions made by each interpreter as to
which specific text or texts should be regarded as the key texts for
interpreting the whole of Thoraist teaching. Both Cajetan and Suarez
and many of their followers have done this, and, subsequently, have done
us a disservice by forcing the variety of Thomistic expressions of ana¬
logy into their own synthetic categories. Thomas' understanding and use
of analogy is far more fluid and flexible than his followers would want
us to believe. No one category can adequately capture Thomas' intention.
Each mode of analogy expresses a particular way of regarding the relation¬
ship in question, and each analogy must, therefore, be approached on its
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own, considering what the intention of that particular analogy actually
is. Most analogies appear to be 'mixed* and open to more than one
interpretation. Discussion along this line seems far more profitable
than debating which particular mode of analogy is the more correct or
more fundamental one. The only alternative to this—and it may be
a better alternative—is to suggest a new approach to the question
of how we can be permitted to speak of God and man in the same language.
We shall soon be looking at one proposal for combining the
analogies of extrinsic attribution and proportionality, but before
doing this, it would be wise to look briefly at the Reformed use of
analogy since it presents us with a radically different approach.
Analogy in Protestant Thought
For Protestants the doctrine of analogy is not nearly so
crucial as it is for Catholics. As mentioned at the outset of our
discussion, Protestant theologians differ from Catholic theologians
by insisting that all analogies between God and the creature are es¬
tablished by extrinsic denomination, from God to the creature. This
is the logical consequence of their implicit rejection of the analogia
entis which is the basic analogy in Catholic theology. As far as
protestants are concerned, there is an utter and complete alienation
of sinful man from holy God, not a fundamental community as the
analogia entis seeks to describe. The relationship between God and
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Ferre is one who is skeptical. "It is no longer possible,
I believe, to hold that the logic of analogy, as it has normally been
interpreted, is cogent." Language. Logic and God, op, cit.. p. 105.
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the creature is established in a supernatural, not a natural way.
Luther and Calvin both thought this to be true.
Luther's understanding of analogy. Given his aversion to
rationalizing revelation (using reason to understand the Word of God),
it is not surprising that Luther gives no systematic presentation of
the presuppositions behind his use of theological language. It is
possible, however, to draw a few conclusions from remarks made through-
59
out the course of his writings which reveal his thinking.
Most important for our discussion is Luther's rejection of any
analogy between man and God. Analogy is impossible because sin has
utterly destroyed the imago del, and there is nothing left in the
creature similar to God. Because of the fall, "we cannot reach the
comprehension of this image of God by our intellect, nor even in
thought."^ Because of our sinful state, no accurate knowledge of
God is possible outside of revelation. God is known sola fide. The
creature simply cannot understand the meaning of attributes predicated
of God without the help of faith. If we could understand than, then
predication would be univocal. For example, "were his justice such as
could be adjudged as just by the human understanding, it were manifestly
61
not divine and would differ nothing from human justice." It is,
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I am indebted to Mondin, op. cit.. pp. 103-107, for much of
this analysis of Luther.
^Luther, Lectures on Genesis. I-V, cited by Mondin, op. cit.,
p. 105.
61Luther, cited by R. Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 101,
quoted by Mondin, op« cit.. p. 105.
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therefore, impossible for us to acquire any knowledge of what God is
in himself but only what is true of his action toward us.
Because of Luther's attitude toward the anaioqia entis and the
imago dei, there can never be any 'ontological similarity' between God
and man. The analogy between Creator and creature is always, to use
Scholastic terminology, an extrinsic one. This is so even after
revelation because the change which redemption brings is an extrinsic
and not an intrinsic one. The justification which faith brings does
not fully transform man; it is only imputed to him. He is not just
but only a justified sinner. The 'old man' continues to live co-
jointly with the 'new man.' Luther makes this point in his com¬
mentary on Romans:
The blessedness of grace is that the sin which remains
in us is not inputed unto us, but we are accounted righteous
before God .... How much soever, therefore, the remnants
of sin within us may turn and rage at times, we are never¬
theless, still accounted righteous before God; and sin is
not imputed unto us, by reason of our faith, which keeps up
a continual resistance against flesh.
On both the espitemological level and the ontological level, there
is only an analogy of extrinsic attribution established by faith.
This is a very limited analogy which cannot be expected to deliver
much information about God, man, or the relationship between the
two of them.
Calvin's understanding of analogy. Calvin is slightly more
open to a natural knowledge of God than is Luther. According to him,
AO
Luther, Preface to the Epistle of Paul to the Romans,
quoted by Mondin, p. 106,
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there should be a two-fold knowledge of God: "Since God is first
manifested, both in the structure of the world and in the general tenor
of Scripture, simply as the Creator, and afterwards reveals himself in
the person of Christ as Redeemer, hence arises a twofold knowledge of
63
him • • • . " Both types of knowledge are based on revelation. There
is natural knowledge that comes through God's revelation of himself in
the created order and in man, and the supernatural knowledge that comes
through God's revelation of himself in Christ. The first is knowledge
of him as Creator, the second as Redeemer.
As concerns the first type of knowledge, we have a serious
problem. This knowledge should be readily accessible to us, but it is
not. The problem is in our reception, not in God's revelation. God
does truly reveal himself in nature. "God ... hath manifested him¬
self in the formation of every part of the world, and daily prese ts
himself to public view, in such a manner, that they cannot open their
64
eyes without being constrained to behold him." The problem is well
summarized by three of Calvin's chapter headings. "The Knowledge of
God (is) Conspicuous in the Formation and Continual Government of the
World." "The Human Mind (is) Naturally Endued with the Knowledge of
God." "This Knowledge (is) Extinguished or Corrupted, Partly by
65
Ignorance, Partly by Wickedness." Because of the fall, man is so
far out of harmony with God and God's creation, he can no longer per¬
ceive the revelation which God makes in the natural order.
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John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion. 1.2.1.
64Ibld.. 1.5.1.
65Ibid.. 1.5.3. and 4.
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In the beginning, when roan bore the imago del, he would have
been capable of acquiring some knowledge of God through the con¬
templation of nature and himself, but this would not have been
knowledge of God's essence but of his virtues. God's nature is
incomprehensible. He gives us "a description not of what he is in
himself, but of what he is to us, that our knowledge of him may
consist rather in a lively perception, than in vain and airy
66
speculation." The natural knowledge man has of God does not come
through reason but through the opera dei by which Calvin means God's
creative and providential activity. God is, therefore, known
only as he is in his actions toward us. We can say that God is
good, wise, or just because we know his works to be good, wise,
and just, not because we know him as he is in himself to be this
way.
For Calvin, knowing God's virtues is quite enough. It is
unimportant for us to know what he is himself. What is impor¬
tant is our knowing what he wills to be for us. Even after the
revelation of Jesus Christ, God's most important work, we do not
know the essence of God but only how God acts. Through the
revelation of Christ, we are given supernatural illumination, not
into the mysteries of God's nature, but only into the mystery of
67




From the preceding discussion, we are justified in saying that
in Calvin, as in Luther, the analogy between Creator and creature is
always an extrinsic one. The attributes predicated of God do not
describe his essence but only his relationship to the created order.
buther and Calvin agree on most crucial points. Although
both can speak of a natural knowledge of God, the fall has made this
impossible as far as man is concerned. We must rely totally on
revelation for our knowledge. Because no trace of an analogia entls
remains after the fall, there is no possibility of any analogy of
intrinsic attribution. Such is not even possible even after the
event of Jesus Christ, for man's sinful nature is not replaced with
a righteous one, but rather righteousness and the other attributes
given by faith are simply imputed to him. Both Calvin and Luther
consider God's essence wholly unknowable. God is truly Deus abscon-
dltus.
Karl Barth and the 'analoqla fidei.• Karl Barth is certainly
the most influential protestant thinker of our time. For this reason,
as well as by reason of its own merit, some mention must be made of
Barth's doctrine of analogy.
Basic to all Barth's thinking is a thoroughgoing rejection
of philosophical solutions to theological problems. Even though
he recognizes the existence of natural theology, he believes it to
be necessarily false and any philosophical systematizing of religious
68
concepts to be false as well. Theology is not responsible to
68
Karl Barth, The Knowledge of God and the Service of God,
pp. 4-5, cited by Mondin, op. clt., p. 149.
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philosophy for any of its statements but only to revelation. Hie Word
of God is not subject to human presupposition. Human presuppo¬
sitions are subject to the Word. This does not mean that there is
no place for philosophy. Philosophy is inevitable. "We all wear
69
some kind of glasses. If we did not, we would not be able to see."
Evenso, philosophy can be no more than the handmaiden of theology.
This is especially true as concerns our knowledge of God. Divine
grace, not human thought, gives us our knowledge.
To the question how we come to know God by means
of our thinking and language, we must give the answer
that of ourselves we do not come to know him, that, on
the contrary, this happens only as the grace of the
revelation of God comes to us and therefore to the means
of our thinking and language, adopting us and than ....
We are permitted to make use, and a successful use at
that, of the means given to us. We do not create this
success. Nor do our means create it. But the grace
of God's revelation creates it. To know this is the
awe in which our knowledge of God becomes true.70
Barth feel that in theological disccurse neither univocity
nor equivocity is possible but that analogy is unavoidable. There
does not exist a simple parity of content and meaning when we use
the same word to discuss the creature and to discuss God. "A parity
of this type would mean either that God had ceased to be God and be-
71
come merely a creature, or that man with his capacity had become a God."
There can be no question of likeness when a word describes creaturely
being and when it describes divine being.
69
Barth, Prolegomena, p. 404., cited by Mondin, op, cit.,
p. 150.
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Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/l, op. cit., p. 223.
71Ibid.. p. 224.
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Barth is as emphatic in his denial of equivocity as of
univocity. If we exaggerate the disparity between God and the
creature, "we do not praise God but deny him" If creaturely
words mean something utterly different when applied to God, we
must be admitting that we do not know God. He says:
The fact that we know him must mean that, with our
views, concepts and words, we do not describe and express
something quite different from himself, but that in and
by these means of ours • • • we describe and express God
himself.72
If this were the case there would be no possibility at all of any
relationship between knower and known, between creature and creator.
God's revelation of himself would be totally negative, a "veiling."
Barth, therefore, concludes:
The impossibility of the thesis of a parity between
our word and the being of God must not press us into the
counter-thesis of a disparity between them. On the basis
of the same presupposition, the latter is just as im¬
possible as the former. 3
Facing these impossibilities, the 'older theologies,' Barth
tells us, used the concept of analogy to express the relationship be¬
tween God and in this way destroyed the equally false theses of
parity and disparity while salvaging the truth contained in both of
then. "There can be no question of either parity or disparity,
there remains only what is generally meant by analogy: similarity,
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So far, Barth is in total agreement with Thomist thought as
regards the necessity of analogy to avoid either univocal or equi¬
vocal predication wheal speaking of God and the creature and the
relationship or 'fellowship* which exists between them. Where he
differs from Thomas is in his insistance that this fellowship is
established by and can only be known through revelation. It is
not on the basis of creation but on the basis of grace that the
analogy is established. The Barthian analogy which defines the
relationship between Creator and creature is not, as in Thomist
75
thought, the analogia entis but rather the analogia fldei.
The analoqia fidei describes a fellowship, a community,
that is established sola gratia between God and man. What sort
of analogy, in traditional terms, is the analoqia fidel? First, it
is not an analogy of Inequality because the mode of predication can¬
not express God's utter transcendence and is constantly exposed to
pantheism. Further, Barth rejects proportionality which he believes
signifies a quantitative correspondence between two beings. The
correspondence or agreement partially exist and partially do not
exist. Barth objects to the mathematical nature of this type of
analogy. Attribution is the only acceptable mode of analogy, and
this means extrinsic and not intrinsic attribution. He makes this
point in reference to Quenstedt who insists that attribute belongs
75
Mclntyre's suggestion that the term analoqia gratiae is
preferable to analoqia fidei is cogent. "It is because grace sets
up the analogy that faith takes place." "Analogy," op. clt., p. 15.
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properly, that is inwardly, to both the analogans and the analoqatum.
In saying this Quenstedt has forgotten the doctrine of justification
by faith and its applicability to the way in which we know God. If
this is applied,
... what converts the creature into an analogue of
God does not lie in itself and its nature, not even in
the sense that God will acknowledge and accept as an
analogue (in itself) something of that which lies in
the nature of the creature. What converts the creature
into an analogue of God lies only in the veracity of the
object known analogously in the knowledge of God, and
therefore in the veracity of God himself. It therefore
possesses it extrinsece in the form of apprehensio and
not at all intrinsece.
According to Barth, in suggesting intrinsic attribution, Quenstedt
is resisting the idea that the similarity between God and the
creature is 'controlled and bestowed' by God himself. Rather
Quenstedt wants the similarity to be understood as being part of
the co-existence of the Creator and the creature. Quenstedt makes
being and not grace the criterion of truth. For this reason he has
not, in spite of claiming so, rejected the analogy of inequality,
for intrinsic attribution means being is identical in God and in
77
us. It is not participation in a common being that establishes
the fellowship between man and God but God's grace shown in man's
redemption.
Man can speak of God in human language because God, through
his grace, has given him this power. This is not quite as straight
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Barth, Church Dogmatics. II/l, op. cit., p. 239.
77Ibid.. p. 240.
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forward as it sounds, for Barth gives four reasons why human language
can be used to describe God: (a) because our words are a creation of
God, they are most properly his and not ours* Words which can dis¬
cuss both God and the creature are most appropriately used in ref¬
erence to God* For example, God is the Father and the Son* These
words describe hint properly* When used of us, our fatherhood or
sonship are but imitations of his* (b) We can use human language
to speak of God because God has first used tide language to speak
of himself in his revelation of himself to us* (c) We can speak
of God in our language because the meaning of this language is fully
realised only in God* For instance, the question is not whether or
not God is a person but whether or not we are persons, i»e* genuinely
free subjects* <d) Through Christ and the Church God has sanctified
, 78our language*
Even though human language can appropriately be used to
speak of God, it can only express the truth of God in a veiled or
hidden way. The reason for this is obvious* God created language
first and most appropriately for himself acid only secondarily for man*
Only God can, therefore, fully understand his own language* Man is
man and not God and can, therefore, never fully understand God's words
whan they are revealed to him* Our language when used by God or
for God is always veiled or hidden from our understanding* God's
revelation is truly both a veiling and an unveiling*
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Barth, Church Dogmatics. 1/1, op. cit*. pp. 153ff* See also
11/1 pp. 223-229* These four points are outlined by Mondin, op, cit..
pp. 156—157.
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Barth puts this point in another more comprehensible way when
he says that the mystery and ambiguity of theological language arises
from a contradiction between form and content. The content of
revelation is divine; the form is human. The form of theological
language is always that of human language, but the content is always
that of God himself. Because man is man, he cannot separate form
from content, isolate the divine content from its human form. All
79
we can ever know is the worldly form of the divine word.
The category of form-content is central to Berth's system,
appearing as the explanation for many situations. "The category of
form-content in Barth's system has the function of expressing the
mystery of divine sovereignty and gracefulness, of divine trans-
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cendence and immanence in the event of revelation." As concerns
theological language, we have seen how in revelation divine content
takes human form and that this human form is not adequate to ex¬
press the divine content. Therefore, the divine content, even
though it is revealed, is also hidden.
So far we have been discussing mainly the epistemology of
the analogia fidei which Barth discusses in some considerable
detail. Nowhere that we know of does he give the same systematic
attention to the ontology of this analogy. It is possible, however,
to get a highly accurate picture of his view by looking at his
approach to the imago dei.
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Barth denies views such as those held by Augustine and Thomas,
that man is in the image of God because of some quality of body or
mind that he possesses. The image of God is not found in man's
physical or psychological make-up. It is not a likeness found in
the dominium terrae. man* s capacity to rule or control even though
this is the result of it. The imago del consists in man being an
"I" and a "Thou." This alone distinguishes man from the rest of
creation.
What is created without and alongside man, exists in
juxtaposition and even in a certain full-scale co-existence,
but not in the true confrontation and reciprocity which are
actualized in the reality of an "I" and a "Thou." Neither
heaven nor earth, water nor land, nor living creatures
from plants upward to land animals, are a "Thou" whom God
can confront as an "I" nor do they stand in an "I-Thou"
relationship to one another, nor can they enter into
such a relationship. 1
The reason God has created this relationship is that he
wished to have a creature who, even though a creature, could be a
real partner, a creature capable of acting responsibly in relation
to him and a creature in which his own divine form is not alien.
Man is created as a creature which can bear the divine form of
life. This point is most important for understanding the ontology
of Earth's analoqia fldei. Barth believes that God himself exists
as a divine "I-Thou" as is witnessed by his saying, "Let us create
man in our own image," rather than saying as in the other instances
of creation, "Let there be," or "Let the earth bring forth."
Barth says,
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When man was to he the subject, it had to be said
that the creative basis of his existence was and is
a history which took place in the divine sphere and
essence; a divine movement to and from a divine correspond¬
ence to it. A genuine counterpart in God himself leading
to a unanimous decision, is the secret prototype which
is the basis of an obvious copy, a secret image and an
obvious reflection in the co-existence of God and man,
and also of the existence of man himself. 2
Being in the likeness of God, therefore, means that man is created
with a nature that has a pattern in the divine nature. The human
*I-Thou» is a 'copy* and 'imitation,' a • creaturely repetition* of
the divine 'I-Thou.1
The divine 'X-Thou' means that within God's being there
is a counterpart, "a genuine but harmonious self-encounter and self-
discovery; a free co-existence and co-operation; an open con-
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frontation and reciprocity." Man repeats this divine •I-Thou.'
First of all, God has made man his counterpart because God's
•encounter and discovery* of himself is limited in God's relation¬
ship to man. Secondly, the relationship that God has to himself
and God has with man is repeated in man's relationship to man.
The evidence for this last point is that God created man male and
female. This is the only interpretation the creation stories give
of God's creating man. It is the only thing we are told other
84





The existence of 'I-Thou' first occurs in God, When he creates,
he says, "Let us," God is not as some assume, confering with others
outside himself. This is an internal differentiation and relationship
85
which is found within the three persons of the Trinity. The divine
'I-Thou' is contained within the one entity, God. The human 'I-Thou,'
as epitomized in man's being male and female, takes place between two
separate individuals. For this reason, there is a correspondence be¬
tween unlike entities when God and man are compared and not a corres¬
pondence between similar individuals. This is the ontological sepa¬
ration expressed in Bartian analogy. There can be no question that
God and man are in anyway alike other than the fact that the relation¬
ship within God of the divine 'I-Thou' is repeated in the relation-
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ship among men.
Barth here calls his analogy an analogia relation!s. There can
be no question of an analoqia entis. Barth states his argument this
way:
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Barth says the decision of the early exegesis was that in the
statement, "Let us," there is a reference to divine triunity. Barth
says that the "Let us" obviously expresses genuine plurality in God,
and while it does not specifically say what this plurality is, it can
only be properly understood against the background of the Christian
doctrine of the Trinity. Ibid., p. 192.
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Berth's teaching on the imago del has passed through several
stages of development before reaching this form. For exanple, in
earlier writings (See Credo, p. 33) quite in tune with traditional
teaching, the imago del signified man's appointment to reflect the
divine glory in his own existence, but any ability to do this was
lost totally in the fall and can only be restored by man's new creation
in Christ. The imago del, viewed from the early perspective, is
something within the individual. From the final perspective out¬
lined above, the imago del is something which exists between men
as they are created for 'I-Thou' relationship to each other, just
as the divine 'I-Thou' exists between father-son in the Trinity.
(See Herbert Hartwell, The Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction.
p. 130, for a list of references indicating Barth's development.)
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It is not palpable that we have to do with a clear
and simple correspondence . • • between this mark of
the divine being, namely that it includes an *1* and
•Thou,' and the being of man, male and female. The
relationship between the summoning 'I* in God's being
and the summoned divine 'Thou' is reflected both in the
relationship of God to the man whom he has created, and
also in the relationship between the 'I* and the 'Thou,'
in the divine being ... are not idential with the
differentiation and relationship between male and female
• • • • Analogy, even as the analogy of relation, does Q7
not entail likeness but the correspondence of the unlike.
To insure that we understand what being in the image of God
means, Barth ventures to translate Genesis 1:26-27 as, "Let us make
man in our original, according to our prototype." This rendering
would make it clear that man was not created to be the image of God
but was created in correspondence with the divine image. The point
of the text is clear. God created man as a being which corresponds
to his own being in such a way that God himself is the original and
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man the copy or imitation, not a duplicate.
Barth, of course, says a lot more about the analoqla fldel
than we have, but this is as far as we need to go in understanding
its epistemology and ontology. As far as Thomist categories are
concerned, Barth obviously intends the analoqla fidel to be tra¬
ditional reformed analogy of extrinsic attribution. Man's divine
likeness is never his possession but consists entirely in the in¬
tention and deed of his creator. Barth makes it quite clear that
87
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man's creation does not automatically constitute his being in the image
of God. The imago dei is a gift beyond the gift of his existence.
Unlike Thomism where by the act of creation man is constituted in God's
image and possesses it as a natural part of his existence, in Barth-
ianism the imago del is not a natural part of man. Even though he
could not be man without it, he could nevertheless be a creature
without it. Man in Thomism is, therefore, always within a basic
established relationship to God and, thereby, in community with him.
In Barthianism there is an utter and complete alienation of sinful man
from holy God and no fundamental community between them except by an
act of divine grace. In Thoraism this special act is not needed. The
act of existence establishes the analogy between man and God. In
Barthianism this is established only by grace through Jesus Christ.
We should expect that thinking as creative and as compli¬
cated as Earth's should also be controversial. Indeed, many criti¬
cisms have been made of Barth's position of which we shall repeat
89
just a few as put forward by Mclntyre.
Critique of the 'analogia fldel.' Barth's identification of
his analogy of faith with the analogy of extrinsic attribution, does
not accurately describe its function in his theology. For one thing,
according to the rules of extrinsic attribution, oomraon terms have a
different meaning in relation to the different analogstes. Healthy
does not mean the same thing when applied to complexion and to medicine.
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Mclntyre, "Analogy," op. cit., pp. 14-16. Unless indicated
otherwise, all the following discussion is taken from this source.
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In Berth's thinking, however, all analogates stand in an identical
relationship to God—as sinners who are related to God only through
the grace of his salvation in Jesus Christ. Secondly, if the ap¬
plication of all predicates shared by God and nan can never be
predicated of roan intrinsically but must always be predicated ex-
trinsically even after the operation of grace, it is difficult to
see how this grace actually operates# For example, while righteous¬
ness is ours only in Christ, if it always is external to us and never
internal, has not the purpose of salvation been frustrated?
Barth rejects proportionality on the most superficial grounds.
He objects to its supposed mathematical nature on the gr und that there
is no way of calculating the correspondence between divine and crea-
turely attributes. Barth has here missed the point explicitly made
by those who favour this analogy, that it is not an analogy of
mathematical proportions in which terms across the sign are related
to each other.
Even though he rejects proportionality, Barth uses it passim.
The analoqia fldei is an analogy of relations and not of attributes
and is, therefore, best conceptualized in terms of proportionality and
not attribution. That the analoqia fidel is an analogy of relationships
is made sufficiently clear by the examples Barth employs, the
relationship of Christ's humanity to his divinity, the relationship
of Christ to the church. The analoqia fldei is based on the simi¬
larity between two relationships: the relationship of divine 'I'
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to the divine 'Thou' as expressed within the Trinity and the relation¬
ship between the 'I' and the human 'Thou' as expressed in man's being
made male and female. "The relationship between the summoning *1'
in God's being and the summoned Divine 'Thou' is reflected both in
the relationship between the 'I' and the 'Thou,' between male and
89
female in the human existence itself."
We must interject here that even though the analoqia fidei
is an analogy of proportionality and not of attribution, it must
not be equated with the analoqia entis of Thomis thought. Barth
consistently rejects all views of the divine-human relationship which
90
conceive it as an analogy of being. Mondin indicates the basic
differences between the Thomist and the Barthian views:
Actually the epistemology and ontology of Berth's
similarity of relations differ toto caelo from the onto¬
logy and epistemology of the analogy of proportionality
of Thomistic natural theology. The ontology and episte¬
mology of Barth's analogy of relations are either based on,
or related to, revelation and grace. The ontology and
epistemology of the analogy of proportionality of Thom¬
istic natural theology are based on nature as such, apart
from revelation and grace. The analogy of relations is
then, an analogy of faith, not an analogy of being ...»
Mclntyre is not happy with Barth's dismissal of the analoqia
entis. especially as it occurs within the discussion of Quenstedt's
interpretation which is not the view generally held by those who
support the doctrine, the view of intrinsic attribution. Because
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Barth, Church Dogmatics. III/l, op. cit., p. 195. See note
86 for text in full.
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Barth, Church Dogmatics. 1/1, op. cit., pp. 274, 279; II/2,
op. cit.. p. 501; II/l, op. cit.. p. 81.
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he accepts Quenstedt* s position, Barth rejects the analoqia entls
saying it eliminates the infinite qualitative difference between
God and man by reducing it to a quantitative difference, just a
difference in degree. Man and God are, therefore, brought under the
same category, being, of which God and man are just species and can
be understood together. This is, as we have already seen, definitely
not the Thomlst view and is debatably not Quenstedt*s view. In re¬
jecting the analoqia entis on the grounds that it conceives being as
a genus, Barth is not opposing Thomas as he thinks he is but is in
fact agreeing with Thomas in the rejection of the analoqia duorum
ad tertium. Had Barth given attention to the Cajetanist interpre¬
tation of the analoqia entis where this analogy is seen as an analogy
or proportionality, he might have considered it more kindly. As it
is, however, he considers a view which could well have been in¬
fluenced by Suarez's thinking, and, as we have seen, the Cajetanists
accuse Suarez of exactly the same thing of which Barth accuses Thomas.
Barth is actually not as opposed in practice to Thomist
uses of analogy as he is in principle. His teaching does not differ
as totally from Aquinas* as would appear if one took his statements
at face value. The differences are great, however, and should not
be minimized. To say as Mondin does, that "instead of maintaining
two conflicting doctrines, Aquinas and Barth simply emphasize dif-
92
ferent aspects of the same reality," is to trivialize the essential
92
Mondin, op. cit., p. 172. This conclusion seems totally in¬
consistent with the analysis which preceds it where Mondin explains
the incompatibility of Barthian and Thomlstlc epistemology and ontology.
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features of each man's approach to the problem. Aquinas insists on
the basic goodness of human nature and on the power of human reason
to shed light on the mysteries of revelation. Barth insists on the
basic sinfulness of nan and the deficiency of human knowledge in
acquiring any insight into God. The analogia entis and the analogla
fidei are not the same reality either epistemologically or onto-
logically. The former is a natural relationship between man and God;
the latter is a supernatural one. Even if both are regarded as analogies
or proportionality, they are not, as we have seen, the same analogy.
Conclusions about Analogy in Traditional Theology
'i-
Neither Aquinas nor Barth are strangers to the truth of the
analogy between man and God. What should be apparent from the above
discussion is that each tradition expresses some truth but no tradition
contains it all. Even from within Protestant and Catholic tradition,
several contemporary writers are acknowledging the inadequacy of the
traditional and modern forms of analogy. Some who accept the basic
correctness of Cajetan's classification of analogy feel that they can¬
not rely totally, as he does, on the analogy of proportionality to
express the meaning of a perfection predicated of both God and man.
Barth, in spite of his sworn allegiance to the analogy of external
attribution, is in fact not only committed to a drastic modification
of it but also to another type of analogy, proportionality, which he
claims to reject. Anderson, a contemporary Thomist in the Cajetanist
tradition finds that he must rely on the doctrine of creation to
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support his interpretation of the analogia entis as an analogy of
proportionality. Mdntyre is quite right when he concludes his dis¬
cussion of Roman, Reformed and Neo-orthodox analogies with this statement.
"The first fact that strikes us is that none of the standard interpre¬
tations of analogy by itself seems able to meet the complexity of
our present-day understanding of our relation to God and even our
knowledge of God." He thai concludes, "If we wish to keep the old-
established ways, thai it seems some combination of analogy of pro-
93
portionality with analogy of attribution is required."
Mascall, independently, reaches the same conclusion. Neither
proportionality nor attribution by themselves can say what the re¬
lationships on the two sides of the equation stand for. A combination
of proportionality and attribution can do together what neither can do
alone. He proposes just such a combination. Using his illustration
of life being predicated of cabbages, men and God, he gives us the
following diagrami
God
analogy of proportionality /! ..God's creative
combined with analogy of // \\ act
attribution unlus ad // vv
alterum Cabbage — Man
analogy of proportionality combined
with analogy of attribution duorum
ad tertlum.
Causality establishes the relationship between God and creature.
The first cause, God, and his creature, cabbages, men, etc., are
^Mclntyre, "Analogy," op. cit., p. 19.
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directly related by the relation of creation which "cuts horizontally
across the analogy of proportionality with an analogy of attribution."
The two sides of the formula are not equal but neither are they
completely dissimilar. When the analogates are God and his creatures,
the analogy is attribution unius ad alteruro. When the analogates are
both creatures, the analogy is the analogy of attribution duoruni ad
tertlum with each of the analogates being involved in the analogy
of attribution unius ad alternium with God. The tight interlocking
of attribution and proportionality provides a satisfactory way of
describing the relationship between God and world. Proportionality
insures that God possesses the attribute formally, not just virtually;
94
attribution avoids the agnosticism possible in proportionality.
Mascall is not the only one rethinking the question of analogy.
Mondin and Klubertanz both propose thorough re-classification of
95
analogy, but neither has much sympathy for the other's proposal. The
situation is so unsettled that continued discussion is inevitable. The
very nature of the subject, human discussion of divine matters, implies
the difficulty of claiming finality for any one position.
ANALOGY IN PROCESS THOUGHT
Since process theology stands in the tradition of natural theo-
95
logy, we should expect considerable comment pertaining to the subject
9^Mascall, Existence and Analogy, op. cit., p. 113.
95
See the concluding chapters of these author's books (op. cit.)
for their proposals.
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Note the titles of two major works in this field, Hartshorne's
A Natural Theology for Our Time, and Cobb's A Christian Natural Theology.
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of analogy. Hartshorne reflects this concern with language when he says:
Let us suppose • . • that there are necessary meta¬
physical truths in language, with its basis in everyday
communication, equipped to express such truths? If there
were no difficulty in expressing metaphysical necessities,
would not more agreement have long ago been reached? If
there is no possibility of expressing them, would the
attempt have been persisted in so long by so many superior
intellects?
k"
He laments that regretably the commonest notion today seems to be that
metaphysical assertions are "confused or inconsistent applications of
98
words which in more normal applications, made good sense." Further¬
more, there is the widespread belief that there is no genuine logic of
metaphysical concepts nor rules for talking metaphysically. Process
99
thinkers do, however, have rules and try both to state and obey then.
Whitehead and Analogical Predication
Nowhere does Whitehead present an explicit statement about
analogy and whether or not he is speaking analogically when he uses
terms like 'creator' and 'creature' with reference both to God and
to other entities. It appears that analogy is a subject which never
commanded his attention. This is not suprising wheal we realize
that his concerns were not primarily theological. Whitehead does
mention the symbolic nature of all language, 1(^0but this is not
applied to speaking of God and others using common predicates. Be
97
Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. cit..
p. 139.
98 99
Ibid. Ibid., p. 158.
100Alfred North Whitehead, Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect.
(New York: Capricorn Books, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1949), pp. 10-13.
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this as It may, he is speaking analogically. It is possible to see
what position is implicit in Whitehead's thinking at least in regard
to the notions of creation and creativity.
As you may recall, Whitehead says that creativity is the
"universal of universals." It has ultimatlc status in reality and
God and all other entities are in its grasp.This subordination
of God to creativity becomes quite apparent when Whitehead clarifies
the function of the initial aim which God provides each creature. Since
this is the beginning of the creative process for each entity, he
says God could be thought of as "the creator of each temporal actual
entity," but he hastens to add:
... this phrase is apt to be misleading by its
suggestion that the ultimate creativity of the universe
is to be ascribed to God's volition. The true meta¬
physical position is that God is the aboriginal instance
of this creativity, and is, therefore, the aboriginal
condition which qualifies its action. It is the function
of actuality to characterize creativity, and God is the
eternal primordial character • • • . There is no
meaning to 'God' apart from the creativity.
God's creating and the creating of others exemplifies the
ultimate creativity which prevades the universe. Both are in¬
stances of it, but neither is seen as possessing the characteristic
in a definitive way. Even though creativity per se is "pure activity"
and does not fit into any of Whitehead* s categories of existence as
well as being dependent on specific instances in the actual world
"^^See above, p. 183ff.
10^Whiteheaa, Process and Reality, op. cit.. p. 344. Also see
page 374 for a similar statement.
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for its actuality, it still transcends any of these instances. Any
comparison, then, between divine and non-divine creativity is analogy
duorum ad tertlum. This is the type of analogy that exists between two
entities because of the relationship each bears to a third entity. In
Whitehead's thinking, both God and others are said to be creators
because of their exemplification of transcendent creativity.
With reference to characteristics predicated of both God and
others, analogy duorum ad tertlum has not been accepted by any of the
theologians cited earlier, either from the Roman or the Reformed
103
traditions. This sort of analogical predication is unanimously
viewed as being inapplicable when one of the analogates is God.
From a theological perspective, the Whiteheading understanding of
creativity does not give us an adequate or acceptable analogy for
discussing the creativity of God and other entitles. Because Creativity
rather than God, is seen as being the ultimate principle of existence,
Mascall echos Susan Stebbing's comment that "Professor Whitehead's
indefensible use of language becomes nothing short of scandalous
104
when he speaks of 'God.'"
Elsewhere Mascall points out that the uniqueness of God's
creative act is destroyed and an improper analogy is established be¬
tween God and the world. Creativity is not primarily and perfectly
God's activity in the world, but a substitute for it. Whiteheadian
creativity is an inherent general principle in all reality of which
103
See above, pp. 308-09.
104Mascall, The Openness of Being, op. cit.. p. 161
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God is but one instance, even though the supreme instance. The ab¬
solute superiority of God in relationship to the cosmos, is denied,
God is the "chief exemplification" of creativity, the creator par
excellence, but creativity is not his creativity. Being the "chief
exemplification" of creativity is not adequate to insure God the place
he holds in traditional theology. Creativity is the ultimate factor
in the creative process? God and other entities simply condition it,
God is not regarded as possessing creativity fully and completely.
He is not the source of creativity nor is creativity as it exists
in others, to be regarded as his gift to them, his creation. Crea¬
tures do not participate in an attribute which properly belongs to
God, but both the creature and God participate in a perfection that
transcends them both. This, as we have seen, can lead to univocal
105
predication. Such is a real danger in Whitehead's thought.
As we have seen, it is not only Whitehead's critics but also
his disciples who cannot accept his subordination of God to creat¬
ivity. We noted previously Hartshorne's and Cobb's departure from
Whitehead by their inversion of Whitehead's priorities and their in¬
sistence that God cannot be conceived as a product of an instance
X0€)
of creativity, only as 'Creativity itself.' In so doing, they insist
that in process thought creativity is an analogical concept occupying
the same place in their thinking as being does in Aquinas. Because of
105
Mascall, Christian Theology and Natural Science, op. clt.,
p. 158.
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this, we find Hartshorne dealing extensively with language and analogical
107
predication.
Hartshorne's Understanding of Analogy
Hartshorne basically agrees with Wittgenstein that theology is
grammar. He would go further, though, and apply this notion to meta¬
physics as well. Theology and metaphysics are grammatical subjects
because they answer questions like, "How do we talk sense rather than
nonsense?" or, "How can we be clear and consistent rather than confused
108
and inconsistant?" A major problem with these two disciplines is
that both have been guilty of using bad grammar. Positivism, therefore,
is partially justified in holding that the idea of God is a mere con-
109
fusion or absurdity. Positivism should not claim, as it does, that
any idea of God must be nonsense. That previous attempts at speaking
clearly about hira have proved deficient, does not condemn any future
107
Like Aquinas and others, Hartshorne's thinking is not
totally consistent from his earliest to his latest writing, but it
does display remarkable agreement. Our basic analysis, however,
will be taken from his later writings, particularly Creative Synthesis
and Philosophic Method, where he provides his most complete dis¬
cussions of these topics.
X08
Hartshome, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method,
op. clt., p. 131.
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Hartshorne often makes this comment with specific reference
to Aquinas' analogy between divine and human knowledge which, he feels,
illustrates this confusion. Even though Thomas thinks he has estab¬
lished analogical similarity, it is in fact, an analogy which inverts
the two terms. Human knowledge is conformed to its object; divine
knowledge conforms the objects it knows to itself. Knowledge is an
extrinsic relationship for God, an intrinsic relationship for other
knowers. It, therefore, has no clear meaning since it means directly
opposite things. See, Philosophers Speak of God, op. clt., pp. 119ff;
The Divine Relativity, op. cit., pp. 7, 119; and Man's Vision of God,
op. cit., p. 240.
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attempt, particularly if such an atterrpt is based on a radical de¬
parture from the traditional expressions. Because process thought
embodies such a departure in its dipolar concept of deity, it claims
to be capable of speaking clearly and consistently about God, the world,
and the relationship existing between them.113 Our purpose now is to
see how Hartshorne justifies this claim by analyzing the way in which
he talks of God, especially the way he speaks about God analogically.
Hartshorne's classification of theological language. Hart¬
shorne believes that theology uses three types of terms when speaking
about God. It Is crucial, he believes, to distinguish between thorn.
They are: (a) plainly symbolic terms; <b) plainly literal terms; and
(c) problematic terms (i.e. those "which may be literal if and in so
far as we have religious intuition.")111 Each of these classifications
needs some definition and description.
Even though he rejects the idea that all talk of God is
symbolic, Hartshorne Insists that we can and do make some legitimately
Hartshorne says that the process understanding of God was
never conceived or much less denied by Kant's and Hume's refutations
of "all" natural theology. A Natural Theology for Our Time, op. cit.,
p. 22. See also, Man's Vision of God. Chapter 1.
111Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method,
op. cit., p. 155. In The Divine Relativity, written before Creative
Synthesis and Philosophic Method, Hartshorne mentions only two types
of terms—metaphorical and literal, the latter including those he
later designates as problematic. He confesses dissatisfaction with
this classification and that he may be using these terms in a non-
metaphorical and non-literal sense. He asks to be shown how to put
his case more precisely. This, I think, he has done for himself in
the three-fold classification cited above. As it seems to be the
classification which most satisfactorily expresses his thought, it is




symbolic statements about God. These statements include our referring
to him as a shepherd, a ruler, a potter, a high tower, a rock, a king,
etc. What makes these statements symbolic is that the terms used refer
to quite specific things found within the natural world. It is, for
example, clear What shepherds are—especially within a biblical frame
of reference, there are almost unlimited alternatives to them. Not-a-
shepherd is a distinction from everything but a shepherd and covers a
vast number of possibilities. Were we to contend that God was literally
a shepherd, we would be severely restricting his freedom to be other than
a shepherd. God cannot, therefore, be identified with any specific
entity. Shepherd, when applied to God, symbolizes something about God,
or more precisely, about God* s relationship to persons. Though not
literally a shepherd, there is something in God's nature which can be
expressed by the use of this term. Symbolic terms (also called
metaphors) point to God but do not describe him. To talk of God in
symbolic terms "somehow makes us aware of him, rather as poetry and
113
art make us aware of things." In religious practice, metaphors
are necessary "in order to move the imaginations and hearts of men,"
but in theology, where this is not relevant, there is no need for
114
metaphor. Symbolic language, therefore, has a religious and not a
theological function.
112 113
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Hartshorne suggests that Berth's dialectical language is
symbolic and should not be regarded as making any logical or theologically
meaningful statements about God. See Man's Vision of God, op. clt.
p. 12.
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While some terms merely symbolize God and his relationship to
man, others describe him quite literallyi. These are abstract terms
like infinite and finite, absolute and relative. Unlike symbolic
terms, there is not an infinity of alternatives to them. For instance,
"if God is not literally finite and relatl.e, then he is literally
and exclusively infinite and absolute, for here there is no third
116
possibility," There is no symbolic reference at all in abstract
statements. The contrast between symbolic and literal speaking is
illustrated in this way:
That which is 'not literally a shepherd' may yet have
all sorts of resentences to, as well as differences from
a shepherd. But that which is not literally 'in some de¬
gree and quality made what it is by contingent relations,'
i,e« relative, can only be something which is by no degree
so constituted, i.e. it must be quite literally and en¬
tirely absolute.11
Literal terms differ totally from symbolic ones. The latter,
as we have said, are very specific referring to a particular reality.
The former are abstract and applicable to a large section of reality.
There is only one directly opposed, contrasting term. While God
could be a myriad of things other than a shepherd, he could only
be one thing, absolute, if he were not relative. Even if we regard
God as super-relative, as Hartshorne does, this does not modify
this idea. Super-relativity is just the eminent form of an en¬
tirely literal relativity. There is nothing symbolic about it.
Super-relativity is simply the specific form of God's relativity.
116




Statements about God which employ terms that properly describe
other specific, concrete states of reality, are to be regarded as
symbolic. Statements which employ abstract and universal terms are
to be regarded as literal. There are, however, some statements which
fit neither category, being neither unambiguously literal nor un¬
ambiguously metaphorical. These are problematical terms. Because
they imply a relationship to the mind, Hartshorne also calls them
•psychical' terms and includes among then knowledge, love and will.
What makes these terms problematic is that we generally think
of then as denoting human states or functions. Therefore, we might
think of then as being symbolic. They are not, however, nearly as
narrowly specific as symbolic terms. For example, 'to know' has a
much wider field of reference than 'to be a shepherd.' The question
is just how wide a field of reference do psychical terms have—how
far do they go beyond a specifically human application. Hartshorne
admits that this is not an easy question to answer, but he believes
"that there is a legitimate, broadest possible meaning for psychical
terms which is applicable to all individuals whatever, from atoms to
, ., ,,118deity."
When expanded this far, instead of sounding like specific,
symbolic terms, they begin to sound like universal, literal terms.
There is, however, a crucial difference here. They are not ab¬
stractions since they exist only in their specific, individual




Only concrete realities can do these things. Because they are ab¬
stractions, literal statements do not vary in meaning as they are
applied to one level of reality or another. Because they are real
only in concrete instances, the meaning of psychical statements does
vary. For example, to be relative is sinply and literally that—no
more, no less, no other. But as regards to know, to feel, to re¬
member, there are qualitative differences which are not easily
covered by "empty terms" like 'way' or 'degree.'119
Hartshome illustrates this point by discussing the term
"knowledge." Knowledge must not be regarded as an abstraction, for
God does not know the same way as man knows, any more than a man
knows in the same way a dog or an atom may be said to know. The
knower determines the nature of his knowledge. Abstract terms like,
for example, 'relative* are insensitive to the differences between
the various levels of reality. Psychical terms like, 'knowledge'
are not. On the other hand, God's knowledge is not just metaphorical
for it is genuine knowledge, to be exact, the most genuine knowledge
there is. "To know" should mean "having conclusive evidence so that
there is no possibility of error." Only God's knowledge perfectly
exemplifies this definition. All creaturaly knowledge is vastly in¬
ferior knowledge.1^0
Hartshorne chooses to identify this third category, the
psychical language we use to describe God, with the traditional
120
Ibid., pp. 155-56. This point is discussed in greater
detail later on.
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category of analogy. In so doing he invites a comparison of his views
with the traditional conceptualizations. Before this can happen,
though, we must set out his own views in greater detail.
Hartshome* s Use of Analogy
As implied in the preceding paragraphs, process thought uses
analogical concepts as it engages in the general attempt of all meta¬
physics, to discover the basic ideas which apply to all reality. It
is through analogy that these basic ideas are formulated and expressed.
Hartshorne is well aware that in philosophical circles today the pre-
/
valar.c idea is that all metaphysical assertions—especially analogies-
are "confused or inconsistent applications of words which in more
121
normal application make good sense." Hartshome would agree that
this is true about a great many of such assertions made in the past,
but the fault lies with the particular assertions and not with the
method as such. If analogies are properly constituted, there is no
reason why they cannot convey necessary metaphysical truths.
The problem in establishing analogies lies with the adequacy
of everyday language to express universal ideas. Everyday language
has a built-in anthropomorphic bias. Our language, because it is our
language, is mostly concerned with ourselves and our own experience,
with human purpose and feeling, not with universal experience. Meta¬
physics attempts to transcend this limitation by establishing def¬




is always something slightly abnormal about metaphysical language.
It is this abnormality which may have kept agreement from being reached
before now, but the difficulty in forming metaphysical assertions is
gramatical, not factual.
Since human terms acquire their meanings through human ex¬
perience, we cannot avoid a certain amount of anthropomorphism as we
use human language to discuss non-human things. Anthropomorphisms
have in the past been one horn of a dilemma. Either we try to under¬
stand things in terms of our own experience and nature and, thereby,
risk failing to see their difference from us, or else we try to in¬
terpret than in ways totally alien to our experience and nature and
discover that this is the same as having no idea of than at all.
The only clear alternative to some degree of anthropomorphism is the
notion of an absolutely unknowable ' thing-ir>-itself.' Hartshome puts
the argument in favor of an anthropomorphic element in language by
sayings
What things are for us, what we can get out of them,
do with them, enjoy in the experiences of them, that we
can know. Also what they may be as analogous to ourselves,
like us, knowing, willing, loving beings—though perhaps
less or more knowing, willing less or more powerfully,
loving less or more comprehensively—all this we can
conceive.123
Whether we can conceive much else about than, Hartshome goes on
to point out, is doubtful. Analogical conceptualization and pred¬




Hartshome, Man's Vision of God, op. cit.. p. 68.
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Process analogies are contrasts based on similarity and dis¬
similarity. The analogues in question possess a common attribute
or participate in a common characteristic, but they possess it or
participate in it in diverse ways. With regard to similarity, we
cannot say that when a common term is used with both a divine and a
human reference, that the two uses of the term have no continuity
of meaning. There must be some relationship between divine and
human goodness or else we are talking nonsense when we call both God
and man good. As regards dissimilarity, we cannot claim that goodness
means exactly the same thing when we call God and man good. If it
did, it would be pointless to speak of divine and human goodness.
'There would just be goodness.
Both similarity and dissimilarity are indispensable to
analogical comparison. This is obviously true of dissimilarity, but
according to Hartshome,
. . . where there are no definite common aspects, there
are no definite contrasts either. or instance, if God in
no sense has magnitude or parts thai he cannot be contrasted
as quantitatively infinite rather than finite; and if he
also has no common qualities with creatures, then he cannot
be contrasted with than as, in a different sense, qualita¬
tively infinite either.
To return to the illustration »good,' if we say that God is
supremely good, thai the least that we are saying is that he is good.
And if we go further to say that he is goodness itself, thai good¬
ness must have some meaning in common with its other uses or else it
is unintelligible. There can be no contrast without continuity, no
124Ibid., p. 140.
dissimilarity without similarity. Although metaphysics seeks ideas
which can apply to all things, it does not seek to eliminate the con-
125
trasts that can exist within the common ideas.
The point scarcely needs repeating. To speak clearly when one
predicates a term with reference to both God and man, there must be
a genuine continuity of meaning between the two uses of the term. Such
a continuity in no way denies radically diverse participation in or
exemplification of the term. To insure that this is understood, we
should point out what Hartshorne often takes for granted, that it is
metaphysical similarity he is describing. The similarity is conceptual
only. The diversity occurs in the actualization.
In accordance with classical metaphysics, Hartshorne is ob¬
viously trying to make his way past the dangers of univocity and
equivocity. While he recognizes that others have been doing the same
thing, he feels that they have done better in avoiding the former than
the latter. He says quite pointedly that the "line between equivocal
meanings and the so-called 'analogical' ones is not so well-drawn in
orthodox systems that it can be seen at all by most of us who are
126
not adherents of such systems." For example, there seems to be
no difference between equivocity and analogy when theologians contend
that only God or other entities literally possess a particular
attribute. Tillich's assertion that only creatures literally exist
126
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372
and that God is beyond the category of being, is an example of this*
To say that God is not 'a being' but rather 'being itself' only compounds
the problem. Can 'being itself' be other than being? If 'being itself'
127
is not an instance of being, then the phrase Is simply bad grammar.
Similarily, to say with some theologians that only God truly (i<e.
literally) creates, says nothing intelligible about God since the
creator can have no other references. We might as well not use the
123
word at all. There must be some real relationship between the divine
and non-divine predication of a common term. Hartshorne goes as far as
to say, "If there Is in no sense any univocal meaning then theology is
JL29
pure sophistry.
This "real relationship" of which Hartshorne speaks, is expressed
by him in this way:
Whatever is good in the creation is, in superior or
eminent fashion, 'analogically not univocally' the property
127
Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, op. cit., p. 119.
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Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method,
op. cit.. p. 140. Elsewhere, Hartshorne is equally as hard on Tillich.
He says that Tillich's doctrine of the symbolic character of all
theological language is a concession to negative theology and, there¬
fore, can be in the same way as saying nothing at all about God. He
questions whether this is a reflection of genuine humility or "un¬
witting blasphemy" to deny that God possesses any intelligible
attributes. His attack on negative theology is scathing. "We dare
not forbid God to sustain relations, to accept the definiteness that
comes through limits, to respond to the creatures and thus to be in¬
fluenced by them .... Is this modesty or is it monstrous pre¬
sumption? Have we this veto power upon divinity? Not to sustain
relationships, not to respond sensitively to the existence of others
is to be wooden, stupid and an utterly empty abstraction • • • • The
modesty of negative theology is highly suspect. It puts an infinite
human veto upon the wealth of the divine life, cutting it off from
all but the purely abstract." Op. cit.. pp. 151, 153.
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of God. Thus, knowledge, purpose, life, love, joy are
deficiently present in us, eminently and analogically
present in God. It is only in this manner that the idea
of God acquires any positive meaning controllable bv
analysis, yet free from anthropomorphic crudities.1^0
He expands and illustrates what this means by saying:
God can be conceived as the infinite degree—or such
form of maximal!ty as is possible—of what is applicable
in finite degree to man, and man as the finite degree of
whatever variable are infinitely applicable to God. For
instance, God is not unchanging while man changes, but
God changes in a manner as different from human change
as is possible while yet being properly called change.
If change is varied as much as possible between the two,
while yet retaining its generic identity as change, then
both unity and diversity in the relationship will be
provided for.*31
What both these statements make clear is that when Hartshorne
predicates a common attribute both of God and other entities, the
analogy established between the two is that of God possessing the
attribute in an eminent, perfect way and the creature possessing it
in a deficient, imperfect way.
The question immediately comes to mind, How do we come to
our understanding of the meaning of the common term? Do we start
with our awareness of ourselves and go up from there, amplifying a
creaturely attribute until it has divine dimensions, or do we start
with God's revelation of himself and from there work our way down to
creaturely connotations? Hartshorne believes that both procedures
are at work. Our awareness of God is not just an extension of our
130
Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, op. clt., p. 77
131
Hartshome, Man's Vision of God, op, clt.. p. 220.
374
awareness of ourselves even though this is involved. Our awareness of
ourselves is not just a drastic delegation of our awareness of God.
Both are indispensable elements of each other. The divine-human con¬
trast is the basis of all human thought and talk, whether it be of
132
God or of persons.
Again we may look to Hartshorne's predication of the word
'know' as an example. He asks, "Does our concept of ♦know* come
merely from extra-human experience, analogically extended to what is
below and above the human, or does the concept come partly from re¬
ligious experience, from some dim but direct awareness of deity?"
He answers by saying:
I really believe that we know what 'knowledge' is
partly by knowing God, and that though it is true that
we form our experience of divine knowledge by analogical
extension from our human knowledge, this is not the whole
truth, the other side of the matter being that we form our
idea of human knowledge.by exploiting the intuition ...
which we have of God.
By this method we know what 'know' ought to mean. As we said earlier,
it means having conclusive evidence so as to exclude a possibility of
error. This obviously would be perfect knowledge, or omniscience, and
defines what God's knowledge is. Our knowledge is at best frag¬
mentary and incomplete. It is impossible to understand fully the
meaning of terms within man's experience alone. Only God's ex¬
perience is complete. His experience defines what knowing is. He
"^^Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method,





alone knows. The contrast between divine and non-divine knowledge
is one of breadth and depth. With regard to the breadth of God's
knowledge, it is perfect because he knows all entities. Nothing es¬
capes his knowing it. He knows all that can possibly be known. Non-
divine knowledge lias far less scope because only a few things are
known by any entity. Likewise, as concerns depth, he knows all
entities intimately. There is nothing about them that escapes his
knowing. Even at its best, non-divine knowledge is superficial. We
never know anything or anyone completely.
This is true of all metaphysical categories for they es-
135
sentially refer, with whatever meaning they have, directly to God.
Love is another example of this. We are justified in saying that we
love, but how perfect is our love? We are at best apathetic toward
most things and even the love we have for the few things we do love,
is diminished by our own feelings of envy, fear, jealousy, irritation.
Only God loves "without any distorting antipathies or blind spots of
X36
mere indifference." God*s love is the norm for human love. We do
not come to our understanding of this just by negating all the limi¬
tations of creaturely love and thai inferring God's love. Rather,
we can come to know God's love by our direct, even though imperfect,
experieica of that love, an experience provided us through the receiving
of initial aims for each moment of our lives.
134
Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, op. clt., p. 36.
135
Hartshorne, "Tilllch's Doctrine of God," op. clt., p. 191.
136
Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method,
op« ox1., p. 156.
376
With regard to God's eminent possession of an attribute, it is
of extreme importance to Hartshorne that he stress God's not being a
"mere case under the categories, nor yet a mere exception to them" He
137
is the categories in their "pure or unqualified meaning. The
difference between God's manifestation of the categories and non-
divine manifestation is an "essential" one, a "difference in principle,
not merely in degree." Hartshorne calls this 'categorical supremacy.'
It is this "superiority in principle" which means that God and he alone
can be literally described by an attribute, for "God's participation in
attributes is not a matter of degree but of sheer possession—complete
and universal possession. The attributes of God are in themselves the
138
generic forms of the attributes."
Hartshorne's understanding of God's having categorical supremacy
differs from Whitehead's understanding of God being the "supreme in¬
stance" or "chief exemplification" of a category at precisely this point.
For Hartshorne, God's eminence is having the generic form of the at¬
tribute; for Whitehead the generic form is beyond God. This is
particularly true with reference to creativity, and we shall look at
this presently. Before doing so, however, there is one additional
issue to be mentioned briefly.
Earlier we discussed God's dipolarity, his 'dual transcend-
139ence.1 At this time, we mentioned that God's dipolarity was
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supreme dlpolarity and that he surpasses every other instance of dipo-
larity and that he surpasses every other instance of dipolarity in
every aspect of both his poles. Hartshoxne, continuing his fight
against the 'monopolar prejudice,' insists that analogies be permitted
with attributes belonging to both God's poles and not just one pole.
He says:
God is universal cause, creative of everything whatever;
but as reality itself, God is likewise universal effect, in¬
fluenced by everything whatever. It is the universality, the
coincidence with reality in its polar aspects which makes God
supreme.
He goes so far as to say that the "real trouble" with an analogy in
the past has been "in the idolatry of infinity, being, cause, and
absoluteness, accepted as substitutes for the divine unity of the
contraries, finite-infinite, being-creativity, cause-effect, absolute-
141
relational, being as such and a_ being." We are, therefore, justified
in setting up analogies which involve both aspects of God's dipolarity.
Two conspicuous illustrations of this, which we have already
142
discussed, are the mind-body analogy and the social analogy. Hart-
shorne indicates that these two analogies used together gives an
excellent model for understanding God's relationship to the world.
The mind-body analogy expresses the immediacy of that relationship but
does not say anything about the nature of that relationship. The
social relationship describes this by indicating that it is not a re¬
lationship of mind to matter only, but a relationship oi adnd to mind
140
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143
as well. Harfcshome also mentions the importance of the 'person-
analogy' as an essential trait for religion. "Man is said to be
created in the divine image. Without this analogy religion loses
an essential trait • • • • There can be no analogy between persons
and something wholly absolute, self-sufficient, infinite, or im-
144
mutable."
The 'Analogy of Creativity'
At the basis of Thornist analogy, as we saw, is the notion
145
of analoqia entis—the analogy of being. The basic relation¬
ship between God and other entities is that they have being. Be¬
cause of this fundamental relationship, other relationships exist
between then. The analoqia entis is an analogy of intrinsic de¬
nomination. Both God and other entities possess being with God,
possessing it essentially and other entities possessing it by
participation which implies possessing it in a deficient or limited
way. In the analoqia entis God is always the prime analogate, so the
analogy is always unium ad alternum. The analoqia entis is es¬
tablished by God's creative act wherein he causes other entities to
have their being according to the principle omne aqens agit simile
sibi. This being is not, however, a carbon copy of his being.
Although not identical to his being, the being he gives is, nonethe¬
less, genuine being.
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Hartshorne*s discussion of creativity parallels what Thomas
says about being. We have already shown how 'becoming* in process
146
thought, occupies the same place as 'being' does in Thomism. We
noted Hartshorne's insistence that creativity be regarded as an
analogical concept functioning in process thought the same way that
147
being functions in 'fhomist thinking. We went further to clarify
that becoming could also be spoken of as creating and that God must
be regarded as 'Creativity itself in process thinking just as he is
148
regarded as 'Being itself' in Thomist thought. All other creativity
is dependent on and derivative from divine creativity. Are we
not, therefore, justified, in saying that Hartshorne's basic analogy
is an 'analogy of creativity'7 Divine creativity is the generic
form of creativity. It defines what creativity really is, and there
is no creativity transcending divine creativity. This creativity
is given to other creatures through God's creative act. Other entities
then possess the creativity appropriate for their own self-creative
process. Their creativity is not equal nor identical to divine
creativity, but it is authentically creativity because it does enable
them to be self-creators. This creativity is truly God's gift of
becoming.' God is the cause, the giver of creativity to others, and
it is an appropriate gift because, as Creativity itself, he produces
something in creatures similar to himself. Both God and other-
creatures can properly and analogically be called creator-creatures.
146
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"All actualities are self-created creatures. Creativity is analogical,
149
not just univocal, in that it is both divine and non-divine."
We took note earlier of the Thomists' inability to agree among
themselves as to whether the analoaia entls was an analogy of intrin¬
sic attribution or proportionality. It would be every bit as difficult
to decide this with reference to Hartshorne's analogy of creativity
for the same tension is there.
Those in the Thomist tradition who advocate proportionality
do so on the basis that as analogy of relations, it guarantees the
ontological discontinuity between God and other entities. This, as
we have seen repeatedly, is a major emphasis with Hartshome. At
the risk of being redundant, we provide yet another statement il¬
lustrating this}
Some will say that ... I (Hartshome) have over¬
looked the infinite gulf between 'God and the creatures.
But not so. Between the finite-infinite individual and
the merely finite individuals, there is a gap in nature
which is literally infinite. And between the divine
cause-effect which influences and is influenced by
every reality, and ordinary cause-effect which, since
they begin to be at a certain stage of the creative
advance of existence, are exclusively causes of what
comes after, and which also, since they must die at a
later stage, will be exclusively effects of what came
before, there is again a doubly infinite distinction.
God both infinitely preceds and infinitely outlasts
every other individual so that all are influenced by
and also influence his actuality.
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Hartshorne Is consistently careful in his speaking to indicate that
in his comparisons one thing is "like" another. This likeness
consists in the adherence to a model, not in any ontological similarity.
The life of a cabbage is not the same as the life of God except both
can be described by the model of creative synthesis.
On the other hand, Hartshorne has insisted on a "certain
univocity" in analogy, and this is what intrinsic attribution
provides. All analogates possess the analogue in question but in
a way appropriate to their nature. God and other entities are
genuinely creator-creatures. This term has a clear referent to
their self-creative synthesis. The superiority of the process
analogy of creativity is the precision with which the terms
creativity is used. As was noted, it is almost impossible with
some thinkers to establish any meaning when they say God is a
creator because of the vagueness of what the term could mean when
spoken of God. In process it simply means that he has his own
self-creative process and has the generic form of that process,
the process "from which everything is abstracted or within which
15X
everything that is bounded has its limits.
In light of the fact that God»s creativity is the generic
form of creativity and his self-creative synthesis is appropriate
for this and that all other entities have self-creative synthesis
which cure appropriate to their nature, it is all but impossible to
choose between proportionality and intrinsic attribution. Fortunately
151
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such a decision does not have to be made for there is a way of
combining them.
Our conclusion about the proper understanding of the analogia
entis was that it had to be regarded as more fluid and flexible than
many interpreters would want and that no one analogy was adequate to
deal with the complexity of our understanding of the relationship
between the divine and non-divine. The same conclusion should be
reached about the analogy of creativity. There is no one correct way
to read it. We need to find a model which combines the two under¬
standings of analogy if we are to read the analogy of creativity
properly. This we have already found in Mascall's model.
In this model the analogy between God and all others is the
analogy of proportionality combined with the analogy of attribution
unium ad alterum. The analogy between entities other than God is
the analogy of proportionality combined with the analogy of at¬
tribution duorum ad tertium. It is God's creative act which
establishes the analogies between him and all other entities. The
analogy of creativity will read that God creates the creativity of
other creator-creatures and thus creates them a relationship with
himself, wherein their creativity is genuine but radically different
from his. The creativity of all entities other than God can be
compared only in light of the divine creativity which utterly trans¬
cends all other forms. The importance of God's creative act must
be stressed again. He creates the creature's creativity. Because
he is Creativity itself, the creativity he creates resembles his
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creativity but is not identical to it. There is always the sharp,
decisive contrast between the perfect, supreme, generic form of
creativity and the deficient, derivative, non-generic forms. God's
creativity is appropriate for his being God; all other entities'
creativity is appropriate for their being what God creates than to
become.
The 'Analogy of Creativity' and the 'Analoqia Fidel'
We have been comparing Hartshornds concept and use of
analogy with those of the Thomists. Even though there is a funda¬
mental difference as to what should be the basic analogy (being or
creativity), there is considerable compatibility. This is not the
case, however, when we compare Hartshorne's views with those of the
152
Reformed tradition, particularly those of Karl Barth.
In spite of an agreement in Intent to avoid univoclty and
equivocity (or parity and disparity, as Barth calls then), the in-
compatability is basic. For Hartshorne, as he has been interpreted
here, the fundamental analogy is the analogy of creativity. For
Barth, it is the analogy of faith. This indicates that the fundamental
analogical relationship between God and other entitles is estab¬
lished in completely different ways. Hartshome sees it happening
through God's creativity, wherein he gives others their crea¬
tivity. Barth regards it as part of God's redemptive act,
being established solely by the grace of God. Hartshorne finds
it possible for persons to know something of God's creativity
See above, page 340 ff.
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through the things he creates, the self-creative creatures. Barth
believes that all knowledge of God comes through divine revelation.
While both (in practice if not in theory with respect to Barth) do
understand their analogies as expressing relationships and, thereby,
qualifying to be called analogies of proportionality, they do not
agree as to the nature of the attribution involved. For Hartshorne,
it is intrinsic. All entities are genuinely creator-creatures. For
Barth, all comparisons are extrinsic. The attribute is only imputed
to the creature and belongs properly only to God. Hartshorne would
insist that God is the generic form of all his attributes, but this
does not mean that other entities cannot possess these attributes.
Barth would insist that the attributes can in no way belong to the
creature other than by God's allowing the terms to be used of the
creature. While Hartshorne feels that his analogical predication
gives a clear understanding of what 'creator' and 'creature' mean
when predicated of God, Barth insists that even though revelation
is an unveiling, it is also a veiling and the truth of God can
only be expressed in a hidden form. Finally, and perhaps of most
importance, Barth could not accept Hartshorne's concept of a dually
transcendent God; therefore, analogies embracing both aspects of
God's dipolarity, would not be formulated. To think of God as a
creator-creature, even the creator-creature would be impossible for
Barth.
The gap between the analogia fidel and the analogy of creativity
is probably too wide to be bridged. Barth's hostility toward metaphysics
385
in general would not be overcome by Hartshorne's particular defense
of it. Hartshorne's refusal to rely completely on revelation for
our knowledge of God has not been changed by his reading of Earth.
Furthermore, Earth emphatically rejects Quenstedt's interpretation of
the analoqia entis (intrinsic attribution) because it reduces "the
infinite qualitative difference" between God and man, to a quanti¬
tative one. He would most assuredly be unconvinced that Hartshorne
has not done this as well. The two emphasize the contrasting aspects
of analogy. For Earth emphasizing disparity between God and all
else is most important; for Hartshorne emphasizing the similarity
predominates. Little vwuld be gained, therefore, by manipulating
the thinking of these two men so some agreement could be found. Any
unity, other than their mutual desire to speak analogically, would be
contrived.
Conclusion
Hartshorne feels that his conceptualization and use of
analogy is superior to others because of its clarity. He is careful
to insure that terms predicated of divine and non-divine actuality are
comprehensible in both instances. With regard to creativity, we know
what it means to be self-created creatures for we have the model
of creative synthesis to explain this. God is categorically supreme
because his self-creative process is the generic form of creative
synthesis. He is Creativity itself. Other actualities are instances
of creativity because God chooses to create them as self-creators.
Hartshorne makes every effort to maintain balance between
speaking univocally or equivocally, but since he considers the latter
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as being the greater problem in thinking of others, he lays stress
on the continuity of meaning. It is possible therefore, to feel that
he may have tipped the scales too far toward univocity. That is not
this author's opinion, however. While Hartbhorne's analogy of
creativity on the one hand is intrinsic attribution, it is on the
other hand, proportionality. As Hartshorne is able to speak with
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